GAP.11

Programme

This page provides information on various events that take place during or in connection with GAP.11 like the keynote lectures, colloquia, section talks, book symposia and forums about issues in the profession, the Frege Prize Colloquium, the students congress, the new format “ask your philosopher!” and the satellite workshops. The conference will be accompanied by a public-philosophy programme. The print version of the conference reader can be found here. The last programme changes can be found here.

Monday, 12.09.22
Tuesday, 13.09.22
Wednesday, 14.09.22
Thursday, 15.09.22
Monday, 12.09.22
Tuesday, 13.09.22
Wednesday, 14.09.22
Thursday, 15.09.22
Monday, 12.09.22
Tuesday, 13.09.22
Wednesday, 14.09.22
Thursday, 15.09.22

Keynote Lectures & Panel “Scientific freedom and morality”

[In German] Opening lecture: Tim Henning (Mainz)

Monday, 12.09.2022, 18:00

Erkenntnis-Lecture: Serena Olsaretti (ICREA, Universitat Pompeu Fabra)

Tuesday, 13.09.2022, 17:00

Abschlussvortrag: John MacFarlane (Berkeley)

Thursday, 15.09.2022, 17:00

The opening lecture by Tim Henning will be followed by the Panel “Scientific freedom and morality”. More information will be provided soon.

Colloquia

During GAP.11, eight colloquia will be taking place:

Colloquium 1:
Public Access to Other Minds in Psychiatry

To adequately diagnose and treat patients, psychiatrists must be able to form justified beliefs about the mental states of patients. However, sometimes psychiatrists' beliefs or diagnoses might differ from the patient’s own beliefs about their minds. Typically, this occurs in cases of delusion and hallucination, but also in cases of anhedonia, alexithymia, or hypochondria. In psychiatric practice, it is often taken for granted that clinicians can doubt or even correct the patients' beliefs about the contents and happenings of their own minds. This seems to contradict the long-standing philosophical idea that introspection is a privileged way of accessing mental states, and subjects have epistemic authority regarding their own mind.

This conflict prompts the following questions: Is there a form of second or third-person access to someone's mental states that can trump first-person access? Can psychiatrists reach better (more accurate/more justified/more reliable) judgements about their patients' minds than the patients themselves? The Colloquium „Public access to other minds in psychiatry“ deals with this question by discussing methods and strategies scientists and clinicians have at their disposal to justify their diagnostic claims, as well as theoretical limitations that may undermine their judgments.

Time

Monday, 12.09.2022, 12:30 – 15:30

Guests

Lisa Bortolotti (Birmingham), Sascha Benjamin Fink (Magdeburg), Jacob Stegenga (Cambridge)

Organizers

Adrian Kind (Magdeburg), Chiara Caporuscio (Magdeburg)

Colloquium 2:
Epistemic Responsibility in the Context of Scientific Inquiry

Facing the risks from human-induced global warming, future AI, nuclear technology, etc., contemporary society has been characterized with a realization of the wide ranging impact of scientific developments and the responsibilities that come with them. Such responsibilities concern not only accountable research by individual scientists, but even more so accountable knowledge production by the given scientific communities.

In view of these socio-epistemic pressures, it has become urgent to shift the focus from traditional epistemological questions of epistemic justification and scientific knowledge to the process of scientific inquiry and norms that underlie it. In particular, it has become important to explicate what the epistemic responsibilities that underly scientific inquiry are. Despite a shared interest in the topic of epistemic responsibility, discussions in epistemology and those in philosophy of science have remained largely disconnected.

This colloquium aims to bridge this divide by bringing together experts working on epistemic responsibility from each of these philosophical domains, particularly focusing on the context of scientific inquiry.

Time

Monday, 12.09.2022, 12:30 – 15:30

Guests

Will Fleisher (North­eastern), Kristina Rolin (Tampere University), Dunja Šešelja (Ruhr University Bochum / Eindhoven University of Technology)

Organizer

Dunja Šešelja (Bochum/Eindhoven) for the GWP

Colloquium 3:
Besser Argumentieren! Was kann philosophische Bildung in Schulen und anderen öffentlichen Räumen beitragen?

