

GAP.11

PHILOSOPHIE & ÖFFENTLICHKEIT

PHILOSOPHY & THE PUBLIC

11. Kongress der Gesellschaft für Analytische Philosophie
Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, 12.–15. September 2022

Veranstalter

Gesellschaft für Analytische Philosophie e. V.
und die Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin

Lokale Organisation

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Geert Keil



Romy Jaster

Geleitwort

Unter dem Stichwort »Philosophie und Öffentlichkeit« werden zwei unterschiedliche Dinge verhandelt: zum einen die Popularisierung philosophischer Forschungsinhalte, zum anderen philosophische Interventionen in gesellschaftliche Debatten. Der Unterschied liegt in der Provenienz der Themen: Das Gettierproblem oder der semantische Externalismus stammen aus der philosophischen Forschung. Nicht alle Forschungsthemen eignen sich gleichermaßen für eine Einspeisung in außerakademische Debatten. Hingegen wären der Klimawandel, künstliche Intelligenz oder Verschwörungstheorien auch dann drängende Themen, wenn die akademische Philosophie von heute auf morgen ihre Arbeit einstellte.

Oft kommt aber auch beides zusammen. Viele öffentliche Debatten berühren Fragen, zu denen in der akademischen Philosophie intensiv geforscht wird. Krieg und Migration, erstarkender Autoritarismus und Desinformation, Expertendissense und Ressourcenverteilung in der Pandemie, Rassismus und Geschlecht – diese Themen werfen ethische, erkenntnistheoretische, wissenschafts-, sprach- und sozialphilosophische Fragen auf. Im Fach werden solche Anwendungsfragen zunehmend ernst genommen: Die analytische Philosophie erlebt in jüngerer Zeit in vielen Bereichen einen *Applied Turn*.

Zugleich beschäftigt sich die Philosophie zunehmend mit ihrer öffentlichen Wahrnehmung und Vermittlung. Aus dem Fach heraus gibt es vielfältige publizistische Aktivitäten, Philosophie-Blogs und Podcasts, Essaywettbewerbe, Philosophy Slams und von Fachphilosoph:innen verfasste populäre Sachbücher. Dabei bewegt sich die akademische Philosophie in einem Diskursraum, der durch ambivalente Entwicklungen gekennzeichnet ist: durch den erhöhten Legitimationsdruck öffentlich finanzierter Forschung, die Herausforderung durch Wissenschaftsskepsis und postfaktisches Denken, nicht zuletzt durch den Strukturwandel der öffentlichen Kommunikation, der Zugangsschwellen senkt und den Diskurs demokratisiert, zugleich aber die Gefahr birgt, dass Expertise und Kompetenz im Rauschen untergehen.

Ein Philosophiekongress, der das Verhältnis von Philosophie und Öffentlichkeit zum Rahmenthema macht, ist also aus mehreren Gründen überfällig. Auf der Agenda der Gesellschaft für analytische Philosophie steht das Thema seit einigen Jahren weit oben. Unter anderem hat die GAP gemeinsam mit der DGPhil die AG »Philosophie und Öffentlichkeit« gegründet und das Netzportal *PhilPublica* ins Leben gerufen. *PhilPublica* ist ein Schau-

fenster für in Publikumsmedien erschienene Beiträge akademischer Philosoph:innen, das an einem Ort sichtbar macht, wie vielfältig die Philosophie zu Themen, die auch außerhalb der Akademie von Interesse sind, in den Medien präsent ist. Außerdem stellt PhilPublica Werkstattwissen zur Philosophiekommunikation zur Verfügung und richtet für Absolvent:innen unserer Studiengänge Workshops mit Wissenschaftsjournalist:innen aus.

In den Hauptvorträgen, Kolloquien, Panels, fachpolitischen Foren und Sonderveranstaltungen des Kongresses wird das Rahmenthema „Philosophie und Öffentlichkeit“ aus verschiedenen Perspektiven beleuchtet und diskutiert. Wir erhoffen uns neben einer Vielzahl von Schlaglichtern auf die Relevanz der akademischen Philosophie für öffentliche Debatten auch einen innerfachlichen Austausch über das Verhältnis von akademischer Philosophie und Öffentlichkeit und über die Möglichkeiten und Grenzen öffentlicher Philosophie. Begleitet wird der Kongress von einem Public Philosophy-Programm, das sich an eine breitere Öffentlichkeit wendet.

Wie die bisherigen Kongresse der GAP dient auch gap.11 dazu, die analytische Philosophie in der Breite und Vielfalt der aktuellen Forschung zu präsentieren. Dies geschieht in mehr als 300 Vorträgen in sechzehn thematischen Sektionen. An den Kongress schließen sich mehrere Satellitenworkshops an.

Im Rahmen der Eröffnungsveranstaltung wird der *Wolfgang-Stegmüller-Preis* verliehen, mit dem die GAP in diesem Jahr vier herausragende Arbeiten von Philosoph:innen auszeichnet, die noch keine Dauerstelle innehaben.

Mit dem *Frege-Preis* zeichnet die GAP alle drei Jahre eine:n deutschsprachige:n Philosoph:in für herausragende Leistungen auf dem Gebiet der Analytischen Philosophie aus. Preisträgerin ist in diesem Jahr Martine Nida-Rümelin. Sie wird für ihre international bedeutenden Arbeiten zur Philosophie des Geistes und des Bewusstseins ausgezeichnet und mit einem Autorenkolloquium geehrt.

Der Kongress ist nach vier Jahren pandemiebedingter Pause der erste große Präsenzkongress der Philosophie im deutschen Sprachraum. Die Rekordzahl an Einreichungen für Sektionsvorträge lässt einen großen Nachholbedarf an fachlichem und persönlichem Austausch vermuten. Wir begrüßen Teilnehmer:innen aus mehr als 30 Ländern.

Die Organisation eines großen Kongresses macht nicht nur Freude, sondern auch etwas Arbeit. Wir möchten uns an dieser Stelle herzlich für die vielfältige Unterstützung bedanken: beim Steering Committee, bei unserem lokalen Organisationsteam, bei den Sektionsleiter:innen und nicht zuletzt bei den vielen anonymen Fachgutachter:innen, die dazu beigetragen haben, das Programm auf die Beine zu stellen. Dieses ehrenamtliche Engagement, das man treffend »service to the profession« nennt, hat den Kongress zwar nicht möglich gemacht – möglich war er vorher schon –, aber ohne diese Unterstützung wäre er nicht wirklich geworden.

Wir freuen uns, Sie nach vierjähriger Kongresspause in Berlin begrüßen zu können und wünschen uns allen einen anregenden und ertragreichen Kongress.

Geert Keil
Präsident der GP

Romy Jaster
Geschäftsführerin der GAP



Prof. Dr. Peter Frensch

Grußwort

Sehr geehrter Herr Keil,
sehr geehrte Frau Jaster,
verehrte Mitglieder der Gesellschaft für Analytische Philosophie,
liebe Gäste, meine Damen und Herren,

herzlich Willkommen an der Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin! Ich freue mich sehr, Sie heute zur elften GAP-Konferenz begrüßen zu dürfen.

In den vier Jahren seit Ihrem letzten Kongress in Köln ist vieles passiert und so freut es mich besonders, dass Sie heute nach den schweren Coronazeiten in Präsenz nach Berlin kommen konnten.

Es lohnt sich. Nicht nur, weil sich eine Reise nach Berlin natürlich immer lohnt. Nein, der Kongress mit dem Titel „Philosophie und Öffentlichkeit“ passt gerade auch deshalb so gut an unsere Universität, weil damit der Bogen gespannt wird von einer traditionellen Kernkompetenz unseres Forschungsprofils hin zu unserem Anspruch, den Austausch von Wissenschaft und Gesellschaft im Rahmen der Third Mission deutlich zu verstärken.

Das Zusammenwirken von Forschung und Lehre, sozusagen den ersten beiden Missionen, ist mit der humboldtschen Bildungsidee eng an unsere Universität und ihren Gründungsvater, den Sprachphilosophen Wilhelm von Humboldt geknüpft. Die 1810 als Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität gegründete Hochschule wurde schnell zum Ideal moderner Wissenschaft und lockte gerade in der Philosophie zahlreiche kluge Köpfe an, darunter Größen wie Friedrich Schleiermacher, Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Karl Marx oder natürlich Georg Friedrich Wilhelm Hegel.

Doch nicht nur in der Vergangenheit setzt die Philosophie an der Humboldt Maßstäbe und unterstreicht die Exzellenz unserer Universität. Auch heute ist das Institut für Philosophie eines unserer Aushängeschilder und erreicht in aktuellen Rankings auch international Spitzenplätze.

Ich habe mir sagen lassen, die analytische Philosophie lege besonderen Wert auf Begriffsklärung und transparente Argumentation. Nun hoffe ich doch, dass dies nicht nur in der analytischen Philosophie gilt, sondern im ganzen Fach. Aber ich bin da nicht der Experte, das machen Sie unter sich aus.

Vor allem heißt es daneben aber auch, die analytische Philosophie habe keine Berührungspunkte mit anderen Wissenschaften. Das freut mich, denn klar ist: Interdisziplinarität ist die notwendige Lebensgrundlage für exzellente Forschung und die Zukunft der Universitäten.

Doch geht es nicht nur darum, mit anderen Fächern in Kontakt zu treten, sondern auch mit Gesellschaft und Öffentlichkeit. Mit unserer Open Humboldt-Strategie setzen wir genau hier an. Als Hauptstadtuniversität wollen wir nicht nur mit unseren Gebäuden in der Mitte Berlins, in der Mitte der Gesellschaft verankert sein. Wir wollen – ja ich würde sagen wir müssen rausgehen und den Austausch mit der Öffentlichkeit nicht allein in den Formen altbewährter Wissenskommunikation erproben. Bei Third Mission geht es darum, wissenschaftsbasierte Entscheidungen zu ermöglichen, die Chancen von Citizen Science zu nutzen und aktuelle gesellschaftspolitische Fragen als Impulse für eigene Forschungsfelder zu definieren.

In der Corona-Pandemie konnten wir sehen, wie wichtig die Stimme der Wissenschaftler:innen war – und zwar nicht nur die von Epidemiologen, Modellierern und Virologen. Die Krise der Demokratie, der Klimawandel, Digitalisierung, Migration und die Rolle von Mensch und Natur sind weitere Themenfelder.

Auch das Programm der 11. GAP-Konferenz spiegelt diese Offenheit für Themen mit gesellschaftlicher, teils auch globaler Relevanz wider. So wird heute noch über die moralischen Grenzen der Wissenschaftsfreiheit diskutiert. Nicht nur aus aktuellem Anlass in meinen Augen eine überaus wichtige Frage, die nichts weniger als den Kern des gesellschaftlichen Zusammenlebens berührt.

Lassen Sie mich unmissverständlich sagen: Wissenschaftsfreiheit ist ein fragiles, ein schützenswertes, ein hohes Gut, dessen Verteidigung zu den Kernaufgaben einer jeden Universität gehört. Dafür steht die Humboldt-Universität. Gleichzeitig – und dies zu betonen ist mir genauso wichtig: Gleichzeitig darf Wissenschaftsfreiheit nicht in falsch verstandener Liberalität münden.

Niemand erweist dem lang erkämpften Gut der Freiheit von Wissenschaft einen Dienst, wenn sie herhalten muss für persönliche Meinungsäußerungen, für ideologische Standpunkte oder wenn sie missbraucht wird als vermeintlich evidenzbasierter Deckmantel für Gesellschaftskritik jedweder Form, Richtung oder Herkunft. Über kurz oder lang wird die Wissenschaftsfreiheit davon einen massiven Schaden erleiden, der die vielen hervorragenden Forscher:innen in unserem Land in Mitleidenschaft ziehen wird, vor allem aber generell das Ansehen unabhängiger Forschung in der Bevölkerung in Frage stellt und diskreditiert. Ein Vertrauensverlust, den sich die Wissenschaft nicht leisten kann.

Für die kommenden Tage wünsche ich Ihnen bei Ihren spannenden Sessions anregende Diskussionen und einen inspirierenden Austausch. Genießen Sie das persönliche Gespräch face-to-face. Und wenn Sie daneben auch etwas Zeit für Berlin haben: Schauen Sie vorbei in unseren vielen Open Humboldt-Projekten – sei es im Humboldt Labor im wiedererrichteten Stadtschloss, im Bahnhof der Wissenschaften oder anderswo.

Ich danke dem Institut für Philosophie und der Gesellschaft für analytische Philosophie für die Organisation dieses Kongresses und übergebe das Wort an dieser Stelle noch einmal an Herrn Keil. An Sie alle nochmals ein herzliches Willkommen an der Humboldt-Universität.

Prof. Dr. Peter Frensch
Präsident der Humboldt-Universität

Inhalt / Content

Allgemeine Informationen	8	General Information
Veranstaltungsorte	10	Conference Venues
Eröffnungsveranstaltung mit Preisverleihungen	17	Opening with Award Ceremony
Hauptvorträge	18	Keynote Lectures
Kolloquien	20	Colloquia
Sektionsvorträge Übersicht	34	Section Talks Overview
Sektionsvorträge Abstracts	58	Section Talks Abstracts
Fachpolitische Foren	212	Issues in the Profession
»Ask Your Philosopher«	215	»Ask Your Philosopher«
Frege-Preis-Kolloquium	217	Frege Award Colloquium
Buchsymposien	218	Book Symposia
Public Philosophy-Programm	220	Public Philosophy Events
Lunch-Präsentationen	223	Lunch-Presentations
Studierendenkongress	224	Student Congress
Satellitenworkshops	228	Satellite Workshops
Vortragende A–Z	235	Speakers A–Z

Congress office

The congress office is located in the seminar building where the opening and the section talks take place (DOR 24, Room 1.102). An additional Info Desk is located in front of the Senatssaal (Main Building, first floor). See the site plans on the next pages.

WiFi Access

Participants who have no eduroam access can use the Public Hotspot *Free WiFi Berlin*.

Changes in the programme

For daily updates of the program, please check <https://gap11.de/news>
This site also contains an overview of the chair assignments.

Meals

The restaurants listed below are within walking distance of the conference venue.

Via Nova II (European)
Universitätsstr. 2
www.vianova2.com

Kantine im Maxim Gorki Theater
Am Festungsgraben 2

Deponie Nr.3 (German)
Georgenstraße 5
www.deponie3.de

Da Vinci (Italian)
Georgenstraße 192
www.davinci-ristorante.de

Tex-Mex (Mexican)
Georgenstraße 198

Sushi Miyabi (Japanese)
Georgenstraße 195
sushimiyabi.de

Chupenga (Mexican)
Georgenstraße 200
chupenga.de

Swing Kitchen (Fast food)
Georgenstraße 201
swingkitchen.com

Nolle (German)
Georgenstraße 5
www.restaurant-nolle.de

dean&david (salads)
Friedrichstraße 96
deananddavid.de

Gendarmerie (French)
Behrenstraße 42
restaurant-gendarmerie.de

Enzian (Bavarian)
Am Kupfergraben 6a

Jolly (Chinese)
Am Kupfergraben 4/4a
www.restaurant-jolly.de

Il Segreto (Italian)
Georgenstraße 2

As an on-campus alternative, we will hire a Food Truck. Regrettably, the university canteen is closed for repair.

The main building houses a small cafeteria (ground floor, see p. 11). Payment cards are available at the conference office.

Closing party

As a highlight of gap.11, two bands composed of philosophers will perform at the closing party on Thursday night (7:30 pm). *The Conscious Club* plays rock, the *Frege Sextett* plays jazz.

Location: Jazz Club "Schlot", Invalidenstr. 117.

Ticket bracelets (€ 5) are available at the conference office.

Book exhibition

The following publishers present their books during GAP.11 in the Senatssaal (Main Building, 1st floor):

Brill	Mentis	Schwabe
De Gruyter	Metzler / Springer	Suhrkamp
Klostermann	Nomos	transcript
Meiner	Reclam	WBG

Public Transport

Stations in the vicinity:

- ▶ S- und U-Bahnhof Friedrichstraße (Bus, S-Bahn, Tram, U-Bahn): 400m / 5 mins walking distance
- ▶ U-Bahnhof Französische Straße (U-Bahn): 650m / 8 mins walking distance
- ▶ U-Bahnhof Unter den Linden (Bus, U-Bahn): 500m / 6 mins walking distance
- ▶ Am Kupfergraben (Tram): directly at the rear entrance of the Main Building

Tickets and Tariffs:


Tickets can be purchased at ticket counters in stations or via the BVG ticket app.

- ▶ Short trip ticket (tariff zone AB): 2,00 €
- ▶ Single ticket (tariff zone AB): 3,00 €
- ▶ 4-trip ticket (tariff zone AB): 9,40 €
- ▶ 24-hour ticket (tariff zone AB): 8,80 €

In most cases, a 4-trip or 24-hour ticket is the cheapest way to get around.


Veranstaltungsorte / Venues

Veranstaltungsorte / Conference Venues




All events take place in Humboldt University's main building (UL 6)
or in the seminar building Hegelplatz (DOR 24).

Next station: S- und U-Bahnhof Friedrichstraße
(Bus, S-Bahn, Tram, U-Bahn): 400m / 5 mins walking distance




Hauptgebäude Erdgeschoss / main building ground floor

Veranstaltungsorte / Venues




Hauptgebäude 1. OG / main building 1st floor




Hauptgebäude 2. OG / main building 2nd floor


Veranstaltungsorte / Venues




Seminargebäude Hegelplatz Erdgeschoss / seminar building ground floor



Seminargebäude 1. OG / seminar building 1st floor




Seminargebäude 2. OG / seminar building 2nd floor




Seminargebäude 3. OG / seminar building 3rd floor


Veranstaltungsorte / Venues



Seminargebäude 4. OG / seminar building 4th floor



5. OG / 5th floor



6. OG / 6th floor

Kongresseröffnung

mit Preisverleihungen

Die Eröffnungsveranstaltung findet in deutscher Sprache im Fritz-Reuter-Saal statt (Seminargebäude am Hegelplatz, Dorotheenstr. 24).

16:00 Eröffnung

Frege Sextett: *Autumn Leaves* (Prévert/Kosma/Mercer)

Grußwort: Prof. Dr. Peter Frensch, Präsident der Humboldt-Universität

Eröffnungsansprache: Prof. Dr. Geert Keil, Präsident der GAP

Frege Sextett: *Summertime* (Gershwin)

16:45 Verleihung der Wolfgang Stegmüller-Preise

Mario Günther, *Learning Conditional Information by Jeffrey Imaging on Stalnaker Conditionals*

Gregor Michael Hörzer, *Understanding Physicalism*

Annina Loets, *Identity and Identities. The Metaphysics and Semantics of 'Qua'*

Thomas Pölzler, *Moral Reality and the Empirical Sciences*

17:10 Verleihung des De Gruyter-Preises

Yannic Kappes, *Empty-Base Explanation*

17:20 Best Paper Award

Stephanie Elsen, *Abhängigkeit von Beziehungen der Achtsamkeit und Responsivität* (Sektion Normative Ethik)

Stefan Roski, *Metaphysically Understanding Why* (Sektion Metaphysik/Ontologie)

Daniel Sharp, *What Is Wrong with Denaturalization?* (Sektion Politische Philosophie/Rechtsphilosophie)

Frege Sextett: *Angel Eyes* (Dennis/Brent)

18:00 Öffentlicher Vortrag

Tim Henning (Universität Mainz): *Wissenschaftsfreiheit, Moral und die Kosten des Irrtums*

Kurzfassung: siehe nächste Seite

19:30 Panel: Wissenschaftsfreiheit und Moral

Elif Özmen (Universität Gießen)

Georg Meggle (Universität Leipzig)

Tim Henning (Universität Mainz)

Moderation: Romy Jaster (HU Berlin)

Eröffnungsvortrag

Wissenschaftsfreiheit, Moral und die Kosten des Irrtums

Tim Henning (Universität Mainz)

Montag, 18.00-19:15 | Seminargebäude am Hegelplatz, Reutersaal
Chair: Geert Keil (HU Berlin)

Der Vortrag formuliert zunächst eine starke liberale Auffassung der Wissenschaftsfreiheit. Diese Auffassung lehnt nicht nur äußere Beschränkungen ab, sondern sie beharrt darauf, dass moralische Einwände generell keine Gründe „von der richtigen Art“ sind, um gegen die Wahrheit einer wissenschaftlichen These zu sprechen. Diese Auffassung stützt einige der Intuitionen der liberalen, antimoralistischen Seite der Debatte.

In einem zweiten Schritt wird gezeigt, dass sogar diese starke liberale Auffassung Raum lässt für moralische Kritik an wissenschaftlichen Positionen. Der Vortrag argumentiert dabei zuerst für die These, dass es im Bereich der epistemischen Normen *pragmatic encroachment* gibt. Wenn eine moderate Form dieser These mit unkontroversen Prämissen über die Geltungsansprüche wissenschaftlicher Thesen kombiniert wird, so folgt: Die Schwelle für Rechtfertigung einer wissenschaftlichen These hängt auch von den praktischen Kosten ab, die den von der These Betroffenen im Irrtumsfalle entstehen. Damit ist Raum für legitime moralische Kritik eröffnet. Wenn Wissenschaftler:innen die Irrtumskosten für Betroffene nicht ernst nehmen, kann dies ihre Behauptungen *sowohl* epistemisch ungerechtfertigt *als auch* moralisch fahrlässig machen. Es liegt dann ein epistemisches Defizit vor, das zugleich ein moralisches Defizit ist. Wir können die These mit Gründen kritisieren, die moralische Signifikanz haben – ohne dass diese moralische Signifikanz für die Kritik essentiell wäre.

Erkenntnis Lecture

Who Should Pay for the Cost of Children? A Surprising Challenge for Liberal Egalitarians

Serena Olsaretti (ICREA, Universitat Pompeu Fabra)

Tuesday, 17.00-18:30 | Main Building, Room 2094
Chair: Anna Goppel (University of Bern)

Liberal egalitarians, including those who believe the state should remain neutral among reasonable conceptions of the good, generally assume that in a just society some of the costs of children should be shared between the family and taxpayers. Family policies that are common in welfare states include publicly-funded parental leave, free or subsidised pre-school childcare and public schools, and child tax credits or family allowances. Upon inspection, however, formulating a case for the sharing of the costs of children within a neutrality-respecting liberal egalitarian framework turns out to be harder than first appears. This paper provides such a case after identifying the main challenges it must surmount. These include the limits of the appeal to gender equality; the fact that parents may not need incentives to have and raise children when children are public goods; and the fact that, given the negative environmental externalities of procreation, children may be public bads.

Closing Lecture

Belief: What Is it Good for?

John MacFarlane (UC Berkeley)

Thursday, 17.00-18:30 | DOR 24, Reutersaal

Chair: Tobias Rosefeldt (Humboldt-Universität Berlin)

What is belief good for? “Absolutely nothing,” say the radical Bayesians. “Simplifying decisions,” say the moderates. “Providing premises in practical reasoning,” say the epistemologists. “Coordinating with others,” say I.

It is hard to see how to construct an adequate theory of rational behavior without using a graded notion of belief, such as credence. But once we have credence, what role is left for belief? After surveying some answers to this question, I will explore the idea that belief is in a different line of work altogether. Its job is not to rationalize and explain an agent’s behavior, but to track what the agent would accept as a reason.

Although some philosophers have seen the connection between belief and reasons, they have tended to see reasons as part of a theory of rational action. This locates belief in the rationalizing and explaining business, where it must vie with credence. In contrast, I argue that reasons play no essential role in an account of individual rationality; they are important because we need to coordinate with others. Credence and belief thus answer to separate needs.

C1 Public Access to Other Minds in Psychiatry

Adrian Kind (Universität Magdeburg)

Chiara Caporusco (Universität Magdeburg)

Monday, 12.30-15.30 | Main Building, Room 2097

To adequately diagnose and treat patients, psychiatrists must be able to form justified beliefs about the mental states of patients. However, sometimes psychiatrists' beliefs or diagnoses might differ from the patient's own beliefs about their minds. Typically, this occurs in cases of delusion and hallucination, but also in cases of anhedonia, alexithymia, or hypochondria. In psychiatric practice, it is often taken for granted that clinicians can doubt or even correct the patients' beliefs about the contents and happenings of their own minds. This seems to contradict the long-standing philosophical idea that introspection is a privileged way of accessing mental states, and subjects have epistemic authority regarding their own mind.

This conflict prompts the following questions: Is there a form of second or third-person access to someone's mental states that can trump first-person access? Can psychiatrists reach better (more accurate/more justified/more reliable) judgements about their patients' minds than the patients themselves? The Colloquium „Public access to other minds in psychiatry“ deals with this question by discussing methods and strategies scientists and clinicians have at their disposal to justify their diagnostic claims, as well as theoretical limitations that may undermine their judgments.

Delusions as a Disruption of Triangulation

Lisa Bortolotti (University of Birmingham)

12.30-13.30

We attribute beliefs to ourselves and others in a process that can be described as a form of triangulation. The triangle has three elements: an interpreter, a speaker, and the environment that is shared between speaker and interpreter. In some cases, there can be a serious breakdown of interpretation. As interpreters we may be tempted to think that speakers are deluded about themselves or the environment. What key factors drive the attribution of delusional beliefs? I will explore a range of options and then suggest that interpreters attribute delusional beliefs when: (1) speakers report a belief with sincerity and conviction; (2) interpreters find the speakers' beliefs implausible; (3) speakers do not give up the beliefs when they face counterarguments or counterevidence; (4) the beliefs seem to be important to how speakers see themselves in relation to their environment; and (5) interpreters deem the beliefs to have significant costs for the speakers or to have a negative impact on the shared social or physical environment. In the end, I will argue that intellectual curiosity can help interpreters overcome the disruption of triangulation and see delusions more as responses to a crisis than as a self-standing problem, across clinical and non-clinical contexts.

Hallucination or Auto-Phenomenological Delusions?

Sascha Benjamin Fink (Universität Magdeburg)
13.30-14.30

Psychiatrists navigate the Other-Minds-Problem in their diagnostic work on a daily basis. Their judgements about the minds of their patients also have to adhere to intersubjective standards of justification as they face possible challenges by others (colleagues, supervisors, lawyers). Some views on psychiatric reasoning, especially those emphasizing phenomenology (Fuchs, 2010; Parnas, Zahavi & Sass, 2013), fail to establish a basis for such inter-subjective justification (Kind, forthcoming), especially when it comes to differential diagnoses vis-à-vis delusions or hallucinations. Delusions are persistent false beliefs; hallucinations are sensory experiences out of touch with perceivable facts. This allows for "introspective delusions" (Caporuscio, 2020): persistent false beliefs about one's mental life. Auto-phenomenological delusions – delusions about one's own experiences – could be behaviorally indistinguishable from hallucinations. Generally, many disorders involving permissible phenomenal contents (e.g. body dysmorphism, Capgras syndrome) are analysable as involving either. However, for some pairs of psychopathologies, this is their main differentia specifica (e.g. blindness denial vs. Charles-Bonnet-Syndrome). Importantly, hallucinations call for a different treatment than delusions. How do psychiatrists justifiably attribute one but not the other? Here, phenomenology fails. Instead, psychiatrists use higher-order features of their conversations with patients as sources of evidence.

No Experience Necessary

Jacob Stegenga (University of Cambridge)
14.30-15.30

A psychiatrist prescribes a drug to a patient, then that patient then has various experiences (changes in symptoms, for example), and finally the psychiatrist might infer that the drug caused those experiences. Are such inferences about the effects of drugs reliable? The evidence-based medicine movement says no, because of phenomena such as the placebo effect and confirmation bias. Instead, says this movement, we must test interventions using randomised trials. On the other hand, many physicians and patients themselves routinely make such inferences, and some physicians and philosophers have argued that first-person experience and expert judgement can be reliable evidence for causal inferences. Assessing this question by empirical evidence is of limited value, because what is in question is the reliability of one mode of evidence compared to another mode of evidence. Instead, we develop a formal model of the kind of empirical scenario in question. We then use a computer simulation to generate data based on this model, which provides insight into the reliability of first-person experience in such scenarios. Our general conclusion is that for typical clinical scenarios in psychiatry, first-person experience is not a reliable guide to a range of drug effects.

C2 Epistemic Responsibility in the Context of Scientific Inquiry

Dunja Šešelja (Ruhr-Universität Bochum / Eindhoven University of Technology)
Monday, 12.30-15.30 | DOR 24, Room 2091/92

Facing the risks from human-induced global warming, future AI, nuclear technology, etc., contemporary society has been characterized with a realization of the wide ranging impact of scientific developments and the responsibilities that come with them. Such responsibilities concern not only accountable research by individual scientists, but even more so accountable knowledge production by the given scientific communities.

In view of these socio-epistemic pressures, it has become urgent to shift the focus from traditional epistemological questions of epistemic justification and scientific knowledge to the process of scientific inquiry and norms that underlie it. In particular, it has become important to explicate what the epistemic responsibilities that underly scientific inquiry are. Despite a shared interest in the topic of epistemic responsibility, discussions in epistemology and those in philosophy of science have remained largely disconnected.

This colloquium aims to bridge this divide by bringing together experts working on epistemic responsibility from each of these philosophical domains, particularly focusing on the context of scientific inquiry.

Collective epistemic responsibility and its implications for individual scientists

Kristina Rolin (Tampere University)
12.30-13.30

Recent years have witnessed an increased interest in collective epistemic responsibility in science. As Fleisher and Šešelja (2022) argue, this is partly because there are epistemically harmful phenomena which can be prevented or corrected only by groups, and not by individual scientists on their own, and which thereby call for collective action. In my presentation, I focus on epistemic responsibility as an obligation to be epistemically responsible for one's knowledge claims. I first clarify what it takes for an individual scientist to be epistemically responsible for his or her knowledge claims. After this, I turn to the question of whether epistemic responsibilities can be attributed to groups, and if they can, what it takes for a group to be epistemically responsible. I argue that certain kinds of groups can bear epistemic responsibilities in their own right, while some other kinds cannot. As to the kinds of groups that can have collective epistemic responsibilities, my aim is to understand what implications such responsibilities have for individual scientists.

Responsibility for collective epistemic harms

Will Fleisher (Northeastern University)
joint work with Dunja Šešelja (RUB / Eindhoven University of Technology)
13.30-14.30

The literature on epistemic responsibility has traditionally focused on justified belief formation and actions that lead to it. Similarly, accounts of collective epistemic responsibility

have addressed the issue of collective belief formation and associated actions. However, cases in which we face an epistemic harm that could be prevented only by a collective action, requiring an effort of an unorganized group, have been left out of these discussions. Examples of collectively preventable epistemic harms include a premature abandonment of a promising research program within a given scientific domain, or the prevalence of pernicious biases in a certain field of study. In this talk we propose an account of collective epistemic responsibility, which fills this gap. Building on Hindriks' (2018) account of collective moral responsibility, we introduce the Epistemic Duty to Join Forces. Our theory provides an account of the responsibilities of scientists to prevent epistemic harms during inquiry. It also suggests fruitful applications to other discussions, such as those concerning epistemic injustice and epistemically pernicious groups.

Towards epistemically responsible 'fact-checking' of scientific claims

Dunja Šešelja (Ruhr-Universität Bochum / Eindhoven University of Technology)
joint work with Will Fleisher (Northeastern) and Daniel Cserhalmi Friedman (Stanford University)
14.30-15.30

To combat the spread of disinformation, online media has introduced the practice of 'fact-checking'. While its application to political claims has been the subject of scholarly debates (e.g. Graves, 2016; Uscinski and Butler, 2013; Uscinski, 2015; Uscinski and Butler, 2013), fact-checking of scientific claims has received comparatively less attention. Yet, applied to the frontier scientific research, fact-checking can be especially challenging. For one thing, claims at the frontier of science are rarely fully established as facts. Moreover, whether a scientific claim is factual cannot always be easily 'checked'. This is because ongoing inquiry, often pervaded by scientific disagreements and controversies, is typically characterized by a high degree of risk and uncertainty. This raises the question: how can we evaluate scientific claims concerning ongoing inquiry in an epistemically responsible way? In this talk we argue that assessing whether a scientific claim is adequately justified requires not only sensitivity to the evidence in favour of that claim, but also sensitivity to the field of research that has produced the claim. We suggest that this requires sensitivity to two kinds of reasons often overlooked in fact-checking discussions: higher-order evidence (Skipper and Steglich-Petersen, 2019, Friedman and Šešelja 2021) and inquisitive reasons (Fleisher, 2022).

C3 Besser Argumentieren! Was kann philosophische Bildung in Schulen und anderen öffentlichen Räumen beitragen?

Anne Burkard (Universität Göttingen)
David Löwenstein (HHU Düsseldorf)
Montag, 12.30-15.30 | DOR 24, Raum 2094

Argumentative Fähigkeiten sind nicht nur für die akademische Philosophie von großer Bedeutung. Vielmehr spielen sie für zahlreiche Lebensbereiche eine wichtige Rolle: von der Alltagskommunikation und schulischen Lernprozessen über öffentliche Diskurse bis hin zur

Kolloquien / Colloquia

Rezeption, Entwicklung und Vermittlung von Erkenntnissen an den Universitäten. Das Kolloquium ist der Frage gewidmet, welchen Beitrag philosophische Bildung in Schulen, Universitäten und anderen öffentlichen Räumen zur Entwicklung dieser Fähigkeiten leisten kann.

Dazu werden drei Aspekte beleuchtet: Erstens geht es um die Reflektion konkreter Initiativen zur Förderung argumentativer Fähigkeiten im Kontext des Philosophieunterrichts. Welche bewährten Modelle gibt es hierfür und für die Kooperation mit anderen Fächern? Was sollten Lehrkräfte können? Wo liegen Herausforderungen und Grenzen?

Zweitens fragen wir, welche Bedeutung logische und rhetorische Kenntnisse und Fähigkeiten für das Argumentieren in unterschiedlichen Kontexten haben können. Dies geschieht ausgehend von einem hochschuldidaktischen Modell für die Vermittlung von Logik und Rhetorik im Rahmen des Philosophiestudiums.

Drittens geht es im Kolloquium um Ansätze zur Verbesserung öffentlicher Debatten. Wie sehen diese Ansätze aus, welche Erfahrungen gibt es mit ihnen, wo liegen Potenziale, aber auch Grenzen speziell der Argumentationstheorie dafür, zur Verbesserung öffentlicher Debatten beizutragen? Dies führt zugleich zurück zu der Frage, inwiefern philosophische Bildung an Schule und Universität einen Beitrag zur Förderung argumentativer Fähigkeiten leisten kann, der auch öffentliche Debatten bereichert.

Gymnasiale Bildung und epistemische Grundhaltung zur Verbesserung der argumentativen Praxis

Dominique Kuenzle (Universität Zürich)

12.30-13.30

Angeichts heutiger epistemischer Herausforderungen für Demokratien und soziales Zusammenleben scheint unumstritten, dass sich schulische Bildung verstärkt darum bemühen soll, dass Schüler:innen auch Jahre und Jahrzehnte nach Schulabschluss noch motiviert und fähig zu konstruktivem Dialog, kritischer Selbstreflexion und vernünftiger Meinungsbildung sein sollten. Das sind offensichtlich hochgesteckte Ziele, die nicht nur überfachliche und soziale Kompetenzen voraussetzen, sondern darüber hinaus auch von epistemischen Wertorientierungen und Haltungen der (ehemaligen) Schüler:innen abhängen. Der Vortrag stellt einen konkreten Vorschlag zur Stärkung solcher Haltungen und Kompetenzen am Gymnasium zur Diskussion: ein Modul (innerhalb oder außerhalb des Philosophieunterrichts anzusiedeln) mit Fokus auf sorgfältigem Umgang mit Argumenten, Begriffen, epistemischen Belegen und wissenschaftlicher Praxis. Um die Wahrscheinlichkeit der Habituation zu maximieren, sollen (a) *überfachliche Koordination* sowie (b) die Entwicklung der relevanten Fähigkeiten anhand der Analyse und Diskussion *aktueller gesellschaftlicher und politischer Ereignisse und Debatten* verbindlich festgeschrieben werden. Während die überfachliche Koordination (a) verhindert, dass das eine Fach nicht weiß, was das andere tut, und damit auch Synergien schafft, schafft die gemeinsame Analyse aktueller Debatten (b) ein Modell einer lebensweltlichen erkenntnisorientierten diskursiven Praxis. Dabei soll, sozusagen die Wände der Schulhäuser von Anfang an sprengend, praktiziert werden, was im Philosophieunterricht auch theoretisch reflektiert werden kann: kooperatives, ehrgeiziges und faires Mitspielen im „*game of giving and asking for reasons*“ (Sellars).

Das Verhältnis zwischen Dialektik und Rhetorik als ursprüngliche Frage der Philosophie und der Didaktik des Argumentierens

Donata Romizi (Universität Wien)
13.30-14.30

Angesichts der Tatsachen, dass (1) die ältesten erhaltenen philosophischen Schriften jene Platons sind, und dass (2) Platon in diesen immer wieder eine Polemik gegen die Sophisten als Meister der Rhetorik führt, kann man behaupten, dass die Abgrenzung zur Rhetorik eine ursprüngliche Eigenschaft der Philosophie darstellt. Sie stellt aber nicht nur einen historischen Ausgangspunkt dar, sondern sie eignet sich auch als Ausgangspunkt fürs Lehren und Lernen des Argumentierens. In diesem Kontext stellt sich nämlich zu Beginn die Frage: Wozu sollte man argumentieren lernen? Was ist der Sinn und Zweck des Argumentierens: zu überzeugen, oder sich an die Wahrheit anzunähern? Das bekannte Phänomen des *student relativism* zeigt, dass sich viele Lernende heutzutage eher mit der Position der Sophisten als mit jener Platons identifizieren. Somit würden viele von ihnen stillschweigend eher im Sinne der Rhetorik als im Sinne der klassischen Philosophie argumentieren lernen. In meinem Beitrag möchte ich einige didaktische Maßnahmen aufzeigen, mit denen ich in meiner Lehrveranstaltung zur Argumentationstheorie versuche zu vermeiden, dass dies (stillschweigend) geschieht.

Was kann philosophische Bildung in Schulen und anderen öffentlichen Räumen zur Förderung argumentativer Fähigkeiten beitragen?

David Lanius (Karlsruher Institut für Technologie)
14.30-15.30

Angesichts drängender politischer Herausforderungen wie dem Krieg in der Ukraine, den Folgen der Corona-Pandemie, der drohenden Klimakrise und damit einhergehender Desinformationskampagnen stellt sich immer deutlicher die Frage, wie die Qualität der öffentlichen Debatte verbessert werden kann. Die Philosophie kann hier auf mindestens zwei Ebenen beitragen. Erstens langfristig, indem sie die Bildungsinstitutionen dabei unterstützt, die Vermittlung von Argumentationskompetenz gezielt zu fördern. Dafür müssen nicht nur die Fähigkeiten, Argumente zu erkennen, zu verstehen, zu bewerten und selbst hervorzubringen systematisch gestärkt werden, sondern vor allem auch die Einsicht und Bereitschaft, diese Fähigkeiten praktisch anzuwenden. Die Philosophie ist hier besonders in der Pflicht, die nötigen epistemischen Werte und intellektuellen Tugenden zu vermitteln. Zweitens sollten Philosoph:innen direkt in die öffentliche Debatte eingreifen und mit ihren fachspezifischen Kompetenzen helfen, gesellschaftliche Debatten und politische Entscheidungsprozesse für die Teilnehmenden begrifflich und argumentativ zu sortieren, indem sie unter anderem deskriptive von normative Annahmen trennen, zentrale Argumente herausarbeiten, relevante implizite Annahmen explizit machen und (visualisierte) Übersichten über Argumentationen und Debatten geben. Philosophische Bildung kann auf mindestens diese beiden Weisen maßgeblich dazu beitragen, die Qualität der öffentlichen Debatte und damit letztlich die Qualität politischer Entscheidungen zu verbessern.

C4 Neo-Aristotelian Metaphysics: Hylomorphism and its Ancient and Modern Alternatives

Béatrice Lienemann (FAU Erlangen)

Marilú Papandreou (University of Bergen)

Tuesday, 09.00-12.00 | UL 6, Room 1070

Neo-Aristotelian approaches are not only important and influential in ethics. Neo-Aristotelian interpretations are also relevant in contemporary metaphysics. The colloquium is devoted to neo-Aristotelian theories in analytic metaphysics.

The colloquium aims to bring together philosophers who take up neo-Aristotelian approaches in analytic philosophy and researchers who attempt to reconstruct and analyze Aristotle's conceptions by applying theories from analytic philosophy.

The specific goal of the colloquium is to discuss hylomorphism as a metaphysical theory to understand and explain the constitution of particular objects such as a bicycle, a mountain, or an octopus. The main focus of the colloquium will be on the metaphysics of artefacts. The 'innocent definition' of the hylomorphism allows a variety of answers, depending on how one answers the following bunch of questions: 1. What is meant by form, what by matter, and what by the whole? 2. What is meant by the three hylomorphistic relations, i.e. the relation between form and matter, the relation between form and the composite whole, and the relation between matter and composite whole?

The colloquium aims to discuss hylomorphism as a metaphysical theory for the interpretation of single objects in general and artefacts in particular, in dealing with different hylomorphistic approaches and with alternatives to hylomorphistic theories.

Artifacts vs. Natural Beings - Two kinds of hylomorphism?

Christian Pfeiffer (University of Toronto)

09.00-10.00

Aristotle suggests in various places that only natural beings are substances, and artifacts are not. He also holds that things that exist by nature are more one and more of a whole than artifacts. To explain this, many commentators have argued that form and matter are differently related in the case of natural beings and artifacts. For example, some scholars hold that artifacts are accidental composites, not genuine hylomorphic composites but composites of a substance and an accident. In the case of natural beings, on the other hand, form and matter are essentially related. The matter of an animal, e.g., is identity-dependent on the animal, but the matter of a statue has its identity independently of the statue.

In my talk, I want to challenge this view: The form-matter relationship in the case of artifacts and natural beings is the same. They differ in how they come to be. The principle of change in an artifact is external, while in a living being, it is internal. They differ further in their activities: The characteristic activities of artifacts depend essentially on humans, while that of animals do not. But, as I will argue, this does not imply that the matter of an artifact is essentially independent in a way that the matter of an animal is not.

Towards an Object-Centered Account of Artifacts and Prototype Production

Kathrin Koslicki (University of Neuchâtel)
10.00-11.00

Prominent existing accounts of artifacts tend to be either author-intention-based or user-based: according to the former, an artifact is what its original author(s) (e.g., builders, designers, producers, etc.) intended it to be; according to the latter, an artifact's history of use and reproduction determines what the artifact is. In this paper, I argue that neither author-intention-based approaches nor user-based approaches yield the right account of artifacts and prototype-production. Instead, what is needed is a more object-centered approach, i.e., an approach which puts greater emphasis on the object itself and its capacities. To account for cases of malfunction, however, our conception of which capacities are relevant to the object's kind-membership must be broadened to include not only the object's actual or current capacities, but also its potential capacities, i.e., capacities it could acquire if the object were repaired or otherwise modified in a way that is compatible with its kind-membership. Such an account, I argue, is more successful than its competitors in capturing cases in which the classification of an artifact diverges from both author-intentions and user-practices. An object-centered account, moreover, opens up the possibility of categorizing artifacts alongside members of natural kinds as full-fledged substances, i.e., matter-form compounds that are highly unified, structured, and capable of persisting through intrinsic change over time.

Persistence and Structure

Thomas Sattig (Universität Tübingen)
11.00-12.00

Perdurance is a mode of persistence. The heart of perdurance is a space-time analogy: a perduring object is extended in time in a way that is analogous to how it is extended in space—to perdure is to be space-like temporally extended. In this talk, I will discuss perdurance in light of the distinction between mereologically structured and unstructured objects. I will show that while the standard formulation of perdurance captures the space-time analogy for unstructured objects, it fails to capture the space-time analogy for structured objects. I will conclude that there are substantially different ways for an object to be space-like temporally extended.

C5 Conceptual Engineering and the Ivory Tower

Robin Löhr (Ruhr-Universität Bochum)
Steffen Koch (Universität Bielefeld)
Tuesday, 09.00-12.00 | UL 6, Room 2097

Conceptual engineering is the method and the activity of assessing and improving our representational devices, in particular words and concepts. But does conceptual engineering have the potential to change representational devices of ordinary people or is it merely a

Kolloquien / Colloquia

topic for academics in their ivory tower? This colloquium aims to facilitate a debate on three related questions:

- Does conceptual engineering really have practical effect from which the public might benefit?
- What exactly are the benefits we can hope to achieve by doing conceptual engineering?
- How can conceptual engineering be implemented in the most effective way?

Answering these questions is of interest for philosophers, considering that much of the current appeal of conceptual engineering is contingent on whether it can actually have such significant effects on our individual and communal lives.

Conceptual Engineering in Philosophy and in the Wild

Georg Brun (Universität Bern)

09.00-10.00

Many theorists seem ready to argue that conceptual engineering is a key method of philosophy but reluctant to promote explicit and intentional efforts in conceptual engineering in the wild, outside philosophical and technical discourse. But more or less explicit and intentional development of concepts is ubiquitous in the sciences and in public discourse, and so are debates about which terms should be used with which meaning. In this talk, I explore how accounts of conceptual engineering developed by philosophers may prove helpful to such conceptual efforts. I argue that theories of conceptual engineering do not only contribute to a better understanding of what is involved in attempts at intentional concept change. Philosophical analysis can also be used to develop tools for doing “real life” conceptual engineering and for reconstructing and evaluating activities aiming at conceptual change. The claim that this will improve debates about conceptual issues is defended against the worries that promoting techniques of conceptual engineering is problematic for strategic and maybe even moral reasons.

Engineering Voting

Mona Simion (University of Glasgow)

10.00-11.00

I argue that our current conception of the nature of voting is incompatible with its constitutive role in democratic exercise and propose to re-think voting as an informative speech act with normative content. When we vote for Alice, what we do is we perform an informative constative with the content 'Alice should be elected', where the 'should' at stake is hypothetical towards personal goals of choice. In turn, this speech act informs collective democrating decision making. As such, I argue, democratic voting is constitutively governed by a knowledge norm: an exercise with too widely spread and too systematic breach of the knowledge norm is not an exercise in democratic voting

Representing or Shaping Reality? What Class Can Teach about Woman

Teresa Marques (Barcelona)
11.00-12.00

Historically, feminists and Marxists aimed to find new theoretical analyses to accurately diagnose, that is, describe, explain, and predict, existing subordination and inequality. Following this tradition, Sally Haslanger (2000) argued that we should ameliorate social kind concepts for discriminated groups (e.g., for race or gender) so as to lay down the conditions of their subordination. But Haslanger's analysis was criticized by Simion (2017), who argues that a concept should be ameliorated only if doing so preserves epistemic accuracy. Simion further argues that Haslanger's concept woman is not epistemically accurate (Simion 2018). In turn, Podosky 2018 and McKenna 2018 have suggested that conceptual revision should be allowed because concepts can "shape reality", not just represent it. Here I argue that this recent debate makes a mistaken assumption. I draw a parallel between the Marxist analysis of class and the aforementioned analysis of woman. The theoretical concept class was not introduced to shape reality – to create new social positions that the concept would come to represent. Rather those positions are occupied (if the Marxist analysis is correct) by the subordinated and the subordinators. Doing away with unfair inequality would bring about less epistemically accurate class concepts. An apt criticism of class analysis would rather have to show that it failed in its aim of explaining and predicting actual conditions of inequality. I claim that this discussion shows us what ameliorative projects that have political aims should look like.

C6 How Many People Should There Be? Philosophy and World Population Growth

Tim Henning (Universität Mainz)
Christian Seidel (Universität Karlsruhe)
Thursday, 13.30-16.30 | UL 6, Room 1072

Whether climate change, scarcity of resources, urbanization, securing pensions or the future of work – hardly any public debate can do without reference to demographic issues and the scenario of a growing world population. The groundbreaking work of Derek Parfit has established the philosophical field of population ethics. It reflects such scenarios in a philosophically highly differentiated manner and tries to thereby contribute to finding good responses to urgent global challenges. One major challenges that has been much discussed in the Recent literature concerns the reasons we have, and the costs we should be willing to bear, to secure the long-term survival of humanity and prevent human extinction. Within a short period of time, population ethics has had a remarkable intra- and inter-disciplinary effect. Trying to solve questions of population ethics has resulted in important and far-reaching developments in normative ethics. And it has become a field where philosophy collaborates fruitfully with other sciences, especially economics.

This colloquium presents latest philosophical contributions to population ethics and discusses their relevance for publicly discussed questions.

Kolloquien / Colloquia

Introduction

13.30-13.35

How Does Humanity Go Extinct?

Elizabeth Finneron-Burns (Western University Ontario)

13.35-14.30

This paper will explore what it means for humanity to go extinct. First, I will look at what 'humanity' actually is. Is it a corporate entity that continues? Or is it a collective of individuals? Is humanity more than simply the species *homo sapiens* or does it also include the things humans have developed like culture and knowledge? Rather than give particular answers to these questions, I will argue that our answers bear on what it means for 'humanity' to go extinct and most importantly, whether and how we can or should prevent it.

Shorting Longtermism

Johann Frick (Berkeley University)

14.35-15.30

The paper will be a critical discussion of the recent 'long-termist' proposal in population ethics, advocated by Hilary Greaves and Will MacAskill, among others.

Incommensurability and Population Ethics Paradoxes

Gustaf Arrhenius (Stockholm University)

15.30-16.25

Population axiology concerns how to evaluate populations in regard to their goodness, that is, how to order populations by the relations "is better than" and "is as good as." The main problem in population axiology has been to find an adequate theory about the value of populations where the number of people, the quality of their lives, and their identities may vary. This field has been riddled with impossibility results, which seem to show that our considered beliefs are inconsistent in cases where the number of people and their welfare varies. There have been many creative but unfortunately failed suggestions for how to eschew these impossibility results. Here I shall consider two recent suggestions by Derek Parfit and Wlodek Rabinowicz that an appeal to incommensurability would help.

Closing

16.25-16.30

C7 The Epistemology of Journalism

Thomas Grundmann (Universität Köln)

Romy Jaster (Humboldt-Universität Berlin)

Thursday, 13.30-16.30 | UL 6, Room 2091/92

In times of massive epistemic pollution, disinformation, informational overload, and increasing social polarization, one would expect the epistemology of journalism to play a major role. For, without epistemically proper journalism the truthfulness of public opinion will severely suffer. Surprisingly, this field of applied epistemology remains to be widely neglected within current epistemology. Questions about the objectivity of the media, the epistemological appropriateness of specific journalistic formats, and the reliability of journalistic practices do not receive the attention they deserve.

The colloquium takes steps towards establishing the epistemology of journalism as a new field of philosophical research. In order to frame the complex of topics in terms of content, it will focus on the following question: Which specific epistemological problems exist for journalistic reporting in the face of massive public misinformation and ignorance? Under this guiding question, the following thematic complexes will be considered:

- Epistemologically negative consequences due to the dissemination of information (e.g. through cognitive biases: false convictions through overgeneralization etc.)
- Epistemological problems of fact-checks
- Dissemination of information under uncertainty
- Epistemological status of nudging to reason, framing and epistemic paternalism in journalism
- Epistemological problems of balanced reporting

Introduction

13.30-13.40

Journalism and the social epistemology of science communication

Carrie Figdor (University of Iowa)

13.40-14.25

In recent work, Stephen John (2018, 2019) has deepened the social epistemological perspective on expert testimony by locating the virtues related to science communication at the institutional level, and by arguing that sincerity, transparency, and honesty are not necessarily virtues at that level. He focuses, as do many social epistemologists, on scientists who communicate with the public and policymakers. But unlike scientists who step into communication roles, for news journalists (and science journalists in particular), science communication is their job. So, an explanation of how non-experts learn from experts in science communication had better be adequate for journalists, with appropriate extension to scientists qua communicators as needed. In this talk, I will critically discuss and amend John's institutional move from the perspective of science news journalism. This perspective raises questions about what counts as an epistemic institution, whether deference to science is a suppressed premise that drives John's analysis of non-expert learning, and the cogency of his arguments against the virtues of sincerity, transparency, and honesty.

Intellectual Virtue Signalling

Neil Levy (Macquari University)
14.30-15.15

Discussions of virtue signalling to date have focused exclusively on the signalling of the moral virtues. I argue that it is important to recognize the existence of intellectual virtue signalling: the status-seeking advertising of supposed intellectual virtues. I argue that not only is intellectual virtue signalling distinct from moral virtue signalling, it also takes distinctive forms. It is also far more likely to be harmful than moral virtue signalling. I provide a heuristic by which we can identify possible instances of intellectual virtue signalling. When people with no relevant expertise rapidly move to offer their opinions on a wide range of topics as soon as these topics become fashionable or newsworthy, and especially when these opinions are contrarian, we should suspect them of intellectual virtue signalling. I argue that intellectual virtue signalling is not only compatible with, but actually conduces to, substantive argument. But I also suggest it is harmful, because it distracts attention from genuine expertise and gives contrarian opinions an undue prominence in public debate. Finally, I ask whether journalism is characterized by intellectual virtue signalling. In responding, I distinguish between reportage and opinion pieces, and argue that while neither is necessarily virtue signalling, virtue signalling is common and expectable in the latter.

What Is a Conspiracy Theory (and why it Matters)

Joseph Uscinski (University of Miami)
15.20-16.05

Since 2015, journalists have covered conspiracy theories extensively. However, journalists—even those who cover conspiracy theories exclusively—are unclear about how to define “conspiracy theory” or determine which ideas count as one. Here, we demonstrate the difficulties encountered when journalists attempt to distinguish conspiracy theories from real conspiracies or from other types of ideas. We argue that such difficulties are due to the contested definition of conspiracy theory, which inherently frustrates journalistic coverage of the topic, content moderation tactics, and schemes aimed at censorship. Finally, we argue that the current “post-truth” epistemology lacks coherence.

Wrap-up/Discussion

16.10-16.30

C8 Krieg in der Ukraine: Philosophische Perspektiven auf eine politische Herausforderung

gap.11-Organisationskomitee

Dienstag 9:30-12.00 Uhr, Hauptgebäude, Hörsaal 2091/92

Die klassischen Themen der Friedens- und Kriegsethik – Theorien des gerechten Krieges, Pazifismus, Friedenssicherung – scheinen nicht gut geeignet, die Besonderheit der politischen und moralischen Herausforderungen zu erfassen, die sich angesichts des Krieges in der Ukraine stellen. Die normative Lage ist ungewöhnlich klar: Es handelt sich um einen völkerrechtswidrigen Angriffskrieg, der dem Angegriffenen gemäß der UN-Charta ein Recht auf militärische Selbstverteidigung verschafft. Auch über das Prinzip, dass Angegriffene Unterstützung verdienen, gibt es kaum Dissens. Weniger klar sind Art, Umfang und Ziele der gebotenen Hilfe – insbesondere angesichts epistemischer Defizite und der Unsicherheit der Folgenabschätzung. Die drei Kolloquiumsgäste eint die Einschätzung, dass die Philosophie auf neue Herausforderungen nicht mit eingefahrenen Debatten reagieren sollte.

9:30 Uhr

Zum Ausmaß von Hilfspflichten angesichts empirischer Unsicherheiten

Susanne Burri (Universität Konstanz)

Empirische Unsicherheiten erschweren die Feststellung unserer Hilfspflichten gegenüber einer Kriegspartei wie der Ukraine. Im Vortrag werden diese Schwierigkeiten skizziert. Einerseits besteht die Gefahr, dass aufgrund von Hilfeleistungen ein Konflikt weiter eskaliert und damit bisher nicht Betroffene in Mitleidenschaft gezogen werden. Andererseits ist oft unklar, ob gut gemeinte Interventionen die betroffene Kriegspartei tatsächlich besserstellen. Schließlich ist es angesichts eigener Interessen schwierig, Unsicherheiten objektiv einzuschätzen.

10:20 Uhr

Putin hat schon verloren – welchen Krieg kann Russland noch gewinnen?

Sergii Sekundant (Universität Odessa)

Westeuropäische Diskussionen zum Pazifismus sind stark durch Fälle geprägt, in denen NATO-Staaten militärisch interveniert haben (Irak, Kosovo, Afghanistan). Diese Diskussionen passen nicht gut auf den Fall eines Landes, das sich gegen eine bereits entfesselte Aggression verteidigt. Normativ läuft der Pazifismus auf die Forderung hinaus, menschliche Verluste auf beiden Seiten zu minimieren. Dieses kurzfristige Ziel ist aber nicht das Einzige, auf das es ankommt. Putin setzt auf eine verrottete Ideologie und versucht, sie anderen aufzuzwingen. Diesen Krieg hat er schon verloren, bevor er begann. Der Vortrag adressiert zwei Fragen: Welchen Krieg kann Russland noch gewinnen? Wie können die Ukraine und Europa ihm dabei helfen?

11:10 Uhr

Politische Meinungsbildung und mediale Kriegsteilnahme

Johannes Müller-Salo (Universität Hannover)

Putins Krieg gegen die Ukraine stellt demokratische Gesellschaften und insbesondere politisch Verantwortliche vor die Herausforderung, unter Unsicherheit weitreichende Entscheidungen treffen zu müssen. Der Vortrag geht der Frage nach, wie sich die Präsenz des Krieges in den sozialen Medien, die Usern eine mediale Kriegsteilnahme ermöglichen und unter bestimmten Umständen sogar auferlegen, auf die öffentliche und politische Diskussion relevanter Unsicherheiten auswirkt.

Sektionen (Übersicht) / Sections (Overview)

Applied Ethics	1	Angewandte Ethik
Aesthetics	2	Ästhetik
Didactics of Philosophy	3	Didaktik der Philosophie
Epistemology	4	Erkenntnistheorie
History of Philosophy	5	Geschichte der Philosophie
Logic	6	Logik
Metaethics, Philosophy of Action, and Decision Theory	7	Metaethik, Handlungs- und Entscheidungstheorie
Metaphilosophy	8	Metaphilosophie
Metaphysics/Ontology	9	Metaphysik/Ontologie
Normative Ethics	10	Normative Ethik
Philosophy of Mind and Cognition	11	Philosophie des Geistes und der Kognition
Philosophy of Language	12	Sprachphilosophie
Philosophy of Religion	13	Religionsphilosophie
Philosophy of Science	14	Wissenschaftstheorie
Political Philosophy and Philosophy of Law	15	Politische Philosophie und Rechtsphilosophie
Social Philosophy	16	Sozialphilosophie

All room numbers refer to the Seminar Building Hegelplatz located at Dorotheenstraße 24 (DOR 24).

Sektionen Dienstag / Sections Tuesday

Tuesday 13.30-14.15		Tuesday 14.15-15.00	
Applied Ethics (1)			
Oliver Hallich <i>Nachvollziehbarkeit als Kriterium für die Respektabilität von Sterbewünschen?</i>	1.401	Karla Alex & Eva C. Winkler <i>Does Epigenome Editing Deserve Similar Consideration as Genome Editing within Bioethics?</i>	1.401
Aesthetics (2)			
Lisa Katharin Schmalzried <i>Kitschy Kitsch and Kitschy Art</i>	1.504	Olga Bahar Özbek <i>Resemblance, Depiction, and Pictorial Reference</i>	1.504
Epistemology (4)			
Alexander Belak & Dominik Gerstorfer <i>Restructuring Understanding's Object</i>	1.307	Federica Isabella Malfatti <i>From Knowledge to Understanding? What Testimony Cannot Teach</i>	1.307
Mario Günther <i>Probability of Guilt</i>	1.308	Dario Mortini <i>Legal Proof and Explanation</i>	1.308
Nick Hughes <i>Epistemic Dilemmas Defended</i>	1.404	Andy Mueller <i>Accessibilism and Coherence? Why You Cannot Have Both, and which one You Should Pick</i>	1.404
History of Philosophy (5)			
Maciek Czerkawski <i>Aristotelian Rhapsody: Did Aristotle 'Pick [His Categories] as They Came His Way'?</i>	1.604	Benjamin Wilck <i>The Logical Form of Debates with Lay People: Aristotle on Inductive Dialectic</i>	1.604
Logic (6)			
Kristina Liefke <i>Floridi-Style Information, Semanticized</i>	1.406	Eric Raidl <i>Definable Conditionals</i>	1.406
Metaethics, Philosophy of Action, and Decision Theory (7)			
Bart Streumer <i>Standing up for Supervenience</i>	1.201	Singa Behrens <i>No Stop-Gap Required: Partially Grounding Moral Facts</i>	1.201
Janis David Schaab <i>Binding Oneself to Oneself</i>	1.204	Benjamin Kiesewetter <i>What is a Moral Obligation?</i>	1.204

Sektionen / Sections

Tuesday 13.30-14.15

Metaphilosophy (8)

Christian Nimtz 1.405
Empirical Support for Conceptual Engineering? The View from Neo-Whorf

Metaphysics/Ontology (9)

Matteo Nizzardo 1.608
Singular Reference & Indiscernible Entities

Normative Ethics (10)

Jonas Blatter 1.601
Too Quick to Anger? – On the Procedural Appropriateness of Reactive Emotions

Jonas Harney & Jake Khawaia 1.606
Two Views on Claims in Multiple-Option Choice Sets

Philosophy of Mind and Cognition (11)

Leonard Dung 1.501
Newton's Principle and the prospects of animal consciousness science

Elmarie Venter 1.502
An Embodied Predictive Processing Approach to Value-Based Decision Making

Eleonore Neufeld 1.506
Engineering Social Concepts: Lessons from the Science of Categorization

Philosophy of Language (12)

Manfred Krifka 1.205
Moorean Infelicities and the Commitment Account for Assertion

Tuesday 14.15-15.00

Steffen Koch & Jakob Ohlhorst 1.405
On the Possibility of Heavy Duty Conceptual Engineering

Alexander Gebharder & Maria Sekatskava 1.607
Probabilistic Supervenience and Agential Possibilities

Jonas Werner 1.608
Qualitativism and Radical Underdetermination

Claudia Blöser 1.601
Forgiveness as Rendering Resentment Unfitting

Vuko Andrić 1.606
Consequentialism and Incoherence

Anna Giustina 1.501
Inner Acquaintance Theories of Consciousness

Simon Wimmer 1.502
Knowledge-First Dispositionalism about Belief

Corina Strößner 1.506
Natural Concepts and Conceptual Spaces

Felix Bräuer 1.205
Assertion, Constitutive Rules and Conditions of Engagement

Tuesday 13.30-14.15

Tuesday 14.15-15.00

Philosophy of Religion (13)

Jacob Hesse 1.505
*Analogy Revisited. From
Linguistics to Epistemology*

Razvan Mihai Sofroni 1.505
*Religious Ritual Knowledge: From
Techne to Phronesis*

Philosophy of Science (14)

Matthias Unterhuber 1.402
*From Ceteris Paribus Laws
to Mechanistic Explanations
[and back]*

Samuel Schindler 1.402
*Micro-Model Explanations and
Counterfactual Constraint*

Andreas Hüttemann 1.403
*Determinism – an Empirical
Thesis*

Matteo De Benedetto & Elio La Rosa 1.403
*Patchworks As Indexed Epsilon Terms:
A Neo-Carnapian Account Of
Theoretical Terms in Science*

Social Philosophy (16)

Livia Sophie von Samson-
Himmelstjerna 1.103
*Is Immanent Critique
Possible?*

Kristina Lepold 1.103
*Nonideal Theory and Critical Theory:
What They Are about and Why Neither
Is (Completely) Right*

Sektionen / Sections

Tuesday 15.00-15.45

Applied Ethics (1)

Korbinian Rüger 1.401
*Prioritizing the Young in Medical
Emergencies*

Aesthetics (2)

Jochen Briesen 1.504
*Institutional and Symbol-
Theoretic Definitions of "Art"*

Epistemology (4)

Rico Hauswald 1.307
Delphische Autorität

Leonardo Flamini 1.308
*Russellian Inquirers and
Wondering about what One Is
Certain. Some Steps toward a
Conceptual Dimension of Inquirers*

Claire Field 1.404
*Normative Mistakes in the
Epistemic Domain*

History of Philosophy (5)

Alexander Arridge 1.604
*Eudaimonia and the External
Goods in Aristotle's Ethics*

Logic (6)

Mirko Engler 1.406
*Unbestimmtheit der Übersetzung
und Synonymie*

Metaethics, Philosophy of Action, and Decision Theory (7)

Sebastian Köhler 1.201
Functions for Expressivists

Irina Schumski 1.204
Inferentialism about Thick Terms

Tuesday 15.45-16.30

Luise Müller 1.401
*A Cooperative Model of the
Physician-Patient Relationship*

Patrik Engisch 1.504
*Metaphysical and Normative
Aspects of Natural Food. The
Case of Natural Wine*

Sergiu Dorian Spatan 1.307
*On the Feeling of Uncertainty:
Why a Metacognitive Account Is
Better than a Probability
Account*

Rianne Fijten, Paul Martin 1.308
Putra & Eva Schmidt
*How Might the Use of Opaque
Artificial Intelligence in Medical
Contexts Undermine
Knowledge?*

Ruben Noorloos 1.604
*Spinoza on Descartes and the
Common Standard*

Ludovica Conti 1.406
*Arbitrary Abstraction and
Logicity*

Christine Tiefensee 1.201
*Conceptual Supervenience for
Inferentialists*

Inken Titz 1.204
A Perspectivist Theory of Advice

Tuesday 15.00-15.45
Tuesday 15.45-16.30
Metaphilosophy (8)

Michael W. Schmidt	1.405	Işık Sarıhan	1.405
<i>The Conceptual Core of the Method of Reflective Equilibrium</i>		<i>Problems with Publishing Philosophical Claims We Don't Believe</i>	

Metaphysics/Ontology (9)

Anne Sophie Meincke	1.607	Gregor M. Hörzer	1.607
<i>Biological Indeterminism: Towards a Biological Defence of Libertarian Free Will</i>		<i>The Metaphysics of Mechanisms Revisited</i>	
Alexander Murphy	1.608	Martin Glazier	1.608
<i>Why Digital Objects Won't Help Virtual Realists</i>		<i>Perspectival Objects</i>	

Normative Ethics (10)

Stephanie Elsen	1.601	Francesca Bunkenborg	1.601
<i>Abhängigkeit von Beziehungen der Achtsamkeit und Responsivität</i>		<i>Modesty and Humility as Distinct Virtues</i>	
		Thorsten Helfer	1.606
		<i>Ill-Being, Desire-Satisfactionism and the Concept of Desire</i>	

Philosophy of Mind and Cognition (11)

Wanja Wiese	1.501	Albert Newen	1.501
<i>Minimal models of Consciousness</i>		<i>Phenomenal Consciousness: The Predictive Processing Framework and the ALARM Theory of Consciousness</i>	
Lars Dänzer	1.502	Markus Werning	1.502
<i>Bye Bye Blockhead</i>		<i>Do We Need Traces for Episodic Memory? A Defense of Trace Minimalism</i>	
Tom Poljanšek	1.506	Alfredo Vernazzani	1.506
<i>Zwei Begriffe des Begriffs. Perzeptiv-behaviorale vs. kognitive Konzeptionen des Begriffs</i>		<i>Perceptual Phenomenology and Fluency in Language Comprehension</i>	

Philosophy of Language (12)

Jonas Werner	1.205	Emanuel Viebahn	1.205
<i>Wrong Good Guesses</i>		<i>Speech Acts in Fiction</i>	

Sektionen / Sections

Tuesday 15.00-15.45

Philosophy of Religion (13)

Christian Tapp 1.505
Anselms Gottesbeweis

Tuesday 15.45-16.30

Victor Michael Hoheneder 1.505
*Subjekt, Welt und Gott – Das
Mystische im Anschluss an
Ludwig Wittgenstein*

Philosophy of Science (14)

Leah Henderson 1.403
*Putting Inference to the Best
Explanation into Context*

Olivier Lemeire 1.402
*Kind Semantics for Scientific
Generics*

Social Philosophy (16)

Max Gab 1.103
*Institutional Agency in Light
of Idealized Role-
Perspectives*

Jonas Zorn 1.103
*Ökonomisierung des Persönli-
chen – Möglichkeiten der Kritik
und Wege des Widerstands*

Sektionen Mittwoch / Sections Wednesday

Wednesday 09.00-09.45		Wednesday 09.45-10.30	
Applied Ethics (1)			
Sergio Filippo Magni <i>Person-Affecting Procreative Beneficence</i>	1.401	Lukas Tank <i>May We Continue to Emit for Luxury Purposes?</i>	1.401
Epistemology (4)			
Alexander Dinges <i>What Is the Group Belief Debate about?</i>	1.307	Anne Schwenkenbecher <i>Group-Based Ignorance and Collective Epistemic Obligations</i>	1.307
Karen Meyer-Seitz <i>What We Know about Others: Knowledge and the Matter of Privacy</i>	1.308	Keith Raymond Harris <i>Non-Doxastic Disinformation</i>	1.308
Guido Tana <i>Dogmatism, Knowledge, and Factivity</i>	1.404	Paolo Savino <i>On Two Proposals to Sidestep the Infallibility Objection against Underdetermination Scepticism</i>	1.404
History of Philosophy (5)			
Julia Wolf <i>Hume's Problem in the Appendix</i>	1.604	Sebastian Bender <i>Kant's Possibility Proof and the Principle of Complete Determination</i>	1.604
Logic (6)			
Deborah Kant <i>An Empirically Informed Perspective on the Set-Theoretic Independence Problem</i>	1.406	Godehard W. Link <i>Neues vom Mengenuniversum: Jetzt doch wieder Aleph_2?</i>	1.406
Metaethics, Philosophy of Action, and Decision Theory (7)			
Xintong Wei <i>Understanding Normative Risk in Moral Deliberation</i>	1.201	Claire Field <i>Risk, Rationality, and Recklessness</i>	1.201
David Heering <i>Explanationism about Responsibility as Reasons-Responsiveness and the Poverty of Actuality Challenge</i>	1.204	Jean Moritz Müller <i>Reasons, Correctness and Intentionality</i>	1.204

Sektionen / Sections

Wednesday 9.00-9.45

Metaphilosophy (8)

James Justus & Michael Bishop
Normativity in the Natural World

1.405

Wednesday 9.45-10.30

Keith Allen, Paul Engelhardt,
Eugen Fischer
*Fragmented and Conflicted: Folk
Beliefs about Vision Challenge
Philosophical Appeals to
Common Sense*

1.405

Metaphysics/Ontology (9)

Julio Brotero De Rizzo
*Truthmakers and the Grounds of
Modalities*

1.607

Alexander Roberts
The Metaphysics of Modalities

1.607

Annina Julia Loets
Plenitude Costed

1.608

Stephan Krämer
Iterating Worldly Ground

1.608

Normative Ethics (10)

Maximilian Kiener
Strict Moral Answerability

1.601

Felix Koch
The Value of Liability

1.601

Nora Heinzelmann
*A Challenge for Coherence
Accounts of Rationality*

1.606

Hannah Altehenger
Too Much Self-Control?

