

CALL FOR PAPERS (GAP.11, HU Berlin, Deadline: 31.05.2022)

Workshop: Hyperintensional Formal Epistemology

We are inviting submissions for contributions to a workshop on Hyperintensional Formal Epistemology organized by the Relevance project, an Emmy Noether group based at the University of Hamburg and funded by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (grant KR 4516/2-1).

The workshop will take place on September 16-17, 2022, in Berlin, as one of six Satellite workshops following GAP.11, the eleventh international congress of the Society for Analytic Philosophy (GAP). Confirmed speakers are Sena Bozdog (Munich), Johannes Korbmayer (Utrecht), Karolina Kryzanowska (Amsterdam), Hannes Leitgeb (Munich), Aybüke Özgün (Amsterdam), and Timothy Williamson (Oxford).

In addition to these six invited contributions, two slots (70 minutes, divided into 45-50 minutes for the talk and the remainder for discussion) are available for contributed papers on the topic of the conference. If you would like to present a paper, please submit a CV and an extended abstract of up to 2,000 words, suitable for anonymous review, to [hamburgrelevance \(at\) gmail \(dot\) com](mailto:hamburgrelevance@gmail.com) by the deadline of 31 May, 2022. Notifications of acceptance will be sent out by 15 June, 2022. We will cover costs for accommodation and (at least) European travel. Submissions by graduate students and early career postdocs are especially welcome.

We are planning to publish selected papers in a special issue of an international peer reviewed journal.

Topic

Hyperintensional theories of content have recently received a great deal of attention. Influential accounts include Fine's truthmaker semantics, Leitgeb's HYPE framework, and two-component approaches inspired by Yablo's work, modelling meanings as pairs of truth-conditions and subject matters. This workshop examines applications of hyperintensional frameworks in formal epistemology. On the one hand, the case for hyperintensionality seems especially forceful here, since intensional approaches notoriously face problems of logical omniscience: taking belief, knowledge, etc. to be closed under logical consequence, they seem adequate at most to highly idealized thinkers. On the other hand, without idealizing assumptions about the agents under consideration, there may not be enough structure to knowledge and belief to enable fruitful systematic theorizing.

Possible topics for submissions include, but are not limited to:

- development or discussion of specific hyperintensional approaches in formal epistemology
- reasons for and against hyperintensionalism in formal epistemology
- reasons for idealization in formal epistemology and the appropriate extent or degree of idealization

For more information on the workshop, please visit our website at <http://relevance-project.org>