Argumentative Fähigkeiten sind nicht nur für die akademische Philosophie von großer Bedeutung. Vielmehr spielen sie für zahlreiche Lebensbereiche eine wichtige Rolle: von der Alltagskommunikation und schulischen Lernprozessen über öffentliche Diskurse bis hin zur Rezeption, Entwicklung und Vermittlung von Erkenntnissen an den Universitäten. Das Kolloquium ist der Frage gewidmet, welchen Beitrag philosophische Bildung in Schulen, Universitäten und anderen öffentlichen Räumen zur Entwicklung dieser Fähigkeiten leisten kann.

Dazu werden drei Aspekte beleuchtet: Erstens geht es um die Reflektion konkreter Initiativen zur Förderung argumentativer Fähigkeiten im Kontext des Philosophieunterrichts. Welche bewährten Modelle gibt es hierfür und für die Kooperation mit anderen Fächern? Was sollten Lehrkräfte können? Wo liegen Herausforderungen und Grenzen?

Zweitens fragen wir, welche Bedeutung logische und rhetorische Kenntnisse und Fähigkeiten für das Argumentieren in unterschiedlichen Kontexten haben können. Dies geschieht ausgehend von einem hochschuldidaktischen Modell für die Vermittlung von Logik und Rhetorik im Rahmen des Philosophiestudiums.

Drittens geht es im Kolloquium um Ansätze zur Verbesserung öffentlicher Debatten. Wie sehen diese Ansätze aus, welche Erfahrungen gibt es mit ihnen, wo liegen Potenziale, aber auch Grenzen speziell der Argumentationstheorie dafür, zur Verbesserung öffentlicher Debatten beizutragen? Dies führt zugleich zurück zu der Frage, inwiefern philosophische Bildung an Schule und Universität einen Beitrag zur Förderung argumentativer Fähigkeiten leisten kann, der auch öffentliche Debatten bereichert.

Time

Monday, 12.09.2022, 12:30 – 15:30

Guests

Dominique Kuenzle (Zürich), David Lanius (Karlsruhe), Donata Romizi (Wien)

Organizers

Anne Burkard (Göttingen), David Löwenstein (Düsseldorf)

Colloquium 4:
Neo-Aristotelian Metaphysics: Hylomorphism and Its Ancient and Modern Alternatives

Neo-Aristotelian approaches are not only important and influential in ethics. Neo-Aristotelian interpretations are also relevant in contemporary metaphysics. The colloquium is devoted to neo-Aristotelian theories in analytic metaphysics.

The colloquium aims to bring together philosophers who take up neo-Aristotelian approaches in analytic philosophy and researchers who attempt to reconstruct and analyze Aristotle’s conceptions by applying theories from analytic philosophy.

The specific goal of the colloquium is to discuss hylomorphism as a metaphysical theory to understand and explain the constitution of particulars objects such as a bicycle, a mountain, or an octopus. The main focus of the colloquium will be on the metaphysics of artefacts. The ‘innocent definition’ of the hylomorphism allows a variety of answers, depending on how one answers the following bunch of questions: 1.) What is meant by form, what by matter, and what by the whole? (2.) What is meant by the three hylomorphistic relations, i.e. the relation between form and matter, the relation between form and the composite whole, and the relation between matter and composite whole?

The colloquium aims to discuss hylomorphism as a metaphysical theory for the interpretation of single objects in general and artefacts in particular, in dealing with different hylomorphistic approaches and with alternatives to hylomorphistic theories.

Time

Tuesday, 13.09.2022, 9:00 – 12:00

Guests

Kathrin Koslicki (Neuchâtel), Christian Pfeiffer (Toronto), Thomas Sattig (Tübingen)

Organizers

Béatrice Lienemann (Erlangen), Marilù Papandreou (Bergen)

Colloquium 5:
Conceptual Engineering and the Ivory Tower

Conceptual engineering is the method and the activity of assessing and improving our representational devices, in particular words and concepts. But does conceptual engineering have the potential to change representational devices of ordinary people or is it merely a topic for academics in their ivory tower? This colloquium aims to facilitate a debate on three related questions:

Answering these questions is of interest for philosophers, considering that much of the current appeal of conceptual engineering is contingent on whether it can actually have such significant effects on our individual and communal lives.