1.606

Philosophy of Mind and Cognition (11)

Christopher Gauker
*Amodal Completion:
Imagination or 3D Modeling?*

1.501

Mattia Riccardi
*Hallucinations and Illusions:
Where's the Difference*

1.501

Bartosz Radomski
*The Free-Energy Principle
Should Not Be Compared to
Hamilton's Principle.*

1.502

Peter Schulte
*Borderlands of the Mind: A
Gradualist Theory of
Representation*

1.502

Francesco Marchi
Everyday Roots of Biased Belief

1.506

Philosophy of Language (12)

Stefano Pugnaghi
*Predicativism, Metasemantics
and Circularity*

1.205

Alexandru Viroel Radulescu
*Answering the Humpty Dumpty
Objection*

1.205

Wednesday 9.00-9.45

Wednesday 9.45-10.30

Philosophy of Science (14)

Kian Salimkhani
*A Dynamical Perspective on the
Arrow of Time*

1.402

Rasmus Jaksland & Kian
Salimkhani
*The Many Problems of Spacetime
Emergence in Quantum Gravity*

1.402

Simon Bleszenohl & Deniz
Sarıkaya
*A Norm for Science Advice:
Making Beliefs Accurate*

1.403

Eva-Maria Jung
*Epistemic and Non-Epistemic
Perspectives on Conspiracy
Theories*

1.403

Political Philosophy and Philosophy of Law (15)

Jakob Huber
Hope from Despair

1.504

Maike Albertzart
*Joint Abilities: A relational
Approach*

1.504

Marius Baumann
Meritocracy and Populism

1.505

Julian Müller
Why Populism is an Ideology

1.505

Social Philosophy (16)

Tugba Sevinc
*Reframing Global Solidarity: A
Critical Survey and a Proposal*

1.103

Hilke Charlotte Hänel
Potentially Disabled?

1.103

Sektionen / Sections

Wednesday 10.30-11.15		Wednesday 11.15-12.00	
Applied Ethics (1)			
Hanna Schübel <i>Die individuelle Verantwortung Emissionen zu entfernen</i>	1.401	Eugen Pissarskoi <i>Zur Irrelevanz von Vorstellungen guten Lebens für die Begründung von Strategien Nachhaltiger Entwicklung</i>	1.401
Epistemology (4)			
Nadja El Kassar <i>Defining Ignorance – It's more than Lack of Knowledge or Lack of True Belief</i>	1.307	Anne Meylan & Kevin Reuter <i>On Being Ignorant</i>	1.307
David Heering <i>Alethic and Narrative Models of Conspiracy Theories</i>	1.308	Eve Kitsik <i>Conceptual Engineering vs Nudging for Epistemic Amelioration</i>	1.308
Jochen Briesen <i>Zwei Verteidigungen von Reichenbachs Lösung des Induktionsproblems</i>	1.404	Christiana Werner <i>Testimony, Imagination and Knowing What It Is Like to Have a Complex Experience</i>	1.404
History of Philosophy (5)			
Johannes Nickl <i>"Quod dubitas, ne feceris". Kant on Conscience and the Certainty of Moral Judgements</i>	1.604	Martin Brecher <i>Die Funktion des Erlaubnisgesetzes bei Kant</i>	1.604
Logic (6)			
Nuno Filipe Maia <i>No Arithmetical Determinacy From Supertask Computations</i>	1.406	Balthasar Grabmayr <i>Can We Turn Metamathematical Results into Representation- Independent Insights?</i>	1.406
Metaethics, Philosophy of Action, and Decision Theory (7)			
Daniele Bruno <i>Risk, Recklessness, and Objectivism about Ought</i>	1.201	Matthias Rolffs <i>Resultant Moral Luck and the Scope of Moral Responsibility</i>	1.201
Max Goetsch <i>Reliability and the Nature of Abilities</i>	1.204	Alexander Gebharder & Maria Sekatskava <i>Supervenient Fixity and Agential Possibilities</i>	1.204

Wednesday 10.30-11.15

Wednesday 11.15-12.00

Metaphilosophy (8)

Elke Elisabeth Schmidt
*Trolleologie und autonomes Fahren
– sind Gedankenexperimente
sinnvoll?*

1.405

Viktoria Knoll
*Will ich das noch sein? –
Begriffsethische
Überlegungen zu personaler
Identität*

1.405

Metaphysics/Ontology (9)

Tobias Wilsch
*Solving Blackburn's Challenge with
Anchored Possibility*

1.607

Paul M. Näger
*The Mereological Problem of
Entanglement*

1.607

Matthias Rolffs & Kian Salimkhani
On Progress in Metaphysics

1.608

David Hommen
*Models as Perspicuous
Representations: A
Wittgensteinian Approach to
Metaphysical Knowledge*

1.608

Normative Ethics (10)

Leonhard Menges
*The Right to Privacy and the Deep
Self*

1.601

W. Jared Parmer
*Manipulation as Covert Non-
Cooperation*

1.601

René Baston
*Improving Self-Control through the
Practice of Moral Responsibility:
Implicit Biases and the Nurturing
Stance*

1.606

Niels de Haan
*Diachronic Perspectivism and
the Better Information
Problem*

1.606

Philosophy of Mind and Cognition (11)

Giulia Martina
*Seeing Colours in a Bolour-Blind
Way*

1.501

Marcello Garibbo
*Still There. Perceiving Objects
Persisting in the Absence of
Change*

1.501

Matej Kohár
*Mechanistic Locality and the
Explanatory Relevance of
Representational Content*

1.502

Hajo Greif
*Adaptation and Its
Analogues: Biological
Categories for Biosemantics*

1.502

Ilia Patronnikow
*Does Implicit Attitudes' Sensitivity to
Evidence Show that they Are Beliefs?*

1.506

Sebastian Watzl
The Rationality of Salience

1.506

Philosophy of Language (12)

Paul Hasselkuss & Markus Schrenk
*A Fresh Look at Wittgenstein's
Family Resemblance*

1.205

Steffen Koch
*How Words Matter. The Case
for Linguistic Revision*

1.205

Sektionen / Sections

Wednesday 10.30-11.15

Philosophy of Science (14)

Maren Bräutigam 1.402
*On the Qualitative Identity of
Similar Fermions: Orthodoxy
versus Heterodoxy*

Marina Moreno 1.403
*Subtracting Self-Selection
Bias from Academic Inquiry: A
Computational Exploration*

Wednesday 11.15-12.00

Karim Baraghith & Nina Nicolin 1.402
*Spatial Separation of Magnetic
Moment and Location as an
Argument for a Trope-Ontological
Interpretation of Quantum Theory?*

Alexander Christian 1.403
*What Does It Take to Justify a
Research Moratorium?*

Political Philosophy and Philosophy of Law (15)

Elisabeth Theresia Widmer 1.504
*Kantian Functionalism and
Social Progress in Max Adler's
Sociological Justification of
Socialism*

Matthew Adams & Johannes
Himmelreich 1.504
*The Regress Problem for
Experiments in Living*

Andrei Bespalov 1.505
*Respect, Responsiveness and
the Fallibilism of Public
Reason*

Frauke Albersmeier 1.505
*The Circumstances of Justice in
Animal Rights Theory*

Social Philosophy (16)

Raphael van Riel 1.103
*Functionalism as an
Explanatory Project in the
Social Sciences*

Franziska Lara Paulmann 1.103
*Refugee Women and Their Specific
Claim to Admission*

Wednesday 13.30-14.15
Wednesday 14.15-15.00
Applied Ethics (1)

Nora Freya Lindemann <i>The Ethics of 'Deathbots'</i>	1.401	Hauke Behrendt <i>Affected in the Loop – A Workable Solution to Dangers of statistical Discrimination through Artificial Intelligence?</i>	1.401
Gesine Schepers <i>Biologische Vielfalt als Gegenstand der Naturethik</i>	1.405	Alexander Arridge <i>Ecotage as Other-Defence</i>	1.405

Didactics of Philosophy (3)

David Lanius <i>Wertevermittlung im Philosophie- und Ethikunterricht? Intellektuelle Tugenden und kognitive Emotionen</i>	1.606	Dominik Balg <i>Moral Disagreement and the Goals of Moral Education</i>	1.606
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Epistemology (4)

Anna-Maria Asunta Eder <i>Finding an Epistemic Compromise</i>	1.307	Nick Küspert <i>Conciliating to Avoid Moral Skepticism</i>	1.307
Nastasia Müller <i>Act First Responsibilism: An Occurrent-State Account of Epistemic Responsibilist Virtue</i>	1.308	Tobias Keiling <i>Open-Mindedness: A Past Performance Account</i>	1.308

History of Philosophy (5)

Elke Elisabeth Schmidt <i>Kant und das Trolley-Problem</i>	1.604	Thomas Meyer <i>Wie sich Normativität aus dem ergibt, was konstitutiv für den freien Willen ist. Zu Hegels Konstitutivismus</i>	1.604
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Logic (6)

Jonas Rafael Becker Arenhart & Hitoshi Omori <i>Change of Logic, without Change of Meaning</i>	1.406	Sebastian G. W. Speitel <i>Logical Constants between Inference and Reference</i>	1.406
Johannes Stern <i>If Transparent, then 'True' Is Not Logical.</i>	1.502	Stephan Krämer <i>Mighty Belief Revision</i>	1.502

Sektionen / Sections

Wednesday 13.30-14.15		Wednesday 14.15-15.00	
Metaethics, Philosophy of Action, and Decision Theory (7)			
Marvin Backes	1.201	Razvan Mihai Sofroni	1.201
<i>Modern Moral Intuitionism and the Reliability Challenge</i>		<i>Moral Knowledge from Art</i>	
Marcel Jahn & Lukas Beck	1.204	Elizabeth Ventham	1.204
<i>Do You Believe In Deep Down? On Two Conceptions of Valuing</i>		<i>An Attitudinal Account of Affective Empathy</i>	
Metaphysics/Ontology (9)			
Julia Zakkou	1.607	Fabian Hundertmark	1.607
<i>Power Collapse</i>		<i>Multi-Track Pluralism</i>	
Donnchadh O Conaill	1.608	Stefan Roski	1.608
<i>The Ontology of Emergent Substances</i>		<i>Metaphysically Understanding Why</i>	
Philosophy of Mind and Cognition (11)			
Julia Langkau	1.501	Stephen Müller	1.501
<i>Imagining Future Memories?</i>		<i>The Content of Mental Imagery, or How to Visualize the Fantastical</i>	
Christian Feldbacher-Escamilia & Maria Sekatskaya	1.506	Sabrina Coninx	1.506
<i>Theoretical and Ontological Reduction of Mental Properties</i>		<i>The Mysterious Pain Quality: Prospects and Challenges of the Orthodox View</i>	
Philosophy of Language (12)			
Christopher Gauker	1.205	Filippo Ferrari & Sebastiano Moruzzi	1.205
<i>Epistemic versus Objective Possibilities</i>		<i>Alethic Pluralism, Deflationism, and the Integration Challenge</i>	
Dan Zeman	1.404	Richard Roth	1.404
<i>Relativism and Retraction: The Case Is Not Yet Lost</i>		<i>Introspection from Possibility Preservation?</i>	

Wednesday 13.30-14.15

Wednesday 14.15-15.00

Philosophy of Science (14)

Francesco De Pretis, William Peden & Mantas Radzvilas
A Battle in the Statistics Wars: A Simulation-Based Comparison of Bayesian, Frequentist and Williamsonian Methodologies

1.402

Jon Leefmann
Public Epistemic Trust in Science

1.402

Elisabeth Gerlinde Muchka
A critique of Lu and Bourrat's Argument for Harmonizing Epigenetic Inheritance with the Gene-Centric Perspective of Evolution

1.403

Karim Baraghith & Christian J. Feldbacher-Escamilla
From Reduction to Unification: The Case of Cultural Evolutionary Psychology

1.403

Political Philosophy and Philosophy of Law (15)

Ilkin Huseynli
Freedom without Ability

1.504

Devon Malcolm Cass
Equality of Status as an Intergenerational Ideal

1.504

Daniel Sharp
What is Wrong with Denaturalization?

1.505

Adis Selimi
Staatenanerkennung und moralische Doppelstandards

1.505

Social Philosophy (16)

Katharina Anna Sodoma
Emotional Gaslighting and Affective Empathy

1.103

Aline Dammel
Hearing Anger

1.103

Sektionen / Sections

Wednesday 15.00-15.45

Applied Ethics (1)		Didactics of Philosophy (3)	
Samuel Ulbricht	1.401	Friedrich Christoph Dörge & Matthias Holweger	1.606
<i>Eine Kantische Antwort auf das Gamer's Dilemma</i>		<i>Zugänge zur Begründung von Moral vermitteln – eine unerfüllbare Forderung</i>	
Kaisa Kärki	1.405		
<i>Inequalities of Attention</i>			
Epistemology (4)		History of Philosophy (5)	
Philip A. Ebert & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen	1.307	Guilia Cantamessi	1.604
<i>Pluralism about Risk</i>		<i>Philosophical Ethics and Ordinary Moral Thought: Sidgwick's Twofold Approach</i>	
Taylor Roger Charlie Matthews	1.308		
<i>Why Skill Matters in Vice Epistemology</i>			
Logic (6)		Metaethics, Philosophy of Action, and Decision Theory (7)	
Erik Stei	1.406	Adriano Mannino & Marina Moreno	1.201
<i>Defending the Generality of Logical Consequence</i>		<i>Towards a Bargaining Model of Reflective Equilibrium</i>	
Gregor Damschen	1.502	Sebastian Schmidt	1.204
<i>Modal Truthmaker Paradox Against Jago's Truthmaker Maximalism</i>		<i>Blameworthiness for Non-Culpable Attitudes</i>	
Metaphysics/Ontology (9)		Philosophy of Mind and Cognition (11)	
Bar Luzon	1.607	Silvana Pani	1.501
<i>The Euthyphro Challenge in Metasemantics</i>		<i>General and Specific Images: A Largely Underexplored Distinction</i>	
Yannic Kappes	1.608	Peter Brössel & Eline Kuipers	1.506
<i>Bolzano's Tortoise and a Loophole for Achilles</i>		<i>Non-Conceptual Knowledge-How</i>	

Wednesday 15.00-15.45

Philosophy of Language (12)		Philosophy of Science (14)	
Kevin Reuter	1.205	Tereza Hendl, Daniel James & Saana Jukola	1.402
<i>Does Context Influence How We Think about Truth?</i>		<i>Who Counts in Official Statistics? Towards an Ethical-Epistemic Analysis of Racial/Ethnic Categorisation</i>	
Nadja-Mira Yolcu	1.404	Patrick Klösel	1.403
<i>Expressive Denegation: Presenting Myself as Not Being in a Mental State</i>		<i>The Limits of Counterfactual Thinking. Two Case Studies from Economics</i>	
Political Philosophy and Philosophy of Law (15)		Social Philosophy (16)	
Suzanne Andrea Bloks	1.504	Gerhard Ernst	1.103
<i>Designing Deliberative Democracy</i>		<i>Liebe und Unersetzbarkeit</i>	
Valerij Zisman	1.505		
<i>Taking the Victims Seriously in Criminal Law</i>			

Sektionen Donnerstag / Sections Thursday

Thursday 09.00-09.45		Thursday 09.45-10.30	
Applied Ethics (1)			
Tim Bütke, Johannes Fottner, Charlotte Haid & Charlotte Franziska Unruh <i>Workplace Decision Algorithms and Human Autonomy</i>	1.401	Norbert Paulo <i>The Trolley Problem in the Ethics of Autonomous Vehicles</i>	1.401
Thomas Alberto <i>Against Recent Defences of Unlimited Open Borders</i>	1.405	Nanette Katherine Ryan <i>Self-Respect & Childhood</i>	1.405
Didactics of Philosophy (3)			
Markus Bohlmann <i>Mentales Modell oder disparates Vorwissen – Was ist ein Präkonzept?</i>	1.606	Katharina Schulz <i>Diversität im schulischen Philosophiekanon und die Förderung fachlicher und pädagogischer Ziele</i>	1.606
Epistemology (4)			
Michael Vollmer <i>Why Should We Suspend Judgement?</i>	1.307	Verena Wagner <i>Epistemic Double Checking and Suspension of Belief</i>	1.307
		Samuel Boardman <i>Surprise Modal Knowledge</i>	1.308
History of Philosophy (5)			
Hamid Taieb <i>The Early Husserl on Existence</i>	1.604	Gregor Emanuel Bös <i>Cutting Diamonds. The Modal Shift in Husserl's Correlationism</i>	1.604
Logic (6)			
Stefano Bonzio, Giuliano Rosella & Flaminio Tommaso <i>Algebras of Counterfactual Conditionals</i>	1.406	Eric Raidl & Hans Rott <i>Difference-Making and 'Because'</i>	1.406
Jonathan Daniel Mai <i>Two-Dimensional Rigidity</i>	1.502	Andreas Ditter <i>Semantics for Higher-Order Essences</i>	1.502
Metaethics, Philosophy of Action, and Decision Theory (7)			
Wooram Lee <i>Reasons, Reasoning, and Guidance: An Interpersonal Picture</i>	1.201	Niels de Haan <i>Diachronic Perspectivism and the Better Information Problem</i>	1.201

Thursday 09.00-09.45
Thursday 09.45-10.30
Metaphysics/Ontology (9)

Lukas Skiba
Higher-Order Metaphysics of Time

1.608

Martin Pleitz
Dynamic Reificationism

1.608

Normative Ethics (10)

Johanna Privitera
Contractualism, Demandingness, and Everyday Risks

1.601

Jörg Löschke
Vicious Partiality and Agent-Relative Deontological Thresholds

1.601

Philosophy of Mind and Cognition (11)

Ramiro Glauer & Frauke Hildebrandt
Becoming Episodic. Generic and Episodic Thinking in Early Cognitive Development

1.501

Laura Bickel
Bergson's Notion of Habit and Novelty and Its Relevance for the Neuroscientific Study of Behavioral Change

1.501

Anaïs Giannuzzo
Self-Knowledge and Creativity

1.506

Sabrina Coninx & Julia Wolf
Pluralism and the Role of Mindreading

1.506

Philosophy of Language (12)

Hannes Worthmann
Two Kinds of Category Mistakes

1.205

Simon Dominik Vonlanthen
Mismatches between Natural Language and Logical Consequence

1.205

Katharina Felka
Moorean Infelicity and Moral Discourse

1.204

Stefan Rinner
Slurs and Freedom of Speech

1.204

Philosophy of Science (14)

Alexander Gebharder & Barbara Osimani
Analogical Inference Bayesian Style 2.0

1.402

Barnaby Crook & Lena Kästner
Discovering Emergent Structure in AI Systems

1.402

Johannes Lenhard
The Most Important Thing. Wittgenstein, Engineering, and the Foundations of Mathematics

1.403

David Hyder
The Conflict between Locality, Determinism, and Causation in the Work of Wittgenstein and Einstein

1.403

Demetris Portides
Idealization and Abstraction in Scientific Modelling

1.404

Gerhard Schurz
Fakten und Werte in der Pandemie

1.404

Sektionen / Sections

Thursday 09.00-09.45

Thursday 09.45-10.30

Political Philosophy and Philosophy of Law (15)

Matthias Brinkmann	1.504	Marcel Twele	1.504
<i>What if Anything Is Wrong with Inflation?</i>		<i>Inheritance Tax and Economic Desert</i>	
Stefan Rinner	1.505	Barbara Bziuk	1.505
<i>Women: What Do We Want Them to Be?</i>		<i>Can Business Corporations be Legally Responsible for Structural Injustice?</i>	

Social Philosophy (16)

Gabriel Wollner	1.103	Hauke Behrendt	1.103
<i>Alienation and Reification, Orthodox and Unified</i>		<i>Diskriminierung und Unterdrückung als gruppenbezogene Formen sozialer Ungerechtigkeit</i>	

Thursday 10.30-11.15

Thursday 11.15-12.00

Applied Ethics (1)

Sara Blanco	1.401	Christian Budnik	1.401
<i>The Explainability-Trust Hypothesis: An Epistemic Analysis of Its Limitations</i>		<i>Kontrolle ist besser: Warum wir künstlicher Intelligenz nicht vertrauen können</i>	
Karl Christoph Reinmuth	1.405	Karsten Witt	1.405
<i>The Possibility and Evaluation of Norm Misuses and Abuses</i>		<i>Moralismus und moralische Urteile</i>	

Didactics of Philosophy (3)

David Löwenstein	1.606	Dominik Balg	1.606
<i>Argumente und Auswege. Dissonanzen und Inkonsistenzen in der Philosophie- und Argumentationsdidaktik</i>		<i>Wer hat recht? Die Rolle des Philosophie- und Ethikunterrichts im Rahmen der schulischen Befähigung zum angemessenen Umgang mit Meinungsverschiedenheiten</i>	

Epistemology (4)

Paul Silva	1.307	Daniela Schuster	1.307
<i>Believing Suspension</i>		<i>Suspension in Machine Learning Systems?</i>	
Nancy Abigail Nuñez Hernandez	1.308	Daniel Schoch	1.308
<i>Epistemic Lessons from the Complexity of Logical Entailment</i>		<i>Transforming Belief into Knowledge: A Decomposition Theorem</i>	

Thursday 10:30-11:15
Thursday 11:15-12:00
History of Philosophy (5)

Richard W. Lawrence
The Chess Analogy in Its Historical Context

1.604

Ansgar Seide
Carnap Against Inductive Metaphysics

1.604

Logic (6)

Yaroslav Shramko
The Diamond of Mingle Logics: A Four-Fold Infinite Way to Be Safe from Paradox

1.406

Andrew Parisi & Marcus Rossberg
Neutral Free Logics

1.406

Michael James De
Empirical Negation and Fitch's Paradox of Knowability

1.502

Metaethics, Philosophy of Action, and Decision Theory (7)

Luke Elson
Structural Rationality Avoids Determinate Substantive Irrationality

1.201

Aleks Knoks
Second-Order Reasons in Default Logic

1.201

Metaphysics/Ontology (9)

David Wörner
Criteria of Identity and Criteria of Distinctness

1.608

Jules Alexander Desai
A Nomological Solution to the Personite Problem

1.608

Normative Ethics (10)

Thomas Schmidt
Supererogation and the Structure of Reasons

1.601

Andreas Bruns
The Saveability Dilemma: A Defence of Frances Kamm's Inviolability Account

1.601

Philosophy of Mind and Cognition (11)

Caroline Stankoz
Cognition on Different Levels of Organisation

1.501

Victor Fernández Castro
Expressivism, Normativity and the Mind

1.501

Nora Heinzelmann
Willpower and Uncertainty

1.506

Francesco Fanti Rovetta
Narratives in the Head: Inner Speech as the Format of Narrative Thought

1.506

Sektionen / Sections

Thursday 10.30-11.15

Thursday 11.15-12.00

Philosophy of Language (12)

Bartosz Szyler <i>Can You Have It All? Semantic Holism, Similarity of Meaning and Compositionality</i>	1.205	John Horden <i>A Puzzle about "Is One of"</i>	1.205
Suaad Al Helou, Matthias Unterhuber & Markus Werning <i>Are Principles of Pragmatics Universal? Does Word-Order Impact Pragmatic Processing? A Behavioral Study in Arabic</i>	1.204	Paul Engelhardt & Eugen Fischer <i>Experimental Argument Analysis: Polysemy Processing in Verbal Reasoning</i>	1.204

Philosophy of Science (14)

Felix Kopecky <i>Rational issue polarisation among agents with perfect memory: How argumentation shapes multi-agent epistemic processes</i>	1.402	Oliver Buchholz <i>The Curve-Fitting Problem Revisited</i>	1.402
Enno Fischer <i>Naturalness and the Heuristic Role of Scientific Principles</i>	1.403	Bogdana Stamenkovic <i>Humboldt and Vernadsky: A Philosophical Perspective on Holistic Ideas in Natural Science</i>	1.403
Christopher Pincock & Michael Poznic <i>Integrating Representational, Exploratory, and Design Modelling</i>	1.404	Paul Hoyningen-Huene <i>Objectivity, Value-Free Science, and Inductive Risk</i>	1.404

Political Philosophy and Philosophy of Law (15)

Niklas Dummer & Christian Neuhäuser <i>Wohngerechtigkeit: Ein Argument für eine progressive Wohnraumsteuer</i>	1.504	Lars Moen <i>Analysing Moralized Freedom</i>	1.504
Hilkje Charlotte Hänel <i>Listening to Refugees' Voices: Testimonial Injustice in Academia and Politics</i>	1.505	Elias Moser <i>Meaningful Work as a Positional Good</i>	1.505

Social Philosophy (16)

Philipp Haueis, Lia Nordmann & Paul Schuetze <i>Philosophy and the Climate Crisis: A Manifesto for Change</i>	1.103	Eleonore Neufeld & Elise Woodard <i>On Subtweeting</i>	1.103
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The following papers have been accepted, but are not presented at the conference:

Ayhan, Sara: What Ekman's "paradox" can tell us about reductions, identity, and meaning of proofs

Båve, Arvid: Propositions and their truth conditions

Blanchard, Thomas: Must Causal Relata Be Distinct?

Blunden, Charlie Thomas: There Is Some Alternative: Conventionality, Status-Quo Bias, and Moral Progress

Facchin, Marco: Why we can't say what cognition is (and you can't either)

Fairhurst, Jordi: Wittgenstein and Deep Disagreements

Fjellstad, Andreas: A non-classical strengthening of McGee's omega-inconsistency result

Gosepath, Stefan: Only a temporal Right to Private Property

Henschen, Tobias: The ontology of macroeconomic aggregates

Johannesson, Eric: Quine's underdetermination thesis

Kindermann, Dirk: Fragmentation and Frege Puzzles

Korem, Naomi: The Overlooked Harm of Academic Protest

Lossau, Tammo: Is Knowledge a Social Kind?

Marschall, Benjamin: Readymades and Realism

Neth, Sven: Better Foundations for Subjective Probability

Odrowaz-Sypniewska, Joanna: Negotiating Boundaries

Propach, Jan Levin: God and Abstract Objects. A Critical Examination of Brian Leftow's Theist Actualism

Schomäcker, Astrid: Bias in Humans and AI: A Road to Fairer Decisions

Schoonen, Tom: Similarity and the Necessity of Origins

Serrahima, Carlota: Painful mood: menstrual discomfort against a sharp distinction between pains and moods

Skurt, Daniel: Modal Logics or: How I stopped worrying about modal worlds

For an updated list of cancellations, see gap.11.de/news.html

15 Adams & Himmelreich

The Regress Problem for Experiments in Living

Matthew Adams (University of Indiana Bloomington), mra10@iu.edu

Johannes Himmelreich (Syracuse University), johannes.himmelreich@gmail.com

Wednesday, 11.15-12.00 | DOR 24, R. 1.504

An emerging body of literature defends experiments in living as a distinctive and preferable way of doing political philosophy. Proponents are united by a focus on the *epistemic* role of experiments in living and by the claim that experiments in living not only (a) provide certain *sui generis* insights into normative principles that regulate political institutions, but also (b) ground such institutions' practical authority. In this paper, we present a regress problem: Experiments in living presuppose theories of the same kind that they are meant to be testing. We identify two kinds of such theoretical presuppositions: (I) conditions of permissible conduct, and (II) conditions of experimental success. Most proponents of experiments in living state the former, few give their account of the latter. Muldoon, for example, states that "collective experiments demand the endorsement of all those involved, or at least all adults involved." We argue that all plausible candidate presuppositions are problematic. Against what proponents of experiments in living claim, these presuppositions are not innocuous or "normatively thin". We raise problems for each and argue that experiments in living face a regress problem.

12 Al Helou, Unterhuber & Werning

Are Principles of Pragmatics Universal? Does Word-Order Impact Pragmatic Processing? A Behavioural Study in Arabic

Suaad Al Helou (Ruhr-Universität Bochum), suaad.alhelou@rub.de

Matthias Unterhuber (Ruhr-Universität Bochum), matthias.unterhuber@rub.de

Markus Werning (Ruhr-Universität Bochum), markus.werning@rub.de

Thursday, 10.30-11.15 | DOR 24, R. 1.204

Our paper investigates two issues: (a) Are the principles of pragmatic processing universal? (b) In case they are, does word-order make a difference? To address (a) and (b), we conduct two behavioural experiments in Arabic. Regarding (a), we inquire whether results found in Western languages and cultures generalize to Arabic language and culture. To this end, we compare three quantitative models of the rational speech act framework (Frank & Goodman, 2012; Werning, Unterhuber, & Wiedemann, 2019), which strive to explain context's influence on word meaning: The Semantic Similarity Model claims that a listener's predictive probability of a word is determined by its semantic similarity with its preceding context (as reflected in the mental lexicon). The Relevance Model asserts that it is only determined by relevance considerations. The Bayesian Pragmatics Model holds that the predictive probability is a relevance-guided update of semantic similarity, as reflected in the mental lexicon. To examine (b), we exploit the fact that Arabic has a free word-order and use word-orders OVS (object-verb-subject) and SVO (subject-verb-object). We find evidence that principles of pragmatic processing might be universal and do not seem to be impacted by word-order in deliberate, offline processing.

1 Alberto**Against Recent Defences of Unlimited Open Borders**

Thomas Alberto (Universität Bern), thomas.alberto@students.unibe.ch

Thursday, 09.00-09.45 | DOR 24, R. 1.405

Brennan and van der Vossen (2018) present a powerful argument in favour of an unlimited open border (OB) policy worldwide. Drawing on cutting-edge economic research, the authors argue that the fastest and most effective way to solve global poverty is not through the redistribution of wealth in charitable programmes but through freer markets, including the freedom of labour mobility. They propose a theory of global justice which defends a novel class of rights: productive rights; for example, the rights to choose who to work for and whom to sell produce to. Arguing from the modern economic consensus that the wealth of nations is a product of the “quality” of a nation’s institutions, they contest that a right to cross-border mobility would allow workers to move from bad-institution countries to good-institution countries, simultaneously unlocking hundreds of trillions of dollars of GDP currently locked away. In my paper, I agree with the authors about the extreme value of good institutions. It is the primary cause of the difference between extreme poverty and wealth. However, I argue that this value provides a presumptive reason against OBs. Extremely valuable institutions ought not to be risked, OBs are a risk, therefore we ought not open borders.

15 Albersmeier**The Circumstances of Justice in Animal Rights Theory**

Frauke Albersmeier (HHU Düsseldorf), frauke.albersmeier@hhu.de

Wednesday, 11.15-12.00 | DOR 24, R. 1.505

The *political turn in animal ethics* – the turn toward the concepts of political theory for analyzing the normative implications of the relationships between humans and animals – has placed renewed emphasis on justice as a crucial concept in animal rights theory. It has involved the reconceptualization of nonhuman animals not just as bearers of moral rights, but also as claim holders with regard to political representation and fair shares in the distribution of the benefits of social cooperation. Foreseeable and actual charges of over-demandingness directed against arguments for (political) animal rights are often confronted by appealing to the doctrine of the circumstances of justice: the idea that matters of justice arise only under specific conditions. The scope of requirements of interspecies justice is delimited by claiming that the circumstances of justice do not obtain in certain human-animal relationships. I argue (i) that such appeals to the circumstances of justice rely on a problematic fragmentation of the moral community that is biased in favor of human interests; and (ii) that a non-anthropocentric theory of justice should start from the realization that the circumstances of justice, as commonly conceived, simply do not obtain for any potential subjects of justice.

15 Albertzart

Joint Abilities: A Relational Approach

Maïke Albertzart (Universität Mainz), maïke.albertzart@uni-mainz.de

Wednesday 09.45-10.30 | DOR 24, R. 1.504

Moral and political philosophy as well as public discourse is rife with talk about joint abilities: we are able to mitigate climate change, alleviate world poverty, or end a pandemic through social distancing and high vaccination rates. However, despite its common usage, the concept of joint ability has received surprisingly little attention in the philosophical literature. What exactly does it mean to say that we can or cannot do something *together*? According to the dominant conception of joint ability, a joint ability is best understood as the ability of a plurality of agents. I argue that plural property accounts of joint ability violate one of the central tenets of the metaphysics of abilities, namely that abilities relate agents to actions. I propose to understand joint abilities as a subcategory of joint potentialities whose manifestation is a relation that belongs non-trivially to all of the potentiality's possessors. The relational model offers a way of understanding our talk about joint abilities in moral and political debates, and it does so while preserving a conceptual continuity between individual and joint abilities. Joint abilities manifest themselves as relations between agents, but they are properties of individual agents.

1 Alex & Winkler

Does Epigenome Editing Deserve Similar Consideration as Genome Editing within Bioethics?

Karla Alex (Universität Heidelberg), karla.alex@med.uni-heidelberg.de

Eva C. Winkler (Universität Heidelberg), eva.winkler@med.uni-heidelberg.de

Tuesday, 14.15-15.00 | DOR 24, R. 1.401

Following recent breakthroughs in genome editing (GE) research, several novel gene technologies have been developed, e.g., epigenome editing (EE). There is a nascent, still small bioethical debate on EE.¹ The goal of our research (DFG-funded project COMPASS-ELSI) is to jumpstart a broader ethical debate on EE. Our two main theses are: Firstly, EE deserves ethical consideration alongside GE as both come with unknown risks for the edited individual. Secondly, regarding heritability, EE and certain types of GE differ from an outcomes-oriented perspective but not necessarily with respect to the intention of passing on risks to potential descendants. To defend both claims, we compare and ethically evaluate therapeutic applicability, risks, potential benefits, and effectiveness from an *ex-ante* perspective, and briefly evaluate grades of intention with respect to inheritability for especially GE. In sum, we state: EE might not always be preferable to GE despite their technological differences. ¹ Cf. especially Huerne et al. Auditing the editor: A review of key translational issues in epigenetic editing (CRISPR J 2022 5/2); World Health Organization. Human genome editing: A framework for governance (2021, p. 25f.).

8 Allen, Engelhardt & Fischer

Fragmented and Conflicted: Folk Beliefs about Vision Challenge Philosophical Appeals to Common Sense

Keith Allen (University of York), keith.allen@york.ac.uk

Paul Engelhardt (University of East Anglia), p.engelhardt@uea.ac.uk

Eugen Fischer (University of East Anglia), e.fischer@uea.ac.uk

Wednesday 09.45-10.30 | DOR 24, R. 1.405

Philosophical debates often appeal to ‘the’ common-sense conception of phenomena of interest: free will, consciousness, material objects, time, colour, etc. Debates about the nature of perception take for granted that there is a single, coherent common-sense conception of vision, which is consistent with Direct Realism and enjoys epistemic default status. Evidential experimental philosophy examines the evidential value of philosophically relevant intuitions. Extending this research, we ask whether folk beliefs deserve the epistemic default status they are often accorded. First, we review work on belief fragmentation that poses a general challenge to philosophical reliance on common-sense conceptions. Second, we present a survey that empirically examines the challenge specifically for beliefs about vision. Using an agreement rating task with verbal and pictorial stimuli, we found many laypeople simultaneously hold conflicting Direct Realist and Indirect Realist beliefs. Direct Realist beliefs are not clearly dominant. Consistent adherence to Direct Realism is the exception. We argue that these findings suggest there is no such thing as ‘the’ common-sense conception of vision to which philosophers of perception could appeal.

10 Altehenger

Too Much Self-Control?

Hannah Altehenger (Universität Konstanz), hannah.altehenger@uni-konstanz.de

Wednesday 09.45-10.30 | DOR 24, R. 1.606

Commonsense thinking about self-control seems to display a fundamental ambivalence: On the one hand, there is the belief that self-control is ‘a good thing’ and ‘something one wouldn’t mind having more of’. On the other hand, however, there is the widespread belief that one can have ‘too much’ self-control. On the whole, people seem to think there is something like an Aristotelian mean with respect to self-control, i.e., that there is a certain level of self-control such that it is undesirable either to fall below or to rise above it. The talk asks if the view that self-control admits not merely of deficiencies but also of ‘excesses’ is justified. One key insight that will emerge is that some of the main worries which drive this view rest on certain mistaken impressions. Once these are removed, it is very doubtful, though, whether there is any interesting sense in which one can have too much self-control.

10 Andrić

Consequentialism and Incoherence

Vuko Andrić (Universität Bayreuth), vuko_andric@yahoo.de

Tuesday, 14.15-15.00 | DOR 24, R. 1.606

In this paper, I defend subjective and indirect consequentialism against the incoherence objection. Subjective consequentialism maintains that the deontic properties of actions depend on foreseeable rather than actual consequences. Indirect consequentialism maintains that the deontic properties of actions depend on the consequences of something other than the actions themselves – e.g. on the consequences of rules and the relation that holds between actions and rules. According to the incoherence objection, subjective and indirect consequentialism are incoherent because they contain an overriding commitment to maximize the good and this commitment coheres only with deontic judgements of actions that make the deontic properties of actions depend exclusively on the actual consequences of these actions. The incoherence objection is meant to show that objective act-consequentialism is the only coherent version of consequentialism. I begin to address the objection by arguing that, on a literal understanding of the commitment to maximize the good, even objective act-consequentialism would, implausibly, qualify as incoherent. Then I suggest a more plausible understanding of the commitment to maximize the good and argue that, given this understanding, subjective and indirect consequentialism are not incoherent – at least, they are not incoherent insofar as this commitment is concerned.

6 Arenhart & Omori

Change of Logic, without Change of Meaning

Jonas Rafael Becker Arenhart (Federal Univ. of Santa Catarina),

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Wednesday, 13.30-14.15 | DOR 24, R. 1.1.406

Change of logic is typically taken as requiring that the meanings of the connectives change too. As a result, it has been argued that legitimate rivalry between logics is under threat. This is, in a nutshell, the meaning-variance argument, traditionally attributed to Quine. In this paper, we present a semantic framework that allows us to resist the meaning-variance claim for an important class of systems: classical logic, the logic of paradox, and strong Kleene logic. The major feature of the semantics is that the connectives have the same meanings in these systems, so that the meaning-variance argument is straightforwardly blocked. We discuss the effects of this semantics for two uses of the argument of meaning variance, and also consider its impact on related issues.

1 Arridge

Ecotage as Other-Defense

Alexander Arridge (University of Oxford), alexander.arridge@st-annes.ox.ac.uk
 Wednesday, 14.15-15.00 | DOR 24, R. 1.405

Ecotage, or the intentional destruction of property conducted with the aim of furthering environmental ends, is not much studied in environmental ethics. This is surprising, given that numerous radical environmentalist groups engage in or encourage ecotage as a legitimate form of environmental action; environmental ethics must catch up with environmentalist practice. This talk argues that instances of ecotage are *pro tanto* justified insofar as they are instances of effective and proportionate other-defence, as follows:

Ecotage as Other-Defence

- P1 Runaway climate change will severely harm many present and future people;
- P2 Certain agents (*climate aggressors*) culpably and wrongly engage in activities that contribute enormously to climate change (e.g. oil companies);
- IC1 Climate aggressors are culpably and wrongly harming many present and future people;
- P3 Agents make themselves liable to defensive harm when they culpably and wrongly harm others (victims);
- P4 Victims or agents acting on victims' behalf are *pro tanto* permitted to defensively harm aggressors, provided that this defensive harm is effective and proportionate;
- IC2 Climate aggressors are liable to defensive harm, and climate victims or agents acting on their behalf are *pro tanto* permitted to (effectively and proportionately) defensively harm them;
- P5 Sabotage of a climate aggressor's property (*ecotage*) is a harm that can be both proportionate and effective at halting or slowing a climate aggressor's climate-change-causing activities;
- C Therefore ecotage, as an instance of effective and proportionate other-defence, is *pro tanto* justified.

The talk elucidates and defends each of these claims in turn, and briefly considers some other morally relevant features of ecotage that might tell either for or against its *overall* justification in particular cases (e.g. its riskiness).

5 Arridge

Eudaimonia and the External Goods in Aristotle's Ethics

Alexander Arridge (University of Oxford), alexander.arridge@st-annes.ox.ac.uk
 Tuesday, 15.00-15.45 | DOR 24, R. 1.604

In Book I Chapter 7 of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle tells us that virtuous activity alone makes a human life *eudaimonic*. In *NE* I.8, however, he admits that certain things other than virtuous activity, such as wealth and political power, contribute to our *eudaimonia* in some way. The exact *nature* of this contribution, however, is unclear: whether these “external goods” are sources of *eudaimonia* like virtuous activity, or whether they contribute to *eudaimonia* only by facilitating or otherwise relating to virtuous activity, is a longstanding dispute in Aristotle scholarship. This paper argues that external goods contribute to *eudai-*

Sektionen / Sections

monia only by standing in certain relations to virtuous activity: while never sources of *eudaimonia*, external goods can be *i) instruments* for and *ii) background conditions* of the performance of virtuous activity; *iii) enabling conditions* on the value of virtuous acts, and *iv) modifiers* on the value of virtuous activity. *iii)* and *iv)* are particularly important and overlooked in the literature. This view, it is argued, provides the most complete, coherent, and faithful interpretation of Aristotle's view of the relation between *eudaimonia* and the external goods, and should be preferred over its rival interpretations.

7 Backes

Modern Moral Intuitionism and the Reliability Challenge

Marvin Backes (Uppsala University), marvin.backes@filosofi.uu.se
Wednesday, 13.30-14.15 | DOR 24, R. 1.201

According to moral realists, broadly speaking, there exists a domain of distinctly moral facts which determine whether some act (or belief) is morally permissible or impermissible, right or wrong. But how do we come to know what these moral facts are? Recent years have seen the emergence of a new family of views that set out to answer this question; viz. *moderate moral intuitionism*. This paper argues that while moderate moral intuitionism may be able to avoid some of the pitfalls of its earlier predecessors, it too is ultimately unpersuasive. In particular, I put forward new arguments for thinking that moderate moral intuitionists are unable to explain convincingly why we may be confident that our moral intuitions are generally reliable. Hence, the paper concludes that moderate moral intuitionism does not after all succeed in providing realists with a plausible moral epistemology.

3 Balg

Moral Disagreement and the Goals of Moral Education

Dominik Balg (Universität Tübingen), dominik.balg@posteo.de
Wednesday, 14.15-15.00 | DOR 24, R. 1.606

In my talk, I critically discuss the implications of moral disagreement for the goals of moral education. I will start by providing a novel interpretation of the epistemic dynamics underlying the idea that widespread and robust moral disagreement undermines the prospects of transmitting moral knowledge in educational settings. After having set up the challenge of disagreement as a specific epistemic challenge for moral knowledge transmission in this way, I will proceed by discussing its didactical implications in more detail. More specifically, I will defend two claims: First, I will argue that the challenge of disagreement is not an effective challenge, because it undermines the possibility of knowledge transfer only with respect to a limited set of moral propositions. Second, I will argue that the challenge of disagreement is not a specific challenge for knowledge transmission accounts of moral education, because the epistemically destructive effects of moral disagreement also pose a challenge for other prominent accounts. If convincing, my arguments show that knowledge transmission accounts of moral education are in a much better position than is usually expected to incorporate the fact that moral questions are notoriously controversial.

3 Balg

Wer hat recht? Die Rolle des Philosophie- und Ethikunterrichts im Rahmen der schulischen Befähigung zum angemessenen Umgang mit Meinungsverschiedenheiten

Dominik Balg (Universität Tübingen), dominik.balg@posteo.de
Thursday, 11.15-12.00 | DOR 24, R. 1.606

Nimmt man den schulischen Auftrag der Befähigung zum angemessenen Umgang mit konfligierenden Standpunkten und widersprechenden Ansichten ernst, kommt dem Philosophie- und Ethikunterricht als paradigmatischem Ort der unterrichtlichen Auseinandersetzung mit normativen Fragen des gesellschaftlichen und zwischenmenschlichen Miteinanders klarerweise eine besondere Verantwortung zu. Um dieser Verantwortung gerecht werden zu können, bedarf es jedoch zunächst differenzierterer und durch die neuere erkenntnistheoretische Forschung informierter didaktischer Konzepte und Ansätze dazu, wie eine solche Befähigung überhaupt aussehen sollte und gelingen kann. Ziel des hier vorgestellten Vortrags soll es sein, dieses didaktische Desiderat vor dem Hintergrund aktueller Diskurse im Bereich der sozialen Erkenntnistheorie in seiner Dringlichkeit zu plausibilisieren, um dann auf dieser Grundlage die konkreten Grundzüge einer fundierten »Didaktik des Disenses« zu skizzieren.

14 Baraghith & Nicolin

Spatial Separation of Magnetic Moment and Location as an Argument for a Trope-Ontological Interpretation of Quantum Theory?

Karim Baraghith (Leibniz Universität Hannover), kbaraghith@gmail.com
Nina Nicolin (HHU Düsseldorf), Nina.Nicolin@uni-duesseldorf.de
Wednesday, 11.15-12.00 | DOR 24, R. 1.402

It has been suggested to interpret particles in quantum field theory (QFT) as bundles of tropes; see e.g. Kuhlmann (2012). If we see *tropes* as the basic units, particles are ‘nothing but’ bundles of tropes; they are constituted by particular – instead of universal – properties. On this reading, a ‘thing’ (like a particle) does not ‘have’ its properties, but it is the specific combination of the properties which constitute the thing in the first place. In this paper, we are going to argue for this very interpretation of QFT. We will present a series of matter-wave interferometer experiments, which show that one can seemingly *separate* a particle’s properties experimentally. This strange phenomenon has also been referred to as the ‘Quantum Chesire Cat’ (QCC). Taking these observations seriously, it seems to be the case that what we call a ‘property’ may exist fundamentally and independently of its particle (or at least can be isolated from it). We are going to argue that a trope theoretical interpretation of quantum particles – which sees the particle’s properties and not the particle itself as fundamental – is probably the most compatible ontological interpretation of QCC (should it prove robust, which some physicists also doubt).

14 Baraghith & Feldbacher-Escamilla

From Reduction to Unification: The Case of Cultural Evolutionary Psychology

Karim Baraghith (Leibniz Universität Hannover), kbaraghith@gmail.com

Christian J. Feldbacher-Escamilla (Universität Köln), cj.feldbacher.escamilla@gmail.com

Wednesday, 14.15–15.00 | DOR 24, R. 1.403

Cultural evolutionary psychology (Heyes 2018) accounts for the cultural evolution of cognition. It is based on evolutionary psychology and cultural evolutionary theory and aims at unifying both in a synthetic attempt. In this paper, we will show that, in sharp contrast to the reductionism of classical evolutionary psychology, cultural evolutionary psychology provides a unification. As we will argue, the form of its unification is ‘evidential’, and this form is to be preferred against purely ‘structural’ unifications as performed by competing approaches such as ‘dual inheritance theory’ in the nature-culture domain. The main difference between evidential unification and structural unification is that the latter ‘merely’ creates an abstract overarching framework for hypotheses and theories under consideration, without establishing a dependence relation between the respective kinds of evidence. Evidential unification, however, establishes a (mutual) dependence relation between different kinds of evidence and, thereby, brings in further explanatory power.

10 Baston

Improving Self-Control through the Practice of Moral Responsibility: Implicit Biases and the Nurturing Stance

René Baston (HHU Düsseldorf), rene.baston@hhu.de

Wednesday, 10.30–11.15 | DOR 24, R. 1.606

Can we hold agents responsible for their implicitly biased behaviour? The aim of this text is to show that, from the nurturing stance, holding subjects responsible for their implicitly biased behaviour is justified, even though they are not blameworthy. First, I will introduce the nurturing stance as Daphne Brandenburg originally developed it. Second, I will specify what holding somebody responsible from the nurturing stance amounts to. Third, I show how and why holding responsible can help a subject develop an impaired capacity. Fourth, I analyse empirical data about holding prejudiced subjects responsible, and highlight that the internal motivation to control prejudiced reactions decreases implicit attitudes’ influences. Furthermore, the data shows that moral demands, in order to be appropriate, have to acknowledge the target’s autonomy and competence. In sum, from the nurturing stance, holding implicitly biased subjects responsible is appropriate if the targets can adequately respond to the moral demands.

15 Baumann

Meritocracy and Populism

Marius Baumann (LMU München), marius.baumann@lmu.de

Wednesday, 09.00-09.45 | DOR 24, R. 1.505

Sandel (2020) holds that meritocracy leads to populist uprisings because it humiliates the losers, leaving them with no one to blame but themselves. I argue that Sandel's critique fails because it has two success conditions that are unlikely to be met in combination:

(1) *Instantiation*: We live in something close enough to a meritocracy

(2) *Individual Acceptance*: People accept that meritocracy explains their position

Individual Acceptance, Sandel acknowledges, does not come easy for most. People only accept it as a last resort. This puts pressure on *Instantiation*, since the more societies deviate from the ideal, the more people can blame circumstances beyond themselves. Exacerbating the problem is the fact that the relation between *Instantiation* and *Individual Acceptance* is not linear.

A comparison to Michael Young's (1958) illustrates this by showing how far we are today from the dramatic remaking of societies that Young has to presuppose for his dystopic novel to work.

Sandel might thus be right that his critique identifies philosophically deeper problems with meritocracy. However, that does not entail that these problems are also causally more effective.

7 Beck & Jahn

Do You Believe in Deep Down? On Two Conceptions of Valuing

Lukas Beck (University of Cambridge), lb760@cam.ac.uk

Marcel Jahn (Humboldt-Universität Berlin), marcel.jahn@hu-berlin.de

Wednesday, 13.30-14.15 | DOR 24, R. 1.204

In this paper, we introduce a distinction between two conceptions of valuing that has been underappreciated in the extant philosophical literature. According to the first conception, which we call the surface-account, valuing something is exclusively a matter of having certain behavioural, cognitive, and emotional dispositions. The second conception, which we call the layer-account, assumes that valuing necessarily involves the presence of certain representational mental states underlying those dispositions. In the first part of the paper, we (a) introduce the distinction in proper detail, (b) demonstrate that the accounts lead to diverging attributions of valuing to agents, and (c) situate the accounts in the recent debate between so-called dispositionalists and psycho-functionalists about the nature of mental states. In the second part, we argue that recognizing the distinction provides considerable theoretical leverage. We demonstrate this by (i) surveying the current meta-ethical debate on conceptualizing valuing and (ii) examining the relationship between valuing and well-being as discussed in both theoretical debates as well as in practical research in behavioral welfare economics. In doing so, we wish to highlight the distinction's importance and the need to decide whether one is committed to the surface- or the layer-account.

1 Behrendt

Affected in the Loop – A Workable Solution to Dangers of Statistical Discrimination through Artificial Intelligence?

Hauke Behrendt (Universität Stuttgart), hauke.behrendt@philo.uni-stuttgart.de
Wednesday, 14.15-15.00 | DOR 24, R. 1.401

My talk aims to identify cases where statistical generalizations through Artificial Intelligence are morally problematic and discuss possible solutions. Statistical generalizations play an essential role in new data processing technologies. In many instances, generalizations are obviously useful. But they also come with a threat of *discrimination*. If, for example, there is a correlation between certain traits of interest and the membership in a marginalized group, statistical generalizations will turn out to *track* membership in that group, and so will the differential treatment based on them. The result is differential treatment explained by particular group membership, say race, which amounts to discrimination according to standard accounts. Significantly, even if variables for specific socially salient groups (e.g. race) are removed from the algorithm to avoid incidents of direct discrimination, those affected may still suffer from *indirect* discrimination (i.e. when other seemingly innocuous variables (e.g. education) correlate with particular group membership). In order to overcome such statistical discriminations, I suggest an “affected in the loop principle” (ALP) to ensure that possibly discriminating data is absent. An advantage of ALP is that it respects the demand for informational privacy instead of paternalistically dictating what data an AI may use by default.

16 Behrendt

Diskriminierung und Unterdrückung als gruppenbezogene Formen sozialer Ungerechtigkeit

Hauke Behrendt (Universität Stuttgart), hauke.behrendt@philo.uni-stuttgart.de
Thursday, 09.45-10.30 | DOR 24, R. 1.103

In meinem Vortrag werde ich das Verhältnis von Diskriminierung und Unterdrückung bestimmen. Meine Ausgangsthese lautet, dass sie jeweils *spezielle Formen gruppenbezogener Ungerechtigkeit* darstellen. Ich schlage vor, zwischen „Diskriminierung“ als Handlungstyp und „Unterdrückung“ als Strukturbegriff zu unterscheiden: Während „Diskriminierung“ moralisches Unrecht bezeichnet, das jemandem in einer konkreten Situation von einem bestimmten (individuellen oder kollektiven) Akteur durch eine benachteiligende Behandlung aufgrund einer sozial bedeutsamen Gruppenzugehörigkeit zugefügt wird, fängt der Begriff der Unterdrückung jenen Sachverhalt struktureller Machtasymmetrien ein, die durch die Zuweisung untergeordneter sozialer Positionen systematische Benachteiligungen für eine ganze Gruppe bewirken. Mit dem Diskriminierungsbegriff werden also genau diejenigen Sachverhalte komparativer Benachteiligung eingefangen, in denen (näher zu bestimmende) Gruppenzugehörigkeiten als zentrales Unterscheidungsmerkmal fungieren. Demgegenüber lässt sich Unterdrückung primär in den normativen Strukturen einer sozia-

len Ordnung verorten. Sie wird durch soziale Normen konstituiert, die bestimmten gesellschaftlichen Gruppen eine systematisch untergeordnete normative Position zuweisen und dadurch eine strukturelle Machtasymmetrie zwischen Akteuren etablieren. Steht „Diskriminierung“ demnach für einzelne Akte gruppenbezogener *Benachteiligung*, handelt es sich bei Unterdrückung um Phänomene struktureller *Beherrschung*. Sprich: Ein Diskriminierungsverbot schützt einzelne Subjekte vor individueller Benachteiligung aufgrund einer (unterstellten) Gruppenzugehörigkeit, wohingegen die Befreiung von Unterdrückung auf eine soziale Neupositionierung ganzer Gruppen gerichtet ist.

7 Behrens

No Stop-Gap Required: Partially Grounding Moral Facts

Singa Behrens (Universität Hamburg), singa.behrens@uni-hamburg.de
Tuesday, 14.15-15.00 | DOR 24, R. 1.201

In this paper, I develop a thus far unexplored option for non-naturalist moral realism: particular moral facts are *merely partially* grounded in non-moral facts, yet ultimately do not have any *full* grounds. Partial Ground Non-Naturalism (PGNN for short) accounts for essential commitments of non-naturalists such as the *sui generis* status of moral facts. However, it avoids serious objections raised against competing non-naturalist accounts that emphasize the explanatory role of *moral laws*. The account is based on an unorthodox notion of *partial ground* recently developed in (Leuenberger 2020; Trogon and Witmer 2021). I argue that assuming *unsupplemented* partial grounds explains why moral facts are *sui generis* while allowing for a robust link between the two domains.

4 Belak & Gerstorfer

Restructuring Understanding's Object

Alexander Belak (Universität Zürich), alexander.belak@uzh.ch
Dominik Gerstorfer (TU Darmstadt), dominik.gerstorfer@tu-darmstadt.de
Tuesday, 13.30-14.15 | DOR 24, R. 1.307

The nature of understanding is a burgeoning topic in recent epistemology. Given the debate's nascent state, even some of understanding's most central elements—e.g., its specific object—are only faintly understood. In this talk, we motivate a more promising account of understanding's object as opposed to currently prevailing views. We argue that predominant approaches to the object of understanding ultimately fail because they disregard relevant insights from the philosophy of science—more specifically, we hold that they rest on misleading metaphysical assumptions. Instead, we develop an account that identifies *structured systems* as understanding's fundamental object. To this end, we utilize the notion of *shared structure* to establish a view that holds out the prospect of settling common puzzles raised in recent epistemology—e.g., how the tension between understanding and factivity can be resolved. We conclude that our account offers a fruitful gateway to a more thorough analysis of understanding, bridging the gap between epistemology and philosophy of science.

5 Bender

Kant's Possibility Proof and the Principle of Complete Determination

Sebastian Bender (Humboldt-Universität Berlin), benderse@hu-berlin.de

Wednesday, 09.45-10.30 | DOR 24, R. 1.604

In his pre-critical 'Possibility Proof,' Kant aims to prove the existence of God just from the fact that something is possible. Possibilities require an actual ground, he argues, and this ground he identifies with God. Though generally well-received, Kant's argument is often thought to fall prey to the so-called 'plurality objection,' according to which Kant is unable to rule out that the ground of possibility is an *aggregate* of beings. If successful, this objection would show that Kant fails to prove that all possibilities are grounded in a *single* being. Kant himself explicitly discusses the plurality objection, but his attempts to rebut it are usually thought to beg the question against the proponent of this objection. This paper argues that Kant's own ways of countering the plurality objection are much more promising than is commonly assumed. More specifically, it argues that in order to show that all possibilities must be grounded in a *single* being, Kant utilizes the *Principle of Complete Determination*—the principle that all possibilities are fully determined (or that there are no indeterminate possibilities). That this is in fact Kant's strategy has so far gone unnoticed by commentators.

15 Bespalov

Respect, Responsiveness, and the Fallibilism of Public Reason

Andrei Bespalov (University of Warwick), Andrei.Bespalov@warwick.ac.uk

Wednesday, 10.30-11.15 | DOR 24, R. 1.505

Mainstream political liberals hold that, in order to respect one another's freedom and equality, citizens should make political decisions only on the grounds of reasons that all may reasonably be expected to accept. On the standard interpretation, this public justification principle (PJP) requires that citizens restrain themselves from publicly defending and opposing legal provisions on the grounds of reasons derived from controversial comprehensive doctrines. Opponents of justificatory restraint argue that it is unnecessary for maintaining civic respect. In their view, it is enough that citizens open their foundational commitments to critical scrutiny and be responsive to one another's arguments. I concede that the standard PJP struggles to vindicate justificatory restraint vis-à-vis the duty of responsiveness as an alternative way of maintaining civic respect. Instead, I propose a novel, fallibilistic formulation of PJP: Citizens should make political decisions only on the grounds of reasons that can be subject to reasonable criticism. I show that, compared to responsiveness, fallibilistic justificatory restraint is a more adequate means of maintaining civic respect.

11 Bickel**Bergson's Notion of Habit and Novelty and its Relevance for the Neuroscientific Study of Behavioural Change**

Laura Bickel (The University of British Columbia), lbickel@mail.ubc.ca
 Thursday, 09.45-10.30 | DOR 24, R. 1.501

This paper aims to investigate to what extent a Bergsonian perspective on habit complements the neuroscientific explanation of how unwanted patterns of behavior can be replaced by new strategies. In pursuit of this goal, I will begin by revisiting Bergson's dissociationist model of habit formation. I argue that Bergson's account provides a useful antidote to the associationist model underlying neuroscientific research. Bergson points out that a habit does not merely consist of an automatically executed reaction to certain stimuli in the environment. Instead, habits are integral to a dynamic and attentional process of selection that informs the sensorimotor present. Then, I demonstrate that for Bergson a kind of phenomenal awareness of non-exhaustiveness inhabits the actualization of routinized behavior. By focusing on the experiential dimension, I argue that Bergson offers insight into the creative ability and openness for change of the organism, a significant dimension that is excluded from the neuroscientific viewpoint. Finally, I conclude that Bergson's philosophy serves as a viable resource for first-person experience-based research on habit that enlarges the field of research beyond the observation of animal behavior in the confined context of the laboratory.

8 Bishop & Justus**Normativity in the Natural World**

Michael Bishop (Florida State University), mbishop@fsu.edu
 James Justus (Florida State University), jjustus@fsu.edu
 Wednesday 09.00-09.45 | DOR 24, R. 1.405

Philosophers offer theories of normative categories (e.g., moral goodness, epistemic justification, rational action). Descriptive theories favored by naturalists try to account for these categories in purely descriptive, empirical, non-normative terms. In so doing, they ground normativity in the descriptive facts uncovered and analyzed within science. For example, utilitarians characterize moral goodness in terms of pleasure and pain; reliabilists characterize epistemic justification in terms of the reliability of cognitive mechanisms; and, reference theorists characterize rational action in terms of people getting what they want. The normativity challenge holds that descriptive theories fail because they cannot account for normativity: *Moore's Challenge* is about the meaning of normative expressions: No set of descriptive claims can have the same meaning as a normative claim. *Hume's Challenge* is about motivation: Normative claims have a motivating force descriptive claims lack. *Kant's Challenge* is about *objective* reasons: Normative claims (or some of them) carry a certain kind of authority that descriptive claims cannot supply. Having divided the problem, we then conquer it. For each challenge, there is a compelling naturalistic response that either meets it decisively or reveals why it should be rejected.

1 Blanco

The Explainability-Trust Hypothesis: An Epistemic Analysis of its Limitations

Sara Blanco (Universität Tübingen), sarablancopena@gmail.com

Thursday, 10.30-11.15 | DOR 24, R. 1.401

Trustworthiness is widely quoted as a key property to enable the effective deployment of AI. However, it is not obvious how to achieve it. The literature often assumes that explanations lead to trust. This has been called the *Explainability-Trust Hypothesis* (ET). It is common to use ET to argue for Explainable AI (XAI). However, the relationship between explanations and trust is complex, and I argue that taking ET for granted is problematic. The main goal of this paper is to clarify under which circumstances ET holds and to point out its limitations. I will argue that even though explanations may sometimes lead to trust, they do not guarantee it (contrary to what the literature suggests). My analysis focuses on epistemological problems of ET that are usually overlooked and need to be taken into account when using explanations as a way to achieve trust. Although it has been noted that ET expresses an epistemological claim and not an empirical one, the details of this epistemic nature and its implications have not yet been explored. I elaborate on these issues with the aim to uncover how trust can be achieved.

10 Blatter

Too Quick to Anger? – On the Procedural Appropriateness of Reactive Emotions

Jonas Blatter (Universität Bern), Jonas.blatter@philo.unibe.ch

Tuesday, 13.30-14.15 | DOR 24, R. 1.601

I argue that getting angry at somebody can be appropriate even if you are uncertain that they acted in an objectionable way. The intuitive answer might be that one should not get angry without sufficient evidence, but only once you are certain about the objectionable actions of the other person. Much of the work on fittingness of emotions supports this answer. However, there is a discrepancy between this answer and the role emotions play in our practices of holding each other accountable. I argue that an emotion like anger is perfectly appropriate under circumstances of uncertainty about the actions of the perpetrator, just as fear serves the function of keeping you safe in the face of uncertain but plausible harm.

14 Blessenohl & Sarikaya

A Norm for Science Advice: Making Beliefs Accurate

Simon Blessenohl (Universität Hamburg), blesseno@usc.edu

Deniz Sarikaya (Universität Hamburg), deniz.sarikaya@uni-hamburg.de

Wednesday, 09.00-09.45 | DOR 24, R. 1.403

Politicians rely on scientists to inform their policy-making. When may scientists make claims such as ‘X is toxic’ even though their evidence does not conclusively show that X is toxic? One view says that scientists ought to make their uncertainty explicit. But politicians might ignore or even be confused by language indicating uncertainty. Another view says that scientists ought to take ethical consequences of policies into account. This view clashes with the proper role of scientists in democratic decision-making. We propose a view overcoming these issues: scientists should say what maximizes the accuracy of politicians' credence.

15 Bloks

Designing Deliberative Democracy

Suzanne Andrea Bloks (Universität Hamburg), suzanne.bloks@uni-hamburg.de

Wednesday, 15.00-15.45 | DOR 24, R. 1.504

Deliberative democratic theory can be said to have two dimensions. One concerns how deliberation can be incorporated in democratic institutions (e.g., the idea of deliberative mini-publics). The other is as an instrument of normative evaluation (of democratic institutions). This paper combines both dimensions to determine the design of deliberative democracy at its most general level, that of parliamentary constituencies (electoral districts). Constituency design determines and shapes electoral representation by defining the *district magnitude*, the *electoral formula* and the ground for *district membership*. According to deliberative democratic theory, it is argued, representation in decision-making has to satisfy a criterion of *deliberative diversity* in order to produce democratically legitimate decisions. This criterion is best satisfied with a unitary constituency (no districting) with proportional representation (PR). This is the seemingly unique constituency design for deliberative democrats and should, therefore, be taken as the default design in *any* representative democracy endorsing a theory of deliberative democracy. With this default design, it is possible to make rigorous comparisons between different institutional forms of deliberative democracy. Furthermore, as deviations from the default compromise the democratic legitimacy of deliberative decision-making by elected representatives, the burden of justification is on those who advocate an alternative constituency design.

10 Blöser

Forgiveness as Rendering Resentment Unfitting

Claudia Blöser (Goethe Universität Frankfurt), claudiabloeser@googlemail.com
Tuesday, 14.15-15.00 | DOR 24, R. 1.601

According to a widespread view, forgiveness centrally involves overcoming resentment that is a fitting response to wrongdoing. But how can we fittingly *overcome* resentment, given that resentment seems always fitting in light of past wrongdoing? My answer involves (1) a novel proposal about what resentment represents and (2) an elucidation of forgiveness as a process. Building on recent theories of emotion, I suggest that resentment not only represents the wrongdoer as blameworthy (this is a “standard view” of resentment), but also *the wrongdoing as having a negative impact on one’s significant possibilities*. Thus, I articulate a new necessary condition for having fully forgiven: One no longer evaluates the wrongdoing as negatively impacting one’s significant possibilities. Further, I suggest that in the process of forgiveness, one *creates the facts* in light of which resentment ceases to be fitting. Forgiveness involves *coming to terms* with the wrongdoing’s negative impact on one’s significant possibilities. A consequence of my account is a clear distinction between reasons to forgive (i.e., for undertaking the actions pertaining to the process) and reasons for (or against) resentment: The latter are reasons that make resentment fitting (or not), the former can be practical reasons.

4 Boardman

Surprise Modal Knowledge

Samuel Boardman (Freie Universität Berlin), samuel.leigh.boardman@gmail.com
Thursday, 09.45-10.30 | DOR 24, R. 1.308

This paper shifts attention from philosophers’ deliberative knowledge of metaphysical modalities to non-expert adults’ intuitive knowledge of modalities more relevant to decision and action. It then puts forth the hypothesis that feelings, and in particular feelings of surprise, have an epistemic role in intuitive modal knowledge acquisition. This *surprise modal knowledge* approach hypothesises that we often use a surprise test to evaluate modal propositions: judge some proposition possible if you imagine that proposition without feeling significant surprise. The cognitive evolutionary model of surprise has it that surprise is that feeling which arises from detection of violation of expectation. Given this, the approach is able to draw upon the rich developmental research into expectations and their violations to make predictions about which events cause children and adults to experience surprise. To establish that surprise has an epistemic (and not just a psychological) role in modal knowledge acquisition, the paper argues that feelings of surprise provide us with evidence that supports modal conclusions. The main objection is that there are lots of propositions that surprise us but that we nonetheless judge possible. But recent robust empirical results about modal judgements show that the surprise account makes the right prediction.

3 Bohlmann

Mentales Modell oder disparates Vorwissen – Was ist ein Präkonzept?

Markus Bohlmann (WWU Münster), markus.bohlmann@uni-muenster.de

Thursday, 09.00-09.45 | DOR 24, R. 1.606

Präkonzepte sind heute wichtiger Ausgangspunkt eines kognitiv herausfordernden, problemorientierten Philosophieunterrichts, Zielgegenstand fachdidaktischer empirischer Forschung und Gegenstand lerntheoretischer Überlegungen im Fach. Dabei wird zwar eine grundständige Definition allgemein akzeptiert: Präkonzepte sind Schüler:innenvorstellungen zu im Unterricht behandelten philosophischen Gehalten, die bereits vorhanden sind, bevor der Unterricht beginnt (prä: zeitlich vorher). Mit den Mitteln der analytischen Philosophie lassen sich jedoch zwei unterschiedliche, inkommensurable Formen von Präkonzeptkonzepten identifizieren: Präkonzepte als mentale Modelle und Präkonzepte als disparates Vorwissen. Das Präkonzeptkonzept mentaler Modelle ist dabei eine Übertragung aus der Didaktik der Naturwissenschaften, die eher in der Theoretischen Philosophie eingesetzt wird (Bohlmann, 2014, 2016, 2017; Bohlmann & Verfers, 2019; Zimmermann, 2016); während das Konzept disparaten Vorwissens eher praktische Probleme der Ethik erschließt, indem es eine große Menge von Schüleraussagen als Präkonzepte gelten lässt (Martena & Burkard, 2018; Thein, 2020b, 2020a). Ich zeige, dass mentale Modelle eine Semantik besitzen, man kann mit ihnen operieren. Dagegen hat disparates Vorwissen propositionalen Gehalt, hier werden Aussagen getroffen, die wahr oder falsch sein können. Ich diskutiere eine Lösung der Inkommensurabilität, die darin besteht, Präkonzepte durchgängig als Konzeptualisierungen zu begreifen.

6 Bonzio, Flaminio & Rosella

Algebras of Counterfactual Conditionals

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Thursday, 09.00-09.45 | DOR 24, R. 1.406

The aim of the present work is to put forward an algebraic approach to counterfactual conditionals (or simply counterfactuals) based on Boolean Algebras of Conditionals (BACs) in [1]. The framework of BACs offers an innovative and privileged perspective on conditionals events: as it is shown in [1], BACs are a valuable tool to analyze the algebraic properties of conditionals, their logic and their relation with probability measures. Our idea is to propose a modal extension of BACs in order to account for counterfactuals. More precisely, we consider a normal modal operator on a BAC so defining modal Boolean Algebras of Conditionals; then, we investigate the properties of these new structures and the resulting logic of counterfactuals. In particular, we define a certain class of modal BACs and analyze the properties of the corresponding class of dual frames; moreover, we provide soundness and completeness results for the logic C1, which Lewis ([2]) claims to be the correct logic of counterfactuals, with respect to such class of modal BACs. Finally, we will see how modal BACs could serve to shed a new light on the relation between counterfactual conditional events and their uncertain quantification.

Sektionen / Sections

References

- [1]. Flaminio, T., Godo, L. & Hosni, H., “Boolean Algebras of Conditionals, Probability and Logic”, *Artificial Intelligence*, 286, (2020).
[2]. Lewis, D., “Completeness and Decidability of Three Logics of Counterfactual Conditionals”, *Theoria*, 37, 74–85 (1971).

5 Bös

Cutting Diamonds. The Modal Shift in Husserl’s

Gregor Emmanuel Bös (King’s College London), mail@gregorboes.com
Thursday, 09.45-10.30 | DOR 24, R. 1.604

Husserl understands truth and evidence as tightly connected. This *correlationism* is of fundamental importance for the phenomenological tradition more widely, but its interpretation remains disputed.

Günther Patzig’s classical study suggests that Husserl’s relation between truth and evidence shifts from prioritizing truth to a priority of evidence. I develop this claim further by spelling out the early and late forms of correlationism as a biconditional $Tr(p) \leftrightarrow Poss(EJ(p))$ where $EJ(p)$ is an act of evident judgement that p . I suggest that the fundamental change concerns the interpretation of the possibility operator ($Poss()$), which aligns with a current debate between Hardy and Zahavi.

This debate can progress by taking a closer look at Husserl’s notion of possible evidence. Husserl begins by correlating truth and *ideal possibility*, the same notion he uses to describe metaphysical possibility and necessity. He later realizes that ideal possibility is too permissive and articulates a notion of *motivated possibility*. I argue that this change contains an illicit move from an alethic to an epistemic notion of possibility. I conclude that a defensible version of correlationism requires a sui generis alethic notion of *real possibility* which can only be specified with reference to a prior understanding of truth, which therefore cannot be defined in terms of possible evidence.

12 Bräuer

Assertion, Constitutive Rules and Conditions of Engagement

Felix Bräuer (Universität Mannheim), felix.braeuer@phil.uni.mannheim.de
Tuesday, 14.15–15.00 | DOR 24, R. 1.205

Many philosophers, following Williamson (1996, 2000), subscribe to the *constitutive rule account of assertion* (CRAA). They hold that asserting is an activity that is constituted by a single constitutive rule of assertion. However, in recent work, Maitra (2011), Johnson (2018), and Kelp & Simion (2020a, 2020b) aim to show that, for all the most popular versions of the constitutive rule of assertion proposed in the literature, asserting is not an activity constituted by a single constitutive rule and that therefore CRAA is very likely false. To reach this conclusion, they all present a version of what can be dubbed the *engagement condition objection*. That is, they each propose a necessary condition on engaging in rule-constituted activities. Then they argue that, for all the most popular versions of the constitutive rule of assertion proposed in the literature, asserting doesn’t satisfy this condition. In response, I present a counterexample that shows that the proposed engagement conditions lead to counterintuitive results, and I propose an alternative that better captures our intuitions.

Then I argue that this alternative engagement condition is compatible with all the most popular versions of the constitutive rule of assertion.

14 Bräutigam

On the Qualitative Identity of Similar Fermions: Orthodoxy versus Heterodoxy

Maren Bräutigam (Universität Bonn), marenbrae@t-onlin.de
Wednesday, 10.30-11.15 | DOR 24, R. 1.402

According to one of the orthodox views, similar fermions are qualitatively identical in all of the allowed states, so that Leibniz's principle of the identity of indiscernibles (PII) is violated. As has been pointed out, this view relies on the semantical standard interpretation that the indices of the Hilbertspace formalism refer directly to particles (*direct factorism*). According to the heterodox view, in contrast, similar fermions are qualitatively distinct in at least some (if not all) of the allowed states, so that PII is valid. Heterodoxy requires giving up the standard semantical interpretation and adopting either *descriptive antifactorism* (the view that descriptively referring particle names can be introduced from outside the formalism) or *descriptive factorism* (the view that indices of the Hilbertspace formalism refer descriptively to particles) instead. I would like to show that it is not yet sufficiently clear what these two heterodox approaches amount to, both ontologically and semantically speaking, and do some clarificatory work accordingly.

5 Brecher

Die Funktion des Erlaubnisgesetzes bei Kant

Martin Brecher (Universität Mannheim), martin.brecher@phil.uni-mannheim.de
Wednesday 11.15-12.00 | DOR 24, R. 1.604

Der Normtyp des Erlaubnisgesetzes (lex permissiva) taucht in Kants Rechtsphilosophie an wichtigen Scharnierstellen auf; seine genaue Funktion ist jedoch umstritten. Der in der Literatur vorherrschenden Meinung zufolge haben Erlaubnisgesetze die Funktion, bestimmte Handlungen zu rechtfertigen, die eigentlich verboten sind: Durch Erlaubnisgesetze würden Verstöße gegen Verbote geduldet (R. Brandt u. a.). Einer anderen Deutung zufolge normieren Erlaubnisgesetze lediglich indifferente („bloß erlaubte“) Handlungen (J. Hruschka). Das Ziel des Vortrags besteht darin zu zeigen, dass sich aus einer sorgfältigen Analyse von Kants normlogischen Bemerkungen eine andere Deutung ergibt: In Auseinandersetzung mit Baumgarten und Achenwall konzipiert Kant das Erlaubnisgesetz in *Zum ewigen Frieden* als eine besondere Art von kontextsensitivem Verbotsgesetz, das eine Handlung im Allgemeinen verbietet, unter bestimmten Bedingungen jedoch genuin erlaubt. Als Erlaubnisgesetz wird die Norm (das Verbotsgesetz) im Hinblick auf die Erlaubnis und die Spezifikation ihrer Bedingungen bezeichnet. Mit dieser Konzeption lassen sich auch die verschiedenen Erlaubnisgesetze im Privatrecht der *Rechtslehre* (in §§ 2, 16, 22) deuten. Sie haben jeweils die Funktion, gewisse Handlungen als unter bestimmten, durch das Erlaubnisgesetz spezifizierten Bedingungen zulässig auszuweisen, die ansonsten (abseits dieser Bedingungen) verboten sind.

2 Briesen

Institutional and Symbol-Theoretic Definitions of “Art”

Jochen Briesen (Universität Konstanz), jochen.briesen@uni-konstanz.de

Tuesday, 15.00-15.45 | DOR 24, R. 1.504

The presentation examines the following question: Can we develop a convincing definition of “art/artwork” by combining an institutional theory of art with symbol-theoretic insights? The aim is not only to provide necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for correctly applying the term “artwork/art” and thereby rationally reconstruct our classificatory practice. The aim is also to give a definition that is explanatorily valuable in the sense that it provides clues for answering central questions in the philosophy of art, such as: Why is art so important to us? How can we account for the differences in our aesthetic evaluation of artworks and non-artworks? Thus, I accept two conditions of adequacy for a convincing definition of “art”: It should adequately reflect our classificatory practice and it should be of some explanatory value. I will argue that in combining institutional and symbol-theoretic accounts, a definition of “art” can be developed that meets both conditions.

4 Briesen

Zwei Verteidigungen von Reichenbachs Lösung des Induktionsproblems

Jochen Briesen (Universität Konstanz), jochen.briesen@uni-konstanz.de

Wednesday 10.30-11.15 | DOR 24, R. 1.404

Hans Reichenbach akzeptiert, dass sich die Induktion weder a priori noch a posteriori als verlässliches Schlussverfahren ausweisen lässt. Allerdings lässt sich aus seiner Sicht sehr wohl a priori rechtfertigen, dass die Induktion in folgendem Sinn optimal ist: Wenn überhaupt ein Verfahren verlässlich ist, um vom Beobachteten auf das Unbeobachtete zu schließen, so ist es die Induktion, d.h. induktive Verfahren sind unter keinen Umständen schlechter als alternative Vorhersageverfahren (höchstens besser). Für die Rechtfertigung der Induktion wäre damit bereits einiges gewonnen. Reichenbachs Nachweis, dass die Induktion in dieser Hinsicht optimal ist, krankt allerdings an einer zentralen Schwierigkeit. In dem Vortrag werde ich zwei Strategien besprechen, auf diese Schwierigkeit zu reagieren. Die erste Strategie führt zu einer Form der Meta-Induktion, die von Gerhard Schurz ausgearbeitet wurde und von der er unter Rekurs auf mathematische Resultate aus dem Feld des maschinellen Lernens zeigt, dass sie sich a priori als optimales Vorhersageverfahren ausweisen lässt. Die zweite Strategie ist bisher nicht gebührend beachtet. Ich werde dafür argumentieren, dass sie ebenfalls erfolgreich ist und gegenüber Schurz' Vorschlag sogar Vorteile aufweist.

15 Brinkmann**What, if Anything, Is Morally Wrong with Inflation?**Matthias Brinkmann (LMU), mail@matthiasbrinkmann.de

Thursday, 09.00-09.45 | DOR 24, R. 1.504

Contemporary political philosophers have largely ignored the topic of inflation, even though it figures large in public political debate. The implicit assumption is that inflation is a technocratic, non-moral issue. In this paper, I will consider several moral arguments against inflation one can find scattered in the philosophical and non-philosophical literature. Many such arguments fail, I suggest, including a libertarian argument from property rights. Nonetheless, an argument from the purpose of money has some initial promise. According to this argument, money constitutes a valuable social practice vis-à-vis which participants develop legitimate expectations. This gives outsiders who can interfere with that practice—e.g., a central bank which controls the supply of money—a pro tanto duty not to interfere with that practice. The strength of this duty, however, differs with a number of contextual factors—e.g., whether participants expect inflation, whether they have been forced into using the currency, whether they have easily available alternative currencies, and so forth.

11 Brössel & Kuipers**Non-Conceptual Knowledge-How**Peter Brössel (Ruhr-Universität Bochum), peter.broessel@ruhr-uni-bochum.deEline Kuipers (Ruhr-Universität Bochum), eline.kuipers@ruhr-uni-bochum.de

Wednesday, 15.00-15.45 | DOR 24, R. 1.506

This paper offers a novel account for understanding knowledge-how based on a framework for capturing non-conceptual, sensorimotor representations. This account shares with intellectualist approaches that it depends purely on the agent's mental representations whether an agent possesses knowledge-how. It sides with anti-intellectualist approaches claiming that conceptual knowledge-that is no prerequisite for knowledge-how. In explaining knowledge-how, we provide a formal framework for capturing non-conceptual, sensorimotor representations using phenomenal similarity spaces (a subtype of Gärdenfors' (2000) Conceptual Spaces). Phenomenal similarity spaces are multi-dimensional geometrical structures in which geometrical distances capture the differences between introspectively accessible perceptual experiences (including proprioceptive experiences). We argue that the sensorimotor representation of one's body performing a skilled activity is adequately understood as a path through a proprioceptive space, a similarity space of the experience of possible bodily parameters for action planning and execution. An agent possesses knowledge-how to perform an action only when she has an accurate representation of the bodily movements required to execute that action. This definition of knowledge-how shelters our approach from the main objections against anti-intellectualist views concerning (general and circumstantial) ability and skill while maintaining that knowledge-how cannot be reduced to knowledge-that.

7 Bruno

Risk, Recklessness, and Objectivism about Ought

Daniele Bruno (Universität Potsdam), daniele.bruno@uni-potsdam.de

Wednesday 10.30-11.15 | DOR 24, R. 1.201

Perspectivism claims that oughts are always determined relative to an agent's epistemic position. Objectivism is the denial of this claim: there is no epistemic filter on ought and any fact, accessible or not, can in principle impinge on what an agent ought to do. One classic objection to Objectivism is that it recommends unconscionably risky actions in so-called three-option-cases. In a recent paper, Davide Fassio (2021) denies this orthodoxy and defends a version of what he calls Non-Standard-Objectivism (NSO). He claims that Objectivism can allow for a class of what he calls *no-recklessness norms*, which take into account facts about the agent's perspective. In this paper, I critically evaluate Fassio's proposal to draw some more general lessons about Objectivism's ability to deal with risk and recklessness. To do so, I make an important and neglected distinction between two kinds of recklessness. Only indirectly relevant recklessness, I argue, is ultimately compatible with objectivism. Directly relevant recklessness, which is required for extensionally adequate verdicts in all three-option cases and presumed by almost all philosophical discussions on risk, is incompatible with objectivism. Conceptual and extensional problems arise when trying to weigh norms of directly relevant recklessness against objective norms postulated by objectivists.

10 Bruns

The Saveability Dilemma: A Defence of Frances Kamm's Inviolability Account

Andreas Bruns (Universität Heidelberg), andi.bruns@gmail.com

Thursday, 11.15-12.00 | DOR 24, R. 1.601

In this talk, I present a novel response to the so-called saveability objection against Frances Kamm's inviolability account. The inviolability account says that we are morally more important beings if it is impermissible to harm us even to prevent greater harm of the same type. The saveability objection says that we might be comparably important if the opposite was true: if it was required to harm us even to prevent greater harm of the same type. We would be less inviolable but more saveable. I argue that the saveability objection leads into a dilemma. Either it is false that the requirement to prevent greater harm makes us more saveable and, in this sense, more important, or the concept of saveability is unintelligible as an account of individual moral status. On the first horn of the dilemma, the saveability objection is a non-starter. On the second horn of the dilemma, the objection fails on its own terms as it submits to a moral theory which gives priority to the moral status of persons over other types of considerations.

14 Buchholz

The Curve-Fitting Problem Revisited

Oliver Buchholz (Universität Tübingen), oliver.buchholz@uni-tuebingen.de

Thursday, 11.15-12.00 | DOR 24, R. 1.402

Deep neural networks (DNNs) are increasingly applied to tasks akin to the curve-fitting problem (CFP). Yet, while the CFP is well-studied in philosophy, it remains unclear whether existing results extend to DNNs. In this talk, I argue for the opposite: DNNs bring to the surface a statistical phenomenon that is likely to shed new light on the CFP and its philosophical ramifications. Generally, the CFP refers to the task of fitting a mathematical function to given observations. According to the conventional analysis, this task involves a tradeoff between *simplicity* (number of functional parameters) and *accuracy* (closeness of the function of the observations): complex functions are prone to situations that are known as *overfitting* and result in low predictive accuracy. Simple functions can prevent overfitting, yet at the cost of lower in-sample accuracy. I show how DNNs escape the conventional analysis. Usually, DNNs are highly complex. Remarkably, however, research revealed that they exhibit high predictive accuracy regardless of their complexity and their very close fit to given observations. Thus, DNNs are generally not susceptible to overfitting and seem unaffected by the tradeoff between simplicity and accuracy. This result is discussed as *benign overfitting* in statistics and potentially has rich philosophical implications.

1 Budnik

Kontrolle ist besser: Warum wir künstlicher Intelligenz nicht vertrauen können

Christian Budnik (Universität Zürich), christian.budnik@philos.uzh.ch

Thursday, 11.15–12.00 | DOR 24, R. 1.401

Unser Alltag wird zunehmend von Artefakten und Anwendungen geprägt, von denen behauptet wird, dass sie künstliche Intelligenz an den Tag legen und eigene Entscheidungen zur Lösung bestimmter Probleme fällen können. Gleichzeitig ist es uns als Anwender:innen in der Regel nicht möglich, die hinter diesen ‘Entscheidungen’ stehenden Prozesse nachzuvollziehen. Als Reaktion darauf wird von vielen Seiten gefordert, wir müssten KI-Systemen vertrauen können. Im Rahmen des Vortrags wird dafür argumentiert, dass es sich dabei in dem Sinne um eine unmögliche Forderung handelt, als KI-Systeme keine angemessenen Objekte von Vertrauen sind. Sie sind es unter anderem deshalb nicht, weil Vertrauen nicht unabhängig von Beziehungen zu verstehen ist, in denen die Beziehungsteilnehmer:innen einander als autonome Wesen betrachten und einen empathischen Zugang zu der Werteperspektive des jeweiligen Beziehungspartners haben. KI-Systeme haben dagegen keine Werteperspektive, in die wir uns versetzen könnten, und sie können nicht in einem relevanten Sinn als autonom aufgefasst werden. Anhand des Spezialfalls von selbstfahrenden Autos wird dafür plädiert, dass wir uns im Hinblick auf KI-Systeme an der Kategorie der Verlässlichkeit orientieren sollten, anstatt vorschnell die Perspektive des Vertrauens einzunehmen, und es wird aufgezeigt, welche systematischen und praktischen Vorteile sich mit diesem Orientierungswechsel verbinden.

10 Bunkenborg

Modesty and Humility as Distinct Virtues

Francesca Bunkenborg (Humboldt-Universität Berlin), bunkenbf@hu-berlin.de
Tuesday, 15.45-16.30 | DOR 24, R. 1.601

Modesty and humility are closely related character traits. They are also what we might call precarious virtues: while commonly classified among the virtues, their standing in that category is nonetheless disputed. Contemporary accounts of modesty and humility typically argue that they are genuine virtues, but do so by blurring the distinction between them, treating them as roughly interchangeable. By contrast, I argue that modesty and humility are indeed virtues, but distinct ones. While modesty is a disposition to a particular kind of inattention to one's positive qualities that is motivated by concern for others, humility consists in a disposition to pay attention to and acknowledge one's negative qualities, where this is motivated by a concern for truthfulness and a desire for either self-improvement or self-acceptance. While most people who are modest will also be humble and vice versa, it is possible to have only one of these virtues and lack the other.

1 Bütthe, Fottner, Haid & Unruh

Workplace Decision Algorithms and Human Autonomy

Tim Bütthe (TU München), buthe@hfp.tum.de
Charlotte Haid (TU München), charlotte.haid@tum.de
Charlotte Franziska Unruh (TU München), charlotte.unruh@tum.de
Thursday, 09.00-09.45 | DOR 24, R. 1.404

Workplace decision algorithms support or replace managerial decision making in areas such as task allocation, shift planning, or team formation. In this talk, we first present a framework for evaluating risks and chances of workplace decision algorithms for the ethical value of human autonomy at work. We then discuss how our framework can be applied in practice, showing how our framework can provide guidelines for developing and implementing a shift scheduling algorithm for companies in the German logistics sector. Ultimately, we propose that we need a new mindset for algorithms at work: algorithmic system should be used to put human workers in control, not to control them.

15 Bziuk

Can business corporations be legally responsible for structural injustice?

Barbara Bziuk (Utrecht University), b.k.bziuk@uu.nl
Thursday, 09.45-10.30 | DOR 24, R. 1.505

In May 2021, Royal Dutch Shell was ordered by the Hague District Court to significantly reduce its CO₂ emissions. This ruling is unprecedented in that it attributes the responsibility for mitigating climate change directly to a specific corporate emitter. Shell neither directly causes climate change alone nor can alleviate it by itself; therefore, what grounds this responsibility attribution? I maintain that this question can be answered via Young's social connection model of responsibility for justice. I defend two claims: First, I argue that the

model explains Shell's connection to climate change and that this relationship grounds Shell's responsibility. Second, by identifying a way in which the social connection model could be applied to corporations in legal practice, I further develop Young's model. I question Young's distinction between political and legal responsibility for justice and propose that courts could mediate citizens' actions regarding political responsibilities.

5 Cantamessi

Philosophical Ethics and Ordinary Moral Thought: Sidgwick's Twofold Approach

Giulia Cantamessi (University of Pavia), GiuliaCantamessi@gmail.com
Wednesday, 15.00-15.45 | DOR 24, R. 1.604

This paper explores the much-debated relationship between ethical theory and ordinary moral thought in Sidgwick's *The Methods of Ethics*. I shall argue that the role played by ordinary moral thought in Sidgwick's ethics is best understood when two different interpretations of this notion are identified, as Sidgwick, though implicitly, treats them as having a different philosophical weight.

On the one hand, Sidgwick relies on certain pre-philosophical moral contents, namely the meanings and uses of ordinary ethical judgements and common moral experiences, in order to reject rival metaethical proposals and to establish some of his own philosophical conclusions. However, different conclusions should be drawn when a stricter sense of ordinary moral thought, i.e., the ensemble of moral rules and beliefs which Sidgwick labels 'common-sense morality', is taken into account. I shall contend that Sidgwick does not appeal to common-sense morality in the elaboration and defence of ethical first principles, and that he ascribes neither evidential value nor initial epistemic authority to common moral beliefs.

Recognising that these two senses of ordinary moral thought have different epistemic relevance and play different roles in *The Methods of Ethics* enables in my view to account more comprehensively for Sidgwick's arguments and moral methodology.

15 Cass

Equality of Status as an Intergenerational Ideal

Devon Malcolm Cass (Nova University of Lisbon), devonmcass@gmail.com
Wednesday, 14.15-15.00 | DOR 24, R. 1.504

Relational egalitarians hold that by focusing on the quality of social relations—that they are equal rather than hierarchical—instead of the equal distribution of goods such as resources or welfare, we better understand the egalitarian nature of justice. Some critics, however, doubt whether relational egalitarianism can generate an extensive (or complete) theory of justice, since the view appears unable to address issues of intergenerational justice, especially between non-overlapping generations. After all, we do not seem to stand in social relations with people who have ceased to exist or who have yet to be born. I argue this dismissal is mistaken. By characterizing and defending an 'institutional' as opposed to 'interpersonal' account, I show that relational egalitarianism can be brought to bear on a range of both backward and forward-looking duties of intergenerational justice. Social, political,

and legal institutions, I demonstrate, may confer equal or unequal statuses on their members, even when they do not coexist. As such, I argue that relational equality—when properly understood—provides an attractive ideal of intergenerational justice.

14 Christian

What Does It Take to Justify a Research Moratorium?

Alexander Christian (HHU Düsseldorf), alexander.christian@hhu.de
Wednesday, 11.15-12.00 | DOR 24, R. 1.403

Public debates about controversial research topics often evoke requests for the introduction of research moratoria. Examples include requests for moratoria on military research in public universities, research with human embryonic stem cells and human germline editing. In all of these cases, experts widely disagree on the justificatory status of particular moratoria. For instance, in the context of human germline editing, a permanent ban (Guttinger, 2018), a temporary ban (Lander et al., 2019) as well as a rejection of a research moratorium (König, 2019; Macintosh, 2019) are currently debated. In this talk, I will first explicate criteria for a well-justified research moratorium. A justification for a research moratorium must (i) overcome autonomy-based, epistemic and political arguments for the freedom of science (Wilholt, 2010, 2012). It must (ii) include a negative risk-benefit analysis of the prospective research outcome, provide evidence for the absence of strategies for risk minimization or demonstrate a violation of fundamental moral rights in research processes. Finally, it must (iii) result from a process of moral deliberation that includes informed experts as well as representatives of all potentially affected groups. I will then discuss whether these criteria are met with regard to requests for a permanent moratorium on CRISPR/Cas-based human germline editing.

11 Coninx

The Mysterious Pain Quality: Prospects and Challenges of the Orthodox View

Sabrina Coninx (Ruhr-Universität Bochum), sabrina.coninx@rub.de
Wednesday, 14.15-15.00 | DOR 24, R. 1.506

Kripke famously wrote that pain is picked out by means of its “immediate phenomenological quality.” (1981, p. 152). According to this view, pains are unified and distinguished from other types of experiences in terms of ‘what it is like’ to undergo them. While philosophers argue about how to naturalize pain, they widely agree that there is a *pain quality* enabling us to immediately identify pains as pains. Corns (2020) prominently labels this the *orthodoxy of simplicity*. Contrary to this orthodoxy, she argues that there is no distinct qualitative character of pain. While she correctly criticizes that the existence of a pain quality has been accepted mainly unquestioned, this paper defends the orthodox view against her initial objections, discussing the different ways in which the apparently mysterious pain quality could be analyzed. Without such a more fine-grained examination of the orthodox view, it is all too easily reduced to implausibly simplistic interpretations. Furthermore, we would miss exploiting the full potential of its more promising interpretations. The focus is thereby on the critical discussion of realist and constructivist variants, revealing general methodological issues of the analytic debate as well as the prospects and challenges of the individual positions under consideration.

11 Coninx & Wolf**Pluralism and the Role of Mindreading**Sabrina Coninx (Ruhr-Universität Bochum), sabrina.coninx@rub.deJulia Wolf (Ruhr-Universität Bochum), julia.wolf-n8i@rub.de

Thursday, 09.45-10.30 | DOR 24, R. 1.506

Mindreading refers to the ability to indirectly attribute mental states to others in order to predict or explain their behaviour. While mindreading was originally thought to be the primary basis of all social cognition, its status is still controversial in recent pluralist accounts which allow for several different socio-epistemic strategies to be employed. As mindreading is more cognitively demanding, it is commonly viewed as a rarely used strategy, only needed when less complex alternatives have failed. That is, mindreading is often constrained to a more peripheral role within a pluralist framework. However, the criteria for assessing the importance of an epistemic strategy for social cognition are often left unclear. In this paper, we first propose three concrete criteria to evaluate the importance of an epistemic strategy for social cognition: Frequency, Reliability and Centrality. In a second step, we focus on the Centrality Criterion, arguing that mindreading meets this and therefore plays an important role for social cognition, even in a pluralist framework. Specifically, we argue that mindreading is needed for a variety of paradigmatic situations of social cognition and that there is a connection between a deficit in mindreading and a deficit in central aspects of social cognition.

6 Conti**Arbitrary Abstraction and Logicality**Ludovica Conti (University of Pavia), ludoconti@gmail.com

Tuesday, 15.45-16.30 | DOR 24, R. 1.406

In this talk, I will discuss a criterion (weak invariance) that has been recently suggested in order to argue for the logicality of abstraction operators, when they are understood as arbitrary expressions (cf. Boccuni Woods 2020). The issue of logicality of the abstractionist vocabulary was originally raised within the seminal abstractionist program, Frege's Logicism, and represents, still today, a crucial topic in the abstractionist debate. My double aim consists in inquiring this topic both from a formal and from a philosophical point of view. On the one side, I will argue that, while weak invariance is not satisfied (except for specific exceptions) by first-order abstraction principles (APs), it characterises a wide range of higher-order ones. So, if we accept an arbitrary interpretation of APs, not only Neologicism (based on HP), but many current abstractionist programs and even the consistent revisions of Frege's Logicism (based on weakened versions of BLV) are able to achieve the logicality objective. On the other side, from a philosophical point of view, I will discuss the role of arbitrariness as a condition for the adoption of the abovementioned logicality criterion. Particularly, I will argue that, on the one hand, the arbitrary interpretation could be considered as the most faithful to abstractionist theories, but, on the other hand, it includes semantic insights that are radically alternative to Logicism. In order to argue for this latter consideration, an analogy between the arbitrary interpretation of the APs and the semantics of some eliminative structuralist reconstructions of the scientific theories will be illustrated.

14 Crook & Kästner

Discovering Emergent Structure in AI Systems

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Thursday, 09.45-10.30 | DOR 24, R. 1.402

Modern artificial intelligence (AI) systems are often complex and opaque. At the same time, they are becoming increasingly prevalent in our lives. As a result, there is an increasing demand to make AI systems *explainable* and their behaviour *intelligible*. Recent work primarily approaches this problem by employing specific explainability methods to aid in-context understanding. We think, however, that important desiderata such as safety and reliability might be best satisfied through the increase of expert understanding with respect to *how AI systems work*.

We suggest this requires research from the scientific perspective. This approach starts from the premise that once AI systems become sufficiently complex, they are best investigated and explained through the same lens as biological organisms. Accordingly, this work seeks to characterise the functional structure that emerges in AI systems through training. As we will describe, researchers pursuing this approach adopt strategies for discovery that have proved successful in the life sciences, such as pattern recognition, functional decomposition, localization, and systematic manipulation.

In this talk, we discuss the promises and limitations of the scientific approach to understanding AI systems. We contend that uncovering their emergent structure plays an important and underappreciated role in solving the explainability problem in AI.

5 Czerkowski

Aristotelian Rhapsody: Did Aristotle ‘Pick [His Categories] as They Came His Way’?

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Tuesday, 13.30-14.15 | DOR 24, R. 1.604

In *Critique*, Kant raises two objections to Aristotle’s categories. Kant’s concern, in the first instance, is whether Aristotle generated all categories that there are and if he did not generate any spurious categories. However, for Kant, this is only a symptom of the second – deeper – flaw in Aristotle’s thinking. According to Kant, Aristotle generated his categories ‘on no common principle’. He ‘merely picked them up as they came his way.’ However, Brentano (1981) contends that Aristotle’s categorial scheme can be saved from Kant’s criticism. According to Brentano, Aristotle’s generative process consists in dividing beings – which, as Aristotle famously argues, do not constitute a single *genos* (a kind that can be cited in a scientific definition) – into classes of decreasing size until the uppermost *genē* reveal themselves. Each of Aristotle’s categories names a *genos* arrived at in this way. This paper will: (1) present – and develop – Kant’s two objections, (2) offer a brief overview of Brentano’s derivation of categories, and, finally, (3) develop three objections to this derivation attacking it at the increasing level of depth (until none of Brentano’s proof of completeness stands).

16 Dammel

Hearing Anger

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 Wednesday, 14.15–15.00 | DOR 24, R. 1.103

Philosophical discussions of the normative status of anger range from Aristotle to the present day. Common to almost all such discussions, on the pro- as well as on the anti-anger side, is a focus on the angry subject and what she is supposed to do. From the point of view of a non-ideal methodology, this seems incomplete at best and obfuscatory at worst. If we want to improve moral relations in a world that is marked by systematic injustices, we have to ask what the *hearers* of anger are supposed to do. I shall propose that we need to understand anger as a move in the game of human relations that can transmit important moral knowledge and advance moral progress. Using Fricker, I shall argue that anger exchanges are testimonial exchanges that are prone to an especially pernicious kind of testimonial injustice. This shall yield a twofold answer to my question: hearers of anger need to (a) cultivate a socially enlightened testimonial sensibility in order to properly receive *anger's claim* and (b) act on the moral knowledge transmitted by anger in order to properly respond to *anger's demand*.

6 Damschen

Modal Truthmaker Paradox Against Jago's Truthmaker Maximalism

Gregor Damschen (Universität Oldenburg), gregor.damschen@uni-oldenburg.de
 Wednesday, 15.00-15.45 | DOR 24, R. 1.502

In this paper, I present the “Modal Truthmaker Paradox” (MTP), that avoids two weaknesses of Elke Brendel's (2020) Truthmaker Paradox: the MTP does not rest on Montague's theorem and it does not assume that provability implies having a truthmaker. Moreover, MTP gives rise to a new problem for truthmaker maximalists (e.g. Jago 2020) as it assumes a weak variant of Truthmaker Maximalism (<If p is true, it is possible that p has a truthmaker>). If a truthmaker maximalist would like to block the MTP, s/he has to give up this weak form of truthmaker maximalism, even Mark Jago's fixed Fitch (Jago 2021 vs Trueman 2021).

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11 Dänzer

Bye Bye Blockhead

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Tuesday, 15.00-15.45 | DOR 24, R. 1.502

What does it take for a creature or artificial system to have a *mind*, or be *intelligent*, in the basic sense of having beliefs, desires and rationality? The so-called Blockhead thought experiment (Block 1981) is still widely regarded as providing a decisive refutation of any behaviourist or dispositionalist answer to this question. The thought experiment turns on an imaginary machine whose outward behaviour equals that of an intelligent person, but which is said to be clearly unintelligent due to the overly simple nature of its internal mechanisms. While there are some responses to the Blockhead challenge in the literature, they are unsatisfactory. This paper aims to do better. It reconsiders the thought experiment and provides an extensive argument for the conclusion that the central claim about the imagined scenario—viz., that the Blockhead lacks intelligence—lacks adequate justification and should therefore not be assigned any weight in deciding on the nature of intelligence.

14 De Benedetto & La Rosa

Patchworks as Indexed Epsilon Terms: A Neo-Carnapian Account of Theoretical Terms in Science

Matteo De Benedetto (Ruhr-Universität Bochum), mtt.debenedetto@gmail.com
Elio La Rosa (LMU München), lrslei@gmail.com
Tuesday, 14.15-15.00 | DOR 24, R. 1.403

In this talk, we will offer a semantics for the so-called patchwork approaches to scientific concepts. These approaches conceptualize theoretical terms in science as highly contextual and indeterminate entities. We will reconstruct patchwork approaches within an extension of epsilon calculus, i.e. indexed epsilon calculus. This reconstruction will provide a Neo-Carnapian account of theoretical terms as indexed epsilon terms compatible with the kind of semantic indeterminacy and context-dependency that patchwork approaches prescribe.

7 de Haan

Diachronic Perspectivism and the Better Information Problem

Niels de Haan (Universität Wien), niels.de.haan@univie.ac.at

Wednesday, 11.15-12.00 | DOR 24, R. 1.606

Benjamin Kiesewetter (2017) defends a version of (objective) diachronic perspectivism: an agent's diachronic reasons are relative to the counterfactual body of evidence an agent could acquire when following a normatively optimal course. At t_1 , what A diachronically ought to do at t_2 depends on A's counterfactual epistemic circumstances at t_2 . While Kiesewetter's account has many merits, it faces the Problem of Overgeneration: it overgenerates diachronic reasons. Moreover, diachronic perspectivism faces an explanatory challenge: how can diachronic reasons be relative to *counterfactual* epistemic circumstances in the future and yet have consequences for the rational deliberation of a planning agent about what she ought to do *now*? To address the problem and explanatory challenge, I develop a *situated evidence constraint*: the counterfactual body of evidence relevant for diachronic reasons is restricted by the agent's *current* evidence about the choice situations she will face in the future. An agent's diachronic reasons correlate to what choice scenarios she has reason to deliberate about. There's a systematic connection between an agent's evidence about choice scenarios and the counterfactual epistemic circumstances of a normatively optimal course, which, in turn, determine an agent's synchronic and diachronic reasons.

10 de Haan

Diachronic Perspectivism and the Better Information Problem

Niels de Haan (Universität Wien), niels.de.haan@univie.ac.at

Thursday, 09.45-10.30 | DOR 24, R. 1.201

Benjamin Kiesewetter (2017) defends a version of (objective) diachronic perspectivism: an agent's diachronic reasons are relative to the counterfactual body of evidence an agent could acquire when following a normatively optimal course. At t_1 , what A diachronically ought to do at t_2 depends on A's counterfactual epistemic circumstances at t_2 . While Kiesewetter's account has many merits, it faces the Problem of Overgeneration: it overgenerates diachronic reasons. Moreover, diachronic perspectivism faces an explanatory challenge: how can diachronic reasons be relative to *counterfactual* epistemic circumstances in the future and yet have consequences for the rational deliberation of a planning agent about what she ought to do *now*? To address the problem and explanatory challenge, I develop a *situated evidence constraint*: the counterfactual body of evidence relevant for diachronic reasons is restricted by the agent's *current* evidence about the choice situations she will face in the future. An agent's diachronic reasons correlate to what choice scenarios she has reason to deliberate about. There's a systematic connection between an agent's evidence about choice scenarios and the counterfactual epistemic circumstances of a normatively optimal course, which, in turn, determine an agent's synchronic and diachronic reasons.

14 De Pretis, Peden & Radzvilas

A Battle in the Statistics Wars: A Simulation-Based Comparison of Bayesian, Frequentist and Williamsonian Methodologies

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Wednesday, 13.30-14.15 | DOR 24, R. 1.402

The Replication Crisis has reinforced the importance of statistical decisions in science. However, there are persistent and fundamental debates in science about the appropriate methodology for statistics. Thus far, these debates have generally focused on conceptual justifications, sociological arguments, or mathematical proofs of their long run properties. Both Bayesianism and frequentism have strong cases on these grounds, so we used a fresh angle: simulations of different methodologies' performance in the short to medium run. We used Big Data methods to conduct a large number of simulations using a straightforward decision problem involving observations and betting decisions about a coin with unknown bias. We programmed four players, inspired by Bayesian statistics, frequentist statistics, Jon Williamson's version of Objective Bayesianism, and a benchmark player who extrapolates from observed frequencies to general frequencies. We formally evaluated these players' decision-making performances. We found no systematic difference in performance between the Bayesian and frequentist players, provided the Bayesian used a flat prior and the frequentist used a low confidence level. The Williamsonian player was also able to perform well given a low confidence level. However, the frequentist and Williamsonian players performed poorly with high confidence levels, while the Bayesian was surprisingly harmed by biased priors.

9 De Rizzo

Truthmakers and the Grounds of Modalities

Julio Brotero De Rizzo (Universität Wien), julio.brotero.de.rizzo@univie.ac.at
Wednesday 09.00-09.45 | DOR 24, R. 1.607

Kit Fine developed a new approach to semantics based on the idea of states, or truthmakers, *exactly verifying* statements. Distinctive of this relation is the feature that a state is supposed to be wholly relevant to the proposition it exactly verifies. Thus, while the state of Socrates being Greek exactly verifies the proposition that Socrates is Greek, the fusion of the state of Socrates being Greek and it being raining now fails to do so, since it has a part which plays no role in rendering the proposition in question true.

While truthmaker semantics has already been applied to a variety of topics its application to modalities is still an open issue. In this talk, I present a truthmaker semantics for propositional modal logic S5 which is probably sound and complete. Central to the clauses for ' \Box ' and ' \Diamond ' is the relation of a state *being an alternative to* another states. I will then discuss consequences of the semantics to the question around the grounds of necessary propositions, and briefly consider variations on the semantics proposed.

6 De**Empirical Negation and Fitch's Paradox of Knowability**

Michael James De (Utrecht University), mikejde@gmail.com

Thursday, 10.30-11.15 | DOR 24, R. 1.502

I propose a constructive or intuitionistic solution to Fitch's paradox of knowability that neither restricts the verificationist principle that all truths are knowable to some class of unproblematic truths, nor defends controversial claims as unproblematic when given their rightful intuitionistic readings. Instead, the proposal turns on an *empirical* understanding of negation required for expressing that a given proposition is unknown.

9 Desai**A Nomological Solution to the Personite Problem**

Jules Alexander Desai (University of Oxford), jules.desai@magd.ox.ac.uk

Thursday, 11.15-12.00 | DOR 24, R. 1.608

Mark Johnston has argued for two radical claims about the nature of persons: (N) they are not located in a naturalistic ontology; and (P) they are hylomorphic complexes with an “ur-essence”. His argument turns on the “personite problem”: that all naturalistic ontologies are committed to the existence of “personites” that are irreconcilable with practical ethics. He then offers (P) as a solution. This paper attempts two things: first, to reject (N) and (P); second, to offer a naturalistic solution to the personite problem. The paper has the following structure. Section 1 elaborates (N) and (P). Section 2 rejects (P) on the grounds that it solves the personite problem only if a highly implausible disjunction is accepted. Section 3 rejects (N) by contending that, at best, the personite problem excludes only *reductive* naturalistic ontologies, but does not exclude non-reductive naturalistic ontologies. Section 4 then offers a non-reductive, “nomological” account of persons (where a person is a locus of nomological activity) and demonstrates how it is not committed to the existence of personites. It is concluded that the nomological account is a superior metaphysics of persons over its reductive naturalistic rivals on the grounds of avoiding the personite problem.

4 Dinges**What is the Group Belief Debate about?**

Alexander Dinges (FAU Erlangen), alexander.dinges@fau.de

Wednesday, 09.00-09.45 | DOR 24, R. 1.307

A growing body of literature addresses the question of what group beliefs are. However, this question seems easily solved. A group belief is a belief held by a group. Moreover, we know what groups and beliefs are from the independent debates on these phenomena. So, what is the group belief debate about? I reject various responses including the ideas that the existing debate on individual belief provides only partial definitions of belief and that “belief” is ambiguous or used non-literally in group belief ascriptions. I then suggest an interpretation of the group belief debate in terms of metaphysical grounding. On this construal, the central question is: What grounds the fact that a group believes something? I go

Sektionen / Sections

on to explore the consequences of this interpretation of the group belief debate. In particular, I suggest that group beliefs can be grounded in multiple ways. Thus, we should part ways with fully general accounts of group belief, as they are proposed in the literature, and focus instead on specific types of groups and the grounds of their respective beliefs.

6 Ditter

Semantics for Higher-Order Essences

Andreas Ditter (Massachusetts Institute of Technology), aditter@mit.edu
Thursday, 09.45-10.30 | DOR 24, R. 1.502

This paper develops a possible worlds semantics for a higher-order logic of essence, providing a general logico-semantic framework for reasoning about the essences of objects, properties, propositions, and logical operations like conjunction, negation, etc. The notion of essence I am concerned with is the notion Kit Fine influentially argued to be not definable in terms of metaphysical necessity. The first part of the paper motivates the idea that the notion of essence can distinguish between a wide range of propositions expressed by logically equivalent sentences, and shows how we can formalize essentialist statements in the framework of higher-order logic. The main part of the paper then presents a semantics which demonstrates the consistency of the distinctions motivated in the first part. Contrary to a claim that is frequently made in the literature, the semantics also shows that the theory of essence doesn't require propositions to be structured in something like the way in which sentences are structured, and that we can model fine-grained essentialist distinctions in a framework that is largely continuous with traditional possible worlds semantics.

3 Dörge & Holweger

Zugänge zur Begründung von Moral vermitteln – eine unerfüllbare Forderung

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Wednesday, 15.00-15.45 | DOR 24, R. 1.606

Der Bildungsplan 2016 des Gymnasiums sieht für die Klassenstufe 10 vor, dass Schülerinnen und Schülern unterschiedliche Zugänge zur „Begründung von Moral“ vermittelt werden. Der BP verbindet damit die Absicht, dass sich SuS systematisch mit einer durchsichtigen und einheitlichen Fragestellung auseinandersetzen. Ziel unseres Vortrags ist es, zu zeigen, dass diese Absicht nicht realisierbar ist. Wir argumentieren, dass der BP unter dem Stichwort „Begründung von Moral“ keine einheitliche Thematik ausweist, sondern eine Mehrzahl teils sehr unterschiedlicher Fragestellungen damit verbindet, mit der Folge, dass ein systematisches Durchdringen moralphilosophischer Grundlagenfragen weniger gefördert, als vielmehr untergraben wird. Wir zeigen zunächst auf, dass der Begriff „Begründung von Moral“ unklar ist aufgrund der jeweiligen Unklarheit der Begriffe „Begründung“ und „Moral“, und argumentieren, dass dies eine erste Quelle dafür ist, dass mit diesem Begriff

oft unterschiedliche Fragestellungen angesprochen werden. Anschließend wenden wir uns den vier im Bildungsplan genannten „Zugängen“ zur „Begründung der Moral“ zu und zeigen, dass diese einerseits ganz unterschiedliche Fragestellungen nahelegen, und dass der Bildungsplan damit andererseits auch faktisch unterschiedliche Fragestellungen anspricht. Im abschließenden Teil thematisieren wir, wie man mit diesem Befund in der schulischen Praxis umgehen sollte.

15 Dummer & Neuhäuser

Wohngerechtigkeit: Ein Argument für eine progressive Wohnraumsteuer

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Thursday, 10.30-11-15 | DOR 24, R. 1.504

Über die gerechte Verteilung von Wohnraum wird politisch viel gestritten. Üblicherweise wird das Problem als Knappheitsproblem dargestellt, das durch mehr Wohnungsbau gelöst werden kann. Auch die zunehmenden Wohnkosten werden als Problem insbesondere für Menschen mit geringeren Einkommen angesehen. Entsprechend zielen politische Maßnahmen auf die Behebung dieser Probleme ab.

Wenig thematisiert wird demgegenüber die Frage, was überhaupt eine gerechte Wohnverteilung ausmacht. Das wäre jedoch nötig, um beurteilen zu können, ob bestimmte politische Maßnahmen wirklich substanziell für mehr Gerechtigkeit sorgen oder nur die schlimmsten Folgen weiterhin bestehender Ungerechtigkeit abmildern – oder vielleicht sogar die Ungerechtigkeit erhöhen. Diese Frage wird jedoch nicht nur in der öffentlichen Diskussion kaum gestellt, sondern es finden sich dazu ebenfalls kaum gerechtigkeits-theoretische Überlegungen.

Wir wollen in unserem Vortrag daher die Frage der Wohngerechtigkeit in den Mittelpunkt rücken. Dazu werden wir in einem ersten empirischen Teil die tatsächliche Verteilung von Wohnraum am Beispiel Deutschlands darstellen. In einem zweiten Teil schlagen wir eine auf Selbstachtung beruhende relational egalitäre Gerechtigkeits-theorie als Maßstab zur Beurteilung von gerechter und ungerechter Wohnraumverteilung vor. In einem dritten Schritt diskutieren wir auf dieser Grundlage die gerechtigkeits-theoretischen Mängel bestehender politischer Vorschläge zum Umgang mit knappem Wohnraum. Schließlich werden wir eine progressive Wohnraumsteuer als besonders vielversprechendes politisches Instrument für mehr Wohngerechtigkeit vorschlagen.

11 Dung

Newton's Principle and the prospects of animal consciousness science

Leonard Dung (Ruhr-Universität Bochum), Leonard.Dung@ruhr-uni-bochum.de
Tuesday, 13.30-14.15 | DOR 24, R. 1.501

How can we know which animals are conscious? Newton's Principle (NP) (as described by Michael Tye) is a general methodological rule which licenses inferences from behavioral evidence to the presence of consciousness in particular species. Roughly, NP states that one is justified to infer that an animal is conscious if it performs a type of behavior which is caused by conscious experience in humans and there is no independent, overriding evidence suggesting that the animal is not conscious. In this talk, I make several claims related to NP. First, the validity of NP is implicitly presupposed and necessary for large parts of research on the distribution of animal consciousness. Second, the use of NP in animal consciousness science is – in spite of two recent objections – justified. Third, since the scope of NP in isolation is limited, NP should be integrated with theoretical knowledge about consciousness to provide a sound methodological foundation for the study of animal consciousness. Due to constraints of time, I will focus on the first two claims.

4 Ebert & Pedersen

Pluralism about Risk

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Wednesday, 15.00-15.45 | DOR 24, R. 1.404

In this paper we explore pluralism about risk. We start by introducing three different notions of risk that can be found in the literature. According to the probabilistic notion, the risk of a proposition p is determined by its probability. The higher the probability, the higher the risk. According to the modal notion, the risk of p is determined by the similarity of the most similar worlds in which p is true. The more similar these worlds are, the higher the risk. According to the normic notion, the risk of p is determined by the normalcy of the most normal worlds in which p is true. The more normal these worlds, the higher the risk. The dominant approach in the literature is to adopt a monist stance, taking a single notion of risk to be uniquely correct. We lay the groundwork for an investigation of pluralism about risk. First, we offer two motivations for the idea that an adequate account of risk should incorporate several notions of risk: respecting data about risk judgments and rationalizing such data. Second, drawing on certain views in ethics and the literature on pluralism about truth and logic we present four different forms that pluralism about risk could take. Third, we present an outline for future work by identifying a number of fundamental questions that these different forms of pluralism must address.

4 Eder

Finding an Epistemic Compromise

Anna-Maria Asunta Eder (Universität Köln), eder.anna-maria@uni-koeln.de
 Wednesday, 13.30-14.15 | DOR 24, R. 1.307

Group decisions are often difficult to make when group members doxastically disagree about a proposition. For instance, this is the case, when they have different credences in the proposition. When they disagree, they are supposed to find a rational epistemic compromise on the proposition on which they base their decision. But how do group members come to a rational epistemic compromise on a proposition when they have different (rational) credences in the proposition, or assign different probabilities to it? In this presentation, I focus on aggregation methods for finding an epistemic compromise and answer the question by proposing the *Fine-Grained Aggregation Method*. I show how this method successfully addresses the challenges of the *Standard Aggregation Method*, or *Weighted Straight Averaging*. One of the challenges is that *Weighted Straight Averaging* does not respect agents' evidence. Another challenge arises because *Weighted Straight Averaging* does not account for synergetic effects. By 'synergic effects', I mean those effects in which a proposition is given a probability even above each agent's initial credences. The *Fine-Grained Aggregation Method* respect agents' evidence and accounts for synergetic effects.

4 El Kassar

Defining Ignorance – It's More than Lack of Knowledge or Lack of True Belief

Nadja El Kassar (Freie Universität Berlin), nadja.el.kassar@fu-berlin.de
 Wednesday 10.30-11.15 | DOR 24, R. 1.307

In my talk, I examine the relation between ignorance and knowledge and I dispute standard assumptions about ignorance. I start by arguing that ignorance deserves its own analysis – rather than the standard derivative approach. When we analyze ignorance as an autonomous concept, we see that ignorance is not the contradictory of knowledge and that ignorance itself is an ambiguous state. Thus, ignorance is not the obvious extreme, conveniently located opposite of knowledge. And ignorance and knowledge do not by themselves constitute the endpoint a simple scale from knowing to not-knowing. I argue for these claims in three steps. First, I show that the epistemic state *ignorance* is not fully determined by calling it lack of knowledge (against the Standard View of Ignorance). Second, I show that ignorance is more than a doxastic attitude, it is a multi-dimensional epistemic state of a subject (against the New View of Ignorance). Third, I point towards the consequences that these insights have for epistemology.

10 Elsen

Abhängigkeit von Beziehungen der Achtsamkeit und Responsivität

Stephanie Elsen (Universität Mainz), steelsen@uni-mainz.de

Tuesday, 15.00-15.45 | DOR 24, R. 1.601

Es ist heute eine weitverbreitete Annahme, dass alle Menschen Träger*innen eines gleichen moralischen Status sind. Viele Moralphilosoph*innen haben es sich zur Herausforderung gemacht, diese Annahme philosophisch zu fundieren und Moraltheorien zu entwickeln, die dieser Annahme entsprechen. Zentral für diese Positionen ist häufig die Idee einer moralischen Gemeinschaft mit folgender Asymmetrie: Alle haben moralische Ansprüche, die mit Pflichten anderer ihnen gegenüber korrelieren, aber nicht notwendig haben alle auch Pflichten. Sowohl für Fähigkeiten- als auch Beziehungsansätze zur Fundierung eines gleichen moralischen Status stellt es allerdings eine besondere Herausforderung dar, eine bestimmte Gruppe von Menschen zu berücksichtigen. Sie empfinden Freude und Leid, besitzen aber nie die anspruchsvollen kognitiven Fähigkeiten, von denen typischerweise angenommen wird, dass sie einen gleichen moralischen Status fundieren. Ich argumentiere dafür, den gleichen moralischen Status eines Individuums in seiner Abhängigkeit von Beziehungen der Achtsamkeit und Responsivität zu fundieren. Eine Konsequenz dieses Vorschlags ist, dass mehr Individuen einen gleichen moralischen Status besitzen als orthodoxe Positionen annehmen. Dies wirft bestimmte Bedenken auf. Ihnen kann jedoch mit einer genauen Betrachtung der individuellen Merkmale und Interessen begegnet werden, aufgrund derer Individuen von Beziehungen der Achtsamkeit und Responsivität in einer moralisch signifikanten Weise abhängig sind.

7 Elson

Structural Rationality Avoids Determinate Substantive Irrationality

Luke Elson (University of Reading), luke.elson@reading.ac.uk

Thursday, 10.30-11.15 | DOR 24, R. 1.201

This paper is about the connection between substantive rationality (compliance with reasons) and structural rationality (also called coherence). Many have defended what I call the Core Claim: if you are substantively rational, then you are structurally rational. For example, there could not be reasons to simultaneously have beliefs and intentions that violate the following structural principle:

- Wide Means-End Coherence. You are rationally required to [intend to ψ if you (intend to ϕ and believe that in order to ϕ you must intend to ψ)].

But there are apparent counterexamples to the Core Claim here, involving multiple permissible-because-incommensurate actions. These counterexamples are the weak point in several views of structural rationality, including those of Kieseewetter, Kolodny, and Lord. In the central part of this paper, I consider such an example, and argue that if we understand incommensurability as indeterminacy, then the Core Claim is vindicated. Only through coherence can we avoid being determinately, substantively irrational.

12 Engelhardt & Fischer

Experimental Argument Analysis: Polysemy Processing in Verbal Reasoning

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Thursday, 11.15-12.00 | DOR 24, R. 1.204

We present the research program of experimental argument analysis (EAA). EAA empirically studies how automatic comprehension inferences shape verbal reasoning. The aim is to explain and expose fallacies in philosophical arguments. We explain when and why experimental methods need to complement familiar methods of argument analysis, lay out how experimental methods from psycholinguistics can be adapted for the purpose, and demonstrate their application through a case study. We argue that the ‘argument from illusion’ involves a fallacy of equivocation, due to a comprehension bias that affects the processing of polysemes (words with several distinct, but related senses). Due to this linguistic salience bias, subordinate uses trigger inferences licensed only by the dominant sense. We review extant evidence for the bias and philosophers’ susceptibility to it. A new study combines eye tracking with plausibility ratings to examine the fallacious inferences we hypothesised to drive the argument from illusion: The study examines inferences from phenomenal uses of appearance verbs to belief attributions and the influence of disambiguating context on these inferences. We point out general consequences for philosophical argument reconstruction and conceptual engineering.

2 Englisch

Metaphysical and Normative Aspects of Natural Food. The Case of Natural Wine

Patrik Engisch (University of Fribourg), patrik.engisch@protonmail.ch

Tuesday, 15.45-16.30 | DOR 24, R. 1.504

The philosophy of food is hot at the moment (e.g., Heldke 2003 ; Allhoff and Monroe 2007; Todd Kaplan 2012, 2021; Korsemeyer 2018 ; Strohl 2019; Borghini and Piras 2021 ; Borghini and Engisch 2022; Engisch 2021, 2022). An important question is that domain concerns the nature and importance of so-called “natural food”. This paper addresses these questions through the case study of natural wine and argues for the following two theses:

- i) Contra several arguments and official regulation (for instance of the FDA in the USA), there is a substantial property of naturalness that determines a non-empty class of food, i.e., natural food.
- ii) While not intrinsically normative, this notion of natural food has important normative consequences, in particular for the notion of food appreciation and for the notion of culinary value, i.e., the value that food items can have qua food items.

In particular, this paper examines and argues against three arguments presented against thesis i); offers a new, substantial definition of naturalness for food; and, finally, unfolds normative implications of this notion of naturalness for aesthetics and value theory generally.