Time

Tuesday, 13.09.2022, 9:00 – 12:00

Guests

Mona Simion (Glasgow), Teresa Marques (Barcelona), Georg Brun (Bern)

Organizers

Robin Löhr (Bochum), Steffen Koch (Bielefeld)

Colloquium 6:
How Many People Should There Be? Philosophy and World Population Growth

Whether climate change, scarcity of resources, urbanization, securing pensions or the future of work -- hardly any public debate can do without reference to demographic issues and the scenario of a growing world population. The groundbreaking work of Derek Parfit has established the philosophical field of population ethics. It reflects such scenarios in a philosophically highly differentiated manner and tries to thereby contribute to finding good responses to urgent global challenges. One major challenge that has been much discussed in the Recent literature concerns the reasons we have, and the costs we should Be willing to bear, to secure the long-term survival of humanity and prevent human extinction.

Within a short period of time, population ethics has had a remarkable intra- and interdisciplinary effect. Trying to solve questions of population ethics has resulted in important and far-reaching developments in normative ethics. And it has a become a field where philosophy collaborates fruitfully with other sciences, especially economics.

This colloquium presents latest philosophical contributions to population ethics and discusses their relevance for publicly discussed questions.

Time

Thursday, 15.09.2022, 13:30 – 16:30

Guests

Elisabeth Finneron-Burns (Western Ontario), Johann Frick (Princeton), Gustaf Arrhenius (Stockholm)

Organizers

Tim Henning (Mainz), Christian Seidel (Karlsruhe)

Colloquium 7:
The Epistemology of Journalism

In times of massive epistemic pollution, disinformation, informational overload, and increasing social polarization, one would expect the epistemology of journalism to play a major role. For, without epistemically proper journalism the truthfulness of public opinion will severely suffer. Surprisingly, this field of applied epistemology remains to be widely neglected within current epistemology. Questions about the objectivity of the media, the epistemological appropriateness of specific journalistic formats, and the reliability of journalistic practices do not receive the attention they deserve.

The colloquium takes steps towards establishing the epistemology of journalism as a new field of philosophical research. In order to frame the complex of topics in terms of content, it will focus on the following question: Which specific epistemological problems exist for journalistic reporting in the face of massive public misinformation and ignorance? Under this guiding question, the following thematic complexes will be considered:

Time

Thursday, 15.09.2022, 13:30 – 16:30

Guests

Carrie Figdor (Iowa), Neil Levy (Macquary), Joseph Uscinski (Miami)

Organizers

Thomas Grundmann (Köln), Romy Jaster (HU Berlin)

Colloquium 8:
Krieg in der Ukraine: Philosophische Perspektiven auf eine po­litische Herausforderung

Die klassischen Themen der Friedens- und Kriegsethik – Theorien des gerechten Krieges, Pazifismus, Friedenssicherung – scheinen nicht gut geeignet, die Besonderheit der politi­schen und moralischen Herausforderungen zu erfassen, die sich angesichts des Krieges in der Ukraine stellen. Die normative Lage ist ungewöhnlich klar: Es handelt sich um einen völkerrechtswidrigen Angriffskrieg, der dem Angegriffenen gemäß der UN-Charta ein Recht auf militärische Selbstverteidigung verschafft. Auch über das Prinzip, dass Angegriffene Un­ter­­stützung verdienen, gibt es kaum Dissens. Weniger klar sind Art, Umfang und Ziele der gebotenen Hilfe – insbesondere angesichts epistemischer Defizite und der Unsicherheit der Folgenabschätzung.