6 Engler

Unbestimmtheit der Übersetzung und Synonymie

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Tuesday, 15.00-15.45 | DOR 24, R. 1.406

In diesem Vortrag wird der Zusammenhang zwischen der Unbestimmtheit von Übersetzungen und der Definierbarkeit einer Synonymierelation für Sätze unterschiedlicher Sprachen untersucht. Quines These von der Unbestimmtheit von Übersetzungen wird von vielen Kommentatoren deshalb als philosophisch interessant erachtet, da sie laut Quine die Undefinierbarkeit einer adäquaten Synonymierelation implizieren soll. In einem formalen Rahmen möchte ich zunächst eine Präzisierung der Unbestimmtheitsthese vorschlagen, die der Anforderung genügt eine solche Undefinierbarkeit in Form einer *reductio ad absurdum* zu implizieren.

Nachdem eine solche Präzisierung vorgeschlagen und diskutiert wurde, zeige ich, dass sich die Unbestimmtheitsthese in ihrer hier vorgeschlagenen Form eignet, um die Undefinierbarkeit einer ganzen Klasse von Relationen zu zeigen, deren Definierbarkeit eigentlich außer Frage steht und damit keine plausible These darstellt. Im weiteren Teil des Vortrags plädiere ich dafür, ein anderes Verständnis von der Unbestimmtheit von Übersetzungen anzunehmen. Insbesondere schlage ich vor, Synonymierelationen differenzierter zu analysieren und beispielsweise streng zwischen inner- und intersprachlicher Synonymie zu unterscheiden. Nach diesem Verständnis stellt die Unbestimmtheit von Übersetzungen ein nachweisbares Phänomen im Rahmen der Übersetzung von Theorien in formalen Sprachen dar, ohne dabei die Definierbarkeit einer Relation der Bedeutungsgleichheit von Sätzen unterschiedlicher Sprachen in Zweifel zu ziehen.

16 Ernst

Liebe und Unersetzbarkeit

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Wednesday, 15.00-15.45 | DOR 24, R. 1.103

In der philosophischen Diskussion um den Begriff der romantischen Liebe findet sich ein Trilemma, das ungefähr die folgende Form annimmt:

- 1) Wir lieben Menschen aufgrund ihrer liebenswerten Eigenschaften.
- 2) Liebenswerte Eigenschaften sind prinzipiell multipel instantiierbar.
- 3) Wenn wir jemanden lieben, dann ist diese Person für uns unersetzbar.

Nicht alle drei Sätze scheinen zugleich wahr sein zu können, denn wenn wir jemanden aufgrund seiner liebenswerten Eigenschaften lieben und wenn eine zweite Person die gleichen liebenswerten Eigenschaften haben kann, scheint die erste Person für uns eben gerade nicht unersetzbar zu sein. Mein Ziel in diesem Vortrag ist es, dieses Trilemma aufzulösen. Dazu gehe ich in zwei Schritten vor. Im ersten Schritt werde ich eine Reihe von Möglichkeiten zur Auflösung des Trilemmas diskutieren, die sich als unzureichend erweisen. Im Zuge dessen werden allerdings die beiden ersten Thesen genauer geklärt. Im zweiten Schritt bringe ich dann meinen eigenen Vorschlag, der von einer Explikation der dritten These ausgeht und auf einer Unterscheidung basiert, die ich in Anlehnung an eine bekannte psychologische Untersuchung zum Thema Liebe vornehme: der Unterscheidung zwischen einem Liebesgefühl und einer Liebesverpflichtung. Auf Grundlage dieser Unterscheidung kann man, wie ich zeigen möchte, allen drei Ausgangsthese gerecht werden.

11 Fanti Rovetta

Narratives in the Head: Inner Speech as the Format of Narrative Thought

Francesco Fanti Rovetta (UOS, RTG SC), francesco.fanti.rovetta@uni-osnabrueck.de
Thursday, 11.15-12.00 | DOR 24, R. 1.506

Narratives are fundamental components of humans' identity and autobiography. In recent times, various scholars have downplayed the role of reflection in the creation of narratives in favour of a social and interactive origin, typically through conversations with others. Concurrently, the term 'narrative thought' has been coined to refer to the cognitive processes involved in the creation of narratives. While 'narrative thought' has been defined on the basis of the content of the thought, little or no attention has been devoted to the kind of mental imagery which supports it and the different possibilities opened up by each representational format. Whereas sometimes it is taken for granted that narratives are in a linguistic format, this is not necessarily the case. With regards to narrative thought, the two options are linguistic encoding through inner speech and imagistic representations. By drawing on recent research into the cognitive role of linguistically encoded thoughts, I argue that when narrative thought is conducted through inner speech it gains in expressive power and allows for forms of abstraction, conceptualization and categorization not possible through imagistic representations. Moreover, by considering the dialogic quality of some inner speech episodes, the dichotomy between internally and externally generated narratives is weakened.

11 Feldbacher-Escamilla & Sekatskaya

Theoretical and Ontological Reduction of Mental Properties

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Wednesday, 13.30-14.15 | DOR 24, R. 1.506

Theoretical irreducibility of mental predicates is often used to argue for ontological irreducibility of mental properties. Whether this ontological conclusion is justified depends on how one understands reduction. Reduction in philosophy of mind is usually understood as a complete reduction of all mental predicates to physical predicates. However, this strong understanding of reduction does not reflect the recent developments in the philosophy of science. In the early stages of logical empiricism, reduction was considered to be about explicit definability/translatability of theoretical predicates with the help of empirical predicates, but this understanding is problematic. A weaker form of reduction is that of employing bilateral reduction sentences for theoretical predicates such as dispositional terms, and an even weaker form of reduction is empirical confirmability of propositions with theoretical predicates. In this talk, we will outline a framework for better interrelating the discussions of reductionism in philosophy of science and philosophy of mind. We will show that ontological reducibility or irreducibility of mental properties to physical properties is ex-

Sektionen / Sections

plained in different ways by different reductionist and non-reductionist theories in philosophy of mind, which constitute different syntheses of a particular understanding of reduction and a particular claim about ontology of mental properties.

12 Felka

Moorean Infelicity and Moral Discourse

Katharina Felka (Universität Graz), katharina.felka@uni-graz.at
Thursday, 09.00-09.45 | DOR 24, R. 1.204

Moral utterances are closely connected to non-cognitive attitudes in a way that ordinary descriptive utterances are not: when a speaker sincerely utters a moral sentence such as 'Killing is wrong', we can infer that she is in a certain non-cognitive state of mind: she disapproves of killing. Most importantly, we can infer this without having any further information about the speaker and the situation in which she utters the sentence: speakers convey non-cognitive attitudes in uttering moral sentences, in a sense in need of further specification. However, this specification has proven to be difficult. Extant proposals all share a central assumption: that speakers communicate non-cognitive attitudes. In contrast, the paper develops a minimalist account of moral discourse, according to which speakers only indicate that they have such attitudes. The result is a superior account of moral discourse: it has the same explanatory power but avoids common pitfalls of its non-minimal alternatives.

11 Fernández Castro

Expressivism, Normativity and the Mind

Victor Fernández Castro (University of Granada), vfernandezcastro@gmail.com
Thursday, 11.15-12.00 | DOR 24, R. 1.501

Back in the eighties, the rouse of folk psychological eliminativism propelled an important debate on the status of mental vocabulary and the role of our attributional practices in the configuration of the mind. Among the reactions to eliminativism there was no shortage of those who rallied to realism but also to interpretivism that claimed that our attributive practices exhausted the meaning of what it is to be a minded creature. Far from over, the recent literature in philosophy of psychology contains an important number of publications that exhibits a renewed interest in interpretivist positions, arguments against realism or new ways to confront eliminativism. The aim of this paper is to present and defend an expressivist approach to the status of folk psychological vocabulary. After presenting the view and their main features in contrast to interpretivist position with which expressivist shares important motivations and claims, I present two arguments to favor the expressivist analysis. According to the first argument, expressivism can account for fundamental aspects of disagreements regarding mental attribution while the second highlights the capacity of the view for explaining a justificatory and exculpatory use of mental states ascriptions.

12 Ferrari & Moruzzi

Alethic Pluralism, Deflationism, and the Integration Challenge

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Wednesday, 14.15-15.00 | DOR 24, R 1.205

A core motivation for alethic pluralism—roughly, the thesis that propositions concerning different subject matters are true in different ways—is the explanatory inadequacy of deflationary conceptions of truth. Among the various ways in which truth can be explanatory, we focus on normative explanation—i.e. the issue whether truth is needed to account for the normative aspects of enquiry. Pluralists, *contra* deflationists, have argued that all admissible truth properties are normative. In a recent paper, Ferrari & Moruzzi have argued that even within a pluralist framework, there are domains (paradigmatically the domain of basic taste) in which truth is not normative. If that's right, alethic pluralism must then be made more ecumenical and allow for a non-normative truth property among the local truth-realizers. The question at the core of this talk is then: how do we integrate a non-normative truth property within an alethic pluralist framework? Call this the *Integration Challenge*. Two broad metaphysical models of alethic pluralism have been proposed: (i) *Strong Pluralism* maintains that there is a plurality of truth properties, each of which operates as the truth property for one or more domains, with no generic truth property applying to all domains; (ii) *Moderate Pluralism* maintains that in addition to the various domain-specific truth properties, there is a generic truth property operating across all discourses. I develop and assess two strategies for alethic pluralists to meet the integration challenge. I then argue that the first strategy is highly problematic for all existing versions of alethic pluralism while the second is only available to strong pluralists.

4 Field

Normative Mistakes in the Epistemic Domain

Claire Field (University of Sterling), claire.a.field@gmail.com

Tuesday, 15.00-15.45 | DOR 24, R. 1.404

Many have thought that factual mistakes are better excuses than normative mistakes. A popular line of thought says that false beliefs about purely factual matters often excuse wrongdoing, but false beliefs about normative matters do not. Most arguments for this focus on the moral and legal domains. However, if this is true, we might expect it to be a general feature of normativity. If it is, this has implications for an increasingly common practice in epistemology – borrowing normative notions such as excuse, blame, and justification from the moral domain. The legitimacy of this borrowing relies on an assumption that normativity is unified, such that normative notions are easily transferable across domains. However, if normativity is unified, and the asymmetry between the exculpatory capacity of factual and normative mistakes, this is bad news for projects that attempt to borrow epistemic normative notions from the moral or legal domains. If normative mistakes cannot excuse in the epistemic domain, then views committed to factive norms of belief become implausibly strong. In this paper, I investigate the status of the asymmetry in the epistemic domain and examine the implications of the result for the unity of normativity.

7 Field

Risk, Rationality and Recklessness

Claire Field (University of Sterling), claire.a.field@gmail.com

Wednesday 09.45-10.30 | DOR 24, R. 1.201

What is the relationship between rationality and recklessness? Risk neutrality is widely thought to be a requirement of rationality. However, it is well known that many people do not make decisions in a risk neutral way, and some philosophers have thought that moderate risk aversion can be rational, and have tried to adapt decision theory to account for it (Allais 1953, Quiggin 1982, Schmeidler 1989, Buchak 2013, Monton 2019). In this paper, I examine two recent attempts, Buchak's (focussed on risk attitudes) and Monton's (focussed on a *de minimis* threshold), and argue that they are unsuccessful because they fail to take adequate account of the epistemic situation of the decision situation. I propose an alternative way to rationalize moderate risk aversion that takes account of the epistemic situation at hand, and show how this avoids the problems of alternative proposals. Additionally, I show how this account enables us to make useful connections between the epistemic and decision-theoretic notion of risk, and the legal notion of recklessness. I propose three options for understanding the relationship between these notions.

4 Fijten, Putora & Schmidt

How Might the Use of Opaque Artificial Intelligence in Medical Contexts Undermine Knowledge?

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Paul Martin Putora (Kantonsspital St. Gallen), PaulMartin.Putora@kssg.ch

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Tuesday, 15.45-16.30 | DOR 24, R. 1.308

The often superior detection and prediction capabilities of AI algorithms together with their opacity raise important epistemological questions in medical contexts, for instance, when algorithms are used to determine whether a patient is at risk of developing cancer. Our worry is that, even if they work well, the opacity of AI algorithms might undermine the ability of users – in particular, medical doctors – to acquire knowledge on the basis of their outputs. To substantiate this worry, we will first present a case that makes it vivid. We will, second, examine several philosophical approaches to knowledge which might be used to spell out systematically how knowledge could be undermined. Each of these approaches can be used to show a respect in which the user of an AI algorithm is lucky to have a true belief, and therefore doesn't know. In the end, we argue that it is possible to make sense of the intuition that a medical doctor's belief based on the output of an opaque algorithm is lucky, and thus not knowledge, by appealing to a perspective-relative version of the Safety condition on knowledge.

14 Fischer**Naturalness and the Heuristic Role of Scientific Principles**Enno Fischer (BUW), efischer@uni-wuppertal.de

Thursday, 10.30-11.15 | DOR 24, R. 1.403

The naturalness principle roughly demands that a theory should not involve independent parameters that are finely tuned. This principle was employed heavily over the last 40 years by theoretical physicists as a guideline for developing theories of beyond the Standard Model physics (BSM). However, since experiments at the Large Hadron Collider (LHC) have not found conclusive signs for new physics, the significance of naturalness arguments has been questioned and it has been suggested that high-energy physics has reached the "dawn of the post-naturalness era."

I argue that an explanation of the current shift in attitude towards naturalness can be given if we acknowledge that the naturalness principle has experienced epistemic support through the theories it has inspired. I argue that the potential coherence between major BSM proposals and the naturalness principle led to an increasing degree of credibility of the principle. The absence of new physics at the LHC has undermined the potential coherence and has led to the principle's current loss of significance. On the basis of this account, I address the heuristic role of naturalness as a guiding principle in high-energy physics.

4 Flamini**Russellian Inquirers and Wondering about what One Is Certain. Some Steps toward a Conceptual Dimension of Inquirers**Leonardo Flamini (University of Pavia, Universität Zürich), leonardo.flamini3@gmail.com

Tuesday, 15.00-15.45 | DOR 24, R. 1.308

Recently, epistemologist Jane Friedman (forthcoming, 2019, 2017) argued for the following norm (NI): If you already know the answer to a given question *Q*, you ought not to inquire into *Q*. Namely, she claimed that there is a normative defect in inquiring into a question while one already knows its answer. This norm has an undeniable intuitive appeal. Indeed, take the case I already know well that Biden is the President of the United States, but, despite this, I inquire into the question "Who is the current President of the United States?". We immediately perceive something fishy in my inquiry, and a natural question arises: "Why should you inquire into that question if you already know its answer?". In this talk, I challenge NI despite its intuitiveness. I present an inquirer I call "Russellian", whose peculiarity is to inquire into what she knows and is certain of to gain a particular kind of conceptual understanding necessary to settle her questions properly. I show that this particular inquirer and her legitimate agency offer a compelling counterexample to NI and provide reasons to claim that NI is not a fair norm for inquiry and inquirers. Finally, I conclude that the possibility of Russellian inquirers points out something more than the falsity of IN. It shows that inquirers have a conceptual dimension that cannot be entirely captured by the simple idea that they are agents who aim to find out and know the true answers to their questions.

16 Gab

Institutional Agency in Light of Idealized Role-Perspectives

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Tuesday, 15.00-15.45 | DOR 24, R. 1.103

In the ongoing debate about the agency of social groups, so called „role-accounts“ (e.g., Ludwig 2017, Ritchie 2020) have gained an increasing foothold as they offer a promising solution to explain the agency of particularly large and complexly structured social groups, i.e., institutions. In my paper, I will argue in favor of such a role-account, aiming to motivate the concept of *Idealized Role-Perspectives*. Taking the perspective of an Idealized Role-Occupant can be understood as a cognitive transformative heuristic, i.e., it provides the individual with agent-neutral reasons to deliberate, infer or behave in certain ways. This has explanatory advantage over other role-accounts, which I argue cannot solve cases of role-occupants facing ambivalent or spontaneous situations. To this end, my account offers an explanation for performing adequately in these roles: I argue that taking the perspective of an *Idealized Role-Occupant* can be understood as a reflexive ability and in terms of understanding the role's constitutive beliefs, norms, standards, practices etc. This in turn can explain how individuals *qua* role-occupants may conceptualize and frame situations from the (often highly) specialized perspective of a role, ensuring the capacity to cooperate with fellow team-members.

11 Garibbo

Still There. Perceiving Objects Persisting in the Absence of Change

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Wednesday, 11.15-12.00 | DOR 24, R. 1.501

In recent years, there has been an on-growing debate about the perceptual experience of temporally extended events such as objects changing over time. Extensionalists claim that this is to be explained in terms of the perceptual experience matching the temporal structure of the perceived event. They often appeal to introspection to justify this claim. As Ian Phillips puts it: „it seems to us that our experience itself unfolds alongside, and in step with, the temporal phenomena which we find ourselves attending to in reflecting on our experience.“ (Phillips 2014, 132). This claim, however, has been criticized by opponents on the basis of the transparency of experience. Given transparency, no property of experience is introspectively available, including temporal properties. In my presentation, I am going to argue in favor of the extensionalist appeal to introspection. More precisely, I am going to argue that the perceptual experience of objects remaining unchanged over time gives us some reasons to assume that temporal properties are an exception to the transparency of perception. In the perceptual experience of an object persisting unchanged over an interval of time, we can become introspectively aware of our experience's unfolding over that interval of time.

11 Gauker**Amodal Completion: Imagination or 3D Modelling?**

Christopher Gauker (Universität Salzburg), christopher.gauker@plus.ac.at
 Wednesday 09.00-09.45 | DOR 24, R. 1.501

When we visually perceive a scene, we may in some sense represent occluded parts of the scene that do not reflect light into our eyes. In psychological research this is called amodal completion. Amodal completion may be based on principles of good form, shape symmetries or even acquired knowledge about the kinds of things perceived. But in what sense do we represent the occluded elements? Bence Nanay has argued that amodal completion takes the form of representations in mental imagery of the occluded portions (2010, 2018). I will argue that Nanay's account requires us to imagine the unimaginable. It requires us to imagine the occluded portions in precisely the places in the scene where they are hidden from view. An alternative account begins with the observation that on the basis of our perception we may build a three-dimensional mental model of the spatial structure of the scene perceived. It is such 3D models that allow us to imagine what an object would look like if we viewed it from the other side. Amodal completion consists in building such a 3D model, which we can do without imagining what the scene would look like from a different perspective.

12 Gauker**Epistemic versus Objective Possibilities**

Christopher Gauker (Universität Salzburg), christopher.gauker@plus.ac.at
 Wednesday, 13.30-14.15 | DOR 24, R. 1.205

In recent decades, many philosophers of language have advocated an approach to the semantics of modal operators that evaluates all sentences as *acceptable* or not relative to a set of possible worlds. An atomic sentence will be said to be acceptable relative to a set of worlds if and only if it is true in all of the worlds in the set. The modal sentence "Vivian might be in Vienna" will be evaluated as acceptable if and only if there is a world in the set in which Vivian is in Vienna. Most of these authors have assumed that the set of worlds pertinent to a given utterance will be the information state of the speaker. An alternative is to say that the pertinent set of worlds is the set of worlds that are, in a sense, to be explained here, *objectively relevant* to the conversation. It will be argued that the objective relevance approach yields better explanations of the fact that modal sentences can be used informatively, the fact that they can be accepted as testimony on the authority of the speaker, and the fact that we can support modal claims on the basis of factual claims.

7 Gebharder & Sekatskaya**Supervenient Fixity and Agential Possibilities**

Alexander Gebharder (LMU), alexander.gebharder@gmail.com
 Maria Sekatskaya (HHU Düsseldorf), maria.sekatskaya@gmail.com
 Wednesday, 11.15-12.00 | DOR 24, R. 1.204

Sektionen / Sections

Compatibilist libertarianism is an actualist account of free will intended to reconcile physical determinism and an agent's ability to do otherwise. This account was proposed as an alternative to the traditional compatibilist and libertarian theories (List 2014; 2019), but it faces some serious objections. We will argue that at its core, compatibilist libertarianism is a variant of classical compatibilism, and that the objections to it can be avoided by embracing its compatibilist nature. We will also propose a slightly modified version of compatibilist libertarianism that is as close to an actualist account of free will in a deterministic world as one can hope for.

9 Gebharter & Sekatskaya

Probabilistic Supervenience and Agential Possibilities

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Tuesday, 14.15-15.00 | DOR 24, R. 1.607

Compatibilist libertarianism (List, 2014) proposes a new solution to the problem of an apparent incompatibility of free will and determinism. It drives a wedge between ontological levels and claims that free will is possible as a higher-level phenomenon even if the fundamental physical level is governed by determinism. After highlighting an inconsistency in the current version of compatibilist libertarianism, we discuss how one of its essential metaphysical assumptions (in particular: supervenience) can be modified in order to avoid this problem. Finally, we discuss the pros and cons of pushing the position to the limits in this way.

14 Gebharter & Osimani

Analogical Inference Bayesian Style 2.0

Alexander Gebharter (LMU MCMP), alexander.gebharter@gmail.com

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Thursday, 09.00-09.45 | DOR 24, R. 1.402

Recently, Dardashti, Hartmann, Thébault, and Winsberg (2019) proposed a Bayesian model for analogical inference. In this talk we investigate how their model performs when varying the degree of certainty about the similarity between the source and the target system. We show that there are circumstances in which the degree of confirmation for the hypothesis about the target system obtained by collecting evidence from the source system goes down when increasing the degree of certainty about the similarity between the source and the target system. We then develop an alternative Bayesian model for analogical inference and show that the direction of the variation of the degree of confirmation always coincides with the direction of the degree of certainty about the similarity between the two systems in this model.

11 Giannuzzo

Self-Knowledge and Creativity

Anais Giannuzzo (Universität Genf), anaigianuzzo@gmail.com

Thursday, 09.00-09.45 | DOR 24, R. 1.506

Kaufman and Paul describe creativity as “the vehicle of self-expression” (Paul and Kaufman 2014, 3). If this is the case, one could in theory reflect on one’s own creative processes and outputs, and draw conclusions about, e.g., the psychological state one was in when creating. I will argue that we can gain self — i.e. knowledge of one’s own mental states and dispositions — by investigating one’s creative processes and outputs (Coliva 2016, 51; Paul and Stokes 2018, 193f.). For example, I might realise I am angry after noticing how uneven my knitting has become; I might also realize I’m in love with someone after noticing how much the drawing I just finished resembles this person.

I will start with an analogy to visual perception in order to argue that one can, by reflecting on one’s own creative processes or outputs, form a hypothesis about the frame of mind one was in when creating. I will then discuss the notion of self-knowledge and the way in which we can gain it. Finally, I will offer an account of how one can acquire self-knowledge by investigating one’s own creative processes or outputs.

11 Giustina

Inner Acquaintance Theories of Consciousness

Anna Giustina (University of Liège), anna.giustina@outlook.com

Tuesday, 14.15-15.00 | DOR 24, R. 1.501

A crucial divide in philosophy of consciousness is whether phenomenal consciousness implies some form of self-consciousness. Disagreement revolves around the following “Inner Awareness Principle”:

IA: For any subject *S* and conscious state *M*, *M* is conscious only if *S* is aware of *M*.

Theorists who do accept *IA* have typically tried to explain consciousness in terms of (meta)*representation* and the debate among them has mostly revolved around whether what makes *M* conscious is a *higher-order* representation or a *self-representation*.

In this paper, I want to explore a *third* option for *IA* defenders—one that has received little attention so far. On this view, inner awareness is explained *not* in meta-representationalist terms, but in terms of the relation of *acquaintance*. Accordingly, an *Inner Acquaintance Theory* of consciousness (*IAT*) has the following general shape:

IAT: For any subject *S* and conscious state *M*, *M* is conscious iff *S* is acquainted with *M*.

Different versions of *IAT* may be developed depending on how the relation of acquaintance and its relata are characterized. The purpose of this paper is to (1) propose what I take to be the main decision points through which any version of *IAT* should be shaped and (2) argue for a particular choice at each and build up what I consider as a particularly promising version of *IAT*.

11 Glauer & Hildebrandt

Becoming Episodic. Generic and Episodic Thinking in Early Cognitive Development

Ramiro Glauer (FH Potsdam), ramiro.glauer@fh-potsdam.de
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Tuesday, 09.00-09.45 | DOR 24, R. 1.501

It has recently been argued that genericity plays a crucial role in the development of humans' ability to conceive of an objective world. Objectivity is taken to be acquired by widening one's subjective perspective in the 'here and now' to a generic group perspective about how things are generally. However, this idea rests on confusing two notions of genericity: social and worldly genericity. We argue that there is no reason to think that the acquisition of social genericity is related to worldly genericity nor that worldly genericity is related to objectivity. Instead, objectivity is acquired by learning to refer to particular situations, that is, by acquiring episodicity as it involves an abstract spatio-temporal frame of reference. The acquisition of objectivity is nonetheless a matter of social-cognitive development because the ability to distinguish "here and now" from other situations results from becoming enculturated in the common practice of a specific symbol use that establishes a shared spatio-temporal reference system.

9 Glazier

Perspectival Objects

Martin Glazier (Universität Genf), martin.glazier@unige.ch
Tuesday, 15.45-16.30 | DOR 24, R. 1.608

Some objects can be seen only from a certain place or vantage point. Sometimes this is because, from some vantage points, one's view of the object is obstructed, but sometimes it is because, from some vantage points, the object is simply not out there to be seen, even if all obstructions are removed. The latter kind of objects I call *perspectival*. Examples include constellations, holograms, and horizons. I argue that perspectival objects are ubiquitous in the sense that for every ordinary, nonperspectival material object, there are many perspectival objects which are co-located with it. These I call the object's *aspects*; they can be seen only when one views the object from the proper vantage point. Now if we admit such things, we face the following question: of the nonperspectival object and its aspects, which is prior? The *aspectualist* takes the aspects to be prior; the *anti-aspectualist* takes the object to be prior. I develop a powerful argument for aspectualism over anti-aspectualism. The argument is that the aspectualist can give a better response to a perspectival analogue of David Lewis's problem of temporary intrinsics.

7 Goetsch

Reliability and the Nature of Abilities

Max Goetsch (Freie Universität Berlin), max.goetsch@fu-berlin.de
 Wednesday 10.30-11.15 | DOR 24, R. 1.204

There is a sense of “ability” such that having an ability to ϕ is not entailed by a single success in ϕ -ing – that success may be entirely by fluke. Nor does possession of ability, in that sense, distribute over disjunction (an ability to ϕ or ψ neither entails an ability to ϕ nor an ability to ψ). Currently, many philosophers subscribe to what I call RELIABILISM about this sense of ability (e.g. Greco 2007; Jaster 2020). This is the hypothesis that what is distinctive about abilities, in this sense, is that they involve a suitable degree of reliability, where reliability is understood as a function of the agent's quota of success among relevant possible situations. The able is thought to succeed in a greater proportion of relevant situations than the unable. I shall argue that RELIABILISM is false. The able need not outstrip the unable in terms of reliability, so understood. In fact, the able can be less reliable than the unable. Appeal to reliability does not hold the key to the nature of abilities. I will argue for this conclusion on the basis of what Mele and Moser (1994) call cases of “statistically reliable luck.”

6 Grabmayr

Can We Turn Metamathematical Results into Representation-Independent Insights?

Balthasar Grabmayr (University of Haifa), balthasar.grabmayr@gmx.net
 Wednesday 11.15-12.00 | DOR 24, R. 1.406

There is a well-known gap between metamathematical theorems and their philosophical interpretations. Take Tarski's Theorem. According to its prevalent interpretation, the collection of all arithmetical truths is not arithmetically definable. However, the underlying metamathematical theorem merely establishes the arithmetical undefinability of a set of specific Gödel codes of certain artefactual entities, such as infix strings, which are true in the standard model. That is, as opposed to its philosophical reading, the metamathematical theorem is formulated (and proved) relative to a specific choice of the Gödel numbering and the notation system. Similar observations apply to Gödel and Church's theorems, which are commonly taken to impose severe limitations on what can be proved and computed using the resources of certain formalisms. The philosophical force of these limitative results heavily relies on the belief that these theorems do not depend on contingencies regarding the underlying representation choices. The main aim of this talk is to put this belief under scrutiny by exploring the extent to which we can abstract away from specific representations in the formulations and proofs of several metamathematical results.

11 Greif

Adaptation and Its Analogues: Biological Categories for Biosemantics

Hajo Greif (Warsaw University of Technology), hans-joachim.greif@pw.edu.pl

Wednesday, 11.15-12.00 | DOR 24, R. 1.502

“Teleosemantic” or “biosemantic” theories form a strong naturalistic programme in the philosophy of mind and language. They seek to explain the nature of mind and language by recourse to a natural history of “proper functions” as selected-for effects of language- and thought-producing mechanisms. However, they remain vague with respect to the nature of the proposed analogy between selected-for effects on the biological level and phenomena that are not strictly biological, such as reproducible linguistic and cultural forms. This essay critically explores various interpretations of this analogy. It suggests that these interpretations can be explicated by contrasting adaptationist with pluralist readings of the evolutionary concept of adaptation. Among the possible interpretations of the relations between biological adaptations and their analogues in language and culture, the two most relevant are a linear, hierarchical, signalling-based model that takes its cues from the evolution of co-operation and joint intentionality and a mutualistic, pluralist model that takes its cues from mimesis and symbolism in the evolution of human communication. Arguing for the merits of the mutualistic model, the present analysis indicates a path towards an evolutionary pluralist version of biosemantics that will align with theories of cognition as being environmentally “scaffolded”. Language and other cultural forms are partly independent reproducible structures that acquire proper functions of their own while being integrated with organism-based cognitive traits in co-evolutionary fashion.

4 Günther

Probability of Guilt

Mario Günther (LMU München), mario.guenther111188@gmail.com

Tuesday, 13.30-14.15 | DOR 24, R. 1.308

In legal proceedings, a fact-finder needs to decide whether a defendant is guilty or not based on probabilistic evidence. We defend the thesis that the defendant should be found guilty just in case it is rational for the fact-finder to believe that the defendant is guilty. We draw on Leitgeb’s stability theory for an appropriate notion of rational belief and show how our thesis solves the problem of statistical evidence. Finally, we defend our account of legal proof against challenges from Staffel and compare it to a recent competitor put forth by Moss.

1 Hallich

Nachvollziehbarkeit als Kriterium für die Respektabilität von Sterbewünschen?

Oliver Hallich (Universität Duisburg-Essen), oliver.hallich@uni-due.de
 Tuesday, 13.30-14.15 | DOR 24, R. 1.401

Mit dem Urteil des Bundesverfassungsgerichts vom 26.02.2020 wurde nicht nur das Verbot „geschäftsmäßiger“, d.h. auf Wiederholung angelegter Suizidassistenz, für verfassungswidrig erklärt; es wurde darüber hinaus das Recht auf selbstbestimmtes Sterben als Ausdruck personaler Freiheit definiert und ausdrücklich von schweren oder unheilbaren Krankheitszuständen entkoppelt. Damit ist ein Zustand, vor dem konservative Denker wie R. Spaemann noch vor einigen Jahren als *worst case scenario* gewarnt haben, Realität geworden: Suizidassistenz kann grundsätzlich auch ohne Krankheit und extremes Leiden in Anspruch genommen werden. Der vorliegende Beitrag zeigt – insbesondere in Auseinandersetzung mit neueren Publikationen Schöne-Seiferts und Wittwers –, dass infolgedessen die *Nachvollziehbarkeit* eines Sterbewunsches zu einer zentralen Kategorie bei der Beurteilung der moralischen Legitimität von Suizidassistenz wird und macht auf die damit verbundenen Probleme aufmerksam. Entweder, so meine These, muss das Nachvollziehbarkeitskriterium so weit aufgefasst werden, dass ausnahmslos *jeder*, auch noch der frivolle, Sterbewunsch als „nachvollziehbar“ zu gelten hat, oder das Nachvollziehbarkeitskriterium ist auf externe normative Kriterien angewiesen und tritt dann in einen Widerspruch zum autonomiebasierten „Bewertungssubjektivismus“, mit dem es meist gekoppelt wird. Insgesamt plädiere ich daher – mit Wittwer, anders als Schöne-Seifert – dafür, an der Bindung der Gewährung von Suizidassistenz an Krankheitszustände festzuhalten.

15 Hänel

Listening to Refugees' Voices: Testimonial Injustice in Academia and Politics

Hilkje C. Hänel (Universität Potsdam), hilkje.charlotte.haenel@uni-potsdam.de
 Thursday, 10.30-11.15 | DOR 24, R. 1.505

Serena Parekh (2020) has recently called for a reframing of the refugee crisis. She argues convincingly that what is termed 'refugee crisis' are in fact two crises; one for Europe and an even more important one for the refugees themselves. Yet, when we talk about the refugee crisis, what we often have in mind are not the harms and suffering of refugees but the ways in which the mass seeking of refuge pertains to a crisis for Europe. This is but one example in which our political judgements are deeply concerned with "our" wellbeing instead of the wellbeing of those seeking help and refuge. This paper makes three claims: First, refugees' voices are not prominent when we talk about the refugee crisis in academia. Second, this problem can be identified as, in Linda Alcoff's terminology (1991), 'speaking for' instead of with others and points to a form of testimonial injustice, as described by Miranda Fricker (2007), that refugees suffer from. Third, this example points to particular insights about non-ideal theorizing; it is marked by a specific method that takes into account insights both from ideology critique as well as feminist standpoint theory.

16 Hänel

Potentially Disabled?

Hilkje C. Hänel (Universität Potsdam), hilkje.charlotte.haenel@uni-potsdam.de
Wednesday 09.45-10.30 | DOR 24, R. 1.103

Ten years ago, I was diagnosed with a rare illness called Myasthenia Gravis. Myasthenia Gravis is a long-term neuromuscular autoimmune disease where antibodies block or destroy specific receptors at the junction between nerve and muscle; hence, nerve impulses fail to trigger muscle contractions. The disease leads to varying degrees of muscle weakness. Currently, I have only minor symptoms, I am not seriously impaired, and I do not suffer from any social disadvantage because of my illness. Yet, my life and my body since my diagnosis feel different than before. In this paper, I aim to make this feeling intelligible and propose that it is a state of what I call 'latent impairment'. Latent impairment is a state of being "in between", different from being actually impaired and also different from being abled-bodied. The theory takes its cues both from social constructionist theories of disability as well as theories of (chronic) illness and their focus on the importance of subjectivity. Furthermore, I suggest that a phenomenological understanding of minimal impairment can show possible ways of becoming an ally to the disability rights movement (DRM).

10 Harney & Khawaja

Two Views on Claims in Multiple-Option Choice Sets

Jonas Harney (Universität des Saarlandes), jonas.harney@hotmail.de
Jake Khawaja (Rutgers University), jakekhawaja@gmail.com
Tuesday, 13.30-14.15 | DOR 24, R. 1.606

Intuitively, a person's possible non-existence can influence the strength of their claims against being harmed or in favor of being benefited. This requires a principled method by which to assess claims in multiple-option choice sets. This paper scrutinizes the extant proposal, offered by Michael Otsuka, which we call the Weakening View. We argue that this proposal faces several problems: (i) it posits an ad hoc asymmetry between gains and losses, (ii) it relies on the controversial assumption that existence can benefit people relative to non-existence, and (iii) it implies that people's first-order claims are substantially diminished in themselves given a sufficient counterfactual gain in well-being. In light of these problems, we develop an alternative: the Combining View. The former holds that a person's claim against a loss of well-being relative to one distribution is weakened by the availability of further alternatives relative to which the person gains well-being. On the contrary, our view holds that a person has an overall claim for or against a certain distribution relative to the whole option set, where overall claims are functions of the different pairwise claims. It thereby avoids, as we show, each of the problems raised for the Weakening View.

16 Harris**Non-Doxastic Disinformation**

Keith Raymond Harris (Ruhr-Universität Bochum), keithraymondharris@gmail.com
 Wednesday 09.45-10.30 | DOR 24, R. 1.308

Disinformation is widely defined in terms of an intention to deceive its targets. However, defining disinformation in these terms threatens to overlook important forms of disinformation, and thereby fails to appreciate the threat disinformation poses. This presentation argues for a more expansive definition of disinformation.

The definition of disinformation as deceptive is often motivated by comparison with lies. Some argue that, just as lies require an intent to deceive their audiences, so does disinformation. However, not all lies aim at deception. 'Knowledge-lies' aim to prevent knowledge, without causing false belief. Similarly, some disinformation is intended to prevent knowledge without deception. This is especially true of so-called "Firehose of Falsehood" disinformation, which floods the epistemic environment with a range of conflicting claims, thereby causing confusion, rather than deception.

Disinformation need not target an audience's beliefs at all. At its core, disinformation is intended to non-coercively manipulate an audience. This can also be accomplished by shaping its audience's sub-doxastic associative states. For example, disinformation put forward by nativist political actors may subtly encourage associations between immigration and crime among its audience. Recognizing such non-doxastic forms of disinformation is crucial to understanding how disinformation functions and how it might be effectively counteracted.

12 Hasselkuss & Schrenk**A Fresh Look at Wittgenstein's Family Resemblance**

Paul Hasselkuss (HHU Düsseldorf), paul@hasselkuss.com
 Markus Schrenk (HHU Düsseldorf), schrenk@hhu.de
 Wednesday 10.30-11.15 | DOR 24, R. 1.205

One of the most popular notions in Wittgenstein's oeuvre is the one of 'family resemblance' (*Familienähnlichkeit*) used in the *Philosophical Investigations* to characterise terms such as 'game' and 'language'. Typically, Wittgenstein is understood to hold that the entities to which such family resemblance terms are correctly applied need not have any one property or set of properties in common. Instead, various concrete games, languages, etc. resemble each other in multiple different ways and fall into the term's extension due to these miscellaneous resemblances. However, not anything goes: Wittgenstein mentions features that nets of resemblances amongst family members have. These features' status and exact nature is controversial and in the existing literature on family resemblance different interpretations and judgements of their importance have been given. It has even been argued that Wittgenstein's notion defies a positive explication.

We believe that this is not so: individual family resemblance terms ('game', 'language',...) can't be defined, alright, but family resemblance can. The aim of this paper is to offer a novel explication. Core ingredients are: a comparison to Mackie's *INUS* condition, reference to Goodman's entrenched predicates, and a distinction between the statics/semantics and dynamics/pragmatics of family resemblance terms.

16 Haueis, Nordmann & Schuetze

Philosophy and the Climate Crisis: A Manifesto for Change

Philipp Haueis (Universität Bielefeld), philipp.haueis@uni-bielefeld.de

Lia Nordmann (Humboldt-Universität Berlin), lia.nordmann@hu-berlin.de

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Thursday, 10.30-11.15 | DOR 24, R. 1.103

We are right in the middle of the climate crisis, and if we do not take adequate action by the end of the decade, the outlook is devastating. In the face of this all-pervasive crisis, we, as philosophers, need to confront the reality that direct and rapid action against a climate collapse appears to be the only way forward. In this article, we therefore pose demands on how academic philosophy has to change in response to this reality. We argue that the best way for philosophy to help tackle the climate crisis is to align itself with the global climate movement, which we consider the most effective agent pressing adequate climate action. To do so philosophers should create *theory for practice*, i.e. produce theoretical knowledge relevant to problems within activist practices. Philosophers also need to *accelerate philosophy* by overcoming institutional obstacles which prevent philosophical thought from adapting more quickly and being put to work in the right places at the right time. Finally, we need *all in for climate action* to transform all areas of philosophy. Following these demands, we sketch a problem agenda with concrete steps to change philosophical research and teaching in light of the climate crisis.

4 Hauswald

Delphische Autorität

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Tuesday, 15.00-15.45 | DOR 24, R. 1.307

Ich möchte einen bislang nicht als solchen gewürdigten Spezialfall epistemischer Autorität in den Fokus rücken, den ich „delphische Autorität“ nenne. Unter einer delphischen Autorität verstehe ich eine epistemische Autorität, die einem Subjekt Wissen, Verstehen oder andere epistemische Güter *über es selbst* vermitteln kann. Ein durchaus signifikanter Teil unserer epistemischen Praxis lässt sich als Auseinandersetzung mit delphischen Autoritäten (z.B. medizinischen oder psychotherapeutischen Experten, Seelsorgern, Steuerberatern, Rechtsanwälten usw.) rekonstruieren. Wie ich zeigen möchte, sind solche Konstellationen durch eine Reihe von Besonderheiten gekennzeichnet, die für eine adäquate epistemologische Analyse berücksichtigt werden müssen, bislang allerdings weitgehend vernachlässigt wurden. Konkret lautet meine These, dass der sog. Präemptionismus keinen befriedigenden Ansatz für die Epistemologie delphischer Autorität darstellt, und zwar aus Gründen, die für delphische Autorität *spezifisch* sind. Zur Stützung dieser These werde ich Bezüge herstellen zwischen den bislang weitgehend isoliert geführten Debatten zu epistemischer Autorität einerseits und zu Selbstwissen und erstpersionaler Autorität andererseits. Ich argumentiere, dass die Interaktion mit delphischen Autoritäten nach Maßgabe einer *kollaborativen Epistemologie* analysiert werden muss, und die Autorität wie das ratsuchende Subjekt eine gemeinsame Verantwortung für das Gelingen der Untersuchung tragen.

4 Heering

Alethic and Narrative Models of Conspiracy Theories

David Heering (Humboldt-Universität Berlin), heeringdavid@gmail.com
 Wednesday 10.30-11.15 | DOR 24, R. 1.308

There is much disagreement in the extant literature on conspiracy theories about whether conspiracy theories are in general irrational. There is, however, overwhelming agreement on a more fundamental point: that they *can* be assessed as rational or irrational. This is because existing models almost exclusively assume that conspiracy theories are a kind of *explanation*, and that commitment to them takes the form of *belief*. Beliefs are representational attitudes assessable in terms of whether they are true or false, justified or unjustified. I call models committed to this assumption *alethic models*. This paper argues that alethic models are mistaken. They have led to an unhelpful dialectical stalemate in the debate, and they fail to account for the aesthetic properties of conspiracy theories. I offer a non-alethic, *narrative model* instead. Narrative models take the label ‘conspiracy narrative’, which is widespread in the social sciences, seriously. Conspiracy theories, according to the narrative model, are *stories*, that is *narrative fictions*, and the relevant mental states are therefore those of fiction as well – imagination and make-believe. These mental states of fiction are not assessable in terms of truth or justification. They are neither rational nor irrational. Narrative models therefore overcome the pitfalls of alethic approaches.

7 Heering

Explanationism as Reasons-Responsiveness and the Poverty of Actuality Challenge

David Heering (Humboldt-Universität Berlin), heeringdavid@gmail.com
 Wednesday 09.00-09.45 | DOR 24, R. 1.204

According to a popular approach, an agent’s moral responsibility for an action is grounded in their ability to respond to reasons (RRR). The core idea behind RRR is that responsible agents act in connection with normative reality, as it were. There are two views about the nature of this connection: Modalism understands it as a modal covariation between reason and action. Explanationism understands it as a special explanatory connection between reason and action. In this paper, I answer a challenge to explanationism, which I call *the poverty of actuality challenge*: The idea is that in order to be responsive to reasons, an agent must take into account not only actual sufficient reasons favouring the action, but also potential sufficient reasons *against* it. These cannot, by definition, be found in the actual world. Thus, an explanationist RRR-account in terms of what actually explains the action fails. I argue against this challenge that it either begs the question against the explanationist or it betrays commitment to the objectionable principle that *complete reasons-explanations of actions must contain as background conditions facts about how the agent responds to counter-reasons*. This principle is implausible and utilises the dubious notion of the ‘completeness’ of an explanation.

10 Heinzelmann

A Challenge for Coherence Accounts of Rationality

Nora Heinzelmann (FAU Erlangen), nora.heinzelmann@fau.de

Wednesday 09.00-09.45 | DOR 24, R. 1.606

According to a popular account, rationality is a kind of coherence of an agent's mental states and, more specifically, a matter of fulfilling norms of coherence. For example, in order to be rational an agent is required to intend to do what they judge they ought to and can do. This norm has been called 'Enkrasia'. Another norm requires that, *ceteris paribus*, an agent retain their intention over time. This has been called 'Persistence of Intention'. This paper argues that thus understood norms of rationality may at times conflict. More specifically, Enkrasia and Persistence of Intention may place demands on the agent that are impossible to fulfil. The framework of requirements then fails to provide us with nor's for reasoning that makes us rational. A rival account, according to which rationality is a kind of responsiveness to one's available reasons, can overcome the problem.

11 Heinzelmann

Willpower and Uncertainty

Nora Heinzelmann (FAU Erlangen), nora.heinzelmann@fau.de

Thursday, 10.30-11.15 | DOR 24, R. 1.506

How is failure of willpower possible? It may be due to delay discounting: this morning, drinking tonight was less valuable to me than staying sober but now that the drink is here it seems better. However, this approach cannot account for willpower failures in cases like the marshmallow experiment. Thus, I suggest a revision based on the recent scientific literature: how agents process uncertainty determines how they discount delayed rewards. In the marshmallow case, the agent does not know when they will receive the larger reward, and they realise as they wait that it will arrive later than expected. This ultimately causes their willpower to break down. My proposal indicates that, in some cases, weakness of will is a cognitive bias whose underlying mechanism is uncertainty processing. Relying on theories of decision-making under uncertainty may allow us to determine under what conditions this is irrational.

10 Helfer

Ill-Being, Desire-Satisfactionism and the Concept of Desire

Thorsten Helfer (Universität des Saarlandes), thorsten.helfer@uni-saarland.de

Tuesday, 15.45-16.30 | DOR 24, R. 1.606

Some things in life can be quite bad and not only in a way that it deprives us of good things. Sometimes things are *actively* bad. I will understand these actively bad things as *ill-being*. In order to accommodate ill-being, some *Desire-Satisfactionists*, defenders of the view that satisfied desires constitute well-being, have argued that there is a second attitude, namely aversions, that determine our ill-being. This is called the *aversion view*. I will argue that the

aversion view is superior to the *frustration view*, which claims that desire-frustration constitutes our ill-being. The aversion view can accommodate for a conceptual independence of the actively good from the actively bad. Furthermore, I will show that accepting the aversion view has consequences for our choice of the underlying concept of desire as well. I will argue that the *behaviour-based concept of desire* cannot accommodate the aversion view properly, because even the most promising behavioural concept of aversion implies the unacceptable conceptual connection between the actively good and bad that led us to the aversion view in the first place. So, the Desire-Satisfactionist should reject the behaviour based-concept of desire, and embrace a *pleasure-based concept of desire*.

14 Henderson

Putting Inference to the Best Explanation into Context

Leah Henderson (University of Groningen), l.henderson@rug.nl
Tuesday, 15.00-15.45 | DOR 24, R. 1.403

It is often assumed that Inference to the Best Explanation, or 'IBE', belongs to the context of justification. But several recent developments might lead one to ask whether it is more appropriate to situate it in the context of pursuit. Peircean abduction, often designated as an immediate precursor to IBE, is, according to recent scholarship, best located in the context of discovery and pursuit, rather than justification. Furthermore, alleged difficulties in reconciling IBE with Bayesianism have led to a proposal for giving IBE a non-justificatory role, which is close to that of pursuit. I argue, however, that these considerations do not make a strong case for locating IBE in the context of pursuit. Although abduction plays an important role in the context of pursuit, IBE is not simply a renaming of abduction. It has been reconceptualised in a way which makes it unsuitable to operate in the context of pursuit. Objections to compatibility between IBE and Bayesianism also do not give strong grounds to locate IBE outside the context of justification. Thus, IBE should continue to be regarded as a candidate for characterising epistemic appraisal in the context of justification.

14 Hendl, James & Jukola

Who Counts in Official Statistics? Towards an Ethical-Epistemic Analysis of Racial / Ethnic Categorisation

Tereza Hendl (UNIA), tereza.hendl@uni-a.de
Daniel James (HHU Düsseldorf), daniel.james@posteo.de
Saana Jukola (Ruhr-Universität Bochum), saanajukola@gmail.com
Wednesday, 15.00-15.45 | DOR 24, R. 1.402

To determine the extent of racial/ethnic discrimination and the success of 'positive action' measures, the EU recommends the collection of statistical data. Unlike the systematic investigation of racial disparities in the UK and the US, in most European countries, 'race' and 'ethnicity' are not used as statistical categories in comprehensive data collection. In Germany, reservations towards gathering racial/ethnic data and even the very term 'Rasse' are deep-seated due to the history of National Socialism. Instead, categories such as 'migration background' are used. In this talk, we aim to do two things: First, we draw on accounts of

Sektionen / Sections

ethical-epistemic analysis, as well as social-scientific research to argue that the category of ‚migration background‘ is both epistemically and ethically problematic. Second, we draw on debates on the metaphysics of race and ethnicity to examine alternatives to ‚migration background‘. We argue that, while talk of ‚racialised groups‘ may be preferable in most (including social-scientific) contexts, cautious talk of ‚Rasse‘ is permissible in others. We thereby explore how conceptual ethics can inform the social-scientific and public debate over racial/ethnic classification and thereby facilitate racial/ethnic data collection that is both ethically and epistemically sound.

13 Hesse

Analogy Revisited. From Linguistics to Epistemology

Jacob Hesse (Ruhr-Universität Bochum), jacob.hesse@rub.de
Tuesday, 13.30-14.15 | DOR 24, R. 1.505

A classical way to avoid anthropomorphism, as well as strict apophaticism, is the doctrine of analogy. I argue that it leads to severe problems if the doctrine of analogy is understood as a theory about the meanings of words when they are applied to God. In contemporary linguistics, we have two options to analyze the analogical uses of word meanings. First, they can be understood as belonging to polysemous expressions with different but related fixed meanings. Second, they can be described as meanings that *are created* on the basis of encoded lexicalized meanings relative to certain contexts of utterance. Both strategies fail when used as a foundation for the doctrine of analogy. If the stipulated word meanings are understood as potentially adequate descriptions of the nature of God, the first option leads to anthropomorphism. From the second option follows excessive arbitrariness since all talk about God would become irreducibly metaphorical. To avoid these problems, it will be proposed to understand the doctrine of analogy as an epistemological assumption, according to which we can only grasp non-fundamental truths about God.

13 Hoheneder

Subjekt, Welt und Gott – Das Mystische im Anschluss an Ludwig Wittgenstein

Victor Michael Hoheneder (LMU München), victor.hoheneder@t-online.de
Tuesday, 15.45-16.30 | DOR 24, R. 1.505

Die Absicht des im Paper umrissenen Vortrages besteht in der Fruchtbarmachung der Begrifflichkeiten des „Tractatus“ Wittgensteins und der zugehörigen Vorarbeiten für eine präzisere Fassung des Phänomens Mystik. Dabei soll zunächst die Verwendung im weitesten Sinne religiöser Begriffe durch Wittgenstein in diesen Werken plausibilisiert werden, wobei zunächst die Stellung des Subjektbegriffs für das Verständnis der Begriffe Gottes und des Mystischen hervorzuheben ist. In einem zweiten Schritt wird argumentiert, dass der Aspekt des Willens für Wittgenstein zentraler Bestandteil der existenziellen Verfassung des Subjekts ist, welcher in Verbindung mit dem eingangs erläuterten Subjekt-Welt-Verhältnis zur Erfahrung der Kontingenz der Welt führt. Dies stellt den zu explizierenden Brückenschlag zum Begriff Gott und zur Erfahrung des Mystischen dar. In einem finalen Schritt soll aufgezeigt werden, inwiefern in Wittgensteins Ausführungen Elemente enthalten sind, die

eine noch weitere Fassung und Beschreibung von Mystik denkbar machen. Dabei wird insbesondere an Wittgensteins Konzeption der logischen Form und die Unterscheidung von Sagen und Zeigen zu denken sein.

12 Horden

Pseudo-Singularity Defended

John Horden (University of Barcelona), hordenjohn@gmail.com
Thursday, 11.15-12.00 | DOR 24, R. 1.205

Plausibly, at least some terms are *pseudo-singular*: syntactically singular but semantically plural; which is to say that despite their misleadingly singular surface form, they can denote two or more things together. Importantly, this idea promises to explain the coherence of many tempting many-one identity claims. On the face of it, any pair of logicians is identical to the logicians. But, thankfully, that isn't to say that one thing can be identical to the things, because a pair isn't a *thing* at all; rather, it's two things. Similarly, many authors treat completions of "the plurality of" as pseudo-singular by stipulation; and it might even be thought that *all* group terms are pseudo-singular. Here I present and try to solve a novel puzzle about the expression "is one of", which challenges the coherence of pseudo-singularity and the plural view of groups.

9 Hörzer

The Metaphysics of Mechanisms Revisited

Gregor M. Hörzer (Universität Osnabrück), ghoerzer@uos.de
Tuesday, 15.45-16.30 | DOR 24, R. 1.607

New Mechanist views of scientific explanation are typically divided into the *complex-systems view*, on which mechanisms are objects, and the *acting-entities view*, on which mechanisms are composed of objects ('entities') and activities. The two camps are usually thought of as directly opposed to each other. I argue that paying attention to the distinction between the question what kinds of things mechanisms *are*, and the question what kinds of things mechanisms *are composed of*, suggests that the core theses of the two camps do not stand in direct opposition to each other. So, the recent trend towards unification may require less of a compromise than one might initially expect. The straightforward combination of the core theses of the two views is that mechanisms are objects composed of objects and activities. Some have instead proposed that mechanisms are entity-involving occurrences ('EIOs') composed of objects and activities. However, both options remain unconvincing. Instead, I propose an as-of-yet overlooked alternative view: mechanisms are occurrences solely composed of activities *of* objects, rather than activities *and* objects. This view still respects the New Mechanists' central commitment to the mutual irreducibility of objects and activities ('entity-activity dualism'), but avoids the problems of the previously proposed views.

14 Hoyningen-Huene

Objectivity, Value-Free Science, and Inductive Risk

Paul Hoyningen-Huene (Leibniz Universität H, UZH), hoyningen@ww.uni-hannover.de
Thursday, 11.15-12.00 | DOR 24, R. 1.404

In this paper I shall defend the idea that there is an abstract and general core meaning of objectivity, and what is seen as a variety of concepts or conceptions of objectivity are criteria of or means to achieve objectivity. I shall then discuss the ideal of a value-free science and its relation to the objectivity of science; its status can be at best a criterion of or means for objectivity. Given this analysis, we can then turn to the problem of inductive risk. Do the value judgements regarding inductive risk really pose a threat to the objectivity of science? My claim will be that this is not the case because they never lower the thresholds postulated for objectivity. I shall conclude the paper with a discussion of yet hardly discussed influences of values on science which indeed poses a serious threat to the objectivity of some scientific disciplines.

15 Huber

Hope from Despair

Jakob Huber (Freie Universität Berlin), jakob.huber@fu-berlin.de
Wednesday 09.00-09.45 | DOR 24, R. 1.504

Recently, there has been an affective shift among climate activists away from hope in the face of global warming towards darker attitudes such as anger, panic or fear and, most surprisingly perhaps, despair. The activist group Extinction Rebellion (XR) has arguably claimed most explicitly that there is no way to escape despair in the face of the imminent climate catastrophe. Among philosophers, by contrast, there is a deep-seated scepticism about despair: celebratory accounts of hope as a motivation and source of grit tend to be juxtaposed with a view of despair as unproductive, impotent or nihilistic. The aim of this paper is to withstand this wholehearted rejection. I argue that a specific form of despair that I call *episodic* has an important role to play in our practical and particularly in our political lives. In guarding against certain pitfalls of false hope, episodic despair can help us to hope (and ultimately act) well. Against this background, I propose that XR should not be understood as asking us to reject or give up hope, but as aspiring for a more robust and realistic kind of hope, which *arises from* despair.

4 Hughes

Epistemic Dilemmas Defended

Nick Hughes (University of Oxford), nickhowellhughes@gmail.com
Tuesday, 13.30-14.15 | DOR 24, R. 1.404

Daniel Greco argues that there cannot be epistemic dilemmas – situations in which, whatever one believes, one will be doing something wrong from the epistemic point of view. In this talk I will show how his argument, and the theory of epistemic dilemmas that it

depends on, goes wrong in multiple ways. I will then look in detail at a would-be epistemic dilemma and argue that no non-dilemmic approach to it can be made to work.

9 Hundertmark

Multi-Track Pluralism

Fabian Hundertmark (Universität Bielefeld), Fhundertmark@uni-bielefeld.de
Wednesday, 14.15-15.00 | DOR 24, R. 1.607

An object needs to have a set of dispositions to show different manifestations to have a multi-track disposition. In this paper, I want to pursue the question, in virtue of which facts some entity has a multi-track disposition rather than only a set of single-track dispositions. Some authors (Corry 2019; Williams 2011) hold that we are only justified to posit a multi-track disposition if all members of a set of single-track dispositions always occur together. In my presentation, I will argue that this requirement excludes dispositions with causal bases from being multi-track. This is problematic because paradigmatic, crucial scientific, and philosophically important multi-track dispositions have causal bases.

To resolve this problem, I suggest that dispositions can be multi-track in virtue of being homeostatic clusters of single-track dispositions. They are sets of single-track dispositions that tend to occur together because of underlying mechanisms or because some properties in the set favor the presence of others. This account captures the relevant instances of multi-track dispositions without being overly liberal.

15 Huseynli

Freedom Without Ability

Ilkin Huseynli (University of Milan), ilkin.huseynli@unimi.it
Wednesday, 13.30-14.15 | DOR 24, R. 1.504

When I am unable to φ but will be prevented if I could φ , am I free to φ ? Most political philosophers assume that ability is necessary for freedom and in the absence of ability, the question of freedom does not arise. If they are right, then a hypothetical prevention has no impact on my freedom when I lack the relevant ability. I argue that I am unfree because I do not enjoy the freedom to φ if I am (actually or hypothetically) prevented. Suppose that the UK government declared me *persona non grata*. Also suppose that I jump over a cliff in order to become paralyzed and I make myself unable to enter the UK. On ability-based account, while before I was prevented by the UK government and this prevention reduced my overall freedom, now this prevention does not matter. Thus, *by becoming paralyzed I made myself freer*. Note that virtually all contemporary theorists reject the direct relevance of one's desires to one's freedom because a desire-based conception implies that a prisoner who reduces her desires to the set of actions which are allowed by her guards does not suffer from any unfreedom. However, as the prisoner increased her overall freedom by reducing her desires, I increased my overall freedom by reducing my abilities. If desire-based conception is rejected, ability-based conception should be rejected too.

14 Hüttemann

Determinism – An Empirical Thesis

Andreas Hüttemann (Universität Köln), ahuettetm@uni-koeln.de

Tuesday, 13.30-14.15 | DOR 24, R. 1.403

Occasionally it is assumed or claimed that determinism is not an empirically testable thesis. Thus, it is argued that determinism must be presupposed in order to understand the world as an intelligible world (Bieri 2001). Suppes (1993) argues that determinism is a transcendental thesis – neither determinism nor indeterminism can be empirically refuted. (see also Keil 2018).

In contrast, I will argue that determinism is an empirical thesis whose verification encounters many difficulties, but which are not fundamentally different from those of other empirical theses.

The paper consists of three parts: (1) Since the term “determinism” is a *terminus technicus* whose definition is initially left to our discretion, I will first discuss what criteria such a definition should satisfy and then suggest that so-called “entailment” definitions best meet these criteria. Section (2) outlines three steps that are required for an empirical test of determinism/indeterminism. Section (3) deals with objections to the claim that determinism is an empirical thesis.

14 Hyder

The Conflict between Locality, Determinism, and Causation in the Work of Wittgenstein and Einstein

David Hyder (University of Ottawa), David.hyder@me.com

Thursday, 09.45–10.30 | DOR 24, R. 1.403

A central question for the philosophy of space-time concerns an apparent incompatibility between the Principle of Locality and the requirement of Nomological Determinism. A series of 20th century paradoxical thought experiments, which later became experimentally confirmed physical phenomena, pitted these two requirements against one another: double-slit, EPR, Aharonov-Bohm. This paper will examine the basic logic of the problem, with particular attention to one of its earliest philosophical manifestations in the theory of Wittgenstein’s *Tractatus*. This foundational work contains a local theory of space-time, developed in response to work of Russell’s work on the Law of Causality in the period immediately before the two philosophers met in 1912. In conclusion, it will be shown how Einstein’s Special Theory of Relativity solved the problem of Locality in a different way, but was thereby thrust on the other horn of dilemma, thereby giving rise to the family of paradoxes in question.

The paper will be read in German.

14 Jaksland & Salimkhani**The Many Problems of Spacetime Emergence in Quantum Gravity**

Rasmus Jaksland (Norwegian University of Science and Tech.), rasmus.jaksland@ntnu.no

Kian Salimkhani (Universität Köln), k.salimkhani@uni-koeln.de

Wednesday 09.45-10.30 | DOR 24, R. 1.402

According to theories of quantum gravity, key spatiotemporal features of our world may be non-fundamental. The implications of this observation are now widely debated in the philosophy of quantum gravity. In this paper we argue that what is often discussed under the umbrella term of “spacetime emergence” in the philosophy of quantum gravity literature in fact consists of a plethora of distinct and even highly different problems. We therefore advocate to cast such debates more specifically in terms of the emergent spatiotemporal aspects, as is already done in the physics literature. We first show how ambiguous the notion of spacetime is and offer five understandings of what *the* problem of spacetime emergence may amount to in each case. We then argue, however, that there are, in fact, many distinct philosophical problems relating to spacetime emergence and that none of the five understandings picks out a problem that is exceptional among these. Next, we observe that different quantum gravity approaches have different spatiotemporal aspects as emergent, whereby speaking of quantum gravity collectively is problematic. Finally, we illustrate how philosophical inquiries that employ notions of spacetime emergence are actually aided by conducting the investigation at the level of specific spatiotemporal aspects.

14 Jung**Epistemic and Non-Epistemic Perspectives on Conspiracy Theories**

Eva-Maria Jung (WWU Münster), eva-maria.jung@uni-muenster.de

Wednesday 09.45-10.30 | DOR 24, R. 1.403

Conspiracy theories have been increasingly in focus of discussion. In this talk, I shall argue that, in academic as well as in non-academic disputes, the distinction between epistemic and non-epistemic perspective is often blurred. This does not only hinder a proper understanding of conspiracy theories, but it also undermines strategies for refuting those among these theories that are enormously harmful to society. The talk is divided into three parts. First, I shall propose a value-neutral, minimal definition of conspiracy theories. Second, I reconstruct some paradigm arguments of the philosophical literature that aim at demonstrating that conspiracy theories inherently have epistemic deficits. I shall show that these arguments are either unconvincing or they transcend the epistemic perspective by implicitly referring to non-epistemic values. Third, I shall argue that from what I have shown it does not follow that we should restrict the discussion about conspiracy theories to the epistemic perspective. On the contrary, understanding and evaluating these theories presupposes an interplay of epistemic and non-epistemic values. Still, the boundaries between the two perspectives should be made transparent in the specific contexts of discussion.

6 Kant

An Empirically Informed Perspective on the Set-Theoretic Independence Problem

Deborah Kant (HHU Düsseldorf, Universität Konstanz), kantdebo@gmail.com
Wednesday 09.00-09.45 | DOR 24, R. 1.406

One of the key questions in the debate about the set-theoretic independence problem is whether extrinsic justification of axioms by desirability judgements is valid or not. In this talk, this problem is embedded in set-theoretic practice by analysing the disagreement between set theorists who believe that new axioms will be added to the standard theory for sets, ZFC, (the absolutist*) or not (the pluralist*). Based on an explorative interview study with professional set theorists which provides a cross-section of views in the set-theoretic community, set theorists do not generally use desirability judgements about axioms as a justification of their truth. Since this provides a snapshot of current set-theoretic practice, it allows for three possible conclusions regarding future developments: depending on whether the status of the ZFC axioms is characterised as ‘accepted as true’ or ‘accepted as epistemically valuable’, and on whether the knowledge and understanding regarding set-theoretic independence and new axioms is considered advanced or not, either the pluralist* is right, the absolutist* might be right, or both are partially right but in an unexpected way.

9 Kappes

Bolzano’s Tortoise and a Loophole for Achilles

Yannic Kappes (Universität Hamburg) yannickappes@gmail.com
Wednesday, 15.00-15.45 | DOR 24, R. 1.608

This talk discusses a novel response to a kind of regress argument originally found in Bolzano’s *Theory of Science* and Carroll’s *What the Tortoise Said to Achilles*. While Carroll’s argument and its contemporary relatives are concerned with the nature of inference, Bolzano’s argument aims to refute the thesis that full grounds must include propositions involving notions such as entailment, grounding or lawhood which link the respective grounds to their groundee. I motivate this thesis, reconstruct Bolzano’s argument, and develop a response based on self-referential linking propositions. I then apply the idea to a reading of Carroll’s dialogue and propose a corresponding solution to the so-called infinite regress problem of inference. Finally, I offer some discussion of objections concerning the self-referentiality of the required linking propositions and their relation to Curry’s paradox.

1 Kärki

Inequalities of Attention

Kaisa Kärki (University of Helsinki), kaisa.karki@helsinki.fi

Wednesday, 15.00-1.45 | DOR 24, R. 1.405

The so-called ‘attention economy’ has been criticized for commercializing the attention of internet users. However, the cost of attention grabbing, sustaining, and immersing digital medias has been talked about as if it touched all people equally. But are we really on the same line in relating to the recent changes of our stimulus environments?

This paper argues that we are not. I point toward individual variance in an agent’s resilience toward personalization of distraction as well as in the agent’s internal and external means of attention regulation – especially managing, on the other hand, her goal-oriented behaviors, on the other, her reward-seeking and compulsive behaviours on the internet. By internal means of attention regulation, I mean the agent’s abilities to guide her attention to whatever she finds important. External means of attention regulation, on the other hand, refer to the agent’s material resources in attention governance such as the amount of space in her apartment and resources to pay for less distracting versions of digital medias.

The purpose is to find out what digital equality could mean when it comes to inequalities arising from the unequal spread of resources in attention regulation. In developing the egalitarian ethics of attention, we need to know better who is suffering from commercialization of attention and why.

4 Keiling

Open-Mindedness: A Past Performance Account

Tobias Keiling (Universität Bonn), tobias.keiling@gmail.com

Wednesday, 14.15-15.00 | DOR 24, R. 1.308

It is a requirement on any account of open-mindedness to specify the conditions under which its exercise is epistemically virtuous. Although often considered an important example of epistemic virtue, a recurring observation in the literature is that being open-minded may also motivate giving up one’s beliefs too easily, with detrimental effect on one’s cognitive standing. In section 1 of the paper, I present a strategy for responding to this worry developed by Jason Baehr (2011) and Wayne Riggs (2003, 2010, 2019). Because of the important role they attribute to self-knowledge regarding one’s own reliability, I call the account they develop the *self-conscious expert* model for understanding open-mindedness. In section 2, I consider an argument developed by Adam Carter and Emma Gordon (2014) against the view: a vicious regress in Baehr’s attempt to define when an exercise of open-mindedness is virtuous. In section 3, I sketch an alternative view. Rather than hold the circle Carter and Gordon describe to be vicious, I argue that it points to another standard of virtuous open-mindedness, i.e. past performance in the exercise of the virtue.

10 Kiener

Strict Moral Answerability

Maximilian Kiener (University of Oxford), Maximilian.kiener@philosophy.ox.ac.uk

Wednesday 09.00-09.45 | DOR 24, R. 1.601

Bernard Williams described the case of a 'lorry driver who, through no fault of his, runs over a child'. I first argue that Williams's case leads to the following individually plausible, yet jointly inconsistent claims, which I call the *Lorry Driver Paradox*:

- (1) The faultless driver is not morally responsible for the child's death.
- (2) *Apology Principle*: One ought to apologise for something only if one is morally responsible for it.
- (3) The driver ought to apologise for the child's death.

To overcome inconsistency, I suggest disambiguating (1):

- (1a) The faultless driver *is not morally liable, i.e. blameworthy*, for the child's death.
- (1b) The faultless driver is (strictly) morally answerable for the child's death.
- (2) *Apology Principle*: One ought to apologise for something only if one is morally answerable for it.
- (3) The driver ought to apologise for the child's death.

I explain how my proposal in (1b) differs from other answerability views and how it takes inspiration from the law. I then support my proposal based on how effectively it solves the *Lorry Driver Paradox* and the fact that it accounts for two important features of normative reasons.

7 Kieseewetter

What Is a Moral Obligation?

Benjamin Kieseewetter (Freie Universität Berlin), benjamin.kieseewetter@hu-berlin.de

Tuesday, 14.15-15.00 | DOR 24, R. 1.204

What is it for an agent to have a moral obligation (or to be morally required) to perform an action? In this paper, I present an analysis of moral obligations in terms of reasons, argue that it provides illuminating explanations of some of their potentially puzzling features, and suggest how it can be put to use to solve some pressing problems in moral philosophy – including the why-be-moral challenge, the so-called paradox of supererogation, and Anscombe's challenge to modern moral philosophy. The core idea of the proposal is that moral obligations are not only constituted by reasons of the subject of the obligation, but also by reasons for others to expect the subject to comply with her reasons. It is this social aspect of moral obligations that explains why moral obligations have a special demand-like character, why wrongdoing makes reactive emotions appropriate, and why it can sometimes be permissible to act in morally suboptimal ways.

4 Kitsik**Conceptual Engineering vs. Nudging for Epistemic Amelioration**

Eve Kitsik (Universität Köln), ekitsik@gmail.com

Wednesday 11.15-12.00 | DOR 24, R. 1.308

Epistemologists have been more concerned with the norms applying to idealized agents than with improving the epistemic situation of real, flawed humans. I am concerned with the latter topic. A relevant cognitive limitation of humans is our limited capacity to pay attention. Hence, a need arises for epistemic amelioration strategies to make the right things salient in belief forming and decision making. I compare two strategies for ameliorating the epistemic situation of attentionally limited agents: conceptual engineering and nudging. I argue that (1) both are ways of improving patterns of attention; (2) we can sometimes choose which of these strategies to use to the same end; and (3) while conceptual engineering seems to have certain disadvantages, those same features may in fact make it preferable to nudging.

14 Klösel**The Limits of Counterfactual Thinking. Two Case Studies from Economics**

Patrick Klösel (LMU), Patrick.kloesel@posteo.de

Wednesday, 15.00-15.45 | DOR 24, R. 1.403

Counterfactual thinking lies at the heart of many scientific disciplines. The two main frameworks for causal inference in the social sciences, the potential outcome framework (Angrist and Pischke, 2009) and structural causal modeling (Pearl, 2009), both rely heavily on counterfactuals (see also Morgan and Winship, 2007).

However, many questions of interest in the social sciences, including economics, are not easily formulated in a counterfactual framework. Oftentimes, variables cannot be – even hypothetically – intervened upon, such as gender and race; similarly, many large-scale economic policy decisions are endogenous and thus cannot be separated clearly from confounding effects.

The central claim of this paper is that counterfactual reasoning is limited to a greater extent than is readily acknowledged: While there are surely many questions in the social sciences that can be addressed using counterfactual reasoning, there are also some which cannot, because the resulting counterfactuals would not be well-defined. The paper tries to answer the question: What does it mean, in an empirical social science context, for counterfactuals to be well-defined? I propose an explication for the well-definedness of counterfactuals in social science research centering on the notions of modularity and causal structure.

7 Knoks

Second-Order Reasons in Default Logic

Aleks Knoks (University of Luxembourg), aleks.knoks@uni.lu
Thursday, 11.15-12.00 | DOR 24, R. 1.201

A normative reason for one to X is a consideration that speaks in favor of one's X ing. A second-order normative reason is, roughly, a consideration that speaks either in favor of, or against taking another consideration as a normative reason. While some philosophers have questioned the existence of second-order reasons, others assign them very important roles. Thus, exclusionary or negative second-order reasons play a crucial role in Joseph Raz's theories of practical reasoning and the normative constitution of social structures. This paper shows how second-order reasons can be captured in default logic. Starting from John Horty's influential default logic-based account of the way in which reasons support ought statements, it explains why one can't rest content with Horty's formalization of exclusionary reasons, develops an alternative account, as well as an account of positive second-order reasons.

8 Knoll

Will ich das noch sein? – Begriffsethische Überlegungen zu personaler Identität

Viktoria Knoll (TU Dresden), viktoria.knoll@tu-dresden.de
Wednesday, 11.15-12.00 | DOR 24, R. 1.405

Die metaphysische Debatte um personale Identität ist ein Klassiker der Philosophie. Die Frage danach, welchen Begriff personaler Identität wir in unserem Sprechen über die Persistenz von Personen eigentlich in Anschlag bringen sollten, beantwortet diese Debatte jedoch nicht – so jedenfalls möchte ich in meinem Vortrag argumentieren. Bei der Gestaltung (dem *Engineering*) unserer Begriffe sollten wir v.a. ihre Funktionen im Blick haben: Wozu dienen uns diese Begriffe in unserer Sprache? Die Funktionen des Begriffs der personalen Identität erstrecken sich dabei auf mindestens zwei Bereiche: die Funktion der Zuschreibung von Wertschätzung sowie die Funktion der narrativen Identität. Wie ich im Vortrag anhand einiger Beispielfälle plausibilisieren möchte, legt eine Analyse dieser beiden Funktionen nahe: Selbst wenn die korrekte metaphysische Theorie personaler Identität etwas Eindeutiges zur transtemporalen Identität einer Person p zu t_1 und einem Gegenstand g zu t_2 anzeigt, sollten wir unser Sprechen über die Persistenz von p nicht allein an diesen metaphysischen Tatsachen ausrichten. Andernfalls laufen wir u.a. Gefahr, gegenüber g keine angemessene Wertschätzung zum Ausdruck zu bringen sowie einer gewissen Respektlosigkeit gegenüber p als Autorin ihrer eigenen Lebensgeschichte sprachlich Ausdruck zu verleihen.

10 Koch**The Value of Liability**Felix Koch (Universität Zürich), felix.koch@uzh.ch

Wednesday 09.45-10.30 | DOR 24, R. 1.601

Discussions of normative powers – e.g. the power to promise, to consent, or to request – frequently elaborate on the benefits of such powers for those who have them. Powers, like rights, are thought to be advantages to their owners. By contrast, the corresponding Hohfeldian liabilities, like the duties or no-rights corresponding to rights, are not normally examined for their value, and are sometimes implicitly or explicitly regarded as detriments. I argue that being a liability-holder, no less than being a power-holder, is often a benefit, and indeed a non-instrumental benefit. My argument proceeds – in a positive vein – by considering the value of the liabilities implied by consent, request, forgiveness, and authority, and – in a negative vein, more briefly – by questioning the putative support for the idea that there is a general axiological asymmetry between being a power-holder and being a liability-holder. If the argument succeeds, it follows that (i) the resources for value-based explanations of normative powers are more extensive and more complex than is usually thought, and (ii) even in abstraction from any such explanatory ambitions, adequately understanding the role of normative powers in our interpersonal lives and our practical deliberation requires attending closely to the distinctive interests of liability-holders.

12 Koch**How Words Matter. The Case for Linguistic Revision**Steffen Koch (Universität Bielefeld), steffen.koch@posteo.de

Wednesday, 11.15-12.00 | DOR 24, R. 1.205

Linguistic interventions are proposals to change our linguistic practice. A particular species of linguistic interventions are linguistic revisions: proposals to change how we use terms like ‚woman‘, ‚belief‘, or ‚knowledge‘. Linguistic revisions take special prominence in recent discussions of conceptual engineering, where the idea is that we should use *old* words to express *new* concepts. But why does retaining old words matter so much? Why not instead introduce new words to express newly constructed concepts? The recent literature is remarkably silent on this question. This talk aims to take a step towards filling this gap by making an empirically informed case of the comparative value of linguistic revision. More specifically, I argue that the combination of the well-researched biases about word-learning and processing that I take from psycholinguistics, the noun-kind bias and the mutual exclusivity bias, give us a good and novel reason to retain the original word in the process of conceptual betterment.

8 Koch & Ohlhorst

On the Possibility of Heavy Duty Conceptual Engineering

Steffen Koch (Universität Bielefeld), steffen.koch@posteo.de

Jakob Ohlhorst (Universität Köln), jakob.ohlhorst@gmail.com

Tuesday, 14.15-15.00 | DOR 24, R. 1.405

Conceptual engineering (CE) is the project of revising the concepts we use in thought and talk, or of constructing new ones. What kind of cognitive benefits can CE bring us? According to what we call the *modest promise*, CE recomposes our available concepts into new ones, making (implicitly) known phenomena visible and easier to think and talk about. By contrast, according to the *bold promise*, CE serves to expand or alter our conceptual repertoire in such a way that we gain access to new, previously unthinkable thoughts and propositions. Call forms of CE that satisfy the bold promise *heavy duty* CE. This talk aims to develop a theoretical underpinning for heavy duty CE and to scrutinize its possibility. We will begin by laying out the paradox of heavy duty CE. Then, we will draw on Susan Carey's account of conceptual discontinuity and Quinean bootstrapping to sketch a solution. On the resulting view, heavy duty CE alters one's total expressive power via the introduction of foreign concepts, and it is possible through complex bootstrapping episodes that involve the introduction of uninterpreted placeholder structures and model building.

11 Kohar

Mechanistic Locality and the Explanatory Relevance of Representational Content

Matej Kohar (TU Berlin), matej.kohar@tu-berlin.de

Wednesday 10.30-11.15 | DOR 24, R. 1.502

This paper argues that good constitutive mechanistic explanations of cognition cannot, at the same time, be representational explanations. This conclusion follows from the commitment to locality as a criterion for explanatory relevance in constitutive mechanistic explanations. Representational contents are not local to explanandum phenomena in cognitive science, and therefore cannot play an explanatory role in constitutive mechanistic explanations, such as those advanced in cognitive neuroscience. This argument is distinguished from older arguments concerning the causal efficacy of extrinsic properties and the alleged explanatory priority of narrow contents over broad contents. While the argument works against any of the currently fashionable brands of naturalistic representationalism, this paper illustrates the general argument on the specific example of modern informational semantics. Representational contents assigned in accordance with informational semantics are shown to be non-local to cognitive phenomena, because the conditional probabilities, which underlie contents constitutively depend on non-local states of affairs under all plausible metaphysical interpretations of conditional probability. It is argued that conditional probabilities which determine representational contents according to informational semantics must be interpreted as physical probabilities (chances). It is then shown that both frequentist and propensity interpretations of physical probabilities results in representational contents being non-local to cognitive phenomena.

7 Köhler**Functions for Expressivists**

Sebastian Köhler (Frankfurt School of Finance & Management), se.koehler@web.de
 Tuesday, 15.00-15.45 | DOR 24, R. 1.201

A central part of meta-ethical expressivism are theses about the *functions* of moral practice and judgements. Expressivists hold that moral practice is a device for interpersonal coordination and for deliberating about what to do, think, or feel. Expressivists appeal to these functions for various explanatory purposes, but they have been remarkably unclear on what they mean by ‘function.’ This paper makes two-fold progress: First, it highlights problems expressivists face who endorse one of the orthodox accounts of functions, namely systems-functions or etiological functions. Second, it offers an account that avoids these problems. On this account, functions are *rationalizing functions*.

14 Kopecky**Rational Issue Polarisation among Agents with Perfect Memory: How Argumentation Shapes Multi-Agent Epistemic Processes**

Felix Kopecky (Karlsruher Institut für Technologie), f.kopecky@kit.edu
 Thursday, 10.30-11.15 | DOR 24, R. 1.402

Models of opinion dynamics have shown how polarisation can rise among deliberating agents that approximate ideal rationality or the behaviour of scientists. Here I provide further support for the thesis that polarisation can rise under condition of epistemic rationality, but without depending on limitations that extant models rely on, such as memory restrictions or prejudiced evaluation of other agents’ testimony. Rather, by following a process-oriented approach, deliberation is modelled through agents’ purposeful introduction of arguments and their rational reactions to introductions of others. This process alone induces polarisation dynamics. A second result is that the effect size of polarisation dynamics correlates with particular types of argumentative behaviour. In particular, polarisation effects can be soothed when agents take into account the opinions of others as premises. These results underpin the relevance of argumentation as a factor in multi-agent epistemic processes.

6 Krämer

Mighty Belief Revision

Stephan Krämer (Universität Hamburg), stephan.kraemer@uni-hamburg.de
Wednesday, 14.15-15.00 | DOR 24, R. 1.502

Belief revision theories standardly endorse a principle of intensionality to the effect that ideal doxastic agents do not discriminate between pieces of information that are equivalent within classical logic. I argue that this principle should be rejected. Its failure, on my view, does not require failures of logical omniscience on the part of the agent, but results from a view of the update as *mighty*: as encoding what the agent learns *might* be the case, as well as what *must* be. Specifically, on the proposed conception of the update, obtaining the information that p or q is taken to imply learning that it might be that p , and that it might be that q . The view is motivated in part by consideration of a puzzle case, obtained by transposing into the context of belief revision a kind of scenario that Kit Fine (*Counterfactuals without Possible Worlds*) has used to argue against intensionalism about counterfactuals. Employing the framework of truthmaker semantics, I show how we may develop a novel account of the logic of belief revision, based on a conception of the update as mighty, which validates natural hyperintensional counterparts of the usual AGM postulates.

9 Krämer

Iterating Worldly Ground

Stephan Krämer (Universität Hamburg), stephan.kraemer@uni-hamburg.de
Wednesday, 09.45-10.30 | DOR 24, R 1.608

Suppose that some facts ground another fact. What, if anything, grounds *that* fact? My paper approaches that question from the perspective of the *truthmaker semantics* for (non-iterated) worldly ground, and proposes a way to extend this semantics to cover iterated ground. The central task here is to provide an account of a statement such as ‘P grounds Q’. I suggest that such statements are made true by (mereological fusions of) states asserting a grounding-like relationship between truthmakers of P and Q. This yields a view whereby most grounding connections are grounded in more basic grounding connections linking more basic facts. For instance, P’s grounding Q grounds P’s grounding Q \vee R. The status of grounding facts not grounded in other grounding facts is left open here; they might, for example, be regarded as zero-grounded as on Litland’s view, or as grounded in facts of essence, as suggested by Rosen. Beyond accounting for the grounds of ground, the proposed truthmaker semantics yields a general account of *relevant entailment* among grounding claims. For example, we obtain that the conjunction of P’s grounding R and Q’s grounding S *contains*, in Fine’s sense of partial content, $P \wedge Q$ ’s grounding $R \wedge S$.

12 Krifka**Moorean Infelicities and the Commitment Account for Assertion**

Manfred Krifka (Leibniz-Zentrum Allgemeine Sprachwissenschaft), krifka@leibniz-zas.de
 Tuesday, 13.30-14.15 | DOR 24, R. 1.205

Moore's paradox, the pragmatic infelicity of 'It is raining but I don't believe it', has been used to argue for the view that to assert a proposition ϕ amounts to expressing one's belief that ϕ is true. I show that similar clauses can be formed, like 'It is raining but don't blame me if it is not raining' whose infelicity is difficult to explain under the belief account but is predicted under the commitment account of assertions. Under this view, to assert a proposition means to vouch for the truth of it. I show that under this account, the original paradox of Moore can be explained as well, similar to the infelicity of assertions like 'It is raining but I don't want you to believe it'. I also show that sentences like 'I believe it is raining' appear as weaker assertions, which is a problem for the belief view but can be explained under the commitment view – it commits only to one's private beliefs, which is easier to defend. And I deal with the thought version of Moore's paradox, arguing that private judgments show similar phenomena as public assertions.

4 Küspert**Conciliating to Avoid Moral Scepticism**

Nick Küspert (University of St. Andrews), n94@st-andrews.ac.uk
 Wednesday, 14.15-15.00 | DOR 24, R. 1.307

It is commonly assumed that moral conciliationism entails epistemological moral scepticism. Contrary to this assumption, I argue that moral conciliationism *saves* us from epistemological moral scepticism. First, I show that only taking disagreements seriously as a threat to our beliefs allows us to utilise agreement to support these beliefs (call this symmetry). Next, I argue that utilising moral agreements as an epistemic resource allows moral conciliationism to resist the conclusion of epistemological moral scepticism. Following this defence of moral conciliationism, I argue that accepting moral conciliationism may indeed be *necessary* to resist epistemological moral scepticism. For this, I suggest that moral inquiry is best understood as a collective project. If so, then agreement on our moral judgments is required to justify the confidence we have in our moral beliefs. However, by symmetry, this appeal is possible only if one accepts the conciliatory attitude towards disagreements. Hence, *accepting*, rather than rejecting moral conciliationism, is the way out of epistemological moral scepticism.

11 Langkau

Imagining Future Memories?

Julia Langkau (Universität Genf), julialangkau@gmail.com

Wednesday, 13.30-14.15 | DOR 24, R. 1.501

The question of whether we can imagine experiences we haven't had before has recently been much discussed. In this paper, I will raise a problem for our imagining of complex experiences we haven't had before. The experiences I am interested in all have qualitative aspects: they are emotional, embodied, and they contain multimodal mental images. I will show that even for such experiences that are not radically new, we face a dilemma when it comes to the question of how we should imagine possible future experiences in order to decide whether we wish to have them: in order to decide whether we should aim to imagine what the experience will actually be like, or what it will be like in our memory. Current literature on imagining (radically) new experiences, I will argue, presupposes that we imagine future memories. However, we should aim to imagine not as we will remember, but rather as the experience will be. I will argue that this process is epistemically more reliable.

3 Lanius

Wertevermittlung im Philosophie- und Ethikunterricht? Intellektuelle Tugenden und kognitive Emotionen

David Lanius (Universität Mainz), dlanius@uni-mainz.de

Wednesday, 13.30-14.15 | DOR 24, R. 1.606

Angeichts immenser gesellschaftlicher Herausforderungen wie Klimakrise, Corona-Pandemie, Digitalisierung und damit einhergehenden Polarisierungstendenzen ist die Forderung nach einer soliden Wertevermittlung in Schule und insbesondere im Philosophie- und Ethikunterricht wieder lauter geworden. Gegen eine solche Forderung und für die Wertneutralität des Unterrichts wird in der Regel unter Rückgriff auf das Kontroversitätsgebot und das Neutralitätsgebot, wie sie zum Beispiel im Dresdner Konsens festgehalten sind, argumentiert. In scheinbarem Einklang mit dieser Argumentation stehen die allgemein akzeptierten Bildungsziele, die Urteils- und Reflexionskompetenz der Schüler*innen zu stärken und ihre individuelle Autonomie zu fördern. In meinem Vortrag möchte ich zeigen, dass wir uns mit der Akzeptanz dieser Ziele gegen den Anschein bereits darauf festlegen, dass der Philosophie- und Ethikunterricht in weiten Teilen tatsächlich wertorientiert sein muss. Denn Kompetenzen bringen Bereitschaften mit sich, die, so meine These, Ausdruck kognitiver Emotionen wie Wahrheitsliebe und intellektueller Tugenden wie Offenheit für Kritik – und damit epistemischer Werte – sind. Wenn das richtig ist, müssen didaktische Interventionen zur Stärkung der Urteils- und Reflexionskompetenz und Förderung individueller Autonomie, wenn sie nicht auf halbem Weg scheitern wollen, notwendigerweise auch die Vermittlung dieser Werte zum Ziel haben.

5 Lawrence

The Chess Analogy in Its Historical Context

Richard W. Lawrence (Institut Wiener Kreis), rwlaw@recursewithless.net
Thursday, 10.30-11.15 | DOR 24, R. 1.604

Johannes Thomaе, a close colleague of Gottlob Frege’s in Jena, adopted a “formal standpoint” on arithmetic, which he explained by comparing arithmetic with chess. According to the analogy, our signs for numbers are like chess pieces, whose meaning comes from the rules of the game we play with them. This analogy played an important role in the early history of analytic philosophy: it inspired a lengthy attack by Frege, and played an important role in Wittgenstein’s reflections on both mathematics and language.

But Thomaе’s analogy is still not well understood, in part because his term “sign” (*Zeichen*) misleads modern readers. I will argue that we can derive a better understanding of the analogy by looking at Thomaе’s mathematical context and the purpose his formalism is meant to serve. For Thomaе, “signs” are not concrete marks but abstract representations, which we arrive at by adopting a distinct kind of mathematical perspective on a domain of objects. The chess analogy is meant to call attention to this shift in perspective and show us how it is possible.

7 Lee

Reasons, Reasoning, and Guidance: An Interpersonal Picture

Wooram Lee (Seoul National University), woo-ram.lee@uni-due.de
Thursday, 09.00-09.45 | DOR 24, R. 1.201

The “Good Reasoning Constraint” on reasons states that a consideration C is a reason for you to φ only if you can reason (or deliberate) *well* from C to φ -ing. It explains why there is a restriction on what there can be reasons for, why reasons must be able to guide agents to the responses they support, and why the so-called “wrong kind of reasons” might not be genuine reasons. This paper offers a counterexample to this constraint. But it also argues that there is a plausible reasoning constraint on reasons in the vicinity, which retains all the attractions of the good reasoning constraint and avoids the problem(s) it faces. This constraint is based on the idea that reasoning is not a solitary endeavor and we typically reason *on behalf of* another person to settle on the question of what to do, think, or feel. According to the “Interpersonal Reasoning Constraint” that this paper defends, a consideration C is a reason for you to φ only if there it is possible for an advisor X , reasoning on behalf of you in ‘if I were you’ mode, to reason well (under the mode relevant to φ -ing) from C towards φ .

14 Leefmann

Public Epistemic Trust in Science

Jon Leefmann (FAU Erlangen), jon.leefmann@fau.de

Wednesday, 14.15-15.00 | DOR 24, R. 1.402

Whether or not the attitude of trust necessarily involves the belief that the trusted are trustworthy, is a contested question in the philosophy of trust. On accounts that respond to this question affirmatively, warranted trust depends on epistemic reasons. I will argue that this picture is insufficient as a guide to understanding real world instances of public epistemic distrust in science. To appropriately respond to epistemic reasons, a trustor must also be sensitive to such reasons. To highlight the importance of factors other than evidence for this kind of sensitivity, I will argue towards two conclusions: [1] Evidence of trustworthiness is insufficient for warranted public epistemic trust in science. [2] Evidence for trustworthiness is not always necessary for warranted public epistemic trust in science. In support of [1] I will appeal to the phenomenon of vaccine hesitancy and argue that trusting also requires seeing the trusted in a positive light. In support of [2] I show that sometimes we have good reasons not to trust even though we have convincing epistemic reasons to believe the other to be trustworthy. There are situations in which we have good reasons to rely on science but yet no reasons to trust science in the full normative sense of the term. Approaches to build trust in science should bear this in mind.

14 Lemeire

Kind Semantics for Scientific Generics

Olivier Lemeire (Katholieke Universiteit Leuven), olivier.lemeire@kuleuven.de

Tuesday, 15.45-16.30 | DOR 24, R. 1.402

Generic sentences are unquantified generalizations such as “Ravens are black.” Generics are common in everyday conversations but can also in be found in every scientific discipline. In this talk, I argue that scientific generics express natural kind generalizations. The generic “Ravens are black,” for instance, roughly says that *being black* is part of what makes *ravens* a natural kind. More precisely, it says that all ravens whose color is partly constitutive of the natural kindhood of the category *ravens*, are black.

Several features often attributed to natural kinds support this semantic theory. First, natural kinds are projectible categories. Second, natural kinds are realized in different ways across scientific disciplines. Third, being a natural kind is a relative property of categories; it exists only relative to the epistemic practices of a particular scientific discipline. Each of these three features of natural kinds explains something about the meaning of generic sentences. First, there are no felicitous generic sentences about extensionally closed categories, such as *ravens in my backyard right now*. Second, the truth-conditions of generic sentences vary across scientific disciplines. Third, the content expressed by a generic sentence depends on the epistemic context. The upshot of this semantic theory is that the truth-conditions of scientific generics can tell us something about what it is to be a natural kind for a particular scientific discipline.

14 Lenhard**The Most Important Thing. Wittgenstein, Engineering, and the Foundations of Mathematics**

Johannes Lenhard (TU Kaiserslautern), johannes.lenhard@mv.uni-kl.de

Thursday, 09.00-09.45 | DOR 24, R. 1.403

In his “Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics” (RFM), Ludwig Wittgenstein argues that contradictions might happen in mathematics without harm to the foundations and without harm to using mathematics. This liberal view caused a scandal and counts as untenable. My contribution revisits Wittgenstein’s claims from the perspective of mathematics as a tool and shows that it is much better supported than usually assumed.

The talk combines historical with systematic argument. I provide little known background about the situation at TU Charlottenburg (Berlin) when Wittgenstein set out to study engineering there. Alois Riedler, then the leading engineer at Charlottenburg, pushed for a new conception of mathematization in line with Wittgenstein’s later claims. Additionally, two examples of inconsistent, but widely used mathematical tools are sketched. Against this background, I (re-)interpret seminal passages of Wittgenstein’s RFM and also his exchange with Alan Turing during his 1939 lectures. There, Wittgenstein highlights that basic laws of thought are at issue and that reflecting on them would be “the most important thing” he has talked about.

16 Lepold**Nonideal Theory and Critical Theory: What They Are About and Why Neither Is (Completely) Right**

Kristina Lepold (Humboldt-Universität Berlin), kristina.lepold@hu-berlin.de

Tuesday, 14.15-15.00 | DOR 24, R. 1.103

One of the aims of political philosophy, if not its primary aim, is to guide political action. Over the past 15 years, there has been a concern that political philosophy may fail to live up to this task because it focuses too much on ideal theory, i.e., on thinking about what full justice requires. This is why a considerable number of political philosophers advocate work in (a specific kind of) nonideal theory, namely nonideal theory as transitional theory. The latter is supposed to offer normative resources that can guide action in the current unjust world. Interestingly and perhaps somewhat surprisingly, this echoes a concern about ideal theory from a very different tradition of social and political thought, namely Frankfurt School critical theory. Like nonideal theorists, representatives of critical theory are skeptical about whether ideal theory is able to guide action in the here and now. In my talk, I would like to explore the following questions: first, are nonideal theory and critical theory actually about the same thing? Second, if not, which of the two is the more convincing one?

6 Liefke

Floridi-Style Information, Semanticized

Kristina Liefke (Ruhr-Universität Bochum), kristina.liefke@ruhr-uni-bochum.de
Tuesday, 13.30–14.15 | DOR 24, R. 1.406

In his book *The Philosophy of Information* (2011) and associated papers, Luciano Floridi provides a taxonomy of different ‘ingredients’ to information [:= true declarative semantic content]. Floridi develops many of his informational notions “from scratch” (Adriaans, 2010), ignoring relevant work in philosophical logic and semantics. My paper shows that this move has serious negative consequences for Floridi’s characterization of information. In particular, Floridi’s abstract description of the relevant informational notions hides significant gaps in his taxonomy. These include perspectival information, indirect information (as well as indirect misinformation), and bullshit. My paper seeks to compensate for this shortcoming. To do so, it will first spell out the semantic part of Floridi’s taxonomy in truthmaker semantics. It will then show that the ‘missing’ informational notions are straightforwardly captured by this semantics. The result is a more rigorous taxonomy that captures a larger part of the informational landscape than Floridi’s taxonomy and that is supported by a flow of evidence from truthmaker semantics.

1 Lindemann

The Ethics of ‘Deathbots’

Nora Freya Lindemann (Universität Osnabrück), norafreya.lindemann@uni-osnabrueck.de
Wednesday, 13.30–14.15 | DOR 24, R. 1.401

Recent developments in AI programming allow for new applications: individualized chatbots which mimic the speaking and writing behaviour of one specific living or dead person. “Deathbots”, chatbots of the dead, have already been implemented and are currently under development by various companies (Brown, 2021; Parker, 2014). Thus, it is an urgent issue to consider the ethical implications of deathbots. Despite this, there is relatively little research on the ethical implications of chatbots generally and on deathbots in particular (Murtarelli et al., 2021; Stokes, 2021). All existing ethical theories about deathbots base their claim on considerations of the dignity of the deceased (Buben, 2015; Öhman & Floridi, 2017a, 2017b; Stokes, 2021). I propose to shift the focus on the dignity and autonomy of bereaved users of deathbots. Drawing on recent insights from the psychology and phenomenology of grief, I argue that deathbots may have a negative impact on grief processes of bereaved users and therefore limit their emotional and psychological wellbeing. Moreover, I suggest that deathbots can limit the autonomy of their users. Hence, deathbots should not be unrestrictedly available. Because of their grief shaping capacities, they should be conceptualized as a medical device for the treatment of Prolonged Grief Disorder.

6 Link

Neues vom Mengenuniversum: Jetzt doch wieder Aleph₂?

Godehard W. Link (LMU), glink@lrz.uni-muenchen.de

Wednesday 09.45-10.30 | DOR 24, R. 1.406

Jahrzehnte nach Cohens Beweis der Unabhängigkeit der Kontinuum-Hypothese CH isolierte H. Woodin auf der Basis neuen mengentheoretischen Wissens ein Prinzip „Stern“ (*), welches

$$(1) \quad 2^{\aleph_0} = \aleph_2$$

impliziert. In weiterführenden Forschungen Woodins zu seinem „Ultimate-L“-Programm scheint sich jedoch abzuzeichnen, dass doch wieder CH bestätigt wird.

Die Hypothese (1) war nicht vollkommen neu. Ein starkes Forcing-Prinzip MM (*Martin's Maximum*) mit einer reichen Theorie führt ebenfalls zu (1). Die Beziehung zwischen (*) und MM blieb allerdings unklar. Jüngst haben D. Asperó und R. Schindler jedoch gezeigt:

$$(2) \quad (*) \text{ folgt aus einer Variante von MM, genannt MM}^{++}.$$

Haben MM⁺⁺ und also (1) damit einen erhöhten Anspruch auf Wahrheit?

Folgende Thesen sollen verteidigt werden:

1. Der Wahrheitsbegriff ist fest in unserer theoretischen Vernunft verankert und nimmt auch in der Mengenlehre eine zentrale philosophische Stellung ein.
2. Mengentheoretische Wahrheit kann nicht platonistisch gerechtfertigt werden, sondern erfordert eine kohärentistische Begründung, welche wesentlich von den mathematischen Tatsachen Gebrauch macht.
3. Während „evidente“ Axiome einen *intrinsischen* Wahrheitsanspruch besitzen, müssen Prinzipien, die zu (1) oder CH führen, mit *extrinsischen* Argumenten begründet werden, welche die Geschlossenheit der Gesamtheorie im Blick haben.
4. (2) liefert ein solches extrinsisches Argument. Es ist jedoch abzuwägen gegen die systemischen Tugenden anderer Prinzipien, etwa Woodins Ultimate-L.

9 Loets

Plentitude Costed

Annina Julia Loets (Humboldt-Universität Berlin), annina.loets@hu-berlin.de

Wednesday 09.00-09.45 | DOR 24, R. 1.608

Many philosophers have come to accept various abundance theses in metaphysics, e.g. that to every class of individuals corresponds a property or that every plurality of objects composes something. Recently, more and more authors urge acceptance of the thesis that coincident material objects abound. Roughly, plenitude is the view that for any change there are coincident objects differing in whether they would survive it. Any location is, as Maegan Fairchild puts it, “full to the brim” with material objects. Is plenitude the next eccentric abundance thesis we will just have to get used to? If plenitude did indispensable theoretical work, if it were simple and strong, and if it were not all that revisionary, the answer, I think, would be “yes”. In this talk, I make first steps at costing plenitude. I argue that plenitude complicates our theorising in other areas of philosophy in ways which raise serious doubts about its overall simplicity.

10 Löschke

Vicious Partiality and Agent-Relative Deontological Thresholds

Jörg Löschke (Universität Zürich), joerg.loeschke@philos.uzh.ch

Thursday, 09.45-10.30 | DOR 24, R. 1.601

Can personal relationships make otherwise impermissible behavior permissible, even required? Can there be a moral duty to tell a lie to benefit a friend, even if it would be impermissible to tell the lie to benefit a stranger? In my talk, I will argue that this can happen because there can be agent-relative deontological thresholds. Deontological thresholds are points where it becomes permissible or required to violate a deontological restriction to avoid a moral catastrophe. What has gone unnoticed by philosophers so far is that such thresholds can be agent-relative: what counts as a moral catastrophe for one agent does not need to be a moral catastrophe for another agent. When a person might suffer a severe decrease in well-being for reasons that do not reflect her moral character, such a decrease might constitute a moral catastrophe for her friend and might justify violating a deontological restriction. This view explains why relationship can change the deontic status of acts from impermissible to required, and it also explains why this happens only in certain cases.

3 Löwenstein

Argumente und Auswege. Dissonanzen und Inkonsistenzen in der Philosophie- und Argumentationsdidaktik

David Löwenstein (HHU Düsseldorf), loewenstein@hhu.de

Thursday, 10.30-11.15 | DOR 24, R. 1.606

Kognitive Dissonanzen und Inkonsistenzen gehören zu den zentralen Charakteristika philosophischer Fragen und Probleme. Gleichzeitig wird die Philosophie zurecht dafür gepriesen, dass sie wichtige Kompetenzen und Tugenden fördert – etwa begriffliche Klarheit, treffende Problemanalyse, gutes Argumentieren, Kritikfähigkeit, Offenheit und konstruktives Diskutieren. Ein zentrales Ziel aller dieser Kompetenzen und Tugenden ist es jedoch, Auswege aus kognitiven Dissonanzen zu finden und argumentativ zu begründen. Inkonsistenzen sind demnach eine wichtige Gelenkstelle zwischen den Themen und Fragen der Philosophie und den zentralen Kompetenzen und Tugenden, die in der Praxis des Philosophierens ausgeübt und geschult werden. So zumindest die Arbeitshypothese, die in diesem Vortrag verfolgt werden soll. Diese Hypothese soll zunächst allgemeinen eingeordnet und diskutiert werden. Danach sollen konkrete Vorschläge gemacht werden, wie dies im Unterricht umgesetzt werden kann – im Wesentlichen durch ein Konzept für vielseitig einsetzbare Unterrichtsmaterialien in Form von Aussage-, Schlussregel- und Argumentkarten.

9 Luzon

The Euthyphro Challenge in Metasemantics

Bar Luzon (New York University), bl2630@nyu.edu

Wednesday, 15.00-15.45 | DOR 24, R. 1.607

According to a natural picture, representational mental states have two important roles: they represent the world as being a certain way, and they help explain and rationalize our actions and other mental states. These two roles are tightly connected: it is in virtue of fulfilling the former role that representational mental states fulfil the latter.

This paper argues that some prominent metasemantic views—Conceptual Role Semantics and Interpretivism—are incompatible with this picture, and thus should be rejected. This incompatibility follows from two facts. First, explanations (even partial ones) are asymmetric. Call this ‘The Euthyphro Principle’. Second, these views *reverse the order of explanation*: according to them, representational mental states represent the world as being a certain way in virtue of their role in explaining and rationalizing our actions and other mental states.

In the paper I flesh out the commitments of the two metasemantic views and of the natural picture and show that each implies explanatory claims pointing in opposite directions. I then defend the Euthyphro Principle, drawing on our intuitions about the Platonic dialogue, and derive the aforementioned conflict. Next, I consider a way of relaxing the natural picture, and argue that this line of reply fails.

1 Magni

Person-Affecting Procreative Beneficence

Sergio Filippo Magni (University of Pavia), filippo.magni@unipv.it

Wednesday, 09.00-09.45 | DOR 24, R. 1.401

This presentation deals with a revision of Savulescu’s impersonal version of the principle of Procreative Beneficence and of its complex relationship with a person-affecting Principle of Harm, in order to evaluate cases of children’s selection in reproduction. It proposes a Person-affecting version of Procreative Beneficence as a simple and viable moral principle in reproductive ethics. Such a principle is a pro-selection view that is opposed to anti-selection views and different from other pro-selection views (like the Minimal Threshold, the Satisficing and the Prevention of Harm views). According to this principle, parents are free to select the best child or someone less than the best, but they are not free to select a child who will not have a worth-living life.

6 Mai

Two-Dimensional Rigidity

Jonathan Daniel Mai (Goethe Universität Frankfurt), jonathan.mai@gmx.net
Thursday, 09.00-09.45 | DOR 24, R. 1.502

Multi-dimensional modal logics are modal logics interpreted over relational structures, whose points are tuples or sequences over some base set. These logics, and here especially two-dimensional modal logic, have many interesting applications in reverse correspondence theory, natural language semantics and philosophy. However, two-dimensional modal logic can also be applied to address conceptual issues concerning the semantics of first-order modal languages. This important application has not yet received the attention it deserves. Due to an influential argument by James Garson the opinion is widespread that a varying domain semantics for first-order modal languages with rigid designators must be based on a free logic. In my talk I want to show that this belief is wrong and that Garson's argument is unsound. I do this by developing a two-dimensional varying domain semantics for first-order modal languages with rigid designators that preserves classical quantification theory.

6 Maia

No Arithmetical Determinacy From Supertask Computations

Nuno Filipe Maia (University of Oxford), nunofilipe2016@gmail.com
Wednesday 10.30-11.15 | DOR 24, R. 1.406

Call 'Arithmetical Determinacy' the thesis that any statement in arithmetic is determinately true or determinately false. Though intuitive the thesis is surprisingly difficult to prove, there being many different arguments for it. Here I discuss a somewhat ignored proposal suggested by Paul Benacerraf & Hilary Putnam (B & P) based on so-called 'supertask computations'; this is, computational procedures capable of performing supertasks. B & P argue that the results of these computations allow us to fix the truth-value of any arbitrary statement and, therefore, secure Arithmetical Determinacy. My aim is two-fold: (i) I first present an objection introduced by Warren & Waxman, to the extent that B & P make an unwarranted use of a strong omega-rule, and argue this objection is ill-founded; (ii) afterwards I give my own objection against B & P, this time based on non-standard models and non-standard computations running inside these models. I discuss possible replies to my argument and find them wanting. I conclude that B & P's argument cannot establish Arithmetical Determinacy.

4 Malfatti

From Knowledge to Understanding? What Testimony Cannot Teach

Federica Isabella Malfatti (Universität Innsbruck), fede.malfatti98@gmail.com

Tuesday, 14.15-15.00 | DOR 24, R. 1.307

The literature on understanding is divided into two broad camps. *Reductionists* believe that understanding involves nothing over and above true, warranted beliefs of a certain set of propositions. *Anti-reductionists*, on the other hand, claim that understanding and knowledge are different cognitive-epistemic states – that might overlap, but that might come apart and should, therefore, be kept distinguished. How do we settle this issue? Antireductionists often point to a difference in the way knowledge and understanding relate to testimony to support their position. Knowledge, they claim, can be easily acquired by reasonably trusting a reliable and trustworthy speaker in an epistemically friendly environment, while understanding is not the kind of achievement that can be testimonially *transmitted*. But if understanding were nothing over and above knowledge of some true propositions, we would expect it to be quite easily transmissible via testimony via speech acts of assertion – like knowledge generally is. Yet this is not what we observe. Hence, or so the antireductionist reasoning goes, understanding must involve something over and above knowledge of some true propositions. The overarching aim of this paper is to show that this line of argument fails. There are indeed differences in the way knowledge and understanding (sometimes) relate to testimony, but these differences tell us nothing conclusive about the relation between knowledge and understanding.

7 Mannino & Moreno

Towards a Bargaining Model of Reflective Equilibrium

Adriano Mannino (LMU), manninoadriano@gmail.com

Marina Moreno (LMU), marinaestrellamoreno@gmail.com

Wednesday, 15.00-15.45 | DOR 24, R. 1.201

On a standard conception, the method of Reflective Equilibrium (RE) is a procedure to make a set of initially credible commitments coherent by applying systematising principles that entail (some of the) the commitments deductively. However, deductive logical relations cannot by themselves tell us how to go about adjusting an incoherent set of commitments, since there are multiple ways to resolve logical conflicts. Standardly, the resolution of conflicts between commitments is taken to be governed by some aggregative principle, viz. some principle directing the reasoner to additively weigh up the relative strengths of the commitments. We argue that aggregative principles aren't necessarily adequate; whether they are depends on the nature of the commitments that conflict.

In particular, we argue that many moral commitments are of a *strict* nature, such that they cannot straightforwardly be outweighed by a sufficient aggregate of countervailing considerations. If strict commitments conflict, we argue, the adequate systematising approach is one of rational bargaining. We thus propose that comprehensive conceptions of RE should allow that the equilibrium to be pursued is, at least sometimes, of a game-theoretic nature, and that we should reckon with a plurality of systematising principles rather than a single, universally applicable method.

11 Marchi

Everyday Roots of Biased Belief

Francesco Marchi (University of Antwerp), francesco.marchi@uantwerpen.be
Wednesday 09.45-10.30 | DOR 24, R. 1.506

While research on cognitive bias and irrational routes to decision-making is extensive, the consequences of decision-making for the belief system are still relatively unexplored. In this article I offer a novel angle on the interplay between decision-making and belief formation. I focus on reasoning that follows ordinary decision-making and argue that it is a rich *source of biased beliefs*. This possibility paints an even bleaker picture for the already shaky conception of humans as rational thinkers and believers. But is it a failure or a feature of the human cognitive system? I offer some consideration in favour of the latter alternative.

11 Martina

Seeing Colours in a Colour-Blind Way

Giulia Martina (University of Turin), giulia.martina@unito.it
Wednesday 10.30-11.15 | DOR 24, R. 1.501

What do the colour-blind see? The traditional answer has been that they see fewer colours than normal perceivers — for instance, a protanope perceiver can only see shades of blue and yellow, black, white, and grey. This answer is challenged by the empirical evidence. The colour-blind's colour discriminations, recognitions, and reports suggest that many colour-blind subjects have a wider range of colour experiences and are sensitive to more visual differences than the traditional answer allows. The Same Colours view provides an under-explored alternative: at least some colour-blind subjects genuinely perceive just the same colour properties as normal perceivers do. How can the colour-blind be capable of perceiving the same colours, given that their visual systems do not function normally? And how can the Same Colours view account for the fact that coloured things sometimes or often look different to normal and colour-blind perceivers, if the properties they perceive are the same? Building on work by Justin Broackes and Mark Kalderon, I address these questions by outlining an account of what it means to see colours in a colour-blind way.

4 Matthews

Why Skill Matters in Vice Epistemology

Taylor R. C. Matthews (University of Nottingham), taylor.matthews@nottingham.ac.uk
 Wednesday, 15.00-15.45 | DOR 24, R. 1.308

Virtue responsibilists widely believe that the cultivation of intellectual character virtues leads to the development of particular intellectual skills. When it comes to the relationship between intellectual vice and skill, however, there has been relatively little discussion. Instead, there is a prevailing assumption that intellectual vices prevent their possessor from conducting their epistemic affairs well or correctly. In other words, intellectual vice makes one less epistemically competent or skilled. Call this Incompetence View of intellectual vice. In this talk, I demonstrate that this view is mistaken; I argue that a number of intellectual vices centrally involve the development of intellectual skills, such that the intellectually vicious often perform their epistemic conduct competently. I argue that support for the Incompetence view stems from what I call the Purity Thesis: that, just as virtue encapsulates good properties, vice encapsulates the bad. Since skilful action is often taken to be a kind of excellence, and intellectual vices are widely considered to be epistemic failings, it is natural to conclude that vice and skill are incompatible. I end by identifying two areas of vice epistemology that could benefit from abandoning both the Incompetence View and the Purity Thesis.

9 Meincke

Biological Indeterminism: Towards a Biological Defence of Libertarian Free Will

Anne Sophie Meincke (Universität Wien), anne.sophie.meincke@univie.ac.at
 Tuesday, 15.00-15.45 | DOR 24, R. 1.607

Are we free to want what we do when we do what we want? Could we have wanted and, hence, acted otherwise? Philosophers hesitate to affirm this, traditionally appealing to causal or universal determinism, according to which any given state of the universe is necessitated by preceding states of the universe together with the laws of nature described by physics. More recently, free will sceptics have turned also to biology and neuroscience, arguing that what we want and how we, accordingly, act is determined by facts about our biological or neurological constitution.

My paper challenges free will scepticism by challenging determinism on scientific grounds. Assuming that free will is better defended at the level of biology (rather than physics), I focus on latest biological and neuroscientific research that provides support for indeterminism.

I present the main characteristics of biological indeterminism, explain how these are linked with core ontological characteristics of living beings and show how, on the basis of biological indeterminism, familiar objections against libertarian free will, such as the problem of luck, can be met. Libertarian free will ought to be reconceived as an evolved biological function, shared by human and non-human animals.

10 Menges

The Right to Privacy and the Deep Self

Leonhard Menges (Universität Salzburg), leonhard.menges@plus.ac.at
Wednesday 10.30-11.15 | DOR 24, R. 1.601

What is the right to informational privacy? A standard answer says that it is the right to have control over personal information. This talk aims at presenting and defending a new account of the right to privacy that is inspired by core ideas of standard control accounts but goes beyond them in crucial ways. The main thesis is that the right to privacy essentially protects that personal information about us only flows when this is an expression of who we deep down are, of what will be called our deep selves. Part 1 of the talk will present problems for more standard control accounts of the right to privacy. Part 2 will spell out what will be called the Deep Self View on the right to privacy. Part 3 will show that the right to privacy, as the Deep Self View depicts it, can be justified.

5 Meyer

Wie sich Normativität aus dem ergibt, was konstitutiv für den freien Willen ist. Zu Hegels Konstitutivismus

Thomas Meyer (Humboldt-Universität Berlin), meyertho@hu-berlin.de
Wednesday, 14.15-15.00 | DOR 24, R. 1.604

In dem Vortrag soll für die These argumentiert werden, dass Hegels *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts* dem meta-normativen Konstitutivismus zugeordnet werden können. Bei letzterem handelt es sich um eine in den letzten Jahren zunehmend intensiv diskutierte Theorie, die eine Erklärung praktischer Normativität beansprucht. Die Grundidee des Konstitutivismus besteht darin, die Normativität praktischer Gründe in Konstitutionsbedingungen unseres praktischen in-der-Welt-Seins zu fundieren. Wenigstens zwei Hauptvarianten lassen sich unterscheiden. Nach einer kurzen Vorstellung des Konstitutivismus in den zwei Varianten, wird zunächst motiviert, die *Grundlinien* konstitutivistisch zu verstehen. Im zweiten Schritt wird dann gezeigt, dass Hegels philosophisches System im umfassenderen Sinn konstitutivistische Elemente besitzt. Der dritte und letzte Schritt zeigt dann auf, wie die konstitutivistische Fundierung der *Grundlinien* verstanden werden könnte.

4 Meyer-Seitz

What We Know about Others: Knowledge and the Matter of Privacy

Karen Meyer-Seitz (WWU Münster), karen.meyer-seitz@wwu.de
Wednesday, 09.00-09.45 | DOR 24, R. 1.308

In recent years, privacy has become a subject of interest within the area of epistemology, especially its connection to the notion of knowledge. So-called access theories of privacy claim that an individual's privacy is diminished when others get to know personal facts about her. Epistemologists have aimed to refine this definition by taking a closer look at the epistemic relations that are necessary for a privacy diminishment. However, because such epistemic accounts of privacy still fall in the more general class of access theories, they face

serious objections that show, as I argue, that no definition that describes privacy solely on grounds of (epistemic) access is able to adequately grasp the nature of privacy. As one of the main reasons for this shortcoming I identify two social factors that these accounts do not include. One, it matters in what kind of social relation we stand with the persons who have access to personal facts about us. And second, it matters what these persons do with the information they have about us and how they act toward us. In addition, both factors pose interesting epistemological questions on their own, as I aim to illustrate.

4 Meylan & Reuter

On Being Ignorant

Anne Meylan (Universität Zürich), anne.meylan@uzh.ch

Kevin Reuter (Universität Zürich), kevin.reuter@uzh.ch

Wednesday 11.15-12.00 | DOR 24, R. 1.307

What is ignorance? An influential and widely endorsed view is the so-called Knowledge Account: A subject S is ignorant of the fact that p iff S does not know that p. (Le Morvan 2012, 2019). In a recent paper, Pritchard (2021) presents counterexamples against the Knowledge Account, suggesting that ignorance has an evaluative dimension. The contribution of our paper is twofold. First, we intend to put the Knowledge Account of ignorance to the test. The results of our Study 1 demonstrate that the phrase “ignorant of the fact that p” is indeed strongly evaluative and, hence, has a different meaning than “not knowing that p”. Second, we aim to investigate a novel explanation as to the nature of the evaluative dimension of ignorance, namely, that attributions of ignorance are more fitting the more we believe a person should (but does not) know a fact. The results of our Study 2 show that the more we expect people to know a fact, the more likely people are willing to ascribe “ignorance of the fact that p” to the person who fails to know p, thereby providing strong support for our explanation.

15 Moen

Analysing Moralised Freedom

Lars Moen (Universität Wien), lars.moen@univie.ac.at

Thursday, 11.15–12.00 | DOR 24, R. 1.504

A moralised conception of freedom is based on a normative theory. Understanding it therefore requires an analysis of this theory. In this paper, I identify two ways in which republican freedom as non-domination is moralised. Analysing this concept therefore involves identifying the basic components of the republican theory of justice and legitimacy. One of these components is the non-moralised pure negative conception of freedom as non-interference. Republicans therefore cannot keep insisting that their freedom concept conflicts with, and is superior to, this more basic concept. I demonstrate how we can use pure negative freedom to formulate the republican theory more precisely. This exercise is more fruitful than the common focus on how the two freedom concepts differ.

14 Moreno

Subtracting Self-Selection Bias from Academic Inquiry: A Computational Exploration

Marina Moreno (LMU), marinaestrellamoreno@gmail.com

Wednesday, 10.30-11.15 | DOR 24, R. 1.403

Academic researchers usually self-select into their fields of research. This fact may give rise to a self-selection effect: certain prior beliefs about the propositions investigated in the field may be positively correlated with the choice to enter the field. To the extent that such self-selection effects are present, relying on the respective expert consensus when assessing the truth value of propositions examined in these fields may be an epistemically unreliable strategy. This paper proposes a conceptual as well as computational exploration of such self-selection dynamics in academic fields and examines their implications for deference to experts on the part of laypeople. In particular, an agent-based model is proposed to study the conditions under which self-selection effects can lead to a relatively stable but false expert majority belief. The model suggests that, unfortunately, the conditions under which false majoritarian beliefs emerge are relatively modest. Furthermore, the model investigates various strategies laypeople can employ in order to update on expert opinions while counterbalancing the bias added by expert self-selection. The most promising strategies examined all entail updating on the *belief change* of the experts, rather than their absolute aggregate credence.

4 Mortini

Explanation and Legal Proof

Dario Mortini (University of Galsgow / Universität Köln), dario9472@gmail.com

Tuesday, 14.15-15.00 | DOR 24, R. 1.308

Legal epistemology is on the rise, and special attention is now devoted to study the genuinely epistemological aspects of legal proof. This is not surprising: because it often involves notions like evidence, truth and testimony, legal proof is up in epistemology to its neck. The present paper also contributes to legal epistemology: inspired by contemporary explanationist analyses of knowledge (e.g., Bernecker forthcoming), I develop a novel explanationist account of legal proof. I propose a new necessary condition on legal proof in terms of *de re* why-explanation and I offer three arguments in its favour. The first *linguistic* argument is based on ordinary language considerations. The second *descriptive* argument gains traction from the most compelling psychological interpretation of legal proof, the ‘story-model’ of legal fact-finding. The third *normative* argument is motivated by communicative justifications of punishment and by the importance of rehabilitating the offenders. I close by comparing my account with extant proposals and I show its superiority in dealing with a hotly debated legal puzzle (the proof paradox). This paper advocates an ‘applied turn’: the epistemological study of legal proof is a fruitful theoretical enterprise and, crucially, it also highlights the practical relevance of general analytic philosophy to both society and the public.

15 Moser**Meaningful Work as Positional Good**Elias Moser (Universität Graz), elias.moser@uni-graz.at

Thursday, 11.15-12.00 | DOR 24, R. 1.505

In this presentation, I introduce an argument against perfectionist accounts in favour of legal enforcement of meaningful work standards. Meaningful work, I will claim is to a significant part socially determined. It is contingent upon mutual recognition of individuals as a valuable contribution. Because meaningful work is inherently interpersonal, it can be described as a so-called 'positional good': Its value is not absolutely defined but dependent on the relative position of the individual with respect to the endowment of the same good by other members of society. The instance of positional goods yields a possible egalitarian defence of equal distributions against the so-called 'levelling down' objection. Legitimate levelling-down in meaningful work, however, would yield the conclusion that the state would be justified in taking measures against meaningful work in order to improve the relative position of those who are forced to perform alienated routine work. This conclusion is rejected as a *reductio ad absurdum* as both liberal and perfectionist thinkers would be willing to subscribe to it.

14 Muchka**A Critique of Lu and Bourrat's Argument for Harmonizing Epigenetic Inheritance With the Gene-Centric Perspective of Evolution**Elisabeth Gerlinde Muchka (Universität Bern), elisabeth.muchka@philo.unibe.ch

Wednesday 13.30-14.15 | DOR 24, R. 1.403

According to the gene-centric perspective of evolutionary theory, evolution is tantamount to change in gene frequencies. Epigenetic inheritance describes the phenomenon that there are heritable entities other than (DNA-based) genes causing heritable variation in the phenotype. Since the gene-centric perspective rests upon the notion that only genes can be inherited, epigenetic inheritance is questioning this perspective. Given this challenge for the gene-centric view Lu and Bourrat (2018) present an argument for harmonizing epigenetic inheritance with the gene-centric perspective of evolution. Their solution consists of invoking the concept of the evolutionary gene where the gene is defined by its phenotypic effect and not by its type of materiality. They further argue that this concept is in line with scientific practice of (gene-centric) formal evolutionary theory, as there is no reference to the materiality of the gene and the gene is only defined by its phenotypic effect. It would hence be capable of accommodating cases of epigenetic inheritance because it sets no conditions for materiality of the gene. I am going to contest their suggestion by showing that a part of formal evolutionary theory does set conditions for the materiality of gene. I will argue that this creates problems for their view.

4 Mueller

Accessibilism and Coherence? Why You Cannot Have Both, and Which One You Should Pick

Andy Mueller (Goethe Universität), andreas.mueller.uniffm@gmail.com
Tuesday, 14.15-15.00 | DOR 24, R. 1.404

Accessibilism is the thesis that whether S's belief that p is epistemically rational is entirely determined by S's accessible mental states. In this talk, I provide a case that demonstrates that accessibilism conflicts with coherence requirements such as the enkratic principle as well as a simply consistency requirement for beliefs. I consider two general strategies to resolve the conflict. The first tries to accommodate coherence requirements by explaining why the relevant beliefs in my case are indeed not rational by accessibilism's own lights. I argue that this strategy fails, as the relevant notions to make this strategy work either do not apply to my case or threaten to trivialize accessibilism. The second strategy to resolving the conflict is jettisoning the coherence requirements. I argue that this way of saving accessibilism does away with the principles that motivated accessibilism in the first place, leaving it as an unsupported view. Therefore, the conflict between accessibilism and coherence requirements can only be resolved in one way. We should give up accessibilism and retain the coherence requirements.

7 Müller

Reasons, Correctness and Intentionality

Jean Moritz Müller (Universität Bonn), jean.moritz.mueller@gmail.com
Wednesday 09.45-10.30 | DOR 24, R. 1.204

Normative reasons of the right kind for an attitude (such as a belief or desire) are closely related to its constitutive correctness conditions. For example, right-kind reasons for belief are related to the constitutive correctness condition of belief in that only what bears on the truth of p is a right-kind reason to believe that p . As this link is typically understood, the properties that determine an attitude's correctness ('correctness-determiners') – e.g. the truth of p in the case of believing that p – are not themselves right-kind reasons for this attitude. After all, supposing otherwise seems highly counter-intuitive: it sounds infelicitous to cite the truth of p in response to the request to give reasons for believing that p . In this talk, I offer some grounds for thinking that correctness-determiners are right-kind reasons. I argue that this follows from the very fact that attitudes are intentional. The way in which attitudes are directed towards their intentional content implies that they are subject to a condition of appropriateness which presupposes that correctness determiners are corresponding right-kind reasons. I also show that the infelicity of citing them in response to reason-requests does not tell against this view.

15 Müller**Why Populism Is an Ideology**

Julian Müller (Universität Hamburg), julian.mueller@uni-hamburg.de

Wednesday 09.45-10.30 | DOR 24, R. 1.505

The genus problem of populism presents one of the most vexing conceptual questions across the social sciences and philosophy: Some theorists believe that populism is nothing more than an assembly of discursive patterns, while others maintain that populism is a strategy to gain political power. Then there are those that argue that populism represents a thin, diluted form of ideology lacking principles and an overarching narrative.

The paper introduces explication as a framework for evaluating competing concepts and developing new ones. Against this methodological backdrop, the paper unfolds its argument for the claim that populism is best conceived of as an ideology that rests on four foundational principles. It is argued that populists share an ideology if and only if their beliefs and dispositions can to a significant extent be explained in terms of the foundational principles of said ideology. The main goal of the paper is hence to reconstruct the foundational principles of populist ideology and demonstrate their explanatory power.

1 Müller**A Cooperative Model of the Physician-Patient Relationship**

Luise Müller (Universität Hamburg), luisemueller.1@gmail.com

Tuesday, 15.45-16.30 | DOR 24, R. 1.401

The physician-patient relationship is an evolving normative ideal. Its nature is affected by the advancements of scientific knowledge and technology. We argue that one of the defining advancements in the medical context is the development of data-driven digital tools. Data-driven digital tools carry great promise when deployed to assist physicians in their diagnostic process, the monitoring of disease progression, and the choice of intervention and treatment. At the same time, the deployment of data-driven tools raises novel concerns.

Existing models of the physician-patient relationship fail to capture its new quality in the age of data-driven digital tools. Instead of rendering the physician obsolete, digital technologies transform the physician-patient-relationship. To make normative sense of this transformation, we introduce a new model of the physician-patient relationship, one that focuses on the relationship as a cooperative one. The model emphasizes equality, reciprocity, and fairness in the distribution of the benefits of using big data in health care. We argue that this model best captures the goals and values of both physician and patient in our digital age and is a useful guide for legislating the design and deployment of data-driven tools in the medical context.

4 Müller

Act First Responsibilism: An Occurrent-State Account of Epistemic Responsibilist Virtue

Nastasia Müller (Freie Universität Berlin), nastasia.mueller@fu-berlin.de
Wednesday, 13.30-14.15 | DOR 24, R. 1.308

I defend and develop a new approach to epistemic responsibilist virtues, which I call *Act First Responsibilism*.

The traditional and dominant view of epistemic responsibilist virtues conceives virtues as enduring, stable traits of character. An act only counts as *virtuous* if it issued from a virtuous trait. *Act First Responsibilism*, by contrast, takes performances of virtuous acts as primary and defines the possession of a virtuous trait derivatively in terms of performances of virtuous acts. The view, thus, does not make the possession of a virtuous trait a condition for the virtuousness of an act.

The advantages of the view are various. Among others, *Act First Responsibilism* allows for a scalar conception of virtuous traits running from the most local virtuous traits, which regard only a certain topic or topics, to virtues simpliciter. Simply put, the more often one performs virtuous acts, the higher the degree to which one possesses a virtuous trait. Further, in that virtuous traits are understood not as one disposition, as the traditional conception indicates, but rather as consisting of three independent dispositions, the view offers a more plausible dispositional account of epistemic responsibilist virtue that is in line with empirical science.

11 Müller

The Content of Mental Imagery, or How to Visualize the Fantastical

Stephen Müller (Universität Salzburg), stephen.mueller@stud.sbg.ac.at
Wednesday, 14.15-15.00 | DOR 24, R. 1.501

The content of mental imagery exhibits two distinguishing characteristics that expose striking conceptual difficulties when examined in conjunction. First, the types of content represented by perception and mental imagery are in important respects similar. Second, the content of mental imagery is causally detached from its respective representational vehicle. (This latter characteristic is especially obvious for non-existent referents, such as when visualizing dragons or the tooth fairy.) It is a challenge for every representational theory of mental imagery to accommodate causally detached content, but the issue is especially acute for similar content views: Precisely that mechanism of content determination that is most plausible for perception (a causal chain + x , where x may be, for example, a teleo-semantic criterion) must be fully inadequate for mental imagery. To address this issue, I will outline a positive theory of how to determine the content of mental imagery. The presented theory claims that a mental image of c^* (representing how something looks) inherits its content from a perception of c (representing something that *has* this look). When we claim that we can visualize things that “just don’t exist”, we are invoking mental imagery that represents the *looks* of particular (though perhaps non-existent) things.

9 Murphy

Why Digital Objects Won't Help Virtual Realists

Alexander Murphy (University College London), alexmurphy111@gmail.com
 Tuesday, 15.00-15.45 | DOR 24, R. 1.608

This paper discusses the (non-)reality of virtual objects. These are the objects we (seem to) perceive, and interact with, when in virtual reality.

I argue against virtual digitalism. This is the view that each virtual object is a digital object. Digital objects are objects whose individuation is determined by facts about computational processes (i.e. the states, and transitions between states, of computational data). Virtual digitalists are virtual realists and so believe that virtual objects are real. They think that identifying virtual and digital objects secures their reality.