Time

Tuesday, 13.09.2022, 9:30 – 12:00

Guests

Susanne Burri (Konstanz), Sergii Sekundant (Odessa), Johannes Müller-Salo (Hannover)

Organizers

GAP-Organisationskomitee

Book Symposia

[In German] Symposium 1: Susanne Boshammer (Osnabrück)

Die zweite Chance: Warum wir (nicht alles) verzeihen sollten, Hamburg (Rowohlt) 2020. Moderation: Dina Emundts (Freie Universität Berlin); Comments: Oliver Hallich (Essen), Stefan Riedener (Zürich). Thursday, 15.09.2022, 13:30 – 15:30

Symposium 2: Gerhard Schurz (Düsseldorf)

Hume’s Problem Solved: The Optimality of Meta-Induction, Cambridge, MA (MIT Press) 2019. Moderation: Thomas Müller (Konstanz); Comments: Leah Henderson (Groningen), Peter Brössel (Bochum). Thursday, 15.09.2022, 13:30 – 15:30

Frege Prize Colloquium

This year, the GAP will award the Frege Prize to Martine Nida-Rümelin (Fribourg). She is being honoured for her outstanding and internationally influential work on the philosophy of mind.

Laudatory speech: Terence Horgan (Arizona); Additional Guests: Pär Sundström (Umeå University), Chair: Kristina Musholt (Universität Leipzig), Wednesday, 14.09.2022, 18:00 – 20:00

Fachpolitische Foren (Issues in the Profession)

Panel 1: Fair and Open Access in Academia

While philosophising may be cheap, gaining access to the results of philosophical research is not: At the moment, a small number of publishing houses make large profits with subscription prices and article processing charges. Depending on the amount of available funding, access to research results is thereby often restricted – even though researchers are already largely funded by public money. Current developments, like Projekt DEAL, focus on agreements between public actors and private publishers (like Wiley, Springer Nature, and Elsevier) to increase open access by covering author processing charges. This, however, leads to a kind of public subsidising of publishing houses with profit margins of above 20%. In order to minimise such disadvantages, many therefore call for diamond open access, i.e. access free of charge for authors and readers. In this panel, we discuss the problems with the current system of publishing and benefits of diamond open access, with our panelists Prof. Martin Paul Eve (Birkbeck, CEO of the Open Library of the Humanities), Marco Tullney (TIB Hannover, director of Projekt KOALA), Dr. Christina Riesenweber (expert for open access publication at UB Freie Universität Berlin).

Organization

Sascha Benjamin Fink, Wanja Wiese

[In German] Panels 2 to 4

For information on these panels, visit the German programme page.

[In German] Ask Your Philosopher! – Analytische Philosophie macht Schule

“Ask your philosopher!” builds a bridge between school and university: several philosophy courses attend the congress with their teachers and will have the opportunity to ask questions that could not be answered in class. Selected philosophers specializing in the respective fields will answer their questions on a podium and engage in discussions with the students. Tuesday, 13.09.2022, 9:00 – 14.00

For more information, visit the German programme page.

Students Congress

There will be a student-organized section at GAP.11 with slots for student presentations. The submission deadline is April 15, 2022. More information can be found in these documents: students-congress reader, time table.

Satellite workshops

Following GAP.11, seven satellite workshops will be held:

Bad Beliefs. Conspiracy Theories, Testimony, and Resistance to Evidence

Philosophical tradition has long held that human beings are rational animals. But the extent of our rationality has come to severe challenge. Naturalistic philosophy, and informed common sense, now tends to hold that we’re pervasively dependent on heuristics and biases, that lead us to take short cuts rather than to reason.

Neil Levy’s book Bad Beliefs (OUP 2022) challenges this consensus. Levy argues that the standard psychological paradigms that supposedly demonstrate systematic departures from rationality typically embed higher-order evidence, to which participants respond rationally. Once we recognize the depth of our dependence on testimony, we see that bad beliefs (such as climate change scepticism or anti-vaxx sentiment) are formed in broadly the same way as good beliefs.

This workshop brings together experts discussing various threads that are interwoven in Levy’s argumentation. These concern the social nature of reasoning itself, the nature of testimony, the reason-responsiveness of heuristics and the rationality of nudging, evidence resistance, and the case of conspiracy belief as an example of having “bad” beliefs.

Time & Place

Place: DOR 24, 1.103
Date: 16.09.2022

Guests

Neil Levy (Macquarie/ Oxford), Rachel E. Fraser (Oxford), Thomas Grundmann (Cologne), Mona Simion (Glasgow), Alessandra Tanesini (Cardiff), Joseph E. Uscinski (Miami)

Organizers

Tobias Schlicht (Bochum), Thomas Grundmann (Cologne); funded by the Volkswagen Foundation as part of the project “Why do people believe weird things?”