I argue that virtual digitalists cannot individuate digital objects in a way that makes them plausibly identifiable with virtual objects, realistically conceived. I consider various approaches the virtual digitalist could adopt, demonstrate that these fail and, furthermore, provide two reasons to think that any further virtual digitalist approach will fail. These are:

1. Virtual digitalists cannot individuate digital objects with acceptable modal profiles.
2. Computational data is too integrated for virtual digitalists' needs.

The identification of distinct virtual objects with distinct digital objects is essential to virtual digitalism. As such, my argument makes for a damning objection to the position.

Overall, even if virtual realism is right, virtual digitalism is not.

9 Näger

The Mereological Problem of Entanglement

Paul M. Näger (WWU Münster), paul.naeger@wwu.de
 Wednesday, 11.15-12.00 | DOR 24, R. 1.607

It is well-known that the entangled quantum state of a composite object cannot be reduced to the states of its parts. This quantum holism provides a peculiar challenge to formulate an appropriate mereological model: When a system is in an entangled state, which objects are there on the micro and macro level, and which of the objects carries which properties? This paper chooses a modelling approach to answer these questions: It proceeds from a systematic overview of consistent mereological models for entangled systems and discusses which of them is compatible with the quantum mechanical evidence (where quantum states are understood realistically). It reveals that entangled quantum systems neither describe undivided wholes nor objects that stand in irreducible relations. The appropriate model assumes that the entangled property is an irreducible non-relational plural property carried collectively by the micro objects, while there is no macro object. In this sense, quantum holism is an instance of property holism, not of object holism.

11 Neufeld

Engineering Social Concepts. Lessons from the Science of Categorization

Eleonore Neufeld (University of Illinois), eneufeld@illinois.edu

Tuesday, 13.30-14.15 | DOR 24, R. 1.506

One of the core insights from Eleanor Rosch's work on categorization is that human categorization isn't arbitrary. Instead, two psychological principles constrain possible systems of classification for all human cultures. According to these principles, the task of a category system is to provide maximum information with the least cognitive effort, and the perceived world provides us with structured rather than arbitrary features. In this paper, I draw two lessons from these principles for current efforts in social conceptual engineering. First, from a cognitive perspective, the way we categorize the world is to be expected given efficiency constraints and the bundles of co-occurring features we receive as perceptual input. Thus, conceptual change must be accompanied by social change, and implementation proposals that don't prioritize changes to our input are likely to be cognitively unfeasible. Second, due to the principles of categorization, naming practices play an extremely important role in the construction of perceived similarities and dissimilarities, and, correspondingly, the dissemination of social stereotypes that serve as markers between different categories that are otherwise similar. As a consequence, naming practices play an extremely important role in eliciting conceptual change, and social change must be accompanied by corresponding change in naming practices in order to effectively elicit conceptual change.

16 Neufeld & Woodard

On Subtweeting

Eleonore Neufeld (University of Illinois), eneufeld@illinois.edu

Elise Woodard (University of Michigan), ewoodard@umich.edu

Thursday, 11.15-12.00 | DOR 24, R. 1.103

In this paper, we explore some of the distinctive philosophical questions that arise from the phenomenon of subtweeting, and show that, far from always being harmless, it can be both ethically and linguistically fraught. In paradigmatic cases of subtweeting, one Twitter user critically or mockingly tweets about another Twitter user without mentioning their username or their name. We propose that the distinctive harmfulness of subtweets has its source in two related, essential features of subtweets—their inspecificity and their deniability—and discuss four ethical problems posed by the practice of subtweeting that arise from these features: the 'normative cover' problem, gaslighting, defense-blocking, and public complicity. After considering reasons in favor of subtweeting, we close by discussing upshots for norms governing social media usage.

11 Newen

Phenomenal Consciousness: The Predictive Processing Framework and the ALARM Theory of Consciousness

Albert Newen (Ruhr-Universität Bochum), albert.newen@rub.de

Tuesday, 15.45-16.30 | DOR 24, R. 1.501

A new line of accounts aims to explain consciousness as a phenomenon produced by the predictive processes realized in the brain according to the predictive processing (PP) framework. The key observation is that any variant of the PP framework needs to add features which are not constitutive for PP at all neural processing levels that are relevant to offer a characterization of specific processes underlying conscious experiences. Thus, any PP characterization or explanation of consciousness is only possible with these additional processing features which are not constitutive of the PP framework in the sense that these processes are realized at all levels of neural processing. Therefore, the PP framework itself, despite its plausibility, is not helpful to develop a characterization or explanation of the mechanism underlying conscious experiences. Therefore, I will outline the new ALARM theory of consciousness as an alternative. The central thesis is that we need to distinguish *two-levels* of phenomenal consciousness, *namely bodily arousal and general alertness* and therefore also have to search for two underlying mechanisms. This conceptual distinction is proven to be empirically adequate and epistemically fruitful from a variety of perspectives including an evolutionary, a neurophysiological, a behavioral, a functional, and a phenomenological perspective.

5 Nickl

“Quod dubitas, ne feceris”. Kant on Conscience and the Certainty of Moral Judgements

Johannes Nickl (University of St. Andrews), jmn20@st-andrews.ac.uk

Wednesday 10.30-11.15 | DOR 24, R. 1.604

In the fourth part of the *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason*, Kant provides a brief description of how conscience can guide an agent in the judgement of the actions she intends to perform. Its guidance relies on the confrontation with an epistemic command which Kant dubs “the postulate of conscience”: one must attain complete certainty about an action’s rightness before one is allowed to act and make sure “not to venture anything on the danger that it might be wrong (*quod dubitas, ne feceris!*)” (VI 185.23-25). The talk aims at shedding new light on the practice of judging actions according to the “quod dubitas” and explores how it relates to the judgement of maxims by the categorical imperative. By discussing the extent to which this principle is capable of guiding an agent’s moral decision making, the talk aims to determine how much certainty can (and must) be attained in moral reasoning. In so doing, the talk proposes a novel interpretation of what it means for Kant to be certain about an action’s rightness.

8 Nimtz

Empirical Support for Conceptual Engineering? The View from Neo-Whorf

Christian Nimtz (Universität Bielefeld), cnimtz@uni-bielefeld.de

Tuesday, 13.30-14.15 | DOR 24, R. 1.405

I assess whether ambitious conceptual engineering may receive the empirical support it requires from ‘Neo-Whorfian’ experimental research in psychology-cum-linguistics.

Ambitious conceptual engineers envisage lexical reform – i.e., intentionally changing the meaning of a term – to effect “positive changes in the whole of our cognitive life – that is, in the way we think, reason, talk, communicate, behave, and coordinate with each other, etc.” (Isaac 2021), or the social/political improvements these may induce (Catapang Podosky 2022, Cappelen 2018). Any such attempt assumes that lexically reforming language effects matching changes in thought. Ostensibly, this claim sits well with extensive Neo-Whorfian experimental results that establish intriguing effects of languages on how their speakers think (Boroditsky 2006, Casasanto 2017b, Lucy 2016).

I argue for three claims. First, the language-to-mind claim that ambitious engineers enlist requires empirical support. Second, a closer look at key elements of the Neo-Whorfian approach shows that its results actually – and for principled reasons – provide little empirical support for ambitious engineering beyond just-so stories. Third, ambitious engineers may accommodate this result by drawing on the ‘thinking for speaking’-paradigm that current Neo-Whorfian research strives to overcome, and by tracing indirect ameliorative cognitive effects of proposed semantic reform (cf. Kitsik 2021).

9 Nizzardo

Singular Reference & Indiscernible Entities

Matteo Nizzardo (University of St. Andrews), mn85@st-andrews.ac.uk

Tuesday, 13.30-14.15 | DOR 24, R. 1.608

One of the questions that have most often been asked about indiscernible entities is whether we can refer to them singularly. All the intuitions one finds in the literature point in the same direction: in the case of indiscernible entities, singular reference is impossible. In contrast, I argue that statements like “Let *a* be one of the indiscernibles” do indeed manage to single out one of the indiscernibles and refer to it, and to it only. I achieve this via a semantics according to which individual constants are seen as choice functions over the domain of quantification. My results are twofold. First, I provide a formal framework for reference to indiscernible individuals. Second, I explain why the intuitions in the literature are mistaken. The fact that we can singularly refer to indiscernible entities is important in many respects. First, it sheds light on some of our linguistic practices. Second, it helps us understanding how indiscernibles are individuated. Finally, it shows that the skeptical arguments against indiscernibles based on the fact that reference to them is problematic are fundamentally misguided.

5 Noorloos

Spinoza on Descartes and the Common Standard

Ruben Noorloos (Central European University), ruben.noorloos@gmail.com
 Tuesday, 15.45-16.30 | DOR 24, R. 1.604

Spinoza accuses Descartes of requiring, but being unable to provide, a “common standard” between volitions and bodily motions. But what does he mean by this? And would Descartes be moved by this criticism? This paper provides an interpretation of Spinoza’s criticism that answers these problems. Against previous interpretations, I argue that to say that two things have no “common standard” means something different from saying that they have “nothing in common”. This latter reading is arguably question-begging against Descartes, who agreed that will and motion have nothing in common yet evidently did not think this precluded their interaction. On my alternative, Spinoza instead points out that volitions and motions in Descartes are literally incommensurable: there is no one-to-one mapping between changes in the will and changes in the body. Spinoza uses the lack of a common standard to emphasize that there should be an intrinsic connection between volitions and motions, instead of merely an extrinsic one as on Descartes’s picture. This reading also connects the common standard criticism with Spinoza’s other criticisms of Descartes in the preface to *Ethics* V.

4 Nuñez Hernandez

Epistemic Lessons from the Complexity of Logic Entailment

Nancy Abigail Nuñez Hernandez (Czech Adamedmy of Sc.), nancy.abigail1985@gmail.com
 Thursday, 10.30-11.15 | DOR 24, R. 1.308

In 1970, Jaakko Hintikka referred to the problem of accounting for the informativeness of deduction as the “scandal of deduction” (Hintikka, 1970). According to Hintikka, the problem seems to arise from the “tautological” or “analytical” nature of deduction: the conclusion validly deduced from a set of premises is said to be contained in that set. A straightforward way to understand this containment relation is to think that the information provided by the conclusion is already contained in the information provided by the premises. Under this assumption, it is problematic to explain how we can gain knowledge by deducing a logical consequence implied in a set of known premises, and because of this problem deduction has been considered uninformative and useless. To address this problem, we need an epistemological account to defend that knowledge can be gained through deduction, that is, an epistemological account to vindicate the usefulness and informativeness of deduction. The aim of this talk is to propose that the complexity of a decision problem known as Logical Entailment can lay the foundation for such an epistemological account.

9 O Conaill

The Ontology of Emergent Substances

Donnchadh O Conaill (Universität Freiburg), donnchadh.oconaill@unifr.ch
Wednesday, 13.30-14.15 | DOR 24, R. 1.608

The recent revival of interest in ontological emergence has mostly focused on *emergent properties* (e.g., novel causal powers). There has been less consideration of *emergent substances* (where substances are ontologically fundamental individual entities). Discussions of emergent substances have tended to argue that there are such entities (Hasker 1999; Zimmerman 2010) rather than positive accounts of their nature. Furthermore, the notion of ‘emergent substance’ faces a problem of intelligibility. Substances are fundamental, which has often been understood in terms of ontologically independence; but emergent entities depend on the entities from which they emerge (Barnes 2012).

I shall outline a positive characterisation of emergent substances which addresses the problem of intelligibility. Drawing on work on the ontology of substance (e.g., Lowe 1998; Schnieder 2006), I shall outline two different ways in which an entity can be understood as ontologically independent: it does not depend on anything else for its individual identity, and its existence is not wholly explained by other entities. These ways of characterising substances as independent are compatible with their depending on other entities in certain respects, e.g., as only existing when certain entities are arranged in certain ways and given certain laws of nature.

2 Özbek

Resemblance, Depiction, and Pictorial Reference

Olga Bahar Özbek (Universität Tübingen), olgaozbek@gmail.com
Tuesday, 14.15-15.00 | DOR 24, R. 1.504

As intuitive as it pre-theoretically may be, the resemblance theory of depiction, roughly the view that pictorial representations depict certain things because they resemble them, faces serious challenges as a systematic philosophical account. While earlier attacks on the view have focused on the formal features of the resemblance relation, which seem to threaten the sufficiency of resemblance for depiction, critics have more recently argued that pictures with generic or fictional suggest that resemblance is not even necessary for depiction. I argue that significant progress can be made on this front by acknowledging a crucial distinction between two principal ways in which a picture can be a picture of something: the predicate “is a picture of” corresponds to two distinct relations, one referential and the other properly depictive, between pictures and what they can be said to ‘represent’. While the resemblance theory should be understood as a theory of the depictive relation, a broadly causal account is our best bet for explaining the referential relation. Separating depiction from pictorial reference in this way makes possible a novel treatment of pictures with generic and fictional content that is compatible with the resemblance theory.

11 Pani**General and Specific Images: A Largely Underexplored Distinction**

Silvana Pani (Universität Salzburg), silvana.pani@plus.ac.at

Wednesday, 15.00-15.45 | DOR 24, R. 1.501

Of all the distinctions that have been introduced in studies on mental images, one has unduly received almost no attention. In this paper, I highlight the relevance of this distinction, viz. the difference between general and specific images. Evidence in support of the general-specific distinction comes from different empirical venues and converges on the recognition of mental images as presenting various degrees of richness in detail both with respect to their content and their format (or representational vehicle). The difference that I draw between the two kinds of images is orthogonal to Fridland's (2021) account of intention specification in skilled action, a novel solution to the interface problem (originally posed by Butterfill and Sinigaglia in 2014). The question is how representations of purportedly different formats – propositional and motoric – work together towards the realization of some action goal. I contend that general images represent outcomes, while specific images represent means or aspects of outcomes. The dividing line between the two types of images is then cashed out in terms of content along the general-specific spectrum. In addition, the general/specific divide adds to the existent transformations relative to the imagistic format (Gauker 2021) a novel procedure, call it *zooming-in* on portions or features of images.

6 Parisi & Rossberg**Neutral Free Logic**

Andrew Parisi (U.o. Connecticut, Reify Health, Boston, Mass.), andrew.p.parisi@gmail.com

Marcus Rossberg (University of Connecticut), marcus.rossberg@uconn.edu

Thursday, 11.15-12.00 | DOR 24, R. 1.406

Classical logic famously has trouble denying the existence of, e.g., Pegasus. If 'Pegasus' is a proper name, ' $\exists x x = \text{Pegasus}$ ' ("Pegasus exists") is a logical truth of classical logic, because all proper names are taken to refer. Free logics allow us to relax this requirement.

Neutral free logic takes any non-quantified statement that contains non-referring terms to *lack truth-value*. A (three-valued) semantics, axiom system, and tableaux system exist for neutral free logic (see Lehmann). However, to date no "proper" proof-system has been proposed. We introduce two three-sided sequent calculi for neutral free logic. We read the first off Lehmann's tableaux system. It is sound and complete with respect to the Lehmann's semantics, and cut is admissible. The second is a generalization of the calculus developed in Parisi (2017). It has perfectly general operational rules and satisfies cut-elimination. Moreover, the calculus presents a universal framework for all variants of free logics in this family: manipulation of the structural rules alone yields a proof system for positive and negative free logic, as well as classical logic and further free logics that have hitherto not been described (perhaps for good reasons).

10 Parmer

Manipulation as Covert Non-Cooperation

W. Jared Parmer (RWTH Aachen), silvana.pani@plus.ac.at

Wednesday, 11.15-12.00 | DOR 24, R. 1.601

Cooperation is a mainstay of contemporary life, especially in multidisciplinary collaboration between experts. One important function of such cooperation is to enable us to work together to be responsive to reasons, whereas individuals we are in no position to understand each of the relevant normative reasons. For reasons-responsiveness to be distributed across the group, fully cooperative participants must remain open with respect to the plans of action, and patterns of activity, that arise from their deciding together what to do, and how to do it. Manipulators, in turn, exploit this open-endedness of cooperative participation, thereby misleading others about their (lack of) concern for cooperative activity. Thus, on the account I develop here, manipulation is covert non-cooperation. I also show why extant theories that explain manipulation in terms of reasons- responsiveness fail, and why deception-based theories like mine survive well-known putative counterexamples.

11 Patronnikov

Does Implicit Attitudes' Sensitivity to Evidence Show that They are Beliefs?

Ilia Patronnikov (University of Barcelona), patrilya@gmail.com

Wednesday 10.30-11.15 | DOR 24, R. 1.506

The paper examines an argument against the received view about the structure of implicit attitudes (IAs) – the associationist view, according to which implicit attitudes are associations. The argument holds that IAs sensitivity to evidence entails that they are beliefs. I argue that sensitivity to evidence is compatible with IAs being associations, and sketch a possible explanation of sensitivity to evidence on behalf of the associationist view. So, contrary to the initial argument, the associationism is not ruled out by sensitivity to evidence. However, I show that the explanation of sensitivity to evidence that the associationist view can provide relies on *ad hoc* assumptions and cannot account for some experimental data. By contrast, the view that IAs are beliefs makes no such assumptions and easily accommodates the data. Therefore, the view is to be preferred to the associationism as long as IA's sensitivity to evidence is concerned.

16 Paulmann**Refugee Women and Their Specific Claim to Admission**

Franziska Lara Paulmann (Universität Kassel), f.paulmann@gmx.de
 Wednesday, 11.15-12.00 | DOR 24, R. 1.103

In this presentation I will discuss the role of refugee women and their special claim to admission. The question that arises first of all is to what extent women have a special claim to admission and how it can be justified. In doing so, I distinguish myself from two conceptions that have been relevant so far, one of which conceives of refugees in humanitarian terms and the other in political terms. The goods-theoretical approach I apply is capable of highlighting the particular vulnerability of refugee women. This is relevant to both the causes of flight and the experiences of flight. The goods-theoretical approach is able to justify that women in both situations have additional claims to admission as refugees that are not taken into account by conventional conceptualizations. The approach is also able to systematically separate the causes of flight from the experiences of flight. The result of this systematic separation is, among other things, that women without prior rights of residence may not be deported if concrete basic goods are harmed by deportation.

1 Paulo**The Trolley Problem in the Ethics of Autonomous Vehicles**

Norbert Paulo (Universität Graz), norbert.paulo@gmail.com
 Thursday, 09.45-10.30 | DOR 24, R. 1.401

In 2021, Germany passed the first law worldwide that regulates dilemma situations with self-driving cars that are largely in line with recommendations made by a high-level Ethics Commission. This paper investigates two particularly problematic aspects of the programming of autonomous vehicles, namely the normative assessment of qualifications according to personal characteristics and of offsetting human victims. It does not attempt to solve these issues comprehensively, though. Instead, it inquires how the trolley problem can contribute to answering them. Against almost all authors in the relevant literature, the paper argues that the trolley problem has direct as well as indirect normative relevance for the regulation of self-driving cars. According to this position (and against the Ethics Commission's recommendations), the offsetting of human victims is permissible in some situations with self-driving cars and impermissible in others. In still other scenarios, including those with varied personal characteristics of potential victims, the trolley problem is only instructive in an indirect way: It provides reasons against the use of moral theories and principles that cannot solve the trolley problem. In this way, the Ethics Commission's use of a restrictive understanding of Kant's categorical imperative is to be rejected.

14 Pincock & Poznic

Integrating Representational, Exploratory, and Design Modelling

Christopher Pincock (Ohio State University), pincock1@osu.edu

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Thursday, 10.30-11.15 | DOR 24, R. 1.404

This paper argues that models can be distinguished based on how those models are used and evaluated. Recent work has shown how heuristic exploratory models are fruitfully distinguished from representational models that aim to accurately represent some features of a target system. We argue that a third sort of “design” model is evaluated in a different way than either representational or exploratory models. A design model is used to specify how a product should be built. We show the value of design models in two sorts of cases. First, when a new product is being designed, practitioners should draw on the representational models of their best theories, but these models are not sufficient to arrive at the best version of this product. It is here that a series of design models contributes to a successful outcome. Second, when an experiment is being conducted, there is often a special role for a design model of the experimental apparatus in specifying how the experiment should be run. The design model can then be used to support the conclusions that are drawn from the experiment. We conclude by emphasizing the importance of integrating these three kinds of models for these scientific outcomes.

1 Pissarskoi

Zur Irrelevanz von Vorstellungen guten Lebens für die Begründung von Strategien nachhaltiger Entwicklung

Eugen Pissarskoi (Universität Tübingen), eugen.pissarskoi@izew.uni-tuebingen.de

Wednesday 11.15-12.00 | DOR 24, R. 1.401

Mein Vortrag fokussiert auf die aktuelle Kontroverse zwischen zwei idealtypischen Strategien zur Nachhaltigen Entwicklung: Green-Growth versus Degrowth. Dieser Kontroverse liegt unter anderem eine ethische Meinungsverschiedenheit darüber zugrunde, welche Auffassung guten Lebens erstrebenswert sein sollte. Green-Growth-Befürworter*innen sind davon überzeugt, dass Erhaltung der Wertschöpfung notwendig dafür sei, Lebensqualität zu wahren. Gemäß den Degrowth-Befürworter*innen würden wir hingegen besser leben, wenn wir weniger Zeit zur Erwirtschaftung finanziellen Einkommens verwendeten, dafür mehr Zeit für konviale und nicht-marktliche Aktivitäten. Ich will ein Argument für die These vorstellen, dass die kontroversen Werthaltungen bezüglich der Auffassungen guten Lebens für die Begründung, welche Strategie gewählt werden sollte, irrelevant sind. Im ersten Schritt werde ich die Auffassungen guten Lebens rekonstruieren, auf die sich die Vertreter*innen der beiden Nachhaltigkeitsstrategien implizit festlegen. Gemäß meiner Interpretation sind sich beide Lager darin einig, dass gutes Leben mehrere Bestandteile hat. Kontrovers ist vielmehr, welches relative Gewicht einzelne Bestandteile guten Lebens für die Höhe der Lebensqualität haben. Anschließend werde ich dafür argumentieren, dass die kontroversen Werthaltungen transformativ (im Sinne von L.Paul) sind: Sie verändern sich in Abhängigkeit von realisierten Weltzuständen. In diesem Fall ist aber, so meine These, die Kontroverse darüber, welche Vorstellung gelingenden Lebens besser ist, irrelevant für die Entscheidung darüber, welche Nachhaltigkeitsstrategie eingeschlagen werden sollte.

9 Pleitz

Dynamic Reificationism

Martin Pleitz (Münster), martinpleitz@web.de

Thursday, 09.45-10.30 | DOR 24, R. 1.608

All abstract and social objects, I believe, are the result of reification. To *reify* is to turn a non-object into an object, or less metaphorically, to represent a non-objectual item by an object that encodes it. Instead of joining the standard condemnation of this as a category mistake, I propose we take a clue from a remark of Frege's about using certain objects to represent concepts (which for him, of course, were non-objects), and understand reification as a basic metaphysical operation, which, it turns out, is only warranted if understood dynamically. Merits of the ensuing position of *dynamic reificationism* are that it provides a novel account of the constitution of abstract objects like numbers and other mathematical objects, universals, sets, states of affairs, propositions, and linguistic expressions, solves the semantic and set theoretical paradoxes in a uniform way, and clarifies the relation between platonism and nominalism.

11 Tom Poljanšek

Zwei Begriffe des Begriffs. Perzeptiv-behaviorale vs. kognitive Konzeptionen des Begriffs

Tom Poljanšek (Georg-August-Universität Göttingen), tom.poljansek@uni-goettingen.de

Tuesday, 15.00-15.45 | DOR 24, R. 1.506

Argumentiert wird für die Unterscheidung zweier Begriffe des Begriffs, die in der philosophischen Diskussion nicht immer klar differenziert werden: Schreiben wir einem Subjekt den Besitz des Begriffs einer bestimmten Objektklasse zu, kann damit das Vermögen des Subjekts bezeichnet sein, Instanzen der infragestehenden Objektklasse perzeptiv hinreichend zuverlässig zu erkennen und situativ objektspezifische Affordanzen wahrzunehmen und Antizipationen zu bilden, die das Subjekt zu einem erfolgreichen Umgang mit dem Objekt befähigen. Eine solche Zuschreibung kann aber auch das Vermögen des Subjekts bezeichnen, prädikative bzw. propositionale Überzeugungen bezüglich Instanzen der infragestehenden Objektklasse zu bilden, die kognitiv für die Bildung weiterer Überzeugungen und inferenzieller Schlüsse zur Verfügung stehen. Einer *wahrnehmungsstrukturierenden* und *handlungsleitenden* Konzeption des Begriffs steht eine *prädikative Erkenntnis ermöglichende* Konzeption des Begriffs gegenüber, die primär auf das Vermögen der systematischen Bildung von Gedanken oder Überzeugungen abstellt. Sofern in der philosophischen Diskussion kognitive Konzeptionen des Begriffs dominieren, liegt der Fokus des Beitrags auf der Eigenständigkeit der perzeptiv-behavioralen gegenüber der kognitiven Konzeption. Dies geschieht in einer kontrastierenden Auseinandersetzung mit Millikans Konzeption der „substance concepts“ und Husserls Konzeption der „Typen“, wobei am Ende des Papers kontrastiv auf die enaktivistische Konzeption des „Sensemaking“ und Gendlers Konzeption von „Aliefs“ Bezug genommen wird.

14 Portides

Idealization and Abstraction in Scientific Modelling

Demetris Portides (University of Cyprus), portides@ucy.ac.cy
Thursday, 09.00-09.45 | DOR 24, R. 1. 404

It is commonplace that Science does not describe the systems of the world in their full detail and complexity. Most frequently the general principles of theory are *inter alia* supplemented with simplifying assumptions and used in the construction of models. It is frequently admitted that model-simplifying assumptions involve two distinct characteristics: the omission of features of the phenomena from the scientific representation of respective target systems (often referred to as *abstraction*) and the modification of features that are retained in the representation (often referred to as *idealization*). This admission dictates a question: how could the two kinds of assumptions be defined so that the given definitions lead to a clear-cut distinction of the two? In this paper I argue against one of the prevailing answers to this question, which I label conception-X. I spell-out the main characteristic of conception-X and argue that it has two important consequences both of which are questionable. I show why conception-X fails to meet its purpose by arguing that its main characteristic and its two consequences are untenable. Finally, I suggest a different way to distinguish the two processes, as two particular forms of *selective attention*.

10 Privitera

Contractualism, Demandingness, and Everyday Risks

Johanna Privitera (Humboldt-Universität Berlin), johanna.privitera@hu-berlin.de
Thursday, 09.00-09.45 | DOR 24, R. 1.601

A recent debate among moral contractualists focuses on whether the permissibility of risky actions should be evaluated *ex ante*, that is, on the basis of the prospects the action has for each individual, or *ex post*, that is on the basis of the benefits and burdens the action is expected to generate. The central consideration invoked in favor of the *ex ante* view is that it can easily account for the intuitive permissibility of everyday risky actions, because such actions only give slightly negative prospects to each individual. The *ex post* view, by contrast, would deem such actions impermissible, thus making contractualism overly demanding. In my talk, I argue that this consideration does not, in fact, constitute a good reason to prefer the *ex ante* view. First, I show that *ex post* theorists can account for the permissibility of everyday risky actions, although to do so, they must formulate the relevant principles in unusually general terms. While such general formulations raise worries of ad-hoc-ness, I argue that, surprisingly, *ex ante* theorists must rely on them, too, to avoid rendering their own version of contractualism overly demanding. So, *ex ante* contractualism is not the better choice with respect to accounting for the permissibility of everyday risky actions.

12 Pugnaghi**Predicativism, Metasemantics and Circularity**

Stefano Pugnaghi (University of St. Andrews, Universität Bonn), sp253@st-andrews.ac.uk
 Wednesday 09.00-09.45 | DOR 24, R. 1.205

Predicativism is nowadays one of the most discussed approaches to the analysis of the semantics of proper names. However, the predicate view still seems to face a challenge originally presented by Kripke in *Naming and Necessity*: a Circularity Challenge. Although few explicitly press this issue, most of the defenders of the predicate view have felt the need to respond to the criticism that the semantic explanation provided by their accounts might be viciously circular. In fact, although I believe there are good reasons to conclude that the predicate view is not explanatorily circular, the replies provided in the literature are not sufficient to protect predicativism from a form of Metasemantic Circularity. Given the role of name-bearing facts in the analysis of the meaning of both referential and predicative uses of names, a non-circular account of the determinants of these facts seems required. However, the only fully developed account of name-bearing currently on the market (developed by Aidan Gray in *Name-Bearing, Reference and Circularity*) seems to face some important difficulties. In the end, not only this proposal should appear unacceptable for many predicativists, but also the considerations advanced by Gray might be taken as highlighting a more general weakness of predicativism.

11 Radomski**The Free-Energy Principle Should Not Be Compared to Hamilton's Principle**

Bartosz Radomski ('Situating Cognition' Research Training Gr.), bartosz.radomski@rub.de
 Wednesday 09.00-09.45 | DOR 24, R. 1.502

Can we find any universal principles that biological systems comply to? For over a decade, Karl Friston and collaborators have been arguing that their free-energy principle (FEP) is a suitable candidate. To justify this claim, they compare the FEP to Hamilton's principle, and argue that the two are both unfalsifiable, fundamental, and yet indispensable for empirical sciences. If they are right, the FEP would vindicate a "laws and theories" image of biology, thus challenging the primacy of mechanistic explanations. My goal is to show that bringing the FEP together with Hamilton's principle cannot however succeed in achieving this task. I suggest two readings of the relation – a strong logical equivalence and a weaker analogy. Next, I show that under the strong reading, an untenable dilemma arises. Either the principles are equivalent and not applicable to biology, or the FEP applies to biology and is not equivalent to Hamilton's principle. This leaves open only the weak reading. However, I claim that the analogy can only be found at the level of formal methods, but that of the epistemic status or empirical relevance. I conclude that new arguments independent of Hamilton's principle are required to justify the FEP's fundamental status.

12 Radulescu

Answering the Humpty Dumpty Objection

Alexandru Viroel Radulescu (University of Missouri), alex.radulescu@gmail.com

Wednesday 09.45-10.30 | DOR 24, R. 1.205

Lewis Carroll's Humpty Dumpty seems mistaken in claiming that he can mean "a nice knock-down argument" by "glory". Absolute intentionalists are accused of making the same mistake when they claim, about some feature of an artifact, that it has that feature solely because of its author's intention. The most common response is to agree that there are limits to what an author can do, but only because there are limits to what they can intend. For example, (Davidson 1986) claimed that Humpty Dumpty cannot mean what he claims to mean because he knows that Alice will not grasp that meaning, and you cannot intend what you think impossible to achieve.

In this paper, I have two aims. First, to show that this kind of response is weaker than has been acknowledged in three important respects: even for meaning, communication is not the only goal of speakers; the limit on intentions is only for rational agents; and mere intentional action is not as constrained as having an intention and acting on it. Second, to illustrate how the response still works for some applications of intentionalism, even in the modified, weaker form.

6 Raidl

Definable Conditionals

Eric Raidl (Universität Tübingen), eric.raidl@gmail.com

Tuesday, 14.15-15.00 | DOR 24, R. 1.406

Conditionals 'if A, [then] C' are difficult to analyse. A standard account has however emerged: a conditional $A > C$ is true in the actual world (roughly) if and only if the closest A-worlds are C-worlds. However, recent reflections suggest strengthening the defining clause by additional conditions. Different approaches argue for different additional conditions. In this talk, I present a general method to prove completeness results for such definable or strengthened conditionals. The problem is this: Imagine you have a conditional of the form $A > B$ in world w iff closest A-worlds are B-worlds and X .

Suppose that X is also formulated in terms of closeness. One can then rephrase $A > B$ as $(A > B) \wedge C$, where C is the expression corresponding to the condition X . The central question is whether known completeness results for $>$ can be used to obtain completeness results for $>'$. The answer is yes and the paper provides a general method: First, redefine $>$ in terms of $>'$. This backtranslation of $>$ yields a formula in the language for $>'$. One can then use this backtranslation to translate axioms for $>$ into axioms for $>'$. This is a looking glass which provides a distorted picture of the logic for $>$, in terms of $>'$. The picture is a logic for $>'$. The method can be applied to many conditional constructions, such as Rott's difference making and dependency conditional, Crupi and Iacona's evidential conditional, and Spohn's sufficient and necessary reason relation, but also to connectives such as 'because', 'even if', or 'whether or not'. In this talk I show how the method works, by way of examples.

6 Raidl & Rott

Difference-Making and 'Because'

Eric Raidl (Universität Tübingen), eric.raidl@gmail.com

Hans Rott (Universität Regensburg), hans.rott@ur.de

Thursday, 09.45-10.30 | DOR 24, R. 1.406

Causes make a difference to their effects, *explanantia* make a difference to their *explananda*, reasons make a difference to what they are reasons for. The paradigmatic way of reporting about causal, explanatory or reason relations is in the form of sentences using *because* or its stylistic variant *since*. Such sentences thus express that the 'antecedent' makes a difference to the 'consequent'.

We analyse *because* with the help of a *difference-making conditional* \gg . The latter is stronger than the usual suppositional conditional $>$ in the tradition of Ramsey, Adams, Stalnaker and Lewis. $A \gg C$ can be defined by the conjunction of (i) $A > C$ and (ii) $\neg(\neg A > C)$. We show that the logic of difference making can be extended to get a logic for '*C because A*' by adding the clauses that (iii) *A* is true or accepted and (iv) *C* is true or accepted.

We set up a semantics for difference making conditionals (DMCs) and *because* which allows us to be non-committal about their metaphysical or epistemic interpretation, that is, about whether they have truth conditions or only acceptability conditions. We discuss the logics of *because* which arise from this semantics and compare them to the corresponding more standard logics of suppositional conditionals.

1 Reinmuth

The Possibility and Evaluation of Norm Misuses and Abuses

Karl Christoph Reinmuth (Europa-Universität Flensburg), karl.reinmuth@uni-flensburg.de

Thursday, 10.30-11.15 | DOR 24, R. 1.405

In a famous passage of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant discusses learning or training to apply rules, a possible rule regress, mother-wit, and judgment. This passage is often discussed regarding the following of rules. However, Kant also refers to a possible misuse of rules. This paper will address the issue of the misuse and abuse of norms. Is the misuse of a norm only a case of incompetent application due to "stupidity" (Kant)? Can other forms of misuse be distinguished from it, which imply an accusation of incorrect rule application? The talk will show whether norms (rules, laws, rights) can be misused or abused at all. Furthermore, the relevance of these considerations for the evaluation of norms and the use of norms will be highlighted. Addressing the question of whether and how norms can be abused helps to show to what extent a distinction can be made between incompetent and malicious use of norms, whether certain accusations of abuse are justified criticism of norm users, to what extent certain weaknesses of norms favour abuse, and whether abuses or misuses of norms can be prevented.

12 Reuter

Does Context Influence How We Think about Truth?

Kevin Reuter (Universität Zürich), kevin.reuter@uzh.ch

Wednesday, 15.00-15.45 | DOR 24, R. 1.205

Within the last 15 years, philosophers have increasingly used experimental methods to investigate the folk concept of *truth* (e.g., Kölbel 2008, Bernard & Ulatowski 2013, Reuter & Brun 2021). Some of these results show that even within the empirical domain, *truth* is ambiguous between a coherence and a correspondence reading. In this talk, I present the results of a study with the aim to investigate whether people apply the term ‘true’ differently in a scientific context compared to a more mundane empirical context. The outcome of this study replicates previous findings, showing that laypeople entertain both a coherence and a correspondence reading of the term ‘true’ in non-scientific but empirical contexts. However, in scientific contexts, the results were very different, indicating that an overwhelming majority of people consider a statement false that does not correspond to reality. The paper therefore argues that the meaning of the term ‘true’ is relative to context. I will discuss the relevance of these studies for research on the folk concept of truth, as well as their importance for philosophical debates on truth.

11 Riccardi

Hallucinations and Illusions: Where’s the Difference?

Mattia Riccardi (University of Proto), riccardi@letras.up.pt

Wednesday 09.45-10.30 | DOR 24, R. 1.501

Hallucinations and illusions are the most paradigmatic kinds of non-veridical perception. But where is the difference between them? This is the issue this paper is about. The paper has three parts. First, I introduce two distinct criteria to distinguish between hallucinations and illusions: accuracy (the extent to which a perceptual experience matches the external stimulus) and robustness (the extent to which a perceptual experience is the standard response across perceivers to a certain external stimulus). Second, I show that sometimes these two criteria diverge in the way they classify (as illusion or hallucination) a certain non-veridical perceptual experience (cases considered: Herman Grid, afterimages, strange-face illusion and Ganzfeld hallucinations). Third, I explain this divergence as reflecting different theoretical interests typically associated with the adoption of each criterion and conclude defending a contextualist claim: we should retain both criteria and choose which one to apply depending on the theoretical enterprise we are pursuing.

12 Rinner**Slurs and Freedom of Speech**

Stefan Rinner (Universität Hamburg), stefan.rinner01@gmail.com

Thursday, 09.45-10.30 | DOR 24, R. 1.204

A very common argument against restrictions on hate speech says that since such restrictions curtail freedom of speech, they cause more harm than they prevent. A no less common reply has it that the harms caused by hate speech are sufficiently great to justify legal restrictions on free speech. In 'Freedom of Expression and Derogatory Words', West questions a common assumption of both arguments concerning the use of slurs, i.e., that restricting the use of slurs necessarily curtails freedom of speech. According to West, everything that can be said with a slur can be said with its neutral counterpart. Given the psychological and social harms of slurs, this would give us a compelling reason to put legal restrictions on their use. However, in this paper, I will argue that, according to the main theories of slurs, slurs can be used to express derogatory information which cannot be expressed by their neutral counterparts. This will leave us with two options when it comes to avoiding the negative effects of slurs: (i) to restrict freedom of speech, or (ii) to argue that the derogatory information expressed by slurs is not covered by free speech. Both options will depart significantly from West's argument.

15 Rinner**Women: What Do We Want Them to Be?**

Stefan Rinner (Universität Hamburg), stefan.rinner01@gmail.com

Thursday, 09.00-09.45 | DOR 24, R. 1.505

In her groundbreaking article 'Gender and Race: What Are They? What Do We Want Them to Be?', Sally Haslanger neither tries to define our concepts of gender and race nor to investigate the kind we may (or may not) be tracking with these concepts. Rather, she asks what we (feminist and antiracist) need these concepts for and, then, tries to define concepts of both gender and race that fulfil these needs. In this talk, I will argue that Haslanger's definition suffers from a methodological problem. Since one of Haslanger's aims in connection with gender and race is to provide conceptual categories that identify the kind of injustice at issue and the groups subject to it, we can ask what kind of injustice can be identified with Haslanger's concept of woman. I will argue that the only injustice relevant to feminists which we can identify with Haslanger's concept of woman is the injustice that (many) women exist. According to Haslanger's concept of woman, this would identify the injustice that there are individuals who are systematically subordinated along some dimension because of observed or imagined bodily features presumed to be evidence of a female's biological role in reproduction. However, I will point out that this is not the injustice feminists primarily want to explain which is why Haslanger's definition does not achieve what it is supposed to achieve.

9 Roberts

The Metaphysics of Modalities

Alexander Roberts (University of Oxford), alexander.roberts@oriel.ox.ac.uk
Wednesday 09.45-10.30 | DOR 24, R. 1.607

Metaphysical necessity is an elusive notion. However, one prominent thought is that it can be characterised in terms of its position with respect to other modalities. According to this characterisation, metaphysical necessity is the maximal *objective*, or *real*, species of necessity. This thesis is, and ought to be, central to our conception of metaphysical necessity. Nevertheless, I shall present an argument for the claim that a natural version of this thesis is incompatible with popular assumptions about the metaphysics of modalities.

7 Rolffs

Resultant Moral Luck and the Scope of Moral Responsibility

Matthias Rolffs (Universität Bern), matthias.rolffs@philo.unibe.ch
Wednesday 11.15-12.00 | DOR 24, R. 1.201

Cases of resultant moral luck present a challenge for theories of moral responsibility: How can we account for the intuition that we fully control our moral responsibility, given that we do not fully control the outcomes of our actions?

Some authors react to this challenge by distinguishing between the scope and the degree of responsibility. Zimmerman (2002) and Swenson (2019) argue that luck affects the scope of moral responsibility, but not its degree. Khoury (2018) takes a more resolute approach, arguing that luck affects neither the degree nor the scope of moral responsibility.

In this talk, I criticize both accounts and formulate an alternative. I argue for the following claims: First, Khoury's (2018) account is either committed to an implausible error theory or does not fully avoid moral luck. Second, Zimmerman's (2002) and Swenson's (2019) distinction between scope and degree of responsibility is insufficiently complex to account for certain plausible responsibility judgements. Third, a distinction between two concepts of responsibility – internal responsibility and action/outcome-responsibility – captures the main intuition behind the denial of resultant moral luck while avoiding the problems of Khoury's and Swenson's accounts.

9 Rolffs & Salimkhani

On Progress in Metaphysics

Matthias Rolffs (Universität Bern), matthias.rolffs@philo.unibe.ch
Kian Salimkhani (Universität Köln), k.salimkhani@uni-koeln.de
Wednesday 10.30-11.15 | DOR 24, R. 1.608

In a recent paper, Kerry McKenzie identifies theory change in science as a source for doubts about the value of engaging in metaphysics of science before a final theory is at hand. According to McKenzie, the basic problem is that naturalistically-inclined metaphysics lacks a concept of progress. More specifically, naturalistically-inclined metaphysics lacks a

concept of progress as approximation that can easily be taken to correspond to the scientific sources of naturalized metaphysical inquiry.

In this paper, we criticise the proposed concept of progress as approximation as too narrow a concept, notably, even in science, and propose an alternative notion of scientific progress that metaphysical investigations can and do latch on to, namely progress understood as exploring and constraining theory space. First, we motivate this notion of progress via an examination of progress in particle physics and propose that it can be applied to metaphysics as well. Second, we argue that this notion of progress leads to a convincing reply to McKenzie's argument. Third, we discuss how this notion of progress relates to the program of naturalized metaphysics and argue that it speaks in favor of a more lenient version of naturalistically-inclined metaphysics, namely inductive metaphysics.

9 Roski

Metaphysically Understanding Why

Stefan Roski (Universität Hamburg, Universität Saarbrücken), stefan.roski@gmail.com
Wednesday, 14.15-15.00 | DOR 24, R 1.608

In recent years, many philosophers have become interested in the use of explanatory notions in metaphysics. Various kinds of robust metaphysical dependence seem to give rise to a distinctive form of metaphysical explanation. At the same time, however, many classical assumptions about explanation that have dominated the philosophy of science have been challenged by epistemologists and philosophers of science that have investigated the connection between explanation and understanding. Metaphysicians have thus far rarely taken notice of this lively debate. And similarly, philosophers working on understanding usually focus on scientific or simple causal cases. The present talk is part of a project that aims to bring both debates into contact. I will propose a novel account of understanding that is suitable to accommodate the kind of understanding that is provided by metaphysical explanations. To motivate my account, I will argue that popular extant accounts of understanding-why are inapplicable, or at least highly non-informative, with regard to metaphysical understanding. The alternative account I will suggest is inspired by Michael Strevens's account of understanding in terms of difference-making. In the final part of the talk, I will compare my approach to an account of metaphysical understanding in terms of unification suggested by Kovacs.

12 Roth

Introspection from Possibility Preservation?

Richard Roth (New York University), richardrichard.rothroth@gmail.com
Wednesday, 14.15-15.00 | DOR 24, R. 1.404

If it's compatible with your knowledge that if p then q , and it's compatible with your knowledge that p , then intuitively it must also be compatible with your knowledge that q ($M(p \supset q) \wedge Mp \supset Mq$, where $M := \neg K \neg$). Call this principle *Possibility Preservation*, and combine it with *Vacuity*: if you know that not p , then it is (vacuously) true that if p , then q ($K \neg p \supset (p \supset q)$). I show that *Possibility Preservation* and *Vacuity* entail *Negative Introspection*, the principle that if you don't know something, you know that you don't know it ($\neg Kp \supset K \neg Kp$). I explain the result, and explore the consequences for the semantics of conditionals and the

Sektionen / Sections

logic of knowledge, and the relationship to similar results by Holguin (forthcoming), Boylan and Schultheis (forthcoming), and Boylan (2021). In particular, I argue that *Possibility Preservation* must be rejected, and hence also popular principles such as the Equation, and Stalnaker (1975)'s Indicative constraint. I explain how one can make the rejection of *Possibility Preservation* more palatable by following Mandelkern (2019, forthcoming), and positing a presupposition on conditionals which ensures that, although invalid, *Possibility Preservation* is true at all worlds where its presuppositions are satisfied.

1 Rüger

Prioritizing the Young in Medical Emergencies

Korbinian Rüger (LMU München), korbinian.rueger@lmu.de
Tuesday, 15.00-15.45 | DOR 24, R. 1.401

During the COVID-19 pandemic, various medical societies have released “ethical guidelines” to assist medical personnel in deciding whom to help when resource constraints prevent helping everyone in need. Unfortunately, most of the released documents are themselves either not very helpful in guiding decisions, not properly justified, or both. One reason for this is that they offer inconsistent advice. For example, some of them ask doctors to pursue potentially conflicting goals, without advising doctors which goal to prioritize in cases of conflict. I here focus on a potential inconsistency that is much harder to detect. What most guidelines have in common is their call to make decisions in light of the overarching goal of maximizing the number of lives saved. However, at the same time, they deny that the age of the patients should be a relevant factor in deciding *which* lives to save. I here argue that this position might be untenable. I argue that if we are committed to maximizing the number of lives saved, then age should be a decisive factor in deciding which lives to save. We should prioritize saving the young. In addition to this conditional argument, I also offer an independent justification for this claim.

1 Ryan

Self-Respect & Childhood

Nanette Katherine Ryan (Georgetown University), nr407@georgetown.edu
Thursday, 09.45-10.30 | DOR 24, R. 1.405

For a child to conceive of themselves as worthless is a deep tragedy. It is a self-conception, one might think, unfitting for a child, or indeed any person. Explaining why this self-conception is so troubling, however, is not a straightforward task. This is because while there is a vast literature on how to conceive of and regard children, there is relatively little regarding how children should conceive of and regard themselves. Moreover, the concepts that we have available, and that are most promising to explain what is problematic about a worthless self-conception—self-esteem and self-respect—are not up to the task. Self-esteem is a descriptive concept, and so lacks the conceptual tools to explain why such a self-conception is problematic, and accounts of self-respect typically presuppose mature capabilities rendering them inappropriate for the context of childhood. In order to explain what is problematic about a self-conception of worthlessness, as well as other troubling self-conceptions in childhood, I articulate a new account of self-respect that I refer to as the ‘base form of self-respect.’

14 Salimkhani**A Dynamical Perspective on the Arrow of Time**Kian Salimkhani (Universität Köln), k.salimkhani@uni-koeln.de

Wednesday 09.00-09.45 | DOR 24, R. 1.402

It is standardly believed that the generally time-reversal fundamental laws of physics themselves cannot explain the apparent directionality of time. In particular, it is usually believed that CP violation is of no help. This paper intends to push back against a dismissal of CP violation as a potential source for the arrow of time and argues that it should be taken more seriously for conceptualising time in physics. This is based on the fact that CP violation is a fundamental feature of the Standard Model of Particle Physics that has large-scale explanatory import regarding the matter–antimatter asymmetry of the universe. I then investigate how CP violation may help to explain the directionality of time. In particular, I argue that accounts à la Maudlin that posit an intrinsic fundamental direction of time are not convincing and instead propose to utilise recent results from work on the dynamical approach to relativity theory.

8 Sarihan**Problems with Publishing Philosophical Claims We Don't Believe**Işık Sarihan (Budapest), isiksarihan@gmail.com

Tuesday, 15.45-16.30 | DOR 24, R. 1.405

Plakias has recently argued that there is nothing wrong with publishing defences of philosophical claims which we don't believe and also nothing wrong with concealing our lack of belief, because an author's lack of belief is irrelevant to the merit of a published work. Fleisher has refined this account by limiting the permissibility of publishing without belief to what he calls 'advocacy role cases'. I argue that such lack of belief is irrelevant only if it is the result of an inexplicable incredulity or the result of a metaphilosophical or epistemic stance that is unrelated to the specific claim. However, in many real life cases, including Fleisher's advocacy role cases, our doubts regarding the claims we defend arise from reasons that have something to do with the insufficiency of the philosophical evidence supporting the claim, and publishing an unconditional defence of a claim without revealing our doubts is impermissible as it involves withholding philosophically-relevant reasons. Plakias has also argued that discouraging philosophers from publishing claims they don't believe would be unfair to junior philosophers with unsettled views. I propose that we should change our academic practices that pressure philosophers to publish articles that pretend to be defences of settled views.

4 Savino

On Two Proposals to Sidestep the Infallibility Objection Against Underdetermination Scepticism

Paolo Savino (University of St. Andrews), ps244@st-andrews.ac.uk

Wednesday 09.45-10.30 | DOR 24, R. 1.404

The underdetermination sceptic infers from the sameness of evidence in the good case and the bad case that our evidence does not favour our beliefs over rival sceptical hypotheses. It has recently been suggested that the underdetermination argument is a bad argument because that inference rests on infallibilism, the view that justification requires evidence that guarantees the truth of the justified belief. Call this 'the infallibility objection'. A natural way for the sceptic to respond to the infallibility objection is to pursue a sidestepping strategy. A sidestepping strategy attempts to evade the infallibility objection by replacing the contentious inference with arguments that depend neither on the sameness of evidence lemma nor on infallibilism. In this paper, I examine two such proposals due to Briesen that employ an explanation principle and an entailment principle. I argue that both proposals fail for the same reason: they do not provide arguments that establish a lack of evidential favouring independently of the sameness of evidence lemma.

7 Schaab

Binding Oneself to Oneself

Janis David Schaab (University of Groningen), janis.d.schaab@gmail.com

Tuesday, 13.30-14.15 | DOR 24, R. 1.204

This article defends the possibility of putting oneself under an obligation to oneself, and its importance for the possibility of obligations to oneself. The argument proceeds in three steps. First, I defend the importance of the *bindingness* of obligations to oneself. Second, I defend the importance of the *contemporaneity* of the binding and the bound self. Third, I defend the possibility that duties which are self-imposed in this way are also *owed to oneself*.

1 Schepers

Biologische Vielfalt als Gegenstand der Naturethik

Gesine Schepers (Universität Bielefeld), gscopers@uni-bielefeld.de

Wednesday, 13.30-14.15 | DOR 24, R. 1.405

Naturethiker befassen sich mit der Frage, wie wir mit Natur umgehen sollen. Vor dem Hintergrund der Naturzerstörungen in den letzten Jahrzehnten geht es dabei vor allem um die Frage, ob wir Natur schützen sollen. In jüngster Zeit haben Naturethiker einen neuen Gegenstand mit in den Blick genommen. Nicht mehr fragen sie nur, wie wir mit Natur umgehen sollen, sondern auch fragen sie, wie wir mit biologischer Vielfalt umgehen sollen, denn auch diese ist zunehmend bedroht. Vor diesem Hintergrund prüfe ich in meinem Vortrag, ob man naturethische Argumente für die Diskussion um biologische Vielfalt fruchtbar machen kann. Ich tue dies exemplarisch an fünf Argumenten: dem Existenzargument, dem

Gesundheitsargument, dem ästhetischen, dem pathozentrischen und dem Eigenwertargument für Naturschutz. Dabei zeigt sich, dass naturethische Argumente nur bedingt dazu geeignet sind, Biodiversitätsschutz zu begründen. Geht es darum, zu entscheiden, wie wir mit biologischer Vielfalt umgehen sollen, ist also eine weitere ethische Auseinandersetzung nötig.

14 Schindler

Micro-Model Explanations and Counterfactual Constraint

Samuel Schindler (Aarhus University), samuel.schindler@css.au.de
Tuesday, 14.15-15.00 | DOR 24, R. 1.402

Relationships of counterfactual dependence have played a major role in recent debates of explanation and understanding in the philosophy of science. Usually, counterfactual dependencies have been viewed as the explanantia of explanation, i.e., the things providing explanation and understanding. Sometimes, however, counterfactual dependencies are actually the targets of explanations in science. These kinds of explanations are the focus of this paper. I argue that “micro-level model explanations” explain the particular form of a counterfactual dependency by representing its underlying, contingent regularity as a necessity. By doing so, micro-level models rule out possible forms which the regularity (and the associated counterfactual) could have taken. The kind of understanding brought about by micro-level model explanations is thus conditional how-necessarily understanding. I introduce and illustrate micro-level model explanations in detail, contrast them to other accounts of explanation, and consider potential problems.

2 Schmalzried

Kitschy Kitsch and Kitschy Art

Lisa Katharin Schmalzried (WCGE, MLU Halle-Wittenberg), lisa.schmalzried@wcge.org
Tuesday, 13.30-14.15 | DOR 24, R. 1.504

The popular question among art critics and feuilletonists “Is this art or kitsch?” implies a dichotomy between kitsch and art. At the same time, we judge some works of art to be kitsch. So, what is the relationship between art and kitsch? This paper argues that the key to answering this question lies in distinguishing between kitsch as an aesthetic category and an aesthetic property. Kitsch as an aesthetic category comprises artefacts, performances, or practices whose dominant function is to enable self-enjoyment by effortlessly evoking emotional reactions of the “soft” emotional spectrum with a “sweet” phenomenological quality in a large group of people. It does so by relying on well-established artistic and cultural themes, styles, and forms of expression. As art’s dominant functions are different from and do not sit well with kitsch’s dominant function, kitsch and art are two different and mutually exclusive aesthetic categories. However, art can possess the aesthetic property of being kitschy. It is kitschy if it has the disposition to effortlessly evoke the just described emotional reaction by supervening on kitsch-typical features. This aesthetic property is relevant for art evaluation. Regarding most art categories, being kitschy points to a deficit and is even a contra-standard aesthetic property.

5 Schmidt

Kant und das Trolley-Problem

Elke Elisabeth Schmidt (Universität Siegen), schmidt@philosophie.uni-siegen.de
Wednesday, 13.30-14.15 | DOR 24, R. 1.604

Kants Antwort auf das Trolley-Problem wird kontrovers diskutiert. Nach der Präzisierung des Trolley-Problems (Teil 1) wird eine Lösung des Trolley-Problems dargelegt, die Kant favorisiert hätte (Teil 2): Gemäß der *weit-/eng*-Interpretation steht der Fahrer des Trolleys vor der Wahl, entweder eine weite Pflicht (fünf Personen zu helfen) oder eine enge Pflicht (eine Person nicht zu töten) zu erfüllen. Da weite Pflichten im Gegensatz zu engen Pflichten Spielraum haben, ist es aus kantischer Perspektive moralisch geboten, den Trolley nicht umzulenken. Im Anschluss (Teil 3) werden drei Einwände diskutiert. (i) Gemäß dem ersten Einwand sei es keine *weite* Pflicht, die fünf Personen zu retten, weil es keinen Spielraum gebe: Wollte der Fahrer die fünf retten, könne er allein *eine* Handlung ausführen. (ii) Es könne keine *weite*, sondern nur eine enge Pflicht sein, die fünf Personen zu retten, da der Fahrer die fünf Personen *töte*, wenn er den Trolley nicht umlenke. (iii) Drittens sei es keine *enge* Pflicht, die Umlenkung des Trolleys zu unterlassen, weil das Umlenken gar keine Tötungshandlung impliziere – der Tod der einen Person sei vielmehr gemäß dem Prinzip der doppelten Wirkung nur eine unerwünschte Nebenfolge. Alle Einwände werden entkräftet. Der Vortrag schließt mit einem Ausblick (Teil 4).

8 Schmidt

Trolleologie und autonomes Fahren – sind Gedankenexperimente sinnvoll?

Elke Elisabeth Schmidt (Universität Siegen), schmidt@philosophie.uni-siegen.de
Wednesday 10.30-11.15 | DOR 24, R. 1.405

Sind philosophische Gedankenexperimente sinnvoll? Um diese Frage zu beantworten, soll exemplarisch die Diskussion um Trolley-Fälle und autonomes Fahren betrachtet werden. Sowohl in Bezug auf klassische Trolley-Fälle wie auch bei der Programmierung autonomer Fahrzeuge ist strittig, ob ein Fahrzeug, das bei Nicht-Eingreifen eine bestimmte Anzahl von Personen töten würde, so umgelenkt werden darf, dass nur eine Person vom Fahrzeug erfasst wird. Während Befürworter*innen meinen, Trolley-Fälle seien ein Paradebeispiel philosophischer Gedankenexperimente, das bestens geeignet sei, um auf Fragestellungen des autonomen Fahrens übertragen zu werden, bestreiten Skeptiker*innen genau dies. In vier Schritten soll gezeigt werden, warum diese Skepsis unbegründet ist. Nach einer Einführung in beide Problembereiche (Trolley und autonomes Fahren, Teil 1) werden die Einwände derer systematisiert und vorgestellt, die eine Parallelisierung beider Bereiche für fehlgeleitet halten (Teil 2). Nach der Entkräftung der einzelnen Einwände (Teil 3) werden die gewonnen Erkenntnisse auf die allgemeine Debatte um Gedankenexperimente übertragen.

8 Schmidt

The Conceptual Core of the Method of Reflective Equilibrium

Michael W. Schmidt (Karlsruher Institut für Technologie), michael.schmidt@kit.edu
 Tuesday, 15.00-15.45 | DOR 24, R. 1.405

Rawls coined the term “reflective equilibrium” but he did neither claim to have invented the respective method of (internal) justification nor to be its main proponent, since he regarded it as a practice that was common in the history of philosophy. Indeed, after *A Theory of Justice* the method of reflective equilibrium (MRE) became the main explicitly endorsed justificatory procedure in moral philosophy and has a good standing in other areas of philosophy as well. Additionally, alternative and more detailed accounts of MRE did emerge. To mention only a few explicit proponents of MRE with elaborated accounts: Norman Daniels (1996). Folke Tersman (1993), Michael DePaul (1993), Catherine Z. Elgin (1996; 2017) and Georg Brun (2014; 2017). As these accounts do differ significantly, at least in some respects, it is an open question if there is a conceptual core of MRE or if we rather should acknowledge only a dim family resemblance. I argue that there is a conceptual core of MRE: There are four rules epistemic agents have to follow if they are to use any conception of MRE; these rules are necessary and jointly sufficient conditions of MRE.

7 Schmidt

Blameworthiness for Non-Culpable Attitudes

Sebastian Schmidt (Univ. Zürich, Univ. Johannesburg),
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 Wednesday, 15.00-15.45 | DOR 24, R. 1.204

Many of our attitudes are non-culpable: there was nothing we should have done to avoid holding them. I argue that we can still be blameworthy for non-culpable attitudes: they can impair our relationships in ways that make our full practice of apology and forgiveness intelligible. My argument poses a new challenge to indirect voluntarists, who attempt to reduce all responsibility for attitudes to responsibility for prior actions and omissions. Rationalists, who instead explain attitudinal responsibility by appeal to reasons-responsiveness, can make sense of blameworthiness for non-culpable attitudes. In response, voluntarists could propose a revision of our actual practices. This would lead us into a quite different debate.

10 Schmidt

Supererogation and the Structure of Reasons

Thomas Schmidt (Humboldt-Universität Berlin), t.schmidt@philosophie.hu-berlin.de
Thursday, 10.30-11.15 | DOR 24, R. 1.601

I bring resources from the theory of reasons to bear on solving paradoxes of supererogation. The main idea is to combine the view that moral status is determined by reasons on the one hand with specific principles of reason transmission that are justifiable on independent grounds on the other. Doing so results, as I argue, in an account of how reasons determine moral status that makes sense of puzzling cases involving supererogation and that is to be preferred over rival views.

4 Schoch

Transforming Belief into Knowledge: A Decomposition Theorem

Daniel Schoch (American University of Ras Al Khaimah), daniel.schoch@aurak.ac.ae
Thursday, 11.15-12.00 | DOR 24, R. 1.308

We analyse knowledge in the form of an operator K mapping a set of possible worlds representing full belief B and a possible world w to a superset $K_w(B) \supset B$ with $w \in K_w(B)$, satisfying the first two conditions of the classical analysis of knowledge that knowledge requires true belief. Justification is extracted from knowledge by $J(B) = \cap_w K_w(B)$, which yields the third condition that knowledge implies justification, $J(B) \subset K_w(B)$. We give two decomposition theorems which characterizes knowledge functions which allow a representation by the composition in the form $K_w(B) = F_w(J(B))$, where F_w is a monotonous closure operator. Knowledge is non-monotonous, as adding a certain belief can undermine justification of a certain proposition. Under our decomposition theorems, all non-monotonicity is captured by the world-independent and therefore *a priori* epistemically accessible justification operator J .

In the second part of the talk, we briefly introduce our newest results on constructing knowledge operators out of inference rules. Justification is established by a Defeasible Justification Logic (DJL), which allows the representation of Gettier cases by defeasible reasoning. As a surprising result, the celebrated KK or 4 principle of epistemic logic does not hold in many Gettier examples. Instead, we establish that these knowledge operators satisfy a fixed point property, $K_w(K_w(B)) = K_w(B)$.

1 Schübel

Die individuelle Verantwortung, Emissionen zu entfernen

Hanna Mirjam Schübel (Universität Freiburg), hanna.schuebel@unifr.ch
Wednesday 10.30-11.15 | DOR 24, R. 1.401

Der Ausbau von Technologien zur Entfernung von Kohlenstoffdioxid aus der Atmosphäre ist mittlerweile Teil staatlicher Strategien zur Erreichung der Klimaneutralität. In diesem Zuge ist es wahrscheinlich, dass der Zugang von Individuen zu Emissions-Entfernungs-Zer-

tifikaten vereinfacht werden wird und Individuen somit die Möglichkeit haben werden, umfassend ihre Emissionen aus der Atmosphäre zu entfernen. Ich argumentiere hier, dass die Möglichkeit Emissionen aus der Atmosphäre zu entfernen die moralische Verantwortung mit sich bringt, den individuellen Kohlenstoffdioxid-Fußabdruck auf null zu minimieren. Denn um keinen Schaden durch Emissionen anzurichten, kann das Individuum nicht nur deren Erzeugung vermeiden, sondern auch dafür sorgen, dass sie aus der Atmosphäre entfernt werden. Ich zeige an drei Einwänden aus der Debatte der individuellen Verantwortung zur Emissionsreduktion, dass die Möglichkeit der Emissionsentfernung Einwände *gegen* eine moralische Verpflichtung Einzelner ihren Kohlenstoffdioxid-Fußabdruck zu minimieren hinfällig macht.

11 Schulte

Borderlands of the Mind: A Gradualist Theory of Representation

Peter Schulte (Universität Zürich), jenspeter.schulte@uzh.ch

Wednesday 09.45-10.30 | DOR 24, R. 1.502

Where should we draw the line between organisms that have a mind and those that do not? That is one of the most intriguing questions in contemporary philosophy of mind, but one that is best discussed in a piecemeal fashion. In this talk, I will thus focus exclusively on one crucial ‘mark of the mental’: the *intentional* or *representational* aspect of mental states. Hence, the question I will be concerned with is this: where should we draw the line between organisms (or, more generally, systems) that represent their environment, and those that do not? First, I will explain how this question should be understood, and sketch a general strategy for answering it. Then I will raise a fundamental difficulty for mainstream answers to this question, with a special focus on the ‘constancy mechanism theory’ pioneered by Tyler Burge. Finally, I will propose an alternative, gradualist account of representation that avoids this difficulty, and defend it against a pressing objection.

3 Schulz

Diversität im schulischen Philosophiekanon und die Förderung fachlicher und pädagogischer Ziele

Katharina Schulz (Georg-August-Universität Göttingen), Katharina.Schulz.Koeln@gmail.com

Thursday, 09.45-10.30 | DOR 24, R. 1.606

Auch wenn für den Philosophie- und Ethikunterricht in Deutschland kein offiziell festgelegter Kanon existiert, lässt sich in der Praxis beobachten, dass auf der Ebene der Lehrpläne, Abiturvorgaben und Schulbücher sehr wohl ein Kanon geprägt wird. Betrachtet man diejenigen Denker:innen, deren Positionen und Texte im Philosophieunterricht als kanonisch gelten, wird deutlich – das lässt sich durch empirische Auswertungen zeigen –, dass die im Unterricht thematisierten Autor:innen einem weitestgehend männlich und westlich dominierten (impliziten) Klassiker-Kanon entsprechen. In meinem Vortrag argumentiere ich für eine Diversifizierung des schulischen Philosophiekanons, indem ich aus pädagogisch-didaktischer Sicht und gestützt durch drei Argumente zeige, dass ein diverserer Kanon zur Erreichung zentraler Ziele des Philosophie- und Ethikunterrichts beiträgt.

Sektionen / Sections

Konkret lege ich dar, dass (1) eine größere kanonische Diversität mehr Identifikationspotenzial bietet und einem Fremdheitsgefühl von unterrepräsentierten Gruppen entgegenwirken kann. Konkretisierend und exemplarisch zeige ich Vorzüge einer Thematisierung von Philosophie aus der islamischen Welt auf. Ich argumentiere, dass (2) in Teilen eine Diskrepanz zwischen den, in bildungspolitischen Forderungen und Lehrplänen formulierten, Zielen des Philosophieunterrichts und den vorgesehenen Unterrichtsinhalten besteht, die mit problematischen Konsequenzen verbunden sein kann. Das letzte Argument bezieht sich darauf, dass (3) ein diverserer Kanon der systematischen Reproduktion von Unwissenheit in Bezug auf soziale Privilegien entgegenwirkt.

7 Schumski

Inferentialism about Thick Terms

Irina Schumski (Univ. Tübingen, University of Leeds),
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Tuesday, 15.00-15.45 | DOR 24, R. 1.204

In recent years, metaethicists like Matthew Chrisman and Christine Tiefensee have suggested adopting an inferentialist approach to the metasemantics of thin deontic and evaluative terms like “ought” and “morally good”. Given that the difference between (some) such thin terms and thick terms like “rude” or “lewd” seems to be a difference in degree, their proposals raise the question of whether and how this approach should and could be extended to thick terms. This is a very rich topic. My modest aim in this paper is to show that, if we *did* extend the scope of metasemantic inferentialism in this way and if we recognized that, so extended, it is no longer compatible with a standard truth-conditional approach to the semantics of the relevant terms, then inferentialism could come to the rescue of the so-called Semantic View of thick terms, on which thick terms are inherently evaluative, i.e. evaluative in meaning. I proceed by sketching three problems for the Semantic View, considering Matti Eklund’s solution for two of these problems, and showing how this solution points in the direction of inferentialism.

14 Schurz

Fakten und Werte in der Pandemie

Gerhard Schurz (HHU Düsseldorf), schurz@hhu.de
Thursday, 09.45-10.30 | DOR 24, R. 1.404

Epidemiologen können zwar uns sagen, welche Maßnahmen die Infektionsraten wahrscheinlich so-und-so niedrig halten. Aber ob die Kosten dieser Maßnahmen die damit erreichten Wirkungen *wert* sind, durch sie legitimiert werden, ist keine wissenschaftliche Faktenfrage, sondern eine Wertentscheidung. Aus dieser Einsicht folgt kein naives “Wertfreiheitspostulat”, demzufolge sich WissenschaftlerInnen nicht zu Wertfragen äußern sollten. Liegt doch die praktisch wichtigste Aufgabe der Wissenschaften darin, mittels empirisch begründeter Zweck-Mittel-Beziehungen aus vorgegebenen Fundamentalwerten abgeleitete Werte in Form von Mittelempfehlungen zu gewinnen. Woran das Prinzip der Wertneutralität jedoch festhält, ist, dass oberste Werte oder Normen nicht erfahrungswissenschaftlich begründet werden können, sondern durch menschlicher Interessen oder Intuitionen konstituiert werden. In Stellungnahmen wissenschaftlicher Politikberatung

sollten Faktenwissen und Wertaussagen daher so weit als möglich getrennt werden und Handlungsempfehlungen explizit auf die dabei hypothetisch unterstellten Wertannahmen bezogen werden. Soweit angemessen sollte dabei auch eine Pluralität von möglichen Wertpräferenzen im Sinne unterschiedlicher möglicher Szenarios berücksichtigt werden, unter denen Anwender wählen können. Auf diese Weise kann nicht nur die Unparteilichkeit von Wissenschaft in praktischen Belangen gewahrt werden, sondern auch die Vertrauenswürdigkeit und Nutzerfreundlichkeit von Expertenurteilen nachhaltig sichergestellt werden. Experten und Expertinnen können so ihrer Rolle als Hilfeleister der Bevölkerung, statt als „Normeneinpeitscher“, viel besser gerecht werden.

4 Schuster

Suspension in Machine Learning Systems?

Daniela Schuster (Universität Konstanz), daniela.schuster@uni-konstanz.de
Thursday, 11.15-12.00 | DOR 24, R. 1.307

A key question concerning the appropriate attribution of the notion of artificial intelligence is to what extent artificial systems can act autonomously and make decisions by themselves. In this talk, I want to focus on a largely neglected aspect of decision-making competence, which is the capability of actively *refraining* from deciding. I will introduce different Machine Learning (ML) models that belong to a research area in computer science that is called “Abstaining Machine Learning” and I will categorize them into two different classes. Next, I will relate this debate to the current epistemological debate about suspension of judgment. Most scholars in this field argue that suspending is a more elaborated form of doxastic neutrality that is not to be identified with other forms such as mere non-belief. In exploring whether the different classes of abstaining ML correspond to forms of neutrality in Epistemology, I will argue that only one class of models potentially qualifies for meeting the higher standards for suspension of judgment. I argue that these findings show that the performance of ML systems with respect to their independence in refraining from deciding can serve as a useful indicator for evaluating their level of autonomy.

4 Schwenkenbecher

Group-Based Ignorance and Collective Epistemic Obligations

Anne Schwenkenbecher (Murdoch University), a.schwenkenbecher@murdoch.edu.au
Wednesday 09.45-10.30 | DOR 24, R. 1.307

Humans are prone to producing morally suboptimal and even disastrous outcomes out of ignorance. Ignorance is generally thought to excuse agents from wrongdoing, but little attention has been paid to group-based ignorance as the reason for some of our collective failings. I distinguish between different types of first-order and higher order group-based ignorance and examine how these can variously lead to problematic inaction. I will make two suggestions regarding our epistemic obligations vis-a-vis collective (in)action problems: (1) that our epistemic obligations concern not just our own knowledge and beliefs but those of others, too and (2) that our epistemic obligations can be held collectively where the epistemic tasks cannot be performed by individuals acting in isolation, for example, when we are required to produce joint epistemic goods.

5 Seite

Carnap Against Inductive Metaphysics

Ansgar Seide (WWU Münster), ansgar.seide@uni-muenster.de

Thursday, 11.15-12.00 | DOR 24, R. 1.604

In his classical article “Überwindung der Metaphysik durch logische Analyse der Sprache” (1932), Rudolf Carnap argues that all metaphysics is meaningless. His argument is based on a verifiability principle of meaning, according to which the meaning of a statement lies in the method of its empirical verification. Since metaphysicians claim to arrive at knowledge that transcends the empirically ascertainable, metaphysics, according to Carnap, always consists of meaningless statements. In an interesting side note, Carnap points out that his criticism is not only directed against a priori metaphysics, but also against a kind of metaphysics that is based on experience and transcends experience by means of “special inferences”. As I will argue in my talk, the metaphysicians alluded to here can be identified as those belonging to the traditional line of inductive metaphysics, a tradition that emerged in the mid- and late 19th century and the early 20th century in Germany. The “special inferences” they use are creative abductions, which are a subform of inferences to the best explanation. Finally, I will argue that it is possible to defend the program of inductive metaphysics against Carnap’s critique if one uses a softer verifiability principle as introduced by Carnap himself in his earlier “Scheinprobleme in der Philosophie” (1928).

15 Selimi

Staatsanerkennung und moralische Doppelstandards

Adis Selimi (HHU Düsseldorf), adis.selimi@hhu.de

Wednesday, 14.15–15.00 | DOR 24, R. 1.505

Trotz des wachsenden Einflusses supranationaler Institutionen gelten Staaten nach wie vor als die zentralen Akteure des Völkerrechts. Ob eine Entität als Staat gesehen wird, hängt dabei wesentlich von der Anerkennung durch die internationale Gemeinschaft ab. So wird De-Facto-Regimen wie Nordzypern oder Transnistrien die Anerkennung verweigert, obwohl sie die klassischen Staatsmerkmale, wie die effektive Kontrolle über ihr Territorium, erfüllen. Ein wesentlicher Grund für die Nicht-Anerkennung solcher Regime ist eine Tendenz zur Moralisierung der völkerrechtlichen Anerkennungspraxis, also die Formulierung zusätzlicher moralischer Bedingungen für die Anerkennung als Staat. Allen Buchanan hat diese Entwicklung im Rahmen seiner Philosophie des Völkerrechts explizit begrüßt und vorgeschlagen, nur solche Entitäten als Staaten anzuerkennen, die minimalen Gerechtigkeitsstandards genügen. Ein Fokus liegt in seiner Konzeption dabei auf dem effektiven Schutz basaler Menschenrechte. Gegen diesen Vorschlag wird insbesondere angeführt, dass die Umsetzung einer solchen Position in der Praxis zu einem Verlust der Staatlichkeit eines Großteils der internationalen Gemeinschaft führen würde. Buchanan hat in Reaktion darauf eine Begrenzung seiner Anerkennungstheorie auf Neustaaten vorgeschlagen. Diese Begrenzung bringt aber das Problem moralischer Doppelstandards mit sich. Im Vortrag wird dafür argumentiert, dass solche Doppelstandards für die Staatenanerkennung unzulässig sind und das Ziel eines effektiven Menschenrechtsschutzes durch die Abschwächung moralisch wünschenswerter Anreizstrukturen unterwandern.

16 Sevinç

Reframing Global Solidarity: A Critical Survey and a Proposal

Tuğba Sevinç (Kadir Has University), sevinc.tugba@gmail.com

Wednesday 09.00-09.45 | DOR 24, R. 1.103

In the face of global problems such as climate catastrophe, refugee crisis, environmental destruction, pandemics, and many others; today, global solidarity is most called for than ever. Nonetheless, the nature, basis, sources, potentials, and conditions of such global solidarity have not been fully theorized. To this end, the paper critically surveys our conceptual alternatives for global solidarity (human solidarity, international solidarity, global political solidarity, and global democratic solidarity) and offers an extension of what I call “cooperative solidarity” to a global context. Drawing on Durkheim and Marx (and also on Tischner, Rawls, and Dewey), the paper argues that the activity of production, that is “doing things with and for each other,” and the existence of ongoing productive cooperation (at local, national, or global levels) can be a source of a sense of togetherness with others. Hence it can potentially give rise to solidarity (given that certain conditions are satisfied). The account I will offer, however, suffers from (at least) three difficulties: lack of justice, lack of recognition, and lack of concrete associational ties. Yet, these difficulties tell us a lot about the nature of solidarity, shedding light on the ways we should practically pursue solidarity.

15 Sharp

What’s Wrong with Denaturalization?

Daniel Sharp (LMU), sharpdaniele@gmail.com

Wednesday, 13.30-14.15 | DOR 24, R. 1.505

In recent years, some democratic states have dramatically expanded their powers to denaturalize their citizens. The most high-profile uses of this power occur as punitive measures in response to criminal acts of persons who possess multiple citizenships. This paper offers a novel explanation of what’s wrong with granting states broad denaturalization powers, which draws on a novel theory of the value of citizenship. This account has two parts. First, I argue that citizenship’s value consists in part in the robustness with which one possesses one’s citizenship rights, and allowing the state to exercise its denaturalization powers undermines the security of these rights. I distinguish two versions of this thesis—a republican version and an autonomy-based version—and defend the latter. Second, I suggest that citizenship’s value is partly a function of its *expressive meaning*: bestowing citizenship on a person expresses that person’s basic social equality. However, citizenship’s expressive meaning is a function of the rules governing its revocation. Therefore, allowing denaturalization alters citizenship’s expressive meaning in ways that undermine its egalitarian potential. I conclude by explaining how this argument helps rebut standard defenses of denaturalization because it shows that denaturalization can also wrong citizens who are *not* denaturalized.

6 Shramko

The Diamond of Mingle Logics: A Four-Fold Infinite Way to Be Safe from Paradox

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Thursday, 10.30-11.15 | DOR 24, R. 1.406

System R-Mingle (RM) was invented by J. Michael Dunn in the middle of 1960s. This system got its name due to the characteristic logical principle called “Mingle”. Although this principle allows for certain irrelevant inferences, it, nevertheless, can secure us against (the worst effects of) the paradoxes of relevance. Moreover, a separation of the first-degree entailment fragment of a mingle logic makes it possible to focus on the characteristic principle of that fragment, known as “Safety”. Based on a purely structural formulation of the first-degree entailment systems it is possible to differentiate between four types of Safety and construct the corresponding proof systems, which constitute a diamond shaped lattice with infinitely many systems between its vertices. The corner systems of the diamond can be supplied with a uniform and rather natural semantics, which reaffirms the rightful place of the mingle logics in the family of the first-degree entailment systems.

4 Silva

Believing Suspension

Paul Silva (Universität Köln), psilvajr@gmail.com

Thursday, 10.30-11.15 | DOR 24, R. 1.307

Can one believe that p while suspending their belief that p ? The conventional view is that this is impossible: belief and the suspension of belief are mutually exclusive states. But this conventional view is rarely, if ever, justified through careful exploration of the nature of belief. Leading theories of belief tell us that belief is a constitutively dispositional state, and leading theories of dispositions tell us that dispositions can be masked. With these two assumptions we can explain how this combination of views generates cases where an agent believes that p while also suspending her belief that p owing to a disposition to mask her own dispositions that constitute her belief that p . We call this *believing suspension* and argue that believing suspension is a genuine doxastic state that obtains just when an agent masks her belief from a disposition to do so. We find the possibility of believing suspension to be both realistic and to have theoretically powerful implications. In the philosophy of mind, it implies that our set of mutually exclusive coarse-grained doxastic attitudes are not belief, disbelief, and suspension. In epistemology, we will argue that the existence of believing suspension offers us a striking new solution to the problem of misleading higher-order evidence, an answer to the problem of rational philosophical sincerity, and a new view in the epistemology of disagreement. As we will explain, none of these epistemological benefits require giving up on uniqueness theses that are restricted to our mutually exclusive coarse-grained attitudes.

9 Skiba

Higher-Order Metaphysics of Time

Lukas Skiba (Universität Hamburg), lukas.skiba@uni-hamburg.de
Thursday, 09.00-09.45 | DOR 24, R. 1.608

Higher-order metaphysicians investigate metaphysical questions in a formal framework that allows for sui generis higher-order quantification (irreducible quantification into syntactic positions other than that of singular terms). Much of their attention has focussed on a higher-order conception of properties, according to which properties are what we quantify over when we quantify into the position of predicates. This conception of properties leads naturally to a conception of facts, according to which facts are what we quantify over when we quantify into the position of sentences. However, the metaphysical impact of this higher-order conception of facts has so far remained relatively underexplored. In this paper, I examine its repercussions on some topics in the metaphysics of time, arguing that it has important consequences for the debate about tense realism. The consequences concern, on the one hand, our understanding of some fundamental concepts employed by tense realists (such as the notion of facts *constituting reality*) and, on the other hand, the question of which versions of tense realism are even so much as logically consistent.

16 Sodoma

Emotional Gaslighting and Affective Empathy

Katharina Anna Sodoma (Universität Duisburg-Essen), katharina.sodoma@uni-due.de
Wednesday, 13.30-14.15 | DOR 24, R. 1.103

Gaslighting is a form of manipulation that aims at undermining a target's confidence in their own reactions, perceptions, memories, and beliefs by communicating to them that their views are not only wrong but utterly groundless. I distinguish a specific kind of gaslighting called "emotional gaslighting" that aims to undermine a target's confidence in their own emotional reactions and the judgments they make based on these reactions. Emotional gaslighting is of particular interest because emotions can help us understand the evaluative features of our situation. I argue that affective empathy can play an important role as an antidote to emotional gaslighting. To empathize affectively is to imaginatively engage with another person's situation and thereby coming to experience an emotional reaction to the imagined scenario that roughly corresponds to the target's reaction and is taken to represent the target's initial reaction. In particular, affective empathy that leads to endorsement of the target's emotional reaction and the corresponding assessment of their situation can reassure the target regarding their ability to make judgments based on their emotional reactions. Because of the opposing effects of emotional gaslighting and affective empathy, affective empathy is thus an important antidote to emotional gaslighting.

7 Sofroni

Moral Knowledge from Art

Razvan Mihai Sofroni (HU Berlin, Berlin School of Mind & Brain, FAU), sofronir@hu-berlin.de
Wednesday, 14.15-15.00 | DOR 24, R. 1.201

Analytic moral philosophy has recently seen a resurgence of pleas to pay more attention to the potential that art, especially literature, has in informing moral thinking, even to the point of providing moral knowledge. According to some (Diamond 1991, Nussbaum 1990), this rests on art's capacity to affect us emotionally. However, whether emotions can generate genuine knowledge and how they contribute to achieving it are questions that have not been addressed in a way that does full justice to the phenomenon. As I will argue, an important sense in which we can achieve moral knowledge by being emotionally moved by art is best captured by an Aristotelian model which construes emotions as enablers (or disablers) of moral knowledge. I contrast this model to its most significant competitors: (1) theories of learning from art which deny that its end is attaining moral knowledge, and (2) accounts which aim to vindicate knowledge acquisition but do so either by appealing to the cognitive aspects of emotions as sources of evidence or by having the presence of emotions function as evidence. As it turns out, these models either fail to explain moral learning (2) or fail to fully capture the phenomenon in question (1).

13 Sofroni

Religious Ritual Knowledge: From Techne to Phronesis

Razvan Mihai Sofroni (HU Berlin, Berlin School of Mind & Brain, FAU), sofronir@hu-berlin.de
Tuesday, 14.15-15.00 | DOR 24, R. 1.505

In his 2014 paper „Ritual knowledge“, Terence Cuneo urges that philosophers of religion with an interest in the nature and scope of religious knowledge would do well to expand their focus from looking at propositional knowledge and its possibility, to thinking about the kind of knowledge embodied in religious practices such as the (Christian) liturgy. He argues persuasively that such practices as blessing, petitioning and thanking God are suffused with knowledge. On his account, the knowledge in question is a species of knowing-how, namely knowing how to engage with God. In this talk, I argue that Cuneo is right in thinking that liturgical practice is a form of knowledge but wrong in thinking that it is knowledge-how. This is because the knowledge embodied in liturgical practice is not subject to two essential features of knowledge-how already pointed out by Aristotle:

- (1) In judging the excellence of an exercise of knowledge-how, one ranks intentional error more highly than accidental error.
- (2) The goodness of an exercise of knowledge-how is independent of why it is being exercised.

After discussing some possible replies, I urge consideration of the view that ritual knowledge might be a species of Aristotelian *phronesis* as distinct from knowledge-how.

4 Spatan

On the Feeling of Uncertainty: Why a Metacognitive Account Is Better than a Probability Account

Sergiu Dorian Spatan (Technische Universität Dresden), sergiu.spatan@tu-dresden.de
Tuesday, 15.45-16.30 | DOR 24, R. 1.307

In the paper, I defend a metacognitive account of the feeling of uncertainty and show why it fares better than the probability-based, non-metacognitive account proposed by Peter Carruthers (see his 2017, “Are epistemic emotions metacognitive?”, *Philosophical Psychology*, 30 (1-2): 58-78). While Carruthers claims that the appraisal responsible for eliciting the feeling of uncertainty is a simple assessment of low probability, I contend that the feeling of uncertainty is elicited by metacognitive appraisals pertaining to the epistemic fittingness of holding a first order belief. In my books, *S* feels uncertain that *p* only if *S* appraises that believing that *p* is *not* maximally epistemically fitting (if she appraises that believing that *p* is maximally epistemically fitting, then she feels certain that *p*). In the argument proposed for this talk, I present a series of counterexamples to Carruthers’ account and show why my metacognitive account fares better at explaining them. What is even more problematic for the probability account is that it does not have the resources to accommodate these examples without rejecting the epistemicity of the feeling of uncertainty, which I believe is very problematic. The metacognitive account, on the other hand, does not have the same problems.

6 Speitel

Logical Constants between Inference and Reference

Sebastian G.W. Speitel (Universität Bonn), sgwspeitel@uni-bonn.de
Wednesday, 14.15-15.00 | DOR 24, R. 1.406

The model-theoretic definition of logical consequence — according to which a sentence ψ follows from the class of sentences Γ if and only if every model of the sentences in Γ is also a model of the sentence ψ , — relies on a prior division of the expressions of the language of Γ and ψ into logical and non-logical. Finding a philosophically motivated and mathematically precise criterion to delineate the logical expressions of a language constitutes the *demarcation problem of the logical constants*.

In this talk, we propose a novel criterion of logicity designed to solve the demarcation problem. It combines insights from the model-theoretic as well as the inferentialist approaches to the issue: a notion qualifies as logical if its inferential behaviour determines a unique denotation among its consistent, formal (i.e., isomorphism-invariant) interpretations. We will motivate the criterion and investigate its scope and limits by considering expressions from the category of generalized quantifiers. We conclude the talk by discussing some consequences of the proposed criterion for the debate concerning determinate reference to the natural number structure in the philosophy of mathematics. The talk presents joint work with Denis Bonnay.

14 Stamenković

Humboldt and Vernadsky: A Philosophical Perspective on Holistic Ideas in Natural Science

Bogdana Stamenković (University of Belgrade), bogdanastamenkovic@yahoo.com
Thursday, 11.15-12.00 | DOR 24, R. 1.403

The aim of this paper is to analyze similarities and differences between two prominent figures — Alexander von Humboldt and Vladimir I. Vernadsky. Some authors questioned whether there are any similarities between Humboldt's and Vernadsky's theories. While the answers to this question remain mostly affirmative, it seems that academic literature lacks a philosophical and historical analysis of these theories. That being the case, I will try to contribute to this discussion by providing the necessary analysis of essential ideas presented by both Humboldt and Vernadsky. First, I show that Humboldt and Vernadsky adopt a holistic approach to the investigation of nature; as I will explain, both authors emphasize that nature is a holistic system whose parts are interconnected in such a way as to contribute to its maintenance. Next, I will explain that Humboldt and Vernadsky recognize the importance of the agency of organisms in nature. While Humboldt's awareness of this agency arises from observation of the Darwinian struggle for survival, Vernadsky perceives it through the process of biogeochemical cycles. Finally, I show that both Humboldt and Vernadsky believe that nature is characterized by the process of coevolution. I finish by noting some important differences between Humboldt's and Vernadsky's theories.

11 Stankozi

Cognition on Different Levels of Organisation

Caroline Stankozi (Ruhr-Universität Bochum) caroline.snatkozi@rub.de
Thursday, 10.30-11.15 | DOR 24, R. 1.501

The notion of cognition is ambiguous not only across, but even within disciplines. How do the many views cohere? In the following, I want to facilitate a more nuanced exchange about cognitive phenomena within, across and beyond scientific disciplines. Thereto, I emphasise that cognition happens on several levels of organisation. I differentiate between cognition in (i) an organism (potentially artificial), (ii) a holobiont (comprised of a host and its microbes), and (iii) a habitually coupled system (akin to extended cognitive systems). Arguably, this distinction can establish substantiated subcategories of cognitive phenomena, marking their crucial turns – as the organisation of a system affects the respective cognitive dynamics. These levels of organisation could help analysing and interrelating the several layers of cognitive phenomena.

6 Stei**Defining the Generality of Logical Consequence**Erik Stei (Utrecht University), e.v.stei@uu.nl

Wednesday, 15.00-15.45 | DOR 24, R. 1.406

The claim that the laws of logic are completely general may sound like a platitude. Certainly, if an argument is logically valid, then true premises guarantee a true conclusion come what may? Recent developments in the philosophy of logic, however, put pressure on the alleged generality of logic. For instance, some logical pluralists claim that logic is relative to mathematical structures (Shapiro 2014) or to domains of investigation (Kouri Kissel 2021). According to the pluralist, relying only on those argument forms that are valid in *all* legitimate logics results in a consequence relation that is much too weak to be called a logic (see also Beall & Restall 2006). Carrying this worry further, logical nihilists argue that insistence on the generality of logic gives rise to counterexamples to each and every law of logic (Russell 2017, 2018). I argue that those challenges to the generality of logic can be resisted since they rely on questionable assumptions. I show that reasonable adjustments of these assumptions are perfectly compatible with the generality platitude.

6 Stern**If Transparent, then 'True' Is Not Logical.**Johannes Stern (University of Bristol), johannes.stern@bristol.ac.uk

Wednesday, 13.30-14.15 | DOR 24, R. 1.502

In this talk we shall take a fresh look at Curry's paradox and argue that it poses a genuine dilemma for proponents of disquotational theorists such as Field who argue that truth is (i) transparent and (ii) a logical notion that serves a merely logical role in language. Curry's paradox shows that Field must either grant that truth is not a logical notion or that there is no adequate conditional connective (material, indicative, subjunctive) that can be deemed to be a logical notion. Logicality of truth implies non-logicality of the conditional connective. At least implicitly, Field opts for logicality of truth. We end our talk by investigating the alternative that takes the conditional to be a logical notion.

7 Streumer

Standing Up for Supervenience

Bart Streumer (University of Groningen), b.streumer@rug.nl

Tuesday, 13.30–14.15 | DOR 24, R. 1.201

According to non-reductive realism, there are irreducibly normative properties. There is a well-known argument against this view that appeals to the following claim about supervenience:

- (S) For all possible worlds W and W^* , if the instantiation of descriptive properties in W and W^* is exactly the same, then the instantiation of normative properties in W and W^* is also exactly the same.

This claim used to be uncontroversial. Recently, however, non-reductive realists have started to resist this argument by challenging (S). In this paper I will defend (S) against their challenges.

11 Strößner

Natural Concepts and Conceptual Spaces

Corina Strößner (Ruhr-Universität Bochum), corinastoessner@posteo.de

Tuesday, 14.15–15.00 | DOR 24, R. 1.506

A central aim of the theory of conceptual spaces (Gärdenfors 2000) is to find criteria of what makes

a concept natural, that is, cognitively salient. The most prominent proposal is the convexity thesis, according to which natural concepts are representable as a convex region in a conceptual space. This criterion has been established in domains, that is, sets of closely related dimensions (e.g., the colour space). However, domain-specific concepts like colours, smells, shapes are not the primary examples of natural concepts. In particular, they are not able to capture natural correlations, as most noun concepts (e.g., apple) do. The aim of the talk is to develop criteria for natural multi-domain concepts. In particular, I will discuss three criteria:

1. There are several characteristic features by which the instances of the concept are classified (e.g. the taste of a strawberry, the shape of a strawberry)
2. Concepts tend to cover densely populated areas of a conceptual space.
3. The probability distribution within the area of a natural concept is unimodal (has only one peak).

Finally, I discuss the relation between these criteria and the convexity requirement.

12 Szyler

Can You Have It All? Semantic Holism, Similarity of Meaning and Compositionality?

Bartosz Szyler (University of Warsaw), b.szyler@student.uw.edu.pl

Thursday, 10.30-11.15 | DOR 24, R. 1.205

The main objective of the paper is to explore the relationship between the similarity-based holistic theories of meaning and compositionality. The considerations proceed in two steps.

In the first step, I examine Paul Churchland's state-space semantics, which I propose to treat as a model theory that combines holism and the explanatory use of similarity of meaning. The latter component makes Churchland's theory vulnerable to the argument developed by Hannes Leitgeb: if we accept some fairly minimal assumptions concerning the nature of similarity relation and the features of language in question, the possibility of combining compositionality and semantic similarity within a single theory seems highly implausible.

In the second step, I outline Paweł Grabarczyk's new Directival Theory of Meaning (nDTM), based on the directival theory of meaning introduced in the 1930s by Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz. The nDTM is an interesting attempt to create a non-referential, holistic semantics built upon pragmatic and syntactic considerations. Both the notion of meaning similarity and the principle of compositionality might be spelt out in the framework of the nDTM. I argue that the compositionality in nDTM is strong enough to ensure productivity and systematicity of language but sufficiently weak to escape Leitgeb's challenge.

5 Taieb

The Early Husserl on Existence

Hamid Taieb (Humboldt-Universität Berlin), hamid.taieb@hu-berlin.de

Thursday, 09.00-09.45 | DOR 24, R. 1.604

This paper aims to study a fascinating, but neglected topic in the history of Austro-German analytic philosophy, namely the theory of existence developed by Husserl in his early works. Husserl has a rich account of existence, inspired both by Bolzano and Brentano. He holds that existence is a relation between the content of a presentation and an object (à la Bolzano), but also brings a phenomenological twist in the theory (in the spirit of Brentano), by claiming that we *experience* existence. His view is that existence is the identity between the content of an "empty" representation (i.e., a representation aiming at something *in absentia*), e.g., 'my laptop', and an object given in perception, e.g., my laptop. The representations and perceptions in question do not need to be instantiated in our mental life, but when they are, we "face" the identity in question and thus are acquainted with existence. In the first, longest part of the paper, I present Husserl's view, and its Bolzanian and Brentanian sources. In the second part, I evaluate the view and point out its theoretical interest.

4 Tana

Dogmatism, Knowledge and Factivity

Guido Tana (University of Edinburgh), tanaguido@gmail.com

Wednesday 09.00-09.45 | DOR 24, R. 1.404

Knowledge breeds dogmatism. This appears to be the paradoxical consequence of knowledge entailing truth. It implies that if S genuinely knows p, then S is entitled to reject a priori any counterevidence against p as misleading. However, such a stance appears irrational because unrestrictedly dogmatic. It appears intuitively impossible to dismiss beforehand all future counterevidence to our knowledge-claims.

This presentation analyses and assesses some proposed solutions of the dogmatist paradox and presents a possible, albeit revisionary, way out. Specifically, whether it really is irrational to be dogmatic in the way described above, and whether it is possible to utter genuine knowledge-claims while allowing for knowledge defeasibility.

It is argued that both approaches fail to solve the paradox. The former delivers a picture of knowledge ill-suited for human beings. The latter fails to explain the impermissibility of endorsing a dogmatic stance. Fallibilism's attempts to detach knowledge and certainty are shown to fail on similar grounds.

The analysis understands the paradox as a dilemma: either we can explain how dogmatism is rationally avoided while endorsing our knowledge-claim or revise the factivity condition. Some possibilities concerning this latter route are suggested, arguing that it might be the least problematic option available.

1 Tank

May We Continue to Emit for Luxury Purposes?

Lukas Tank (Christian-Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel), etank@philsem.uni-kiel.de

Wednesday 09.45-10.30 | DOR 24, R. 1.401

The distinction between emissions for luxury purposes and emissions for subsistence purposes is a mainstay in the climate ethics literature. Luxury emissions are usually thought to be in need of greater justification than subsistence emissions. Based on this distinction I argue that, by now, luxury emissions are not only harder to justify than subsistence emissions, but that no sufficient justification for continued luxury emissions can be offered. We have a duty to cease emitting all luxury emissions. This duty applies not only after some future point in time, but now. The underlying rationale is the following: As of 2022, we have reached a stage where climate change has not only begun, but has begun to cause major harms. All substantial quantities of emissions must be expected to worsen climate change and lead to further major harms. Luxury purposes provide an insufficient justification for causing major harms. This novel argument stands in stark contrast to what dominates not only the climate politics, but also the climate ethics discourse: the view that we have a general budget of permissible emissions left. My argument presents a first step to outlining a more differentiated approach.

13 Tapp**Anselms Gottesbeweis**

Christian Tapp (Ruhr-Universität Bochum), christian.tapp@rub.de
 Tuesday, 15.00-15.45 | DOR 24, R. 1.505

Seit über 1000 Jahren beschäftigt und bewegt Anselms Gottesbeweis aus dem Proslogion die philosophischen Gemüter. In diesem Vortrag stelle ich eine neue logische Gesamtreakonstruktion von Anselms Argumentation vor. Sie berücksichtigt das gesamte Argument aus Proslogion 2–4 – und nicht nur den Rumpf aus P2 oder P3 – und legt die (bzw. genauer: eine Lesart der) vielen Prämissen ganz unterschiedlicher Art offen, von denen die Konklusion abhängt. Das ermöglicht eine Reihe neuer Einsichten in ein vermeintlich so gut bekanntes Argument: von den metaphysischen Prinzipien, die Anselm voraussetzt, über bestimmte modallogische Schlussprinzipien, die er anwendet, bis hinab zu gewissen einfachen und gerade wegen ihrer Einfachheit wohl oft übersehenen empirischen Prämissen. Man mag es überraschend finden, aber Anselms Gottesbeweis ist kein ontologisches Argument!

7 Titz**A Perspectivist Theory of Advice**

Inken Titz (Ruhr-Universität Bochum), inken.titz@rub.de
 Tuesday, 15.45-16.30 | DOR 24, R. 1.204

Perspectivism is the view that what we ought to do depends on our current epistemic position. More precisely, what I ought to do is a function of the reasons currently available to me. While this view has recently gained great popularity, it faces an unresolved puzzle: if you advise me that I ought to ψ , then as long as my own available reasons support ϕ -ing, your advice is strictly speaking wrong. This is the case even if the information you possess is in fact better than mine. Perspectivism has to account for this counterintuitive result in cases of better-informed advisors.

In this talk, I propose a novel theory of advice for perspectivists. I argue that there is an intuitive way to disambiguate two senses of 'ought' that we commonly use in deliberation and advice, which I introduce as 'conclusive' and 'searching.' However, only the conclusive ought is genuinely normative. I then introduce the concept of sufficiently close reasons and define the searching ought with its help. This allows explaining advice with help of both senses of ought. I then show that my theory can account for a particularly difficult challenge: unexpected advice. I close the talk by considering two objections to my view.

7 Tiefensee

Conceptual Supervenience for Inferentialists

Christine Tiefensee (Frankfurt School of Finance & Management), c.tiefensee@fs.de
Tuesday, 15.45-16.30 | DOR 24, R. 1.201

In this paper, I develop a novel inferentialist account of conceptual normative supervenience. I argue, firstly, that supervenience should be interpreted as the claim (S*) that as a matter of conceptual necessity, if some *x* has some normative property N, then *x* also possesses some normatively relevant non-normative property B such that, as a matter of metaphysical necessity, everything that possesses B also possesses N. Secondly, I show that inferentialism equips us with everything we need to explain why (S*) is a non-trivial conceptual truth. Thirdly, I explicate how this inferentialist explanation relates to substantively normative theses about normative relevance. I do so by employing an inferentialist account of evaluative notions which understands these notions as metaconceptual devices that systematise proprieties of language-exit transitions. Whereas the observation that evaluative notions are *metaconceptual* devices explains why it is conceptually true that the evaluative supervenes on *non-normative* properties, their *specific* metaconceptual function explains why the evaluative *co-varies* with *normatively relevant* non-normative properties. By combining inferentialism and the supervenience debate, this contribution fills a lacuna not only in our thinking about conceptual supervenience and its relation to normative reasoning, but also in our understanding of how best to put inferentialism to metanormative use.

15 Twele

Inheritance Tax and Economic Desert

Marcel Twele (Universität Bern), marcel.twele@gmail.com
Thursday, 09.45-10.30 | DOR 24, R. 1.504

In public discourse, *desert-based* arguments against the institution of inheritance taxation loom large. While the tax's opponents recognize that most inheritances are undeserved on part of the *heir*, many insist that bequest is deserved on part of the *testator* due to her contribution to social welfare while alive. Objections coming from different angles. Some stress the fact that the testator is already dead and that – whatever she might have deserved while alive – she deserves nothing after having died. Others reject economic desert as a moral principle straight away.

In this paper, I am going to take still a different route. I take moral economic desert seriously and show that even if one grants the additional claim that dead people can be morally deserving, it is all but clear that testators do actually deserve the (legal) power to bequeath their *whole* (monetary and material) estate, since it is questionable that they have deserved the estate in the first place. Furthermore, even the part of their legally conferred property that inheritors *do* morally deserve (and deserve to bequeath) might be the object of a legitimate redistribution-policy, since the corresponding moral claims are best understood as overridable by other “desertist” considerations.

1 Ulbricht

Eine Kantische Antwort auf das Gamer's Dilemma

Samuel Ulbricht (Universität Mainz), samuel.ulbricht@posteo.de

Wednesday, 15.00–15.45 | DOR 24, R. 1.401

Morgan Lucks *Gamer's Dilemma* besteht in der Inkonsistenz der folgenden, intuitiv plausiblen Thesen:

- i. Virtueller Mord ist moralisch erlaubt.
- ii. Es gibt keinen relevanten moralischen Unterschied zwischen virtuellem Mord und virtuellem Kindesmissbrauch im Computerspiel.
- iii. Virtueller Kindesmissbrauch ist moralisch verboten.

Zahlreiche Versuche, diese Paradoxie aufzulösen, säumen das Feld der Computerspiellethik. Meist wird These (ii) angegriffen und das Phänomen mithilfe expressivistischer Argumentationen zu klären versucht. Diese Ansätze stoßen allerdings häufig auf mindestens eine der folgenden Schwierigkeiten:

1. Sie liefern zwar eine gute Erklärung für unsere Intuitionen, aber keine *normativen Gründe*, weshalb bestimmtes Spielhandeln moralisch relevant sein sollte.
2. Sie missachten mindestens eine der folgenden, normativ wesentlichen Unterscheidungen:
 - a. Spielen (als Handeln) \neq Spiel (als Gegenstand)
 - b. Spielhandlung (etwa Spiel-Mord) \neq *analoge* wirkliche Handlung (etwa Mord)

Dezidiert deontologische Versuche, das *Gamer's Dilemma* aufzulösen, sucht man vergebens. Dabei lässt sich mit Kant die Paradoxie entwirren, indem man den Blick auf die Gründe der Spielenden richtet. Nicht (ii) muss zurückgewiesen werden, sondern die pauschale Geltung der Thesen (i) und (iii). Das *Gamer's Dilemma* beruht aus Kantischer Perspektive auf einer falschen Grundannahme: Der moralische Status von Spielhandlungen ergibt sich *nicht* aus dem moralischen Status ihrer wirklichen Konterparts, sondern aus ihren Begründungen.

14 Unterhuber

From Ceteris Paribus Laws to Mechanistic Explanations [and Back]

Matthias Unterhuber (Ruhr-Universität Bochum), matthias.unterhuber@rub.de

Tuesday, 13.30-14.15 | DOR 24, R. 1.402

The present paper aims to bring together accounts of ceteris paribus laws and mechanistic explanation. It is argued that two types of normalcy conditions have to be distinguished to do justice to generalizations in the sciences, as targeted by ceteris paribus laws: (a) interference and (b) shift normalcy conditions. Interference normalcy can be cashed out in terms of mechanisms being free of interferences, whereas shift normalcy indicates a shift in the mechanism referenced. Based on three examples from biology and physics it is argued that both types of normalcy conditions are employed by the sciences. In contrast to interference normalcy conditions, shift normalcy conditions can be avoided but are often endorsed. This is due their power to increase the systematicity of regularities described by the particular discipline.

16 van Riel

Functionalism As an Explanatory Project in the Social Sciences

Raphael van Riel (Universität Duisburg Essen), raphael.vanriel@uni-due.de
Wednesday, 10.30-11.15 | DOR 24, R. 1.103

Functionalism, once a dominant view in sociology, social anthropology, and Marxist thought, has largely been abandoned as an approach to understanding social structure. Arguments against functionalism vary. They range from criticisms of a focus on social stability and of a more or less overt ethnocentrism to worries raised in connection with metaphysical and epistemological commitments of functionalist theories of social reality. A worry of this latter type underlies the prominent *missing mechanism argument* against functionalism in the social sciences (henceforth: MMA), which is due to Jon Elster. It aims at what Elster took to be a general trait of almost all functional explanation in the social sciences, namely, that a feedback loop between function bearer and functional effect is hypothesized without any evidence that such a feedback loop exists.

The goal of this talk is (i) to provide a better understanding of the varieties of functional explanation we find in the social sciences, and (ii) to argue that MMA has, contrary to what Elster and others suggest, fairly limited scope – it is successful when directed at one particular type of functionalism only. Dominant versions of functionalism in the social sciences remain unaffected.

11 Venter

An Embodied Predictive Processing Approach to Value-Based Decision Making

Elmarie Venter (University of Edinburgh), elmarieventer.de@gmail.com
Tuesday, 13.30-14.15 | DOR 24, R. 1.502

In this paper, I develop an embodied account of value-based decision making according to which decision making is a closely integrated and deeply unified process that involves the whole embodied individual engaging the world. I situate my account within the predictive processing (PP) framework and first defend an ecological-enactive approach according to which the function of the generative model is to steer an individual's interactions with the world. I then propose that value-based decision making is a function of acting on the precision weighting of affordances to explain away prediction error and improve the individual's grip on the world. The tendency to improve grip is a primarily phenomenological notion that signifies the way an individual acts in a situation that is experienced as deviating from the optimum. An individual's optimal state is a function of their morphology, physiology, behavioral pattern, and environment; deviation is given by prediction error derived from bodily disattunement. I argue that optimal grip is achieved by responding to available options in the environment and feedback from the individual's current bodily state. This includes a crucial source of information that decision making models – and many PP accounts – have until now neglected: *interoceptive* information.

7 Ventham**An Attitudinal Account of Affective Empathy**

Elizabeth Ventham (University of Liverpool), elizabeth.ventham@liverpool.ac.uk
 Wednesday, 14.15-15.00 | DOR 24, R. 1.204

Empathising seems to be something that agents can do to greater or lesser extents. But it's not clear what the relevant success conditions are – knowing (or matching) the bare sensations that an agent feels at a given time seems less important for empathising with them, for example, than knowing about their emotions at that same time.

This paper argues that people are better at empathising with other people's experiences when they are better able to match their target's *desires*. And knowing (and taking on) another person's other mental states is only important for more successful empathising insofar as those mental states are informative of their desires.

The paper begins by explaining a number of difficulties in understanding what makes instances of affective empathy more or less successful. Firstly, it looks at sceptical worries, and secondly at the complexities of our affective experiences. Next, I give my argument for the desire theory, by saying describing reasons that desires are important for interpersonal understanding (such as their link to an agent's motivations), and by demonstrating why other mental states are less important than they might originally seem. Finally, I show that this account can also alleviate the difficulties in empathising successfully.

11 Vernazzani**Perceptual Phenomenology and Fluency in Language Comprehension**

Alfredo Vernazzani (Ruhr-Universität Bochum), alfredo-vernazzani@daad-alumni.de
 Tuesday, 15.45-16.30 | DOR 24, R. 1.506

Philosophers agree that episodes of language comprehension have a characteristic phenomenology. This is illustrated by cases of phenomenal contrast. In *w1*, Mary only speaks English, in *w2*, she speaks English and Russian: when confronted with the same situation of someone speaking in Russian in the two different scenarios, all things being equal, her phenomenology will differ. According to the semantic perception view [SPV] defended by Bayne, Brogaard, Millikan, and Siegel, the phenomenological difference is best explained by Mary's directly perceiving the *meaning* of the speech in Russian in *w2*, but not in *w1*. The phenomenal contrast is thus explained in virtue of a difference in perceptual content in the two scenarios. In this talk, I argue that the SPV faces considerable phenomenological challenges and lacks empirical support. While low-level content alone may not suffice to explain the phenomenal contrast, I advance a new explanation of the phenomenal contrast for episodes of language comprehension based on perceptual fluency, the subjective feeling of ease with which some perceptual tasks are carried out. I then show that my fluency-based account is better supported both phenomenologically and empirically.

12 Viebahn

Speech Acts in Fiction

Emanuel Viebahn (Humboldt-Universität Berlin), emanuel.viebahn@hu-berlin.de

Tuesday, 15.45-16.30 | DOR 24, R. 1.205

What kind of speech acts does an author produce in writing a work of fiction? For example, what kind of speech act did Tolkien perform in writing down (1) at the beginning of *The Hobbit*?

(1) In a hole in the ground there lived a hobbit.

In the philosophical debate on this question, by far the two most popular answers are the following:

- The pretence view (Searle and many others):
In writing down (1), Tolkien doesn't in fact perform any speech act. He merely *pretends to assert* that there lived a hobbit in a hole in the ground. This action lacks illocutionary force altogether.
- The make-believe view (Currie and many others):
Tolkien performs a directive speech act. In writing down (1), he *invites or prescribes the readers to make believe* that there lived a hobbit in a hole in the ground. This action is thus similar to everyday directive speech acts, such as invitations, suggestions and requests.

The aim of this talk is to argue against these two views and to defend the novel view that speech acts in fiction are a diverse phenomenon: in writing fiction, authors perform many different speech acts, including assertions, directives and commissives.

4 Vollmer

Why Should We Suspend Judgment?

Michael Vollmer (Universität Innsbruck), michael.vollmer@uibk.ac.at

Thursday, 09.00–09.45 | DOR 24, R. 1.307

According to a recent line of thought, evidentialism is ill-equipped to account for the reasons for suspending judgement on some issue. While the nature and fittingness-conditions of belief may preclude any non-evidential reasons to be of the right kind, things might be different in the case of suspension of judgement. Here, so the argument goes, the nature and fittingness-conditions could allow different, non-evidential reasons for suspension. In my talk, I inquire into the prospects of this reasoning by, first, analysing the nature of suspension. If the attitude of suspension is only fitting with regard to the evidential situation of the subject, the evidentialist has a straightforward reply at hand: only reasons which are indicative of the evidential situation of the subject can be reasons of the right kind to suspend judgement.

16 von Samson-Himmelstjerna

Is Immanent Critique Possible?

Livia Sophie von Samson-Himmelstjerna (HU Berlin), livia.samson@posteo.de
 Tuesday, 13.30-14.15 | DOR 24, R. 1.103

Immanent critique, as characteristic for, and central to, the tradition of critical social theory, claims to be a non-normative, yet normatively significant form of social critique and thus an alternative to normative political theory. It has recently been argued that immanent critique cannot meet both desiderata at once, i.e. that it either relies on substantive normative standards and thus fails to meet the *no normativism desideratum*, or that the norms it relies on lack force for the society or social institution in question, making it fail to meet the *normative significance desideratum*. My paper argues that immanent critique *can fulfil both desiderata at once*. In short, I argue that immanent critique relies on *functional-ethical* norms which do not violate the no normativism desideratum, and that these norms are *constitutive* of societies or social institutions, which grants them normative force.

12 Vonlanthen

Mismatches between Natural Language and Logical Consequence

Simon Dominik Vonlanthen (Ruhr-Universität Bochum), simon.vonlanthen@rub.de
 Thursday, 09.45-10.30 | DOR 24, R. 1.205

Concerning the relationship between natural language and formal logic, Glanzberg (2015) has recently argued that natural language cannot generate a logical consequence relation. The reason is that truth-conditions in natural language semantics cannot contain quantification over models *and* account for linguistic understanding. Given that logical consequence requires a space of such models, we yield a *conceptual* mismatch: logical consequence is not *realisable* in natural language. Further, any logical constants in natural language cannot generate such relations either, for the same reason. I reject this conclusion. If we make the motivated switch from referentialist truth-conditional (meta)semantics to *inferentialist* ones, we automatically also have to shift from model-theoretic conceptions of logical notions to proof-theoretic ones. Then, so I argue, there is no conceptual mismatch anymore: Proof-theoretic conceptions do not go beyond inferentialist (meta)semantics. Moreover, there are good reasons to be optimistic that we *can* find logical constants in natural language, as can be gleaned from the expression “and”. Since according to the proof-theoretic conceptions, this is all we need for a relation of logical consequence, we can further conclude that natural language *does* contain such relations.

4 Wagner

Epistemic Double Checking and Suspension of Belief

Verena Wagner (Universität Konstanz), v.wagner@uni-konstanz.de

Thursday, 09.45-10.30 | DOR 24, R. 1.307

The aim of this talk is to explore the connection of epistemic double checking and suspension of belief. Double checking is applied by epistemic agents who engage in critical self-assessment with respect to their own doxastic attitudes. Intuitively, it seems plausible that an agent who wants to assess one of her beliefs must suspend the relevant belief for the sake of genuine re-inquiry. This is what makes Jane Friedman's DBI-norm (Don't Believe and Inquire) so compelling. Yet, I will argue that epistemic double checking requires a special form of suspension that allows for inquiring into one's belief without thereby dropping the belief in question. I will show that none of the current accounts of doxastic suspension (including Friedman's) can accommodate this demand. I suggest that a new kind of suspension must be introduced to properly describe the possibility of suspending a belief without dropping it, and the rationality of doing so. Double checking, so I argue, is the activity of inquiring into one's belief while keeping the relevant belief temporarily on hold. A to-be-assessed belief is not to be dropped before the assessment delivers defeating evidence.

11 Watzl

The Rationality of Salience

Sebastian Watzl (University of Oslo), sebaswat@ifikk.uio.no

Wednesday, 11.15-12.00 | DOR 24, R. 1.506

This paper investigates the rational role of *salience*. I argue that salience presents a rational force that is more basic than any practical justification in terms of the reasons for which we might perform our actions. I will argue that in the absence of reasons to the contrary and in the absence of distorting factors, an agent is rationally entitled to focus more attention on what is more salient to them at the time. My overall argument for the rationality claim can be put in terms of an argument for the rationality of a basic form of situational trust. My arguments exploit an analogy according to which salience stands to attention roughly like perceptual experience stands to belief. I will present three arguments for the rationality claim: a *pragmatic* argument, a *phenomenal* argument, and an argument *from well-functioning*.

7 Wei

Understanding Normative Risk in Moral Deliberation

Xintong Wei (University of Stirling), l.weixintong@gmail.com

Wednesday 09.00-09.45 | DOR 24, R. 1.201

When we deliberate about what to do morally, we often run two types of risk. One type of risk results from having incomplete or false information about empirical facts, such as the effectiveness of donating to a particular charity. Another type of risk results from having incomplete or false information about normative facts, such as whether it is permissible to prioritize the welfare of the present generations over that of future generations. According to the Symmetry Thesis, empirical risk matters for what one should do morally, and so does normative risk. In this paper, I defend the Symmetry Thesis against Weatherson's (2014) argument from fetish motivations and Harman's (2015) argument from exculpation. I offer an account of how we should understand empirical and normative risk in moral deliberation on a reason-based normative framework. On this normative framework, what one should do morally is determined by the balance of one's moral reasons. I will argue that risks (empirical and normative) are types of modifiers: They attenuate the weight of moral reasons that they modify. Risks (empirical and normative) matter for what we should do morally.

4 Werner

Testimony, Imagination, and Knowing What it is Like to have a Complex Experience

Christiana Werner (Universität Duisburg-Essen), christiana.werner@uni-due.de

Wednesday 11.15-12.00 | DOR 24, R. 1.404

Knowledge of what it is like ('WIL-knowledge') fulfils important functions in recent debates on decisions (Paul 2014), interpersonal understanding (Boisserie-Lacroix & Inchingolo 2021), and epistemic injustice (Wiltsher 2021). A majority assumes that we cannot acquire WIL-knowledge of experiences such as "being a parent" (Paul 2014) via testimony. This paper aims to challenge the sceptical consensus about testimony as follows: firstly, the phenomenal character of experiences such as "being a parent" seems to result from the subject being in a series of mental states and is in this sense complex. A subject without the complex experience can nevertheless have WIL-knowledge of its components. Secondly, testimony can be used as an instruction manual for imagination. This enables WIL-knowledge transfer, which requires: (1) testimony with information about the components of the complex experience, (2) WIL-knowledge of the components on the receiver's side (3) putting together imaginatively the components of the complex experience according to the experienter's testimony. Finally, the paper argues that the imagining of the complex experience is a context of justification, because it is based on WIL-knowledge of the components of the complex experience and on testimony.

9 Werner

Qualitativism and Radical Underdetermination

Jonas Werner (Universität Bern), jonas.werner@philo.unibe.ch

Tuesday, 14.15-15.00 | DOR 24, R. 1.608

Qualitativism is sometimes be understood as the thesis that qualitative facts ground all other facts. This understanding of qualitativism leads to a view on which there are non-qualitative high-level facts. However, qualitative facts seem unable to modally fix all non-qualitative facts. One way to deal with this is to uphold that non-qualitative facts are metaphysically indeterminate in the sense that the world does not settle which non-qualitative states of affairs obtain. I argue that conventional ways to model this indeterminacy lead to a problem for proponents of grounding-qualitativism, namely that it requires that the identities of all objects whose existence is possibly grounded in the qualitative base have to be fixed. As a way out I consider the view that the world is radically under-determined in the sense that it is metaphysically underspecified without there being any candidate-specifications. A way to connect indeterminacy and radical underdetermination is proposed: Certain cases of radical underdetermination present themselves as cases of indeterminacy when considered from the perspective of richer worlds in which more identities are fixed. From its own perspective, however, the world is radically underspecified.

12 Werner

Wrong Good Guesses

Jonas Werner (Universität Bern), jonas.werner@philo.unibe.ch

Tuesday, 15.00-15.45 | DOR 24, R. 1.205

The practice of guessing has found some attention in the recent literature and rules that govern good guesses have been proposed. One of the main ideas is that good guesses strike the perfect balance between informativeness and accuracy. This leads to the result that sometimes good guesses can be such that one's credence in the truth of one's guess is relatively low. In particular, it is acceptable to guess the most likely of a selection of unlikely options. In my talk I tease out normative implications of such guesses. I argue that there can be cases of harmful and morally wrong guesses that meet the non-normative criteria for goodness. In particular, I argue that in many mundane contexts giving the only answer that meets the non-normative criteria for a good guess is giving an answer that is harmful and wrong. I use this result to show that there can be a particular way of harmful speech-acts that take the form of presupposition- and implicature-free questions.

11 Werning

Do We Need Traces for Episodic Memory? A Defense of Trace Minimalism

Markus Werning (Ruhr-Universität Bochum), markus.werning@rub.de

Tuesday, 15.45-16.30 | DOR 24, R. 1.502

On one side in the debate on memory, the Causal Theory claims that episodic remembering requires a memory trace that causally links the event of remembering to the event of experience and carries over representational content from the content of experience to the content of remembering. On the other side, simulationists reject, both, the necessity of preserving representational content and the necessity of a causal link between experience and memory, arguing that remembering is nothing but a peculiar form of imagination that has been reliably produced and is directed towards an episode of one's personal past. Albeit sharing the criticism of the Causal Theory and, in particular, its demand for an intermediary carrier of representational content, I will argue that a causal connection to experience is necessary to fulfill even the minimal requirements of past-directedness and reliability. I will present an account of minimal traces devoid of representational content and exploit an analogy to a predictive processing framework of perception. As perception can be regarded as a prediction of the present based on sparse sensory inputs without any representational content, episodic memory can be conceived of as a "prediction of the past" on the basis of a merely *causal* link to a previous experience.

15 Widmer

Kantian Functionalism and Social Progress in Max Adler's Sociological Justification of Socialism

Elisabeth Theresia Widmer (Universität Wien), elisabeth@widmer.cc

Wednesday, 10.30-11.15 | DOR 24, R. 1.504

This paper identifies two problems in Marx's and G. A. Cohen's accounts of social norms—reductionism and determinism—and argues that Max Adler's account is better suited to deal with these problems. In Marx's account, social norms of the superstructure are, on the one hand, *reduced* to their economy-stabilizing function and, on the other hand, viewed as being *determined* by the mode of production. While Cohen's functionalism overcomes reductionism, his account remains deterministic to some extent. By outlining Max Adler's Kantian functionalism, I claim that the Austromarxist provided a position that overcomes both problems. First, I introduce Adler's sociological position, which takes social norms in their capitalism-stabilizing function *and* in their function to promote social progress. In a second step, I argue that this account overcomes the problems of reductionism and determinism. In a third step, I argue that despite these advantages, it falls short in considering the normative implications of his theory. I explain this shortcoming by his aim to argue for an alternative program to Hans Kelsen's formalist approach and the more radical Marxist socialism in Soviet Bolshevism.

11 Wiese

Minimal Models of Consciousness

Wanja Wiese (Ruhr-Universität Bochum), wanja.wiese@rub.de
Tuesday, 15.00-15.45 | DOR 24, R. 1.501

There is currently much interest in comparing theories of consciousness, sometimes with the goal of finding common threads (Del Pin et al., 2021; Doerig et al., 2020; Northoff & Lamme, 2020; Sattin et al., 2021; Seth & Bayne, 2022; Signorelli et al., 2021). General options for a synthesis in this diverse theoretical landscape include integration and unification. Whereas integrative approaches seek to combine different theories into a single framework (e.g., a ‘standard model,’ as it is called in Graziano et al., 2019), unification (in the sense of Miłkowski, 2016) seeks to replace existing theories with something simpler, e.g., an *idealised* description of core features shared by different theories.

An important type of idealisation involves the development of *minimal models* of a target phenomenon. In research on consciousness, this topic is currently discussed in terms of *minimal phenomenal experience* (Metzinger, 2020; Windt, 2015) and *minimal unifying models* (Rorot, 2021; Vilas et al., 2021; Wiese, 2020). Although both notions clearly overlap, there are some relevant differences.

This paper clarifies what a *minimal model of consciousness* (MMC) is, reviews examples to provide a *taxonomy* of existing MMCs, discusses their pragmatic and epistemic *benefits*, and highlights promising paths for *future research* on MMCs.

5 Wilck

The Logical Form of Debates with Lay People: Aristotle on Inductive Dialectic

Benjamin Wilck (Humboldt-Universität Berlin), benjamin.wilck3@gmail.com
Tuesday, 14.15-15.00 | DOR 24, R. 1.604

In the *Topics*, Aristotle restricts dialectical arguments to deductive ones (*syllogismoí*). This might strike us as baffling, given that Aristotle expressly admits that dialectical arguments can also be inductive. I argue that the apparent tension between the *Topics*’ restriction of dialectic to deductive reasoning and the existence of inductive dialectic can be resolved by distinguishing between different contexts or purposes of dialectic: while deduction is used in debates with dialectically skilled interlocutors (whom Aristotle calls “dialecticians”), induction is more suitable for dialectical debates with inexperienced interlocutors (that is, common people from the crowd or young people). Specifically, I argue that, while inductive dialectic is most suitably employed in everyday encounters, deductive dialectic is reserved for dialectical training or for examining claims to knowledge and expertise put forward by putative scientists. Hence, the fact that Aristotle’s particular dialectical arguments in the *Topics*’ middle books are exclusively deductive ones simply shows that Aristotle’s respondents in the *Topics* are trained dialecticians or putative scientists. This in turn implies that the *Topics*’ deduction-requirement for dialectical arguments is not part of Aristotle’s general account of dialectic, but only of his specific handbook for dialectical debates with a particular type or group of respondents, namely, the Platonic-Academic philosophers.

9 Wilsch

Solving Blackburn's Challenge with Anchored Possibility

Tobias Wilsch (Universität Mainz, Universität Tübingen), tobias.wilsch@gmail.com
 Wednesday 10.30-11.15 | DOR 24, R. 1.607

Simon Blackburn once attacked realist conceptions of modal facts with the claim that the source of necessity would have to itself be necessary. Every attempt to explain the necessity of the source would suffer from regress or circularity. Bob Hale developed Blackburn's argument further and brought it to a different conclusion: while ordinary necessity-facts hold in virtue of facts about the source of necessity, the necessity of source-facts is fundamental. My goal in this talk is to offer an alternative response to Blackburn's challenge, which avoids Hale's fundamentalist conclusion. I attack two existing accounts of the necessity of source-facts, – the iterated-source account and the Stability account, – and then develop my own. My own account rests on the idea that any genuine space of possibilities is *anchored*. The anchor of possibilities includes every truth that helps to ground the possibilities. On the anchored conception, every truth prior to the possibilities remains constant across that space. I develop and motivate this anchored conception of possibility to meet Blackburn's challenge. My response is that source-facts have been necessary all along simply in virtue of featuring in the anchor of possibility.

11 Wimmer

Knowledge-First Dispositionalism about Belief

Simon Wimmer (TU Dortmund), simon.wimmer@tu-dortmund.de
 Tuesday, 14.15-15.00 | DOR 24, R. 1.502

This essay introduces a knowledge-first theory of belief that is intended to capture the folk psychology of belief. The theory is inspired by Williamson (2000, pp.46-7) and says that

For x to believe p is for

- (i) x to treat p in the fully specific way F such that
- (ii) F is relevantly similar to the fully specific way G such that
- (iii) in normal circumstances, any y treats any q they know in G.

The essay's main aim is to highlight the explanatory power of this theory. Examples of the theory's explanatory benefits to be discussed include: first, appeal to knowledge in (iii) predicts the developmental trajectory of the folk psychologies of knowledge and belief summarized by Phillips et al. (2020)'s "Knowledge before Belief"; second, reference to *relevant* similarity in (ii) builds in an element of context-sensitivity that predicts both experimental results obtained by Buckwalter, Rose, and Turri (2015) and diverging intuitions about whether cases of delusion and superstition are cases of belief (e.g., Ichino 2018 vs. Risen 2016); and, third, talk of *similarity* in (ii) explains why the verb 'believe' admits of degree modifiers and comparatives, as in 'strongly/partially believe' and 'x believes p more strongly than y'.

1 Witt

Moralismus und moralische Urteile

Karsten Witt (Hochschule f. Polizei u. öffentl. Verwaltung NRW), karsten.witt@hspv.nrw.de
Thursday, 11.15-12.00 | DOR 24, R. 1.405

Die herrschende Moral ist vielen heutigen Menschen suspekt. Nicht nur, weil sich ihre Zeitgenossen ihrer wie eh und je bedienen, um eigene Unzulänglichkeiten zu überdecken, sondern auch, weil sie es mit der Moral immer häufiger zu ‚übertreiben‘ scheinen. Dies ist das Moralismusproblem. Obgleich unter anderem Kant, Mill, Sidgwick, Nietzsche und Williams auf es aufmerksam gemacht haben, ist es erst seit kurzem Gegenstand einer intensiven Debatte. Mein Vortrag knüpft an diese Debatte an.

Er besteht aus zwei Teilen: Teil 1 widmet sich der Natur des Moralismus. Ich werde für eine neuartige Moralismuskonzeption argumentieren, die die fehlerhafte Kommunikation sowie die Machtasymmetrie zwischen Kritikerin und Adressatin betont, während sie die Rolle von Fehltritten relativiert: Ob wir es mit Moralismus zu tun haben, hängt ausschließlich davon ab, ob mit der Äußerung der Kritik aus einer Position der Überlegenheit heraus ein Kommunikationsfehler begangen wurde.

In Teil 2 wende ich mich der Ethik des Moralismus zu. Hier sollen die Überlegungen aus Teil 1 auf diejenige Klasse von Problemen übertragen werden, die eine Hauptursache der heutigen Moralskepsis sein dürften: so genannte ‚strukturelle‘ Probleme wie Weltarmut, Klimawandel oder Rassismus. Ich möchte argumentieren, dass die Lösung dieser Probleme durch moralische Kritik häufig moralistisch sein dürfte.

5 Wolf

Hume's Problem in the Appendix

Julia Wolf (Ruhr-Universität Bochum), julia.wolf-n8i@rub.de
Wednesday 09.00-09.45 | DOR 24, R. 1.604

In the Appendix to the *Treatise of Human Nature* Hume argues that there is a significant problem with his earlier account of personal identity. There has been considerable debate, however, about what this problem actually is. I develop a new version of an internal inconsistency reading where I argue that Hume realised that his original account of the connexion between perceptions in terms of an association of the ideas of the perceptions was not a viable means of accounting for the connexion between perceptions. This is because it leads to an infinite regress of ideas of perceptions that is only stopped by accepting that the mind perceives a connexion between perceptions. This, however, is something Hume cannot allow as he thinks that perceptions are distinct and that the mind cannot perceive a connexion between distinct existences. As a result, Hume is left without a positive account of the self as he is unable to account for the connexion between perceptions. I explain how this new account differs from some of the existing accounts in the literature, and show that it meets the widely accepted criteria that a successful explanation of Hume's problem must satisfy.

16 Wollner**Alienation and Reification, Orthodox and Unified**

Gabriel Wollner (Universität Bayreuth), Gabriel.Wollner@uni-bayreuth.de
 Thursday, 09.00-09.45 | DOR 24, R. 1.103

This paper offers an orthodox and unified account of alienation and reification. My reconstruction of alienation and reification has its philosophical foundations in contemporary action theory and avoids the charges of perfectionism and essentialism. It supports the claim that non-alienation and de-reification cannot be achieved within capitalist institutions. And it casts alienation and reification as different aspects of the same capitalist syndrome, while building bridges to other important elements of the Marxist project.

The basic idea of my unified and orthodox account is this: Alienation and reification pick out different ways in which individuals under capitalism fail to properly occupy the first-personal point of view. At the core of this diagnosis is an idea about what it is to act with others while at the same time performing an action that is really one's own. Alienation is a first-order phenomenon and occurs when individuals acting on the world and bringing about material change fail to really act. Reification is a second-order phenomenon and occurs when individuals producing their social world fail to really act.

9 Wörner**Criteria of Identity and Criteria of Distinctness**

David Wörner (Massachusetts Institute of Technology), woerner.david@gmail.com
 Thursday, 10.30-11.15 | DOR 24, R. 1.608

It is widely taken for granted that answering questions of identity calls for a specification of *criteria of identity*. If we want to answer questions of personal identity, say, we must specify a criterion of personal identity. I argue, however, that a closer look at what exactly identity criteria are reveals that many *proposed* identity criteria fail to qualify as such. Instead, these proposals turn out to correspond to plausible criteria of *distinctness*: principles that lay down what makes things of a certain kind distinct from all other things. Recognizing this helps clarify how we should approach disputed questions of identity and bears the promise of establishing more transparent ground rules for dealing with such questions, which play pivotal roles in many areas of philosophy.