The Embodiment of Conscious Subjects

This workshop aims to connect recent work on embodiment (embodied cognition, the sense of owning one’s own body) with the metaphysical question of embodiment: what is it, metaphysically speaking, for a conscious subject to be embodied?

Recent work on embodiment can be understood as outlining different conditions on being embodied. These include the Action Condition (for an embodied subject some bodily movements are basic actions); the Knowledge Condition (the subject can be directly aware of certain states of their own body); and the Phenomenological Condition (the subject’s sense of their body helps to structure many experiences).

We shall explore the possibility that these conditions together constrain or even constitute what it is for a subject to be embodied. Furthermore, these conditions seem each to involve degrees of satisfaction. This suggests that being embodied is not all-or-nothing, but is rather a matter of degree.

Time & Place

Place: DOR 24, 1.204
Date: 16.09.2022

Guests

to be decided

Organizers

Julien Bugnon (Fribourg), Martine Nida-Rümelin (Fribourg) & Donnchadh O Conaill (Fribourg)

Memory and Imagination: Varieties of (Dis)Continuism

The aim of this workshop is to systematically examine the relationship between episodic memory and imagination from distinct perspectives. This workshop brings together key researchers in the field to explore the different ways of understanding the (dis)continuism debate about memory and imagination, from a metaphysical, epistemological, attitudinal, or normative perspective, and explore the nuances of the relation between these two fundamental cognitive capacities.

The workshop hence aims to develop a more precise understanding of the relationship between memory and imagination, and brings the internationally already well established and currently hotly debated topic on the relationship between memory and imagination to a broader audience in the German speaking and European philosophical community. Further information about the workshop can be found here.

Time & Place

Place: DOR 24, 1.201
Date: 16.09.2022

Guests

Alma Barner (University of Salzburg), Dorothea Debus (Universität Konstanz), Kristina Liefke (Ruhr-Universität Bochum), Kourken Michaelian (Grenoble), John Sutton (Macquarie), Flash talks: Call for Papers

Organizers

Markus Werning (Bochum), Chris McCarroll (National Yang Ming Chiao Tung University), Anco Peeters (Bochum), in cooperation with the DFG Research Group “Constructing scenarios of the past: A new framework in episodic memory”

Scaffolding & Niche Construction: Conceptualization & Applications

Two concepts have proven central in the attempt to characterize the influence of extra-bodily factors on cognitive and affective phenomena: scaffolding and niche construction. The workshop addresses three central issues surrounding these concepts.

First, although the phenomena of scaffolding and niche construction are widely discussed, there is no agreement on their conceptualization and ontological status. Second, while both concepts originate in the field of biological evolution, they are also increasingly applied to socio-political, socio-technological, and ontogentic phenomena. What makes the notions of scaffolding and niche construction apt for such diverse areas of application? Third, most of the early research on scaffolding and niche construction highlighted their positive aspects while recent research includes applications in which potentially negative aspects take center stage (e.g. in political radicalization or the development of psychopathologies). To what extent is the debate enriched or watered down by this expansion of focus?

Time & Place

Place: DOR 24, 1.308
Date: 16.09.2022

Guests

Lucy Osler (University of Copenhagen), Matthew Ratcliffe (University of York), Somogy Varga (Aarhus University)

Organizers

Albert Newen (Bochum), Achim Stephan (Osnabrück), Sabrina Coninx (Bochum), Gregor Hörzer (Osnabrück), in cooperation with the DFG Research Training Group “Situated Cognition”

Hyperintensional Formal Epistemology

Hyperintensional theories of content have recently received a great deal of attention. Influential accounts include Fine’s truthmaker semantics, Leitgeb’s HYPE framework, and two-component approaches inspired by Yablo’s work, modelling meanings as pairs of truth-conditions and subject matters.