12 Worthmann**Two Kinds of Category Mistakes**

Hannes Worthmann (FAU Erlangen), hannes.worthmann@fau.de
 Thursday, 09.00-09.45 | DOR 24, R. 1.205

So-called category mistakes play a peculiar role in contemporary philosophy. Their elimination is commonly regarded as being part of philosophy's core business, yet at the same time it seems impossible to sketch even a preliminary understanding of this type of error

on the basis of undisputed examples, let alone to define this type of error. This situation can be explained by the fact that we try to grasp two different variants of conceptual puzzles under one conception: On the one hand, complex expressions that evoke a characteristic impression of infelicity, triggered, for example, by a sentence such as “Green ideas sleep furiously”. On the other hand, conceptualizations that lead to typical philosophical problems, such as regresses, paradoxes, dilemmas, and the like. In the aftermath of Ryle’s treatment of the subject, it became common to assume that there is a strong logical-conceptual connection between the linguistic-phenomenological peculiarity of an expression, its status as category mistake, and its role in causing these problems. However, this connection does not exist, so that (at least) two variants of “category mistake” should be distinguished. In addition to the much-discussed error characterized by linguistic-phenomenological peculiarity, a functional notion of category error can be developed, which can play a fruitful role in the description of typical philosophical problems.

12 Yolcu

Expressive Denegation: Presenting Myself as Not Being in a Mental State

Nadja-Mira Yolcu (Universität Mannheim), nadja-mira.yolcu@phil.uni-mannheim.de
Wednesday, 15.00-15.45 | DOR 24, R. 1.404

According to psychological expressivism, avowals – serious and competent utterances of present tense self-ascriptions of mental states (e.g. “I hope that the sun is shining”) – are typically expressive of the first-order mental state named. With a propositional avowal of the form “I ψ that p ”, a speaker expresses the first-order mental state of ψ -ing that p instead of reporting on her mental state (as descriptivism has it).

Self-ascriptions of mental states can be negated. *Disavowals*, such as “I don’t believe that it is raining” and “I am not afraid”, can be issued just as spontaneously as avowals and are often even used in combination with avowals as in “I don’t want chocolate. I want cotton candy.” Nevertheless, disavowals are rarely discussed and if they are, they are posed as a challenge to the expressivist thesis. Here I will make the case for extending expressivism to disavowals. I propose that (at least some) disavowals are instances of *expressive denegation*: With a disavowal, a speaker expresses, in some sense, the *absence* of the mental state named. I end by exploring some consequences of expressivism for disavowals.

9 Zakkou

Power Collapse

Julia Zakkou (Universität Bielefeld), julia.zakkou@uni-bielefeld.de
Wednesday, 13.30-14.15 | DOR 24, R. 1.607

What distinguishes things that are endowed with agency from those that lack it? Some scholars in the Aristotelian tradition suggest a distinction in terms of two kinds of powers: agents have both one-way and two-way powers; non-agents, by contrast, have only one-way powers. I call this view *Aristotelianism*. In this talk, I examine different ways to think of one-way and two-way powers. I argue that a prominent account, as well as variations of it,

yield a certain form of *Megarianism* when combined with Aristotelianism: for non-agents, power collapses into actuality—that is, non-agents have the power to do something if and only if they are doing it. This might not be a knock-down argument against Aristotelianism, but it does seem cause for concern.

12 Zeman

Relativism and Retraction: The Case Is Not Yet Lost

Dan Zeman (University of Warsaw), danczeman@gmail.com

Wednesday, 13.30-14.15 | DOR 24, R. 1.404

The argument from retraction (the speech act of “taking back” a previous speech act) has been one of the main arguments used by relativists about a variety of perspectival expressions (predicates of taste, epistemic modals, moral and aesthetic claims etc.) to support their view. For some (e.g., MacFarlane), retraction is even mandatory: a norm of retraction makes it obligatory for an agent to retract a previously unretracted assertion whenever what has been asserted is shown to be currently false.

Recently, several considerations – both from the armchair and based on empirical studies – have been offered to undercut the support retraction has been taken to provide relativism. In this paper, I engage with both types of considerations. In relation to the former, I show that even if relativists give up the claim that retraction is mandatory, their view remains better situated in accounting for retraction than its rivals. In relation to the latter, I survey some of the current experimental literature and argue that there is a way to interpret the results that makes them compatible with a flexible version of relativism. I end with some considerations regarding the support relativism can still get from retraction.

15 Zisman

Taking the Victim Seriously in Criminal Law

Valerij Zisman (Universität Bielefeld), valerij.zisman@uni-bielefeld.de

Wednesday, 15.00-15.45 | DOR 24, R. 1.505

Recently, the victim’s role in criminal law was re-discovered and one of the centers of focus in the philosophical debate. Specifically, several authors have proposed that the victim’s interests or rights in some form figure into the justification for why we should punish offenders in criminal law. In this talk, I argue that such attempts to justify criminal punishment fail. But this is not because authors have been wrong about the role the victim should play in criminal law. What they did get wrong is the idea that criminal punishment is needed to adequately account for the victim’s interests or rights. There are two ways to argue for the necessity of punishment. First, one can make the claim that there is an intrinsic relationship between punishing offenders and restoring the victim’s moral worth or dignity. The second is to make the empirical case that punishing offenders is the best way to respect the victim’s rights in criminal law. I argue that both these strategies fail. There is no convincing case to be made for the intrinsic relationship between punishment and the victim’s dignity. For the second strategy, the empirical research actually suggests that the victim’s

rights are best respected by making the offender provide restitution to the victim and granting victims some procedural rights in criminal law.

16 Zorn

Ökonomisierung des Persönlichen – Möglichkeiten der Kritik und Wege des Widerstands

Jonas Zorn (TU Dortmund), Jonas.Zorn@gmx.de

Tuesday, 15.45-16.30 | DOR 24, R. 1.103

Eine Kernidee des Marxismus ist die Annahme einer zunehmenden Ökonomisierung persönlicher Beziehungen. Bei der Formulierung einer normativen Kritik dieser Entwicklung scheitern jene Theorien jedoch, weil sie nicht ohne eine *Sozialontologie* auskommen. Ihre Kritiken basieren auf Vorstellungen darüber, was „wahre“ oder „echte“ Freundschaft oder Liebe ausmacht, um auf einer solchen Grundlage dafür zu argumentieren, dass ökonomisierte Denk- und Lebensformen diese „wahren“ Sozialbeziehungen verfehlen. Derlei Essentialisierungen sind nur schwer haltbar, genauso wie das Ableiten normativer Kritik aus solchen rein deskriptiven Prämissen. In meinem Vortrag möchte ich einen neuen Ansatz vorstellen, der solche Essentialisierungen umgeht. Ermöglicht werden soll dies durch eine Verschiebung der Analyse auf die begriffliche Ebene. Die zunehmende Ökonomisierung persönlicher Beziehungen soll als Verflachung zuvor dichter sozialer und moralischer Begriffe rekonstruiert werden und damit als Verlust eines Ausdrucksraums für bedeutungsvolle zwischenmenschliche Erfahrungen und Ansprüche. Kritisiert werden soll ein so entstehender Mangel an kollektiven interpretatorischen Ressourcen als *hermeneutisches Defizit*, das bis hin zu Formen genuiner *epistemischer Ungerechtigkeit* reicht. Im Sinne einer *sozialen Epistemologie des Widerstands* möchte ich mit der *ameliorativen Analyse* der Begriffe der Welt des Sozialen eine Strategie vorschlagen, um die Möglichkeit einer Konzeptualisierung unserer komplexen sozialen Erlebnisse und Bedürfnisse wiederherzustellen.

Fachpolitische Foren

Mittwoch, 16.00-17.45

Die fachpolitischen Foren bieten einen Ort für Beiträge zu fach- und hochschulpolitischen Themen, wobei bei GAP.11 ein besonderer Fokus auf Fragen liegt, die das Verhältnis von Philosophie und Öffentlichkeit betreffen. Die Foren wurden nicht vom Organisationskomitee geplant und besetzt, sondern gemeinsam mit den Sektionen in einem *Call for Papers* ausgeschrieben. Das Format der Foren ist offener als das der Sektionen; neben Einzelvorträgen sind auch Gruppenpräsentationen oder Paneldiskussionen möglich.

1 Fair and Open Access in Academia

Organisation: Sascha B. Fink (Universität Magdeburg) & Wanja Wiese (Universität Mainz)

Panelists: Martin Paul Eve (Birkbeck University of London), Marco Tullney (TIB Hannover), Christina Riesenweber (Freie Universität Berlin)

Wednesday, 16.00-17.45 | Main Building, Room 1072

While philosophising may be cheap, gaining access to the results of philosophical research is not: At the moment, a small number of publishing houses make large profits with subscription prices and article processing charges. Depending on the amount of available funding, access to research results is thereby often restricted – even though researchers are already largely funded by public money. Current developments, like Projekt DEAL, focus on agreements between public actors and private publishers (like Wiley, Springer Nature, and Elsevier) to increase open access by covering author processing charges. This, however, leads to a kind of public subsidising of publishing houses with profit margins of above 20%. In order to minimise such disadvantages, many therefore call for diamond open access, i.e. access free of charge for authors and readers. In this panel, we discuss the problems with the current system of publishing and benefits of diamond open access, with our panelists.

2 Blogging in der Philosophie

Organisation: Norbert Paulo (Universität Graz) & Gottfried Schweiger (Universität Salzburg)

Diskutanten: Anja Leser (Philosophie.ch), Anne Specht (fiph Hannover) & Jakob Huber (Theorieblog)

Mittwoch, 16.00-17.45 | Hauptgebäude, Raum 2091/92

Während es im anglo-amerikanischen Raum einige prominente Blogs sowohl für die philosophische Fachöffentlichkeit als für eine breitere Öffentlichkeit gibt, sind gut organisierte Philosophieblogs im deutschsprachigen Raum eher eine Randerscheinung. Dieses fachpolitische Forum will die Frage nach dem Für und Wider von Philosophieblogs im spezifischen Kontext der DACH-Länder erörtern. Blogs können ein Medium der fachinternen Kommunikation sein, um jenseits von wissenschaftlichen Texten miteinander zu kommunizieren und Inhalte zu verbreiten. Sie können aber auch der Kommunikation mit der interessierten Öffentlichkeit dienen. Im Gegensatz zu Zeitungen, Zeitschriften, Radio usw., für die Reichweiten und Prestigewerte etabliert sind, ist der Blog als „neues“ Medium noch mit vielen Unsicherheiten versehen: Wer betreibt Philosophieblogs und garantiert mithin die Qualität der Inhalte? Was macht einen guten philosophischen Blogpost eigentlich aus? Wie steht es um die Honorierung der Beitragenden? Daneben stellen sich auch strukturelle Fragen: Welche Rolle sollten Universitäten, Philosophieinstitute oder die Fachgesellschaften bei der Etablierung und Verbreitung von Blogs spielen? Inwieweit können trotz Konkurrenzsituation positive Beziehungen zu anderen Medien etabliert werden? Wird die fachfremde Öffentlichkeit nur als passives Gegenüber verstanden oder gibt es Möglichkeiten eines aktiveren Austauschs? Diese und andere Fragen zum Blogging wollen wir mit Betreiber*innen von Philosophieblogs in Deutschland, Österreich und der Schweiz diskutieren.

3 Philosophie in erster Generation

Organisation: Daniel James (HHU Düsseldorf), Barbara Vetter (Freie Universität Berlin)

Diskussanten: Daniel James (HHU Düsseldorf), Christina Möller (FH Dortmund), Christian Neuhäuser (TU Dortmund)

Mittwoch, 16.00-17.45 | Hauptgebäude, Raum 2097

Die Philosophie hat sich in den letzten Jahren verschiedenen unterrepräsentierten Gruppen zugewendet. In diesem Forum soll der Fokus auf eine unterrepräsentierte Gruppe gelenkt werden, die oft schwer zu erkennen ist: die sogenannten Erstakademiker:innen (Personen, die als erste in ihrer Familie an einer Hochschule studieren) in der Philosophie. Mit welchen, sei es allgemeinen oder philosophiespezifischen, Ausschlussmechanismen oder Hürden sind sie konfrontiert? Gibt es spezifisch philosophische Gründe dafür, Erstakademiker:innen speziell zu fördern und einzubeziehen? Und wie kann die Philosophie als Fach Erstakademiker:innen besonders fördern und einbinden? Diesen Fragen wird sich das Forum mit Beiträgen aus empirischen, philosophischen und persönlichen Perspektiven widmen. Zugleich soll es Gelegenheit zum Austausch und zur Vernetzung zwischen Erstakademiker:innen aller Karrierestufen in der Philosophie bieten.

4 Ökologische Nachhaltigkeit im Wissenschaftsbetrieb der Philosophie

Organisation: AG Nachhaltigkeit der GAP und der DGPhil

Diskutanten: Wiebke Hampel (Klimaschutzmanagerin HU Berlin), Steffen Koch (Universität Bielefeld), Susanne Mantel (Universität des Saarlandes)

Moderation: Eva Schmidt (TU Dortmund)

Mittwoch, 16.00-17.45 | Hauptgebäude Raum 2094

Angesichts des sich verschärfenden Klimawandels und seiner jetzt schon spürbaren dramatischen Folgen steht auch der Wissenschaftsbetrieb vor der Herausforderung, nachhaltiger zu werden und insbesondere seinen CO₂-Ausstoß deutlich zu reduzieren. Die AG Nachhaltigkeit der GAP und der DGPhil will das Ziel der Nachhaltigkeit für den deutschsprachigen Philosophiebetrieb auf die Agenda setzen. Auf dem fachpolitischen Forum stellen Mitglieder der AG als einen ersten Beitrag einen Good Practices Guide für die nachhaltige Organisation und Durchführung internationaler Veranstaltungen vor. Ziel des Forums ist es unter anderem, Ideen zu sammeln, wie sich Nachhaltigkeit im Wissenschaftsbetrieb erreichen lässt, das Für und Wider verschiedener Nachhaltigkeitsmaßnahmen zu erörtern, und die Vernetzung interessierter Fachkolleg*innen zu ermöglichen. Ein Schlaglicht wird auf der Relevanz von sozialen und internationalen Dimensionen der Nachhaltigkeit für die ökologische Nachhaltigkeit im Wissenschaftsbetrieb der Philosophie liegen. Nach drei Impulsvorträgen und einer Podiumsdiskussion soll das Forum Gelegenheit zu einer breiten Debatte des Themas Nachhaltigkeit unter den Teilnehmer*innen bieten.

Ask Your Philosopher! Analytische Philosophie macht Schule

Dienstag 9.00 – 14.00 Uhr, Hauptgebäude, Hörsaal 1072

Im Philosophie- und Ethik-Unterricht an der Schule bleiben oft Fragen übrig, die als zu schwierig, zu voraussetzungsreich oder über den Lehrstoff hinausgehend beiseitegelegt werden. Die GAP lädt Schüler:innen dazu ein, auf dem Kongress ihre philosophischen Fragen mit ausgewiesenen Expert:innen zu diskutieren.

Philosophie- und Ethikkurse konnten eine aus dem Unterricht heraus entwickelte philosophische Frage an die GAP senden. Zwei Professor:innen, die für die Frage besondere fachliche Expertise haben, stehen den Schüler:innen in einem Podiumsgespräch Rede und Antwort.

9.00–10.15

Ist menschliches Denken und Entscheiden durch Kausalität bestimmt?

Grundkurs Philosophie des Europäischen Gymnasiums Bertha von Suttner

Podiumsgäste: Maike Albertzart (Universität Mainz) und Tobias Rosefeldt (HU Berlin)

10:30-11:45

Gibt es Zufall?

Grundkurs Philosophie des Humboldt-Gymnasiums Berlin-Tegel

Podiumsgäste: Thomas Müller (Universität Konstanz) und Barbara Vetter (FU Berlin)

11:45-12:45

Mittagspause

12:45-14:00

Stellt die Künstliche Intelligenz die menschliche Sonderstellung in Frage?

Grundkurs Philosophie der Sophie-Scholl-Schule Berlin-Schöneberg

Podiumsgäste: Eva Schmidt (Universität Dortmund) und Eva Weber-Guskar (Universität Bochum)

Conscious Individuals

Frege Award Colloquium with Martine Nida-Rümelin

Wednesday, 18:00-20:00; DOR 24, Reutersaal

Panelists: Martine Nida-Rümelin (University of Fribourg), Terence Horgan (University of Arizona), Pär Sundström (Umeå University)

Chair: Kristina Musholt (Universität Leipzig)

Every three years, GAP honours a German-speaking philosopher for outstanding achievements in the field of analytic philosophy with the Frege award.

Martine Nida-Rümelin receives the award for her distinguished work in the philosophy of mind and consciousness. The laudation by Terence Horgan will be followed by a colloquium that deals with themes from Martine Nida-Rümelin's forthcoming book *Conscious Individuals*.

18:00 Geert Keil: Introduction

18:05 Terence Horgan: Laudation

18:20 Award ceremony

Colloquium

Chair: Kristina Musholt

18:30 Pär Sundström: TBD

18:50 Terence Horgan: Agentive Phenomenology and the Nature of the Conscious Self: My Ongoing Debate with Prof. Nida-Rümelin

19:10 Martine Nina-Rümelin: Response

General Discussion

Buchsymposien

Susanne Boshammer (Universität Osnabrück)

Die zweite Chance: Warum wir (nicht alles) verzeihen sollten

Hamburg (Rowohlt) 2020

Donnerstag, 13:30-15:30 Uhr, Hauptgebäude, Raum 2097

Kommentare: Stefan Riedener (Universität Zürich), Oliver Hallich (Universität Duisburg-Essen); Moderation: Dina Emundts (Freie Universität Berlin)

Die Bereitschaft, erlittenes Unrecht zu verzeihen, gilt kulturübergreifend als eine soziale Tugend und das aus gutem Grund: Wer verzeiht, überwindet seinen gerechten Zorn und verzichtet auf angemessene Vergeltung. Das trägt nicht nur zur eigenen Seelenruhe, sondern auch zum sozialen Frieden bei und entlastet im Erfolgsfall sowohl die Schuldigen als auch die Leidtragenden von Unrecht.

Unterscheidet man das Verzeihen von ähnlich entlastenden Umgangsweisen mit moralischem Fehlverhalten – wie z. B. Entschuldigen oder Nachsicht – und bedenkt zudem, dass Vergebung üblicherweise als eine Art Privileg der Unrechtsopfer gilt, wird jedoch deutlich, dass es beim Verzeihen nicht allein um die Abkehr von retributiven Empfindungen geht. Vielmehr üben wir, wenn wir jemandem verzeihen, eine normative Fähigkeit aus, indem wir die Person bewusst von der moralischen Schuldigkeit entbinden, sich ihr Fehlverhalten uns gegenüber zum Vorwurf zu machen: Wenn ich dir verzeihe, musst du, was mich betrifft, kein schlechtes Gewissen mehr haben. Du darfst mit dir ins Reine kommen.



Dieses Verständnis vorausgesetzt, wird ersichtlich, dass es neben den moralischen Vorzügen der Vergebungsbereitschaft zugleich gewichtige Aspekte gibt, die aus moralischer Sicht dagegensprechen, erlittenes Unrecht zu verzeihen. Dazu gehören Gründe der Gerechtigkeit, des Selbst- bzw. Normenschutzes und der Selbstachtung.

13:30 Dina Emundts: Einführung

13:35 Susanne Boshammer:
Vorstellung des Buches

13:50 Stefan Riedener: Verzeihen als
normative Fähigkeit

14:10 Oliver Hallich: Gegen Verzeihen

14:30 Susanne Boshammer: Replik

14:45 Allgemeine Diskussion

Gerhard Schurz (Universität Düsseldorf)

[Hume's Problem Solved: The Optimality of Meta-Induction](#)


Cambridge, MA (MIT Press) 2019.

Thursday, 13:30-15:30, Main building, Room 2094

Comments: Leah Henderson (Rijksuniversiteit Groningen), Peter Brössel (Universität Bochum); Chair: Thomas Müller (Universität Konstanz).

The problem of justifying induction, or Hume's problem, belongs to the hardest challenges in epistemology. This book presents a new approach to Hume's problem. The approach concedes the force of Hume's sceptical arguments against the possibility of a non-circular justification of the reliability of induction. What it demonstrates is that one can nevertheless give a non-circular justification of the optimality of induction, more precisely of meta-induction, that is, induction applied at the level of competing methods of prediction. Based on discoveries in computational learning theory it is demonstrated that a learning strategy, called attractivity-weighted meta-induction, is predictively optimal in all possible worlds among all prediction methods that are accessible to the epistemic agent. Moreover, the a priori justification of meta-induction generates a non-circular a posteriori justification of object-induction, that is, induction applied at the level of events, based on the superior track record of object-induction. Taken together these results provide a non-circular solution to Hume's problem. Beyond its importance for foundation-oriented epistemology, meta-induction has applications in cognitive science (meta-induction as a new account to adaptive rationality), social epistemology (meta-induction as a means for the social spread of knowledge), and generalized evolution theory (meta-induction as a social learning strategy).

- 13:30 Thomas Müller: Introduction
- 13:35 Gerhard Schurz: Summary of the book
- 13:50 Leah Henderson: Crossing levels: Meta-induction and the problem of induction
- 14:10 Peter Brössel: Meta-induction and the foundations of rational reasoning
- 14:30 Gerhard Schurz: Replies
- 14:45 General discussion



Open Philosophy

Was hat die Philosophie zu den drängenden Fragen unserer Zeit beizutragen? Diskutieren Sie mit führenden Philosophinnen und Philosophen über Fragen mit Sprengkraft!

Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, 11.-16. September 2022

Alle Infos auch unter: www.gap11.de/openphilosophy

Debatte: „Nachgefragt“ Umverteilung oder Hände weg von den Erbschaften?

Sonntag, 19.00-21:00 | Hauptgebäude, Senatssaal

Diskutanten: Frank Dietrich (Universität Düsseldorf) & Stefan Gosepath (FU Berlin)

Moderation: Paulus Kaufmann (LMU München)

Die Summe der vererbten Vermögen in Deutschland wächst beständig. Allein in den letzten zehn Jahren hat sie sich mehr als verdoppelt. Gerade hohe Erbschaften kommen ausgerechnet denen zugute, die bereits über hohe Vermögen verfügen. So tragen Erbschaften wesentlich zu einer Vergrößerung der Vermögensunterschiede in Deutschland bei. Sollten wir angesichts solcher Fakten das Erbrecht grundlegend überdenken? Wäre eine stärkere Umverteilung gerechter? Welche Gründe sprechen andererseits für zurückhaltende Eingriffe in die gängige Praxis des Vererbens?

In Zusammenarbeit mit „Nachgefragt: Ethikgespräche an der LMU München“.

Anschließend ist das Publikum eingeladen, nachzufragen und mitzudiskutieren.

Vortrag und Podium: Wissenschaftsfreiheit und Moral

Montag, 18:00-20:30 | Seminargebäude am Hegelplatz, Reutersaal

Tim Henning (Universität Mainz): „Wissenschaftsfreiheit, moralische Kritik und die Kosten des Irrtums“

Auf dem Podium mit Tim Henning: Elif Özmen (Universität Gießen) und Georg Meggle (Universität Leipzig)

Moderation: Romy Jaster (Humboldt-Universität Berlin)

Über die Grenzen der Wissenschaftsfreiheit wird erbittert gestritten. Die einen ziehen die Grenze dort, wo Schäden für benachteiligte Gruppen zu befürchten sind. Andere sehen in moralischen Grenzziehungen eine Bedrohung der Wissenschaftsfreiheit. Tim Henning entwickelt in seinem Vortrag eine differenziertere Position, die moralische mit erkenntnistheoretischen Überlegungen verschränkt (siehe oben, S. 18). Die anschließende Podiumsdiskussion verspricht eine kontroverse Debatte.

Kolloquium: Der Krieg in der Ukraine

Philosophische Perspektiven auf eine politische Herausforderung

Dienstag, 09.30-12:00 | Hauptgebäude, R. 2091/92

In drei Vorträgen wirft die Veranstaltung drei philosophische Schlaglichter auf die politischen und moralischen Herausforderungen, vor die uns der Krieg in der Ukraine stellt (siehe oben, S. 19). Jedem Vortrag folgt eine Diskussion.

- Susanne Burri (Universität Konstanz): Zum Ausmaß unserer Hilfspflichten angesichts empirischer Unsicherheiten
- Sergii Sekundant (University of Odessa): Putin hat den Krieg schon verloren – kann Russland noch gewinnen?
- Johannes Müller-Salo (Universität Hannover): Politische Meinungsbildung und politische Kriegsteilnahme

Philosophie interaktiv: denXte

Ist Data (aus Star Trek) ein erlebendes Wesen?

Martine Nida-Rümelin (Universität Fribourg)

Freitag, 19.00-21:00, | Hauptgebäude, Senatssaal

Das mit dem Communicator-Preis ausgezeichnete Düsseldorfer Public Philosophy-Format „denXte“ kommt nach Berlin! Bei denXte ist das Publikum am Drücker: Eine namhafte Philosophin präsentiert ein Gedankenexperiment, das Publikum stimmt ab, anschließend wird diskutiert. Gast des Abends: die jüngst für ihr philosophisches Werk ausgezeichnete Philosophin Martine Nida-Rümelin.

Die Existenz künstlicher Intelligenz bezweifelt kaum jemand. Aber gibt es auch künstliches Bewusstsein? Müssen wir ernstlich damit rechnen, dass ein Humanoid wie Data etwas erlebt? Sollten wir annehmen, dass es für Data irgendwie *ist*, einem Menschen in die Augen zu sehen? Um das herauszufinden, müssten wir, so scheint es, ‘in ihn hineinschlüpfen’, wir müssten seinen Körper zu unserem machen. Aber das geht nicht. Wie können wir jemals herausfinden, ob ein Roboter etwas erlebt? Können wir es überhaupt herausfinden? Und vor allem: Was genau wollen wir denn wissen, wenn wir diese Frage stellen?

DFG & Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung

Dienstag, 12.15-13:15, Hauptgebäude, Raum 2093
Walter Denk (AvH-Stiftung), Niklas Hebing (DFG)

Die Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft und die Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung informieren über ihre Förderprogramme, stehen für Fragen zur Verfügung und bieten einen Treffpunkt für Alumni.

Society for Women in Philosophy (SWIP Germany)

Mittwoch, 12.15-13.15, DOR 24, Raum 1.103
SWIP-Vorstand

Die Society for Women in Philosophy (SWIP) Germany lädt zum Vernetzungstreffen und zum Austausch über Fragen der Geschlechtergerechtigkeit in der deutschen philosophischen Community ein. Es wird ein kleiner Imbiss gereicht.

Fritz Thyssen Stiftung

Donnerstag, 12.15-13:15, Hauptgebäude, Raum 2095a
Hendrikje Gröpler (Referentin für den Bereich Philosophie)

Zweck der Fritz Thyssen Stiftung ist nach ihrer Satzung die unmittelbare Förderung der Wissenschaft an wissenschaftlichen Hochschulen und Forschungsstätten, vornehmlich in Deutschland, unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des wissenschaftlichen Nachwuchses. Die Fritz Thyssen Stiftung unterstützt zeitlich befristete Forschungsprojekte, promovierte Nachwuchswissenschaftlerinnen und Nachwuchswissenschaftler durch die Vergabe von Postdoc-Stipendien, kleinere wissenschaftliche Tagungen und die Publikation der Resultate von Forschungsarbeiten, die mit Mitteln der Stiftung erarbeitet wurden. Hendrikje Gröpler, zuständige Referentin für das Fach Philosophie, informiert über die Fördermöglichkeiten im Bereich der Philosophie, stellt die entsprechenden Förderinstrumente vor und gibt Hinweise zum Ablauf und den Kriterien des Beantragungs- und Auswahlverfahrens.

Volkswagen-Stiftung

Donnerstag, 12.00-13:15, Hauptgebäude, Raum 2095b (Hybridformat)
Tobias Schönwitz (Förderreferent für den Bereich Philosophie)

Ziel der Veranstaltung ist es, über Fördermöglichkeiten der VolkswagenStiftung im Bereich der Philosophie zu informieren. Dr. des. Tobias Schönwitz (Förderreferent, Philosophie) wird hierfür die neue Förderstrategie der VolkswagenStiftung vorstellen. Darüber hinaus besteht Raum, um auf allgemeine Fragen zur Antragstellung, Begutachtung oder Förderung durch die VolkswagenStiftung einzugehen.

Studierendenkongress / Students congress

Philosophiestudierende in BA- und MA-Studiengängen waren aufgerufen, sich mit einem Vortrag zu bewerben. Alle Einreichungen wurden in einem von der Fachschaftsinitiative Philosophie der Humboldt-Universität organisierten Verfahren von promovierenden oder promovierten Wissenschaftler:innen begutachtet. Die besten 22 Einreichungen wurden ausgewählt.

Alle Raumnummern beziehen sich auf das Seminargebäude am Hegelplatz, Dorotheenstraße 24 (DOR 24).

Tuesday 09.00-09.45

Aesthetics

Sebastian Meißl 1.204
Der kulturtheoretische Kampf gegen die Transzendentalphilosophie – Roland Barthes Konzept vom Tod des Autors als Erklärungsmodell einer alternativen epistemologischen Agenda

Epistemology

Leon Isenmann 1.205
Verschwörungserzählungen und Echokammern: eine Frage des Grounds. Überlegungen zur Metaphysik problemorientierter Ansätze in der sozialen Erkenntnistheorie

Tuesday 10.00-10.45

History of Philosophy

Sonja Eichstädt 1.204
Zur Aufforderung in Fichtes praktischer Philosophie

Epistemology

Gabriel Levc 1.205
Plausible Deniability and Epistemic Authority

Tuesday 11.00-11.45

Logic

Sabina Domínguez Parrado & Pelle Nelissen 1.205
Dynamic Attitudes in Hyper-intensional Belief Revision

Didactics of Philosophy

Valentin Stoppe 1.204
Das Sokratische Gespräch als Unterrichtsmethode zum Philosophieren

Tuesday 17.00-17.45

Philosophy of Science

Lea Franz 1.205
The (Dis-) Similarity of the Sexes?
A feminist Criticism of the
“Essential Difference View” in
Decision-Making Research

Normative Ethics

Wanja Thielmann 1.204
Keine Werte ohne Warte.
Ein axiologisches Aggregations-
paradoxon

Tuesday 18.00-18.45

Applied Ethics

Clarissa Melzer 1.204
SoldatInnen im Einsatz –
Heldentum oder Verpflicht-
ung? Die Betrachtung des
militärischen Berufsbildes von
den Begriffen der Super-
erogation und der Pflicht

Social Philosophy

Marlene Valek 1.205
SILENCING AS RESISTANCE

Tuesday 19.00-19.45

Social Philosophy

Emily Kay Williamson 1.205
The Master of his Oikos: what
can Contemporary Society
Learn from the Power
Dynamics of Ancient Greece?

Metaethics, Philosophy of Action, and Decision Theory

Tobias Lechner 1.204
Autonomy and Advance
Directives

Tuesday 20.00-20.45

Carl Lehmann 1.205
Uniessentia Gender Roles and
the Dissolution of the Social
Individual

Lauritz Hahn 1.204
Christine Korsgaard’s theory of
personal identity

Wednesday 16.00-16.45

Wednesday 17.00-17.45

Political Philosophy and Philosophy of Law

Luchino Hagemeyer 1.205
*The Nullity of Non-Consent
Revisited*

Paul Nicolas Möller 1.205
*An Arendtian account of feminist
politics?*

Philosophy of Language

Manuel Paß 1.204
*Sprachkritik bei Karl Kraus
und Ludwig Wittgenstein.
Zwei Verfahren therapeu-
tischer Praxis*

Claudia Bassier, Sonja Heuer, 1.204
Rufina Kaehler, Heide König,
Pascal Lemmer & Anne Zänkert
*The Proverbs Test on the test
bench. Interdisciplinary research
on schizophrenia and figurative
language at the interface of
Philosophy, Psychiatry,
Psychology and Linguistics*

Wednesday 18.00-18.45

Wednesday 19.00-19.45

Political Philosophy and Philosophy of Law

Jonathan Delazer 1.205
*Rhetorische Demokratie und
radikaler Kapitalismus; das
kapitalismuskompatible
Demokratiemodell von
Walter Lippmann*

Evigenia Chugurina 1.205
*Die staatsrechtlichen
Bedingungen des Friedens
nach G. W. F. Hegel*

Philosophy of Mind and Cognition

Akanksha Nambiar 1.204
*Metacognition and Decision
making: Interpreting the
relation between 2 concepts.*

Nicole Marczyk 1.204
*Über das Verhältnis von Geist
und Kosmos bei Thomas
Nagel – Chancen und Heraus-
forderungen für eine
teleologische
Naturkonzeption*

Satellite Workshops

The congress will be followed by seven satellite workshops. All satellites take place in the Seminargebäude am Hegelplatz (DOR 24). For any queries, please consult the organizers.

S1 Bad Beliefs. Conspiracy Theories, Testimony, and Resistance to Evidence

Organisation: Thomas Grundmann (Universität Köln), thomas.grundmann@uni-koeln.de & Tobias Schlicht (Ruhr-Universität Bochum), tobias.schlicht@rub.de

Speakers: Rachel E. Fraser (University of Oxford), Thomas Grundmann (Universität Köln), Neil Levy (Macquarie/ Oxford), Mona Simion (University of Glasgow), Alessandra Tanesini (Cardiff University) & Joseph E. Uscinski (University of Miami)

Friday, 08.30-18.45 | DOR 24, 1.103

Philosophical tradition has long held that human beings are rational animals. But the extent of our rationality has come to severe challenge. Naturalistic philosophy, and informed common sense, now tends to hold that we're pervasively dependent on heuristics and biases, that lead us to take short cuts rather than to reason.

Neil Levy's book *Bad Beliefs* (OUP 2022) challenges this consensus. Levy argues that the standard psychological paradigms that supposedly demonstrate systematic departures from rationality typically embed higher-order evidence, to which participants respond rationally. Once we recognize the depth of our dependence on testimony, we see that bad beliefs (such as climate change scepticism or anti-vax sentiment) are formed in broadly the same way as good beliefs.

This workshop brings together experts discussing various threads that are interwoven in Levy's argumentation. These concern the social nature of reasoning itself, the nature of testimony, the reason-responsiveness of heuristics and the rationality of nudging, evidence resistance, and the case of conspiracy belief as an example of having "bad" beliefs.

Funded by the Volkswagen Foundation as part of the project "Why do people believe weird things?".

08.30-09.30 Welcome Coffee

09.00-10.15 Neil Levy "Bad Beliefs. Why they Happen to Good People"

10.15-11.30 Mona Simion "Knowledge and Disinformation"

11.30-12.00 Coffee Break

12.00-13.15 Thomas Grundmann "Is Nudging Giving Reasons?"

13.15-14.45 Lunch Break

14.45-16.00 Rachel E. Fraser "Narrative Scaffolds"

16.00-16.15 Coffee Break

16.15-17.30 Joseph E. Uscinski "Are Conspiracy Theories 'Bad' Beliefs?"

17.30-18.45 Alessandra Tanesini "Mindshaping and Intellectual Virtues"

19.30 Dinner

S2 The Embodiment of Conscious Subjects

Organisation: Julien Bugnon, julien.bugnon@unifr.ch, Martine Nida-Rümelin, martine.nida-ruemelin@unifr.ch, Donnchadh O'Conaill, donnchadh.oconaill@unifr.ch, all University of Fribourg/CH

Speakers: Adrian Alsmith (King's College London), Barry Dainton (University of Liverpool), Brentyn Ramm (Universität Witten/Herdecke) & Carlotta Serrahima (LOGOS, University of Barcelona)

Friday, 09.00-18.30 | DOR 24, 1.204

This workshop aims to connect recent work on embodiment (embodied cognition, the sense of owning one's own body) with the metaphysical question of embodiment: what is it, metaphysically speaking, for a conscious subject to be embodied?

Recent work on embodiment can be understood as outlining different conditions on being embodied. These include the Action Condition (for an embodied subject some bodily movements are basic actions); the Knowledge Condition (the subject can be directly aware of certain states of their own body); and the Phenomenological Condition (the subject's sense of their body helps to structure many experiences).

We shall explore the possibility that these conditions together constrain or even constitute what it is for a subject to be embodied. Furthermore, these conditions seem each to involve degrees of satisfaction. This suggests that being embodied is not all-or-nothing, but is rather a matter of degree.

09.00-10.45 Barry Dainton "Grades of Embodiment"

11.15-13.00 Carlota Serrahima "Psychological Immunity, Bodily Ownership, and Vice Versa"

13.00-14.30 Lunch

14.30-16.15 Adrian Alsmith *tba*

16.45-18.30 Brentyn Ramm "First Person Embodiment: The Body in Consciousness"

S3 Memory and Imagination: Varieties of (Dis)Continuism

Organisation: Anco Peeters (Ruhr-Universität Bochum), anco.peeters@rub.de, Chris McCarroll (National Yang Ming Chiao Tung University), chrismccarroll@nycu.edu.tw & Markus Werning (Ruhr-Universität Bochum), markus.werning@rub.de

Speakers: Alma Barner (Universität Salzburg), Dorothea Debus (Universität Konstanz), Kristina Liefke (Ruhr-Universität Bochum), Kourken Michaelian (University of Grenoble), Anco Peeters (RUB), Louise Richardson (University of York), John Sutton (Macquarie University) & Markus Werning (RUB) + Flash talks

Friday, 09.00-18.50 | DOR 24, 1.201

The aim of this workshop is to systematically examine the relationship between episodic memory and imagination from distinct perspectives. This workshop brings together key researchers in the field to explore the different ways of understanding the (dis)continuism debate about memory and imagination, from a metaphysical, epistemological, attitudinal, or normative perspective, and explore the nuances of the relation between these two fundamental cognitive capacities.

The workshop hence aims to develop a more precise understanding of the relationship between memory and imagination, and brings the internationally already well established and currently hotly debated topic on the relationship between memory and imagination to a broader audience in the German speaking and European philosophical community.

In cooperation with the DFG Research Group “Constructing scenarios of the past: A new framework in episodic memory”.

Homepage: <https://www.ruhr-uni-bochum.de/phil-lang/gap11-memory-imagination.html>

09.00–09.15 Introduction

09.15–10.15 Kourken Michaelian

10.15–11.05 Markus Werning

11.05–11.25 Coffee Break

11.25–12.15 Alma Barner “The Moral Value of Mental Time Travel”

12.15–13.05 Chris McCarroll

13.05–14.15 Lunch

14.15–15.00: Flash Light Talks

15.00–15.50 Kristina Liefke “Reporting Episodic Remembering and Experiential Imagining: Support for – and against – Continuism”

15.50–16.40 Anco Peeters “The Role of Imagination in the Memory Palace Mnemonic”

16.40–17.00 Coffee Break

17.00–17.50 Dorothea Debus & Louise Richardson

17.50–18.50 John Sutton

S4 Scaffolding & Niche Construction: Conceptualization & Applications

Organisation: Sabrina Coninx (Ruhr-Universität Bochum), sabrina.coninx@rub.de, Gregor Hörzer (Universität Osnabrück), ghoerzer@uni-osnabrueck.de, Albert Newen (Ruhr-Universität Bochum), Albert.Newen@rub.de, Achim Stephan (Universität Osnabrück), achim.stephan@uos.de

Speakers: Sabrina Coninx (RUB), Francesco Fanti Rovetta (Universität Osnabrück), Maja Griem (RUB), Lucy Osler (University of Copenhagen), Bartosz Radomski (RUB), Matthew Ratcliffe (University of York), Daniele Valentini (Universität Osnabrück) & Somogy Varga (Aarhus University)

Friday, 08.30-18.30 | DOR 24, 1.308

Two concepts have proven central in the attempt to characterize the influence of extra-bodily factors on cognitive and affective phenomena: scaffolding and niche construction. The workshop addresses three central issues surrounding these concepts.

First, although the phenomena of scaffolding and niche construction are widely discussed, there is no agreement on their conceptualization and ontological status. Second, while both concepts originate in the field of biological evolution, they are also increasingly applied to socio-political, socio-technological, and ontogenic phenomena. What makes the notions of scaffolding and niche construction apt for such diverse areas of application? Third, most of the early research on scaffolding and niche construction highlighted their positive aspects while recent research includes applications in which potentially negative aspects take center stage (e.g. in political radicalization or the development of psychopathologies). To what extent is the debate enriched or watered down by this expansion of focus?

08.30-09.30 Arrival

09.00-09.15 Introduction

09.15-10.15 Somogy Varga “Scaffolding: Types and Applications”

10.15-11.00 Sabrina Coninx “The Dark Side of Niche Constructions”

11.00-11.30 Snack Break

11.30-12.15 Bartosz Radomski “Adaptivity as a Philosophical Problem from the Enactive and Free-Energy Perspectives”

12.15-13.00 Maja Griem “Playful Scaffolding in Non-Human Animals: How Social Signals Shape Learning Environments”

13.00-14.15 Lunch Break

14.15-15.15 Lucy Osler “The Quantified Self: Scaffolded Self-Understanding and Narrative Straight Jackets”

15.15-16.00 Daniele Valentini “Platform Based Extremism: Affectivity Online and New Media Embodies Practices”

16.00-16.45 Coffee Break

16.45-17.30 Francesco Fanti Rovetta “Inner Speech Scaffolding the Dialogical Self and when It Goes Bad: The Case of Verbal Rumination

17.30-18.30 Matthew Ratcliffe “Emotional Scaffolding: The Case of Grief”

S5 Hyperintensional Formal Epistemology

Organisation: “The Relevance Project”, an Emmy Noether group based at the University of Hamburg, funded by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft.

Speakers: Sena Bozdag (MCMP München), Johannes Korbmacher (Utrecht University), Karolina Krzyzanowska (University of Amsterdam), Hannes Leitgeb (LMU München), Aybüke Özgün (University of Amsterdam), Johannes Stern (University of Bristol) & Timothy Williamson (University of Oxford)

Friday, 09.00-17.40 / Saturday, 09.00-13.00 | DOR 24, 1.401

Hyperintensional theories of content have recently received a great deal of attention. Influential accounts include Fine’s truthmaker semantics, Leitgeb’s HYPE framework, and two-component approaches inspired by Yablo’s work, modelling meanings as pairs of truth-conditions and subject matters.

This workshop examines applications of hyperintensional frameworks in formal epistemology. On the one hand, the case for hyperintensionality seems especially forceful here, since intensional approaches notoriously face problems of logical omniscience: taking belief, knowledge, etc. to be closed under logical consequence, they seem adequate at most to highly idealized thinkers. On the other hand, without idealizing assumptions about the agents under consideration, there may not be enough structure to knowledge and belief to enable fruitful systematic theorizing. The workshop will include presentations of particular hyperintensional theories as well as foundational discussions of the case for hyperintensionalism.

Homepage: <https://relevance-project.org/events/hyperintensional-formal-epistemology/>

Friday

09.00-10.10 Johannes Korbmacher “Parts and Probabilities”

10.25-11.35 Aybüke Özgün “(Relevant) Evidence in Epistemic Logic”

11.50-13.00 Johannes Stern “Representation Sensitive State Semantics for Belief”

13.00-15.00 Lunch Break

15.00-16.10 Sena Bozdag “A Semantics For Hyperintensional Belief Revision Based On Information Bases”

16.30-17.40 Timothy Williamson “Hyperintensional Epistemology and Degrees of Freedom”

Dinner and Drinks

Saturday

09.00-10.10 Karolina Krzyzanowska *tba*

10.25-11.35 Johannes Mai “Impossibilities in Action”

11.50-13.00 Hannes Leitgeb “Formal Epistemology in Vector Space Models”

S6 Supererogation: Feministische Perspektiven

Organisation: Katharina Naumann (Universität Magdeburg), katharina.naumann@ovgu.de, Marie-Luise Raters (Universität Potsdam), mlraters@uni-potsdam.de, Karoline Reinhardt (Universität Tübingen), karoline.reinhardt@uni-tuebingen.de

Sprecher:innen neben den Organisator:innen: Hilge Landweer (FU Berlin), Vera Marstaller (Universität Freiburg), Corinna Mieth (Ruhr-Universität Bochum), Amélie Stuart (Universität Erfurt), Tatjana Noemi Tömmel (TU Berlin) & Lea Watzinger (Universität Graz)

Freitag, 10.00-18.00 / Samstag, 10.00-13.00 | DOR 24, 1.307

In unserer moralischen Urteilspraxis werden manche Handlungen als (bisweilen sogar in hohem Maße) moralisch wertvoll, aber dennoch nicht geboten betrachtet. In der philosophischen Fachdebatte wurde dafür von J.O. Urmson in seinem Aufsatz „Saints and Heroes“ der Ausdruck ‚Supererogation‘ geprägt. Wie eine solche Handlungskategorie zu definieren ist und wie bzw. ob sie sich theoretisch überhaupt begründen lässt, ist Gegenstand philosophischer Kontroversen. Weniger Beachtung hat dabei bislang der Umstand gefunden, dass das, was als Pflichterfüllung, freiwillige Mehrleistung oder gar als Heroismus verstanden wird, in unserer Urteilspraxis auch durch Geschlechterrollen und die daran geknüpften Handlungserwartungen geprägt ist. Damit hat die Frage danach, was als Supererogation gilt, auch genuin politische, soziale und epistemische Dimensionen, Im Workshop wollen wir daher unter Rekurs auf theoretische und methodische Ressourcen der feministischen Philosophie der Frage nachgehen, welche Herausforderungen und Potentiale sich aus diesem Befund für die Supererogationsforschung ergeben.

Freitag

10.00–10.15 Einführung und Begrüßung

10.15–11.00 Amélie Stuart „Subalternität und Supererogation“

11.15–12.00 Vera Marstaller „Frida Kahlos Supererogationen: Held*innen in der Perspektive dekolonialer Feminismen“

12.00–13.30 Mittagspause

13.30–14.15 Katharina Naumann „Strukturelles Nichtwissen und Supererogation“

14.30–15.15 Lea Watzinger „Ist Whistleblowing moralisch heldenhaft?“

15.15–15.45 Kaffeepause

15.45–16.30 Karoline Reinhardt „Die Grenzen der Pflicht und die Grenzen der Supererogation“

16.45–17.30 Corinna Mieth „Supererogation, Aufopferung und die Zuschreibung von Heldenhaftigkeit“

17.30–18.00 Abschlussbemerkungen und Vorstellung Special Issue

ab 19.00 Conference Dinner

Samstag

10.00–10.45 Hilge Landweer „Supererogation oder Entfremdung? Aufopferung in feministischer Kritik“

11.00–11.45 Marie Luise Raters „Warum es keine Supererogation ist, sich ausnutzen zu lassen: Häusliche Pflege zwischen Supererogation, Pflicht und Selbstaufgabe“

12.00–12.45 Tatjana Noemi Tömmel „Mater gloriosa et dolorosa: Mutterschaft, Supererogation und Care-Ethik“

12.45–13.00 Verabschiedung

S7 Die Zukunft des Idealismus

Organisation: Thomas Hofweber (University of North Carolina), Anton Friedrich Koch (Universität Heidelberg)

Freitag, 09.30-17.30 / Samstag, 09.00-13.00 | DOR 24, 1.205

Sprecher:innen: Cord Friebe (Universität Siegen), Richard Gaskin (University of Liverpool), Thomas Hofweber (University of North Carolina), Anton Friedrich Koch (Universität Heidelberg), Niklas Kurzböck (Universität Bonn), Ana-Silvia Munte (Universität Tübingen) & Jens Pier (Universität Leipzig)

Obwohl der Idealismus in der Vergangenheit eine gängige Position war, wird er heute kaum noch vertreten, scheinbar aus gutem Grund. Der Idealismus scheint eine Position zu sein, die in die Vergangenheit gehört und keine Zukunft mehr hat. Es ist deshalb nicht überraschend, dass fast alle Diskussionen über den Idealismus im Bereich der Geschichte der Philosophie zu finden sind, jedoch kaum in der systematischen Philosophie und insbesondere auch nicht in der analytischen Philosophie.

Der Workshop hofft, Fortschritte in der Frage zu erzielen, ob der Idealismus eine Zukunft als Position in der systematischen Philosophie hat, und wenn ja, in welcher Gestalt. Wie sollen wir den Idealismus verstehen, und wie kann man ihn, so verstanden, verteidigen? Wir hoffen, diejenigen, die systematische Ideen zum Idealismus haben, in diesem Workshop zusammenzubringen.

Anmeldung: idealismusworkshop@gmail.com

Homepage: www.idealismus.net

Freitag

09.00-09.30 *Welcome and Introduction*

09.30 -10.30 Anton Friedrich Koch „Für eine moderat idealistische Konzeption der Zeit“

10.45-11.45 Cord Friebe „Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der aktuellen Physik“

11.45-14.00 *Lunch Break*

14.00-15.00 Thomas Hofweber “Wieso der Idealismus trotz allem stimmt”

15.15-16.15 Ana-Silvia Munte “Der Idealismus – eine bessere Strategie für die Rehabilitation des metaphysischen Monismus?”

16.30-17.30 Richard Gaskin “The Harmony of Thought and Reality”: Negation and Linguistic Idealism’

Samstag

09.00-10.00 Niklas Kurzböck „Warum ein non-naturalistischer moralischer Realismus einer idealistischen Ontologie bedarf“

10.15-11.15 Jens Pier „Diagnostischer Idealismus“

11.30-13.00 Abschlussdiskussion: Die Zukunft des Idealismus

Vortragende A–Z / Speakers A–Z

- Adams, Matthew 58
Al Helou, Suaad 58
Albersmeier, Frauke 59
Alberto, Thomas 59
Albertzart, Maike 60, 215
Alex, Karla 60
Allen, Keith 61
Alsmith, Adrian 229
Altehenger, Hannah 61
Andrić, Vuko 62
Arrhenius, Gustaf 30
Arridge, Alexander 63

Backes, Marvin 64
Balg, Dominik 64, 65
Baraghith, Karim 65, 66
Barner, Alma 230
Bassier, Claudia 226
Baston, René 66
Baumann, Marius 67
Beck, Lukas 67
Becker Arenhart, Jonas Rafael 62
Behrendt, Hauke 68
Behrens, Singa 69
Belak, Alexander 69
Bender, Sebastian 70
Bespalov, Andrei 70
Bickel, Laura 71
Bishop, Michael 71
Blanco, Sara 72
Blatter, Jonas 72
Blessenohl, Simon 73
Blocs, Suzanne Andrea 73
Blöser, Claudia 74
Boardman, Samuel 74
Bohlmann, Markus 75

Bonzio, Stefano 75
Bortolotti, Lisa 20
Bös, Gregor Emmanuel 76
Boshammer, Susanne 218
Bozdag, Sena 232
Bräuer, Felix 76
Bräutigam, Maren 77
Brecher, Martin 77
Briesen, Jochen 78
Brinkmann, Matthias 79
Brössel, Peter 79, 219
Brun, Georg 28
Bruno, Daniele 80
Bruns, Andreas 80
Buchhoz, Oliver 81
Budnik, Christian 81
Bunkenborg, Francesca 82
Burri, Susanne 33, 221
Büthe, Tim 82
Bziuk, Barbara 82

Cantamessi, Giulia 83
Cass, Devon Malcolm 83
Christian, Alexander 84
Chugurina, Evigenia 226
Coninx, Sabrina 84, 85, 231
Conti, Ludovica 85
Crook, Barnaby 86
Cserhalmi Friedman, Daniel 23
Czerkawski, Maciek 86
Dainton, Barry 229

Dammel, Aline 87
Dänzer, Lars 88
De Benedetto, Matteo 88
De Haan, Niels 89
De Pretis, Francesco 90
De Rizzo, Julio Brotero 90
De, Michael James 91
Debus, Dorothea 230
Delazer, Jonathan 226
Desai, Jules Alexander 91
Dietrich, Frank 220
Dinges, Alexander 91
Ditter, Andreas 92
Dominguez Parrado, Sabina 224
Dörge, Friedrich Christoph 92
Dummer, Niklas 93
Dung, Leonard 94

Ebert, Philip A. 94
Eder, Anna-Maria Asunta 95
Eichstädt, Sonja 224
El Kassar, Nadja 95
Elsen, Stephanie 96
Elson, Luke 96
Engelhardt, Paul 61, 97
Engisch, Patrik 97
Engler, Mirko 98
Ernst, Gerhard 98
Eve, Martin Paul 212

Fanti Rovetta, Francesco 99
Fanti Rovetta, Franceso 231

Vortragende A–Z / Speakers A–Z

Feldbacher-Escamilla, Christian J. 66, 99	Grundmann, Thomas 228	Huber, Jakob 120, 212
Felka, Katharina 100	Günther, Mario 110	Hughes, Nick 120
Fernández Castro, Víctor 100	Hagemeier, Luchino 226	Hundertmark, Fabian 121
Ferrari, Filippo 101	Hahn, Lauritz 225	Huseynli, Ilkin 121
Field, Claire 101, 102	Haid, Charlotte 82	Hüttemann, Andreas 122
Figdor, Carrie 31	Hallich, Oliver 111, 218	Hyder, David 122
Fijten, Rianne 102	Hampel, Wiebke 214	Isenmann, Leon 224
Fink, Sascha Benjamin 21	Hänel, Hilkje C. 111, 112	Jahn, Marcel 67
Finneron-Burns, Elizabeth 30	Harney, Jonas 112	Jaksland, Rasmus 123
Fischer, Enno 103	Harris, Keith Raymond 113	James, Daniel 117, 213
Fischer, Eugen 61, 97	Hasselkuss, Paul 113	Jaster, Romy 3
Flamini, Leonardo 103	Haueis, Philipp 114	Jukola, Saana 117
Flaminio, Tommaso 75	Hauswald, Rico 114	Jung, Eva-Maria 123
Fleisher, Will 22, 23	Heering, David 115	Justus, James 71
Franz, Lea 225	Heinzelmann, Nora 116	Kaehler, Rufina 226
Fraser, Rachel E. 228	Helfer, Thorsten 116	Kant, Deborah 124
Frensch, Peter 5, 17	Henderson, Leah 117, 219	Kappes, Yannic 124
Frick, Johann 30	Hendl, Tereza 117	Kärki, Kaisa 125
Friebe, Cord 234	Henning, Tim 17, 18, 220	Kästner, Lena 86
Gab, Max 104	Hesse, Jacob 118	Keil, Geert 3, 17
Garibbo, Marcello 104	Heuer, Sonja 226	Keiling, Tobias 125
Gaskin, Richard 234	Hildebrandt, Frauke 108	Khawaja, Jake 112
Gauker, Christopher 105	Himmelreich, Johannes 58	Kiener, Maximilian 126
Gebharter, Alexander 105, 106	Hofweber, Thomas 234	Kiesewetter, Benjamin 126
Gerstorfer, Dominik 69	Hoheneder, Victor Michael 118	Kitsik, Eve 127
Giannuzzo, Anaïs 107	Holweger, Matthias 92	Klösel, Patrick 127
Giustina, Anna 107	Horden, John 119	Knoks, Aleks 128
Glauer, Ramiro 108	Horgan, Terence 217	Knoll, Viktoria 128
Glazier, Martin 108	Hörzer, Gregor M. 119	Koch, Anton Friedrich 234
Goetsch, Max 109	Hoyningen-Huene, Paul 120	Koch, Felix 129
Gosepath, Stefan 220		Koch, Steffen 129, 130, 214
Grabmayr, Balthasar 109		Kohar, Matej 130
Greif, Hajo 110		Köhler, Sebastian 131
Griem, Maja 231		König, Heide 226

Vortragende A–Z / Speakers A–Z

- | | | |
|----------------------------|---------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| Kopecky, Felix 131 | MacFarlane, John 19 | Müller, Jean Moritz 150 |
| Korbmacher, Johannes 232 | Magni, Sergio Filippo 141 | Müller, Julian 151 |
| Koslicki, Kathrin 27 | Mai, Jonathan Daniel 142 | Müller, Luise 151 |
| Krämer, Stephan 132 | Maia, Nuno Filipe 142 | Müller, Nastasia 152 |
| Krifka, Manfred 133 | Malfatti, Federica Isabella 143 | Müller, Stephen 152 |
| Krzyzanowska, Karolina 232 | Mannino, Adriano 143 | Müller, Thomas 215 |
| Kuenzle, Dominique 24 | Mantel, Susanne 214 | Müller-Salo, Johannes 33, 221 |
| Kuipers, Eline 79 | Marchi, Francesco 144 | Munte, Ana-Silvia 234 |
| Kurzböck, Niklas 234 | Marczyk, Nicole 226 | Murphy, Alexander 153 |
| Küspert, Nick 133 | Marques, Teresa 29 | |
| | Marstaller, Vera 233 | Näger, Paul M. 153 |
| La Rosa, Elio 88 | Martina, Giulia 144 | Nambiar, Akanksha 226 |
| Landweer, Hilge 233 | Matthews, Taylor R. C. 145 | Nelissen, Pelle 224 |
| Langkau, Julia 134 | Meggle, Georg 17, 220 | Neufeld, Eleonore 154 |
| Lanius, David 25, 134 | Meincke, Anne Sophie 145 | Neuhäuser, Christian 93, 213 |
| Lawrence, Richard W. 135 | Meißl, Sebastian 224 | Newen, Albert 155 |
| Lechner, Tobias 225 | Melzer, Clarissa 225 | Nickl, Johannes 155 |
| Lee, Wooram 135 | Menges, Leonhard 146 | Nicolin, Nina 65 |
| Leefmann, Jon 136 | Meyer, Thomas 146 | Nida-Rümelin, Martine 217, 221 |
| Lehmann, Carl 225 | Meyer-Seitz, Karen 146 | Nimtz, Christian 156 |
| Leitgeb, Hannes 232 | Meylan, Anne 147 | Nizzardo, Matteo 156 |
| Lemeire, Olivier 136 | Michaelian, Kourken 230 | Noorloos, Ruben 157 |
| Lemmer, Pascal 226 | Mieth, Corinna 233 | Nordmann, Lia 114 |
| Lenhard, Johannes 137 | Moen, Lars 147 | Núñez Hernandez, Nancy Abigail 157 |
| Lepold, Kristina 137 | Möller, Christina 213 | |
| Leser, Anja 212 | Möller, Paul Nicolas 226 | O Conaill, Donnchadh 158 |
| Levc, Gabriel 224 | Moreno, Marina 143, 148 | Ohlhorst, Jakob 130 |
| Levy, Neil 32, 228 | Mortini, Dario 148 | Olsaretti, Serena 18 |
| Liefke, Kristina 138, 230 | Moruzzi, Sebastiano 101 | Omori, Hitoshi 62 |
| Lindemann, Nora Freya 138 | Moser, Elias 149 | Osimani, Barbara 106 |
| Link, Godehard W. 139 | Muchka, Elisabeth Gerlinde 149 | Osler, Lucy 231 |
| Loets, Annina Julia 139 | Mueller, Andy 150 | Özbek, Olga Bahar 158 |
| Löschke, Jörg 140 | | Özgün, Aybüke 232 |
| Löwenstein, David 140 | | Özmen, Elif 17, 220 |
| Luzon, Bar 141 | | |
| | | Pani, Silvana 159 |
| | | Parisi, Andrew 159 |

Vortragende A–Z / Speakers A–Z

- Parmer, W. Jared 160
 Paß, Manuel 226
 Patronnikov, Ilia 160
 Paulmann, Franziska
 Lara 161
 Paulo, Norbert 161
 Peden, William 90
 Pedersen, Nikolaj
 Jang Lee Linding
 94
 Peeters, Anco 230
 Pfeiffer, Christian 26
 Pier, Jens 234
 Pincock, Christopher
 162
 Pissarskoi, Eugen 162
 Pleitz, Martin 163
 Poljanšek, Tom 163
 Portides, Demetris
 164
 Poznic, Michael 162
 Privitera, Johanna
 164
 Pugnaghi, Stefano
 165
 Putora, Paul Martin
 102

 Radomski, Bartosz
 165, 231
 Radulescu, Alexandru
 Viroel 166
 Radzvilas, Mantas 90
 Raidl, Eric 166, 167
 Ramm, Brentyn 229
 Ratcliffe, Matthew
 231
 Reinmuth, Karl
 Christoph 167
 Reuter, Kevin 147,
 168
 Riccardi, Mattia 168
 Richardson, Louise
 230
 Riedener, Stefan 218

 Riesenweber,
 Christina 212
 Rinner, Stefan 169
 Roberts, Alexander
 170
 Rolffs, Matthias 170
 Rolin, Kristina 22
 Romizi, Donata 25
 Rosefeldt, Tobias 215
 Rosella, Giuliano 75
 Roski, Stefan 171
 Rossberg, Marcus 159
 Roth, Richard 171
 Rott, Hans 167
 Rüger, Korbinian 172
 Ryan, Nanette
 Katherine 172

 Salimkhani, Kian 123,
 170, 173
 Sarihan, Işık 173
 Sarikaya, Deniz 73
 Sattig, Thomas 27
 Savino, Paolo 174
 Schaab, Janis David
 174
 Schepers, Gesine 174
 Schindler, Samuel
 175
 Schmalzried, Lisa
 Katharin 175
 Schmidt, Elke
 Elisabeth 176
 Schmidt, Eva 102, 215
 Schmidt, Michael W.
 177
 Schmidt, Sebastian
 177
 Schmidt, Thomas 178
 Schoch, Daniel 178
 Schrenk, Markus 113
 Schübel, Hanna
 Mirjam 178
 Schuetze, Paul 114
 Schulte, Peter 179
 Schulz, Katharina 179

 Schumski, Irina 180
 Schurz, Gerhard 180,
 219
 Schuster, Daniela 181
 Schwenkenbecher,
 Anne 181
 Seide, Ansgar 182
 Sekatskaya, Maria 99,
 105, 106
 Sekundant, Sergii 33,
 221
 Selimi, Adis 182
 Serrahima, Carlotta
 229
 Šešelja, Dunja 22, 23
 Sevinç, Tuğba 183
 Sharp, Daniel 183
 Shramko, Yaroslav
 184
 Silva, Paul 184
 Simion, Mona 28, 228
 Skiba, Lukas 185
 Sodoma, Katharina
 Anna 185
 Sofroni, Razvan Mihai
 186
 Spatan, Sergiu Dorian
 187
 Specht, Anne 212
 Speitel, Sebastian
 G.W. 187
 Stamencović,
 Bogdana 188
 Stankozi, Caroline
 188
 Stegenga, Jacob 21
 Stei, Erik 189
 Stern, Johannes 189,
 232
 Stoppe, Valentin 224
 Streumer, Bart 190
 Strößner, Corina 190
 Stuart, Amélie 233
 Sundström, Pär 217
 Sutton, John 230
 Szyler, Bartosz 191

Vortragende A–Z / Speakers A–Z

Taieb, Hamid 191	Varga, Somogy 231	Widmer, Elisabeth
Tana, Guido 192	Venter, Elmarie 196	Theresia 203
Tanesini, Alessandra	Ventham, Elizabeth	Wiese, Wanja 204
228	197	Wilck, Benjamin 204
Tank, Lukas 192	Vernazzani, Alfredo	Williamson, Emily Kay
Tapp, Christian 193	197	225
Thielmann, Wanja	Vetter, Barbara 215	Williamson, Timothy
225	Viebahn, Emanuel	232
Tiefensee, Christine	198	Wilsch, Tobias 205
194	Vollmer, Michael 198	Wimmer, Simon 205
Titz, Inken 193	von Samson-Himmel-	Winkler, Eva C. 60
Tömmel, Tatjana	stjerna, Livia	Witt, Karsten 206
Noemi 233	Sophie 199	Wolf, Julia 85, 206
Tullney, Marco 212	Vonlanthen, Simon	Wollner, Gabriel 207
Twele, Marcel 194	Dominik 199	Woodard, Elise 154
		Wörner, David 207
		Worthmann, Hannes
		207
Ulbricht, Samuel 195	Wagner, Verena 200	Yolcu, Nadja-Mira 208
Unruh, Charlotte	Watzinger, Lea 233	
Franziska 82	Watzl, Sebastian 200	Zakkou, Julia 208
Unterhuber, Matthias	Weber-Guskar, Eva	Zänkert, Anne 226
58, 195	215	Zeman, Dan 209
Uscinski, Joseph 32,	Wei, Xintong 201	Zisman, Valerij 209
228	Werner, Christiana	Zorn, Jonas 210
	201	
Valek, Marlene 225	Werner, Jonas 202	
Valentini, Daniele 231	Werning, Markus 58,	
van Riel, Raphael 196	203, 230	