This workshop examines applications of hyperintensional frameworks in formal epistemology. On the one hand, the case for hyperintensionality seems especially forceful here, since intensional approaches notoriously face problems of logical omniscience: taking belief, knowledge, etc. to be closed under logical consequence, they seem adequate at most to highly idealized thinkers. On the other hand, without idealizing assumptions about the agents under consideration, there may not be enough structure to knowledge and belief to enable fruitful systematic theorizing. The workshop will include presentations of particular hyperintensional theories as well as foundational discussions of the case for hyperintensionalism.

Time & Place

Place: DOR 24, 1.401
Date: 16./17.09.2022

Guests

Sena Bozdag (Munich), Johannes Korbmacher (Utrecht), Karolina Kryzanowska (Amsterdam), Hannes Leitgeb (Munich), Aybüke Özgün (Amsterdam), Timothy Williamson (Oxford), to be decided (Call for Papers)

Organizers

The Relevance project, an Emmy Noether group based at the University of Hamburg, funded by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft

Supererogation: Feministische Perspektiven

In unserer moralischen Urteilspraxis werden manche Handlungen als (bisweilen sogar in hohem Maße) moralisch wertvoll, aber dennoch nicht geboten betrachtet. In der philosophischen Fachdebatte wurde dafür von J.O. Urmson in seinem Aufsatz „Saints and Heroes“ der Ausdruck ‚Supererogation‘ geprägt. Wie eine solche Handlungskategorie zu definieren ist und wie bzw. ob sie sich theoretisch überhaupt begründen lässt, ist Gegenstand kontrovers geführter philosophischer Auseinandersetzungen. Weniger Beachtung hat dabei bislang der Umstand gefunden, dass das, was als Pflichterfüllung, freiwillige Mehrleistung oder gar als Heroismus verstanden wird, in unserer Urteilspraxis auch durch Geschlechterrollen und die daran geknüpften Handlungserwartungen geprägt ist. Damit hat die Frage danach, was als Supererogation gilt, auch eine genuin politische, soziale und epistemische Dimension.

Im Workshop wollen wir daher unter Rekurs auf theoretische und methodische Ressourcen der feministischen Philosophie der Frage nachgehen, welche Herausforderungen und Potentiale sich aus diesem Befund für die Supererogationsforschung ergeben. Das Programm zum Workshop finden Sie hier.

Time & Place

Place: DOR 24, 1.307
Date: 16./17.09.2022

Guests

Hilge Landweer (Berlin), Vera Marstaller (Freiburg i. Br.), Corinna Mieth (Bochum), Amelie Stuart (Erfurt), Tatjana Noemi Tömmel (Berlin), Lea Watzinger (Graz)

Organizers

Katharina Naumann (Magdeburg), Marie-Luise Raters (Potsdam), Karoline Reinhardt (Tübingen)

Die Zukunft des Idealismus

Obwohl der Idealismus in der Vergangenheit eine gängige Position war, wird er heute kaum noch vertreten, scheinbar aus gutem Grund. Der Idealismus scheint eine Position zu sein, die in die Vergangenheit gehört und keine Zukunft mehr hat. Es ist deshalb nicht überraschend, dass fast alle Diskussionen über den Idealismus im Bereich der Geschichte der Philosophie zu finden sind, jedoch kaum in der systematischen Philosophie und insbesondere auch nicht in der analytischen Philosophie.

Der Workshop hofft, Fortschritte in der Frage zu erzielen, ob der Idealismus eine Zukunft als Position in der systematischen Philosophie hat, und wenn ja, in welcher Gestalt. Wie sollen wir den Idealismus verstehen, und wie kann man ihn, so verstanden, verteidigen? Wir hoffen, diejenigen, die systematische Ideen zum Idealismus haben, im September in Berlin in diesem Workshop zusammenzubringen. Weitere Informationen finden Sie auf www.idealismus.net.

Time & Place

Place: DOR 24, 1.205
Date: 16./17.09.2022

Guests

to be decided (Call for Papers)

Organizers

Thomas Hofweber (North Carolina), Anton Friedrich Koch (Heidelberg)

Downloads

This section will soon provide various informational documents about GAP.11. Resources in context with travelling to the conference site and accomadation in Berlin can be found on Travel & Accomodation